What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

[pbehn]

Do it in 1941.

I think it had to be done in 1940. Easier to tell Allisson to produce a bigger engine with turbo and NAA to design an unarmed MRCA around it.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Consider the process of importing British tutors across all, engineering, procurement, inspection, fabrication, assembly, inspection, to delivery which must be known to a.) build a suitable plant connected to supply and labor, b.) training program for all labor required to fabricate and assemble the Mosquito, c.) rigorous flight testing for performance qualifictions to spec, d.) aircrew assembly and training, d.) inventory build up to minimal strike force plus spares for first deployment.

I'm pretty ignorant about Merlin production. How might this affect quality-control in British R-R plants, seeing so much talent deployed elsewhere? I get that there's probably not hard numbers to lead to a hard conclusion, but does anyone have any thoughts about this?

 

[Schweik]

A couple of points in Mosquito 'what if'. Britain had capacity to increase Merlin production locally but not without consequences to Griffon production. R-R laid grondwork with Ford for manufacture and quickly signed up Packard to license first 1650-1 for both US use (P-40F) and Canada (Merlin XX and derivatives) for Hurricane, Mosquito, Lancaster in 1941. The development of the Merlin 60 series at Packard began with Merlin 61 as the Packard V-1650-3 which did not start Bench testing in June/July 1942. It failed twice at least) The very first Production Packard V-1650-3 was sent to NAA in early September, failed, replacement sent in November. The NEXT production 1650-3 was sent to NAA in Late April for the first production flight of P-51B-1-NA #1 on May 5, 1943.

Pause. There was never a chance that any Mosquito utilizing Merlin 60 series for US fabrication would even receive one until on or about Blitz Week in ETO last week of July 1943.

Step back. If the Canada commited Mosquitos, using Packard manufactured Merlin 31, 33, or 69 were deemed suitable for future AAF switch, then the Canadian commited Mosquitos must be backfilled from alternate source (what/where) beginning in mid 1942. Politically, given the wildest claims, however valid, there would not be funding for ngineering, plants and procurement until the high command admitted failure of Daylight bombing as primary tool to achieve US directed Casablanca/Pointblank objectives in Spring 1943.

Consider the process of importing British tutors across all, engineering, procurement, inspection, fabrication, assembly, inspection, to delivery which must be known to a.) build a suitable plant connected to supply and labor, b.) training program for all labor required to fabricate and assemble the Mosquito, c.) rigorous flight testing for performance qualifictions to spec, d.) aircrew assembly and training, d.) inventory build up to minimal strike force plus spares for first deployment.

Consider the politics of trying to tell (and convince) Spaatz, Eaker, Anderson, Arnold that the dream of deploying the B-17 with Norden bombsight was inadequate relative to 'super Mosquito'.

There would/could be zero 'aha' that the Mosquito, and crafted and proven strategy to use them would be the answer to AAF strategic plans for long range attacks -until the hard reality of summer/fall 1943. Begin the above process even as the B-29 is rolling off production lines.

So, you are now annointed as the big brain to a.) propose an attack strategy that is more effective at both target destruction and also relativey cost effective in conservation of aircrew. Do it in 1941.

Well argued, but I disagree. You are making two premises which I think are false.

First, that somehow production of Mosquito airframes is going to be harder than say, production of Merlin engines.
Now I admit, I don't know all the intimate details of Mosquito aircraft production, but I do know the general history of military aviation in general in WW2, and I know that the hardest nut to crack in terms of production and technical development of a military aircraft was the engine. Lots of countries around the world (including several quite small countries) made beautiful aerodynamic, potentially maneuverable airframes, and many, many very nice aircraft designs failed because the nation where they would have been built could not manage to make a high performing, reliable engine. Other countries including Italy and the Soviet Union managed to make quite good wooden aircraft. The Soviet fighters may have been roughly made in 1942 but by 1944 they were making some very good planes. Packard managed to get the Merlin going very quickly. Other US firms (like P&W) rapidly developed existing engine types into new and much more powerful variants.

American industry also did manufacture a very large number of all different kinds of aircraft. I concede that the Mosquito may have been more challenging than many, perhaps harder than most to produce, but I do not buy that they couldn't figure it out. If they managed to make 400 some odd Mosquitoes in Canada, I think they could make at least 4,000 in the US.

Second, that somehow increasing production of Mosquitos required instant renunciation and repudiation of the entire Strategic Bombing strategy overnight
The development of the Mustang didn't require cancelling all other fighter designs. It however proved itself to be the most capable escort fighter available and this probably did impact some other aircraft production eventually (I'm pretty sure it led to P-40s being canceled finally). However that was a somewhat gradual process which took place as the new fighter proved itself first in testing and then in combat. We needed somewhat visionary people in the right place at the right time to make this happen, but we had them.

When the Strategic Bombing setbacks came in 43, the Mustang was in the pipeline, and a reorientation of the bombing strategy to use long range escorts took place, but this was something which did not happen over night and the Mustang itself was gradually improved to fulfill this role. The other existing US fighters like P-47 and P-38 were also improved in range and other aspects.

The story of the Mosquito itself follows a somewhat similar arc. Several people had to have the vision to perceive that this aircraft had the potential to be very useful, and a series of decisions were made which got it into production, and into action in an increasing number of roles, and the production did ramp up quite a bit as the true excellence of the design increasingly became obvious. What I'm suggesting here is not a total and instantaneous overturning of the entire bombing policy overnight, but a more rapid expansion or acceleration of production and perhaps somebody in the US to recognize that the British had another aircraft type which was enough of a game changer that we might want to start producing them.

This wasn't always an easy sell partly for Nationalistic reasons, partly financial, partly just inertia and partly (in my opinion) because some of the Bomber Mafia gang were kind of crazy and / or bloody minded. But it's not outside the realm of possibility. As we know the US was actually interested in manufacturing Mosquitos.

At some point if the Mosquitos were getting results and the heavy bombers were taking more and more losses, perhaps there could have been a shift.

 

[Schweik]

I'm pretty ignorant about Merlin production. How might this affect quality-control in British R-R plants, seeing so much talent deployed elsewhere? I get that there's probably not hard numbers to lead to a hard conclusion, but does anyone have any thoughts about this?

Lets not forget that historically Packard did manage to produce 100,000+ Merlin engines during the war. I think they produced 150k in total. And they may have had some trouble making them in the first few months but they seem to have sorted that out and production quality was apparently high.

This is on top of the production of Merlins done by Rolls Royce and affiliated firms (?) in the UK, many of which were going into Hurricanes well into 1944.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Lets not forget that historically Packard did manage to produce 100,000+ Merlin engines during the war. I think they produced 150k in total. And they may have had some trouble making them in the first few months but they seem to have sorted that out and production quality was apparently high.

This is on top of the production of Merlins done by Rolls Royce and affiliated firms (?) in the UK, many of which were going into Hurricanes well into 1944.

I know the numbers were big, I was just wondering how a cadre system to broaden production base might affect British Merlin production.

 

[buffnut453]

Lets not forget that historically Packard did manage to produce 100,000+ Merlin engines during the war. I think they produced 150k in total. And they may have had some trouble making them in the first few months but they seem to have sorted that out and production quality was apparently high.

This is on top of the production of Merlins done by Rolls Royce and affiliated firms (?) in the UK, many of which were going into Hurricanes well into 1944.

Not according to Wiki they didn't....the Merlin page says that Packard built about 55K Merlins while the various RR factories in the UK made over 112K.

 

[Schweik]

Not according to Wiki they didn't....the Merlin page says that Packard built about 55K Merlins while the various RR factories in the UK made over 112K.

I'm sorry looks like you are right - I googled it and misunderstood, apparently 150k is the total number.

55k is probably enough though.

 

[Schweik]

I know the numbers were big, I was just wondering how a cadre system to broaden production base might affect British Merlin production.

If you make a few less Hurricanes and Lancasters etc. maybe you don't need to broaden production. Maybe put R-2800s into Lancasters?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If you make a few less Hurricanes and Lancasters etc. maybe you don't need to broaden production. Maybe put R-2800s into Lancasters?

Again, my question was about QC, not numbers. How might moving a bunch of R-R techs to Canada and America affect QC in British plants?

 

[wuzak]

While the Mossie would need less escort, I think 1) it would still need escort while it's lugging its load (and perhaps afterwards if doing low-level escape, to prevent bounces) and 2) you're still going to need those fighters to wrest air superiority in advance of D-day, and not have huge fleets of bombers to draw GAF fighters (meaning they can husband their fighters for Der Tag.)

I wouldn't escort the Mosquitoes, rather have the fighters freelancing around the areas of the route and target.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I wouldn't escort the Mosquitoes, rather have the fighters freelancing around the areas of the route and target.

Yeah, sure, the Doolittle approach rather than the Eaker approach. Those fighters will still be necessary.

But -- if you're extracting your Mossies at low-level, I'd still advise some top-cover for their egress.

 

[drgondog]

Well argued, but I disagree. You are making two premises which I think are false.

First, that somehow production of Mosquito airframes is going to be harder than say, production of Merlin engines.
Now I admit, I don't know all the intimate details of Mosquito aircraft production, but I do know the general history of military aviation in general in WW2, and I know that the hardest nut to crack in terms of production and technical development of a military aircraft was the engine. Lots of countries around the world (including several quite small countries) made beautiful aerodynamic, potentially maneuverable airframes, and many, many very nice aircraft designs failed because the nation where they would have been built could not manage to make a high performing, reliable engine. Other countries including Italy and the Soviet Union managed to make quite good wooden aircraft. The Soviet fighters may have been roughly made in 1942 but by 1944 they were making some very good planes. Packard managed to get the Merlin going very quickly. Other US firms (like P&W) rapidly developed existing engine types into new and much more powerful variants.

Although Soviets built several 'good' wooden aircraft, I can think of none in 1940/41 that remotely had the performance capabilities of the Mossie, or attained serial production in the same numbers. As to engine development, it was the tough concept to product step to improve performance.

Had the Rolls design been made available to US manufacturers in 1939, there were MANY companies that could build it to spec with a short learning curve, given early understanding of tolerances, materials, Tooling and processes. We were the best in the world at building and mass producing 'metal systems'. R-R engineers did the heavy lifting (ditto Mosquito) but Mosquito fabrication processes were largely unknown in US - at least in the supply and scale to even atch B-24 production cyscles.

Packard labored for six months to go from R-R Supercharger design drawings to construct and test on Block and send complete 2Stage/Two Speed prototype to Wright Pat for bench test - and more than a year to develop the first Production release of the1650-3. Why do you think gathering expertise in the art and science of designing, building and testing the airframe - compounding the xpertise to build many, and continue to serial production in less than two years using previously unfamiliar skills is not Far more complex than mass producing an engine..

Production of precision made systems was a hallmark of Ford and GM run companies. In the orbit included Chryler, Allison, Oldsmobile, etc. There were no mass produced high performance wooden aircraft manufacturing in US. Befor, during or after the war.

Structural analysis in the airframe industry by 1939 were both the 'standard as applied to sheet metal, extrusions, stamped parts and cast/forged fittings' and somewhat plentiful - but stress analysis on wooden/plywood structures in which weight and uniform strength are critical even has different parameters for yield and failure and bonding integrity harder to predict and inspect. Bilding a reliablee, flyable, high prformance aircraft is a distant relative to Higgins Boat or even PTs. The US have no analogy compared to Mosquito.

Seek info on the German Ta153 Moskito for classic examples of failures to 'git er done', particularly with respect to Lamination/bonding failures

American industry also did manufacture a very large number of all different kinds of aircraft. I concede that the Mosquito may have been more challenging than many, perhaps harder than most to produce, but I do not buy that they couldn't figure it out. If they managed to make 400 some odd Mosquitoes in Canada, I think they could make at least 4,000 in the US.

Beginning when? Selecting which manufacturer? Planning and executing plan for tooling, processes, work stations, acquring expertise from DeHavilland, integrating them into Training and Supervisory teams, recruiting and hiring labor familiar woth wood vehicle construction, securing the feed stream for raw material and GFE, competing successfully for R-R engines against the Canada/Australa/British/Curtiss/NAA demand. If not successful at getting Arnold/Echols and War Production Board to buy in - kiss the project goodbye. Make your case for Mosquito vs P-51B in mid 1943?

Second, that somehow increasing production of Mosquitos required instant renunciation and repudiation of the entire Strategic Bombing strategy overnight
The development of the Mustang didn't require cancelling all other fighter designs. It however proved itself to be the most capable escort fighter available and this probably did impact some other aircraft production eventually (I'm pretty sure it led to P-40s being canceled finally). However that was a somewhat gradual process which took place as the new fighter proved itself first in testing and then in combat. We needed somewhat visionary people in the right place at the right time to make this happen, but we had them.

When the Strategic Bombing setbacks came in 43, the Mustang was in the pipeline, and a reorientation of the bombing strategy to use long range escorts took place, but this was something which did not happen over night and the Mustang itself was gradually improved to fulfill this role. The other existing US fighters like P-47 and P-38 were also improved in range and other aspects.

The story of the Mosquito itself follows a somewhat similar arc. Several people had to have the vision to perceive that this aircraft had the potential to be very useful, and a series of decisions were made which got it into production, and into action in an increasing number of roles, and the production did ramp up quite a bit as the true excellence of the design increasingly became obvious. What I'm suggesting here is not a total and instantaneous overturning of the entire bombing policy overnight, but a more rapid expansion or acceleration of production and perhaps somebody in the US to recognize that the British had another aircraft type which was enough of a game changer that we might want to start producing them.

This wasn't always an easy sell partly for Nationalistic reasons, partly financial, partly just inertia and partly (in my opinion) because some of the Bomber Mafia gang were kind of crazy and / or bloody minded. But it's not outside the realm of possibility.

Bomber 'Mafia' were hard nosed practical leaders - who did you have in mind as crazy/bloody minded? The Mustang wasn't easy to sell ecause of high level 'nationalism' but it did get sold because clear thinking planners understood the potential - the same process would have to be undertaken at Plans and Requirements level two levels under Arnold. But you have to pitch it convincingly. What are your proof points of Mosquito ops of the mission profile type you believe replaces 4 engine long range dylight bombers? In 1941? in 1942? When does the concept take root?

As we know the US was actually interested in manufacturing Mosquitos.

For recon.

Well yes, if overnight implied making decision to replace B-17 in full mass production in early 1942 with several plants up and running? in time to introduce Mosquito in late 1943?

Make your case for a decision later than late 1941.

At some point if the Mosquitos were getting results and the heavy bombers were taking more and more losses, perhaps there could have been a shift.

Shift when? See above for decision tree/dates

 

[pbehn]

If you make a few less Hurricanes and Lancasters etc. maybe you don't need to broaden production. Maybe put R-2800s into Lancasters?

For the strategy to replace USA four engined bombers Packard need to double their production of licence built British engines at the expense of USA engine and also plane manufacturers. The real performance advantage of the Mosquito wasnt clear until the two stage Merlin appeared in 1942.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Well argued, but I disagree. You are making two premises which I think are false.

First, that somehow production of Mosquito airframes is going to be harder than say, production of Merlin engines.

Now I admit, I don't know all the intimate details of Mosquito aircraft production

I'd quit while you're ahead!

EDIT: I guess Bill broke it down for you!

 

[GrauGeist]

The Germans had perhaps one of the best wood laminate adhesives to be found with the "Tego" film which used a phenolic resin, unlike the Casein adhesive used by Dr Havilland.
Unfortunately (for them), Tego was only available from Goldmann in Wuppertal and when that factory was bombed in '43, German wood aircraft projects had to shift to an inferior adhesive.

In the U.S., companies like Cessna were using laminates in their aircraft like their T-50 (AT-17) which had laminated wing components using spruce and plywood.

 

[pbehn]

Structural analysis in the airframe industry by 1939 were both the 'standard as applied to sheet metal, extrusions, stamped parts and cast/forged fittings' and somewhat plentiful - but stress analysis on wooden/plywood structures in which weight and uniform strength are critical even has different parameters for yield and failure and bonding integrity harder to predict and inspect. Bilding a reliablee, flyable, high prformance aircraft is a distant relative to Higgins Boat or even PTs. The US have no analogy compared to Mosquito.

I looked into this on a previous discussion. Looking at the yields and UTS of various woods I think de Havilland had their own standards and way of doing things with wood. The science of what happens when a metal yields is not so difficult to explain, crystal structures are strained, then they start to break and slide. Even with some woods pulled along the grain or across the grain you can equate to a metal in the rolling direction or across it, or through the wall thickness. But plywood is a composite and used with other woods to brace and support. In my opinion it was only the desperation the British had for performance aircraft that led to it ever being tried. At the time this "what if" requires the USA to forget its own strategy and start a new one, the British thought it was a waste of Merlins and told de Havilland to halt work on it.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Don't forget the Lockheed Vega;

"THE monocoque type of fuselage construction seems to promise satisfaction of the three requisites of prime importance; namely, high strength-weight ratio, "streamlined" form, and unobstructed interior, according to the author.
The conventional method of building a fuselage consists, first, in the construction of a "form" of the required shape, upon which a layer of veneer is fastened. Other layers are applied, and thus a fuselage shell of two or three plies is completed. But the process is expensive and laborious, involving the handling and individual fitting of many small pieces.
In the process described by the author, a wooden form of the exact shape of one half of the fuselage body, divided on a vertical plane passing through the center line, is built. This form, or pattern, is next suspended in a large box in which reinforcing bars previously have been woven, and concrete is poured in. A reinforced-concrete block weighing from 10 to 30 tons and having a central depression exactly the shape of half of the finished fuselage is thus made.
To assemble a half shell, the outer layer is placed in position in the concrete mold and coated with a casein glue, and the second layer is placed inside the first layer. A coat of glue is given the second layer, the inner layer is put into place inside the other two and air pressure is applied to a rubber bag which fills the space between the plywood shell and the cover of the concrete mold.
After remaining under pressure in the mold for about 8 hr., the half-shell is removed and placed on a drying rack. It is without joints, cracks or laps, perfectly glued throughout and formed to the exact streamline desired. Two half-shells constituting the fuselage are clamped into position on a "skeleton" by special clamps, and automatically align themselves on the framework. They are glued and nailed in place, and cutouts are made for windows and other openings. Installation of seats and fittings completes the structure."

Fabrication of the Lockheed Vega Airplane-Fuselage

T HE monocoque type of fuselage construction seems to promise satisfaction of the three requisites of prime importance; namely, high strength-weight ratio, “streamlined” form, and unobstructed interior, according to the author. The conventional method of building a fuselage consists, first, in

www.sae.org

 

[pbehn]

Don't forget the Lockheed Vega;

Who could, my wife never shuts up about the Lockheed Vega.

 

[wuzak]

I think you are just skimming my posts - understandable, if you don't want to read them, but it is resulting in a skewed perception of what I am actually saying. IMO most strikes only needed the 500 lb bombs. Some marks of Mosquitos could carry the 1,000 pounders, and we know they did also sometimes carry 4,000 lbs bombs. I thought the 2,000 lb bomb wasn't actually used, maybe I misunderstood Wuzaks post.

I think when he said 2,000lb he meant 4,000lb.

There was a 2,000lb HC bomb, but I am not sure if it would fit inside a Mosquito, due to its length.

The only 2,000lb class general purpose bomb the British had was the 1,900lb GP, which had a poor charge-to-weight ratio.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I looked into this on a previous discussion. Looking at the yields and UTS of various woods I think de Havilland had their own standards and way of doing things with wood. The science of what happens when a metal yields is not so difficult to explain, crystal structures are strained, then they start to break and slide. Even with some woods pulled along the grain or across the grain you can equate to a metal in the rolling direction or across it, or through the wall thickness. But plywood is a composite and used with other woods to brace and support. In my opinion it was only the desperation the British had for performance aircraft that led to it ever being tried. At the time this "what if" requires the USA to forget its own strategy and start a new one, the British thought it was a waste of Merlins and told de Havilland to halt work on it.

Spot on! Also to add, with wood there is a constant battle to ensure structural integrity, especially when operating areas where you have a wide temperature range. While using different types of wood, in a composite assembly I've found you also had different rates of expansion/shrinkage and moisture absorption. I have found when this happens and you start getting moisture entrapment between 2 bonded structures, you start getting delamination and fungus if moisture is allowed to remain within the structure.