FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
If they did get some good multi engine time under their belt (be it a B-17) that should work but I think there should be an easy transition aircraft (Anson?) flown before jumping to a Mosquito.
What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (3 Viewers)
- Thread starter Donald Johnson
- Start date
- Status
wuzak
Captain
Yes, you are right. The T.III would be conversion training (is that the correct term?).
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Yes and then move to operational combat aircraft
MiTasol
Major
The Brits, Aussies and Canadians had bucket loads of Ansons and Oxfords for basic twin training, and other purposes.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
MiTasol
Major
In exchange for the Canadians getting lots of Cessna Cranes? It was said more acres of farmland were plowed by the Cessnas than by tractors
There were "Operational training Units" as well as "Conversion Units" specifically involved with the training of Mosquito pilots and the navigators/set operators. I suspect that such training would vary depending on whether these airmen were assigned night fighter duties or Bombing related duties.
I don't have any detailed information to share on the specifics or this training or related prior training, but prior to that it would have involved Advanced Flying Units that would have provided Beam Approach Training and other specifics. My own information relates more specifically to heavy bomber training.
Note that some Mosquito pilots would previously have been single or twin engine fighter pilots (Spitfires, Hurricanes, or Beaufighters) or twin engine bomber pilots (Blenheim, Wellington). as such they would not necessarily be green pilots.
Last edited:
Somewhere in my research, I bumped into some ORB documents that detailed operations by a USAAF pilot attached to an RAF unit based on the continent that was was tasked with night operations against the Luftwaffe during the Ardennes offensive. I was intrigued by the observation that they were vectored onto targets by ground radar operators. I'll have to see if I can find those documents.
Those Americans on this forum might be interested to,learn that there numerous American airmen who served with RCAF and RAF units during the war. Many, at some point we're either "claimed" by the USAAF or transferred over to the USAAF in part to get a substantial pay raise. They continued to serve with RCAF and RAF units until they completed their required service and then later transferred to US units. One particular individual, whose identity I will keep to myself for now, confided with me that he was very unhappy with his time with the USAAF as his service with the RCAF units were not recognized in any way, either by his comrades or by his country after the war. Sadly he died before I could explore this with him in more detail.
Those Americans on this forum might be interested to,learn that there numerous American airmen who served with RCAF and RAF units during the war. Many, at some point we're either "claimed" by the USAAF or transferred over to the USAAF in part to get a substantial pay raise. They continued to serve with RCAF and RAF units until they completed their required service and then later transferred to US units. One particular individual, whose identity I will keep to myself for now, confided with me that he was very unhappy with his time with the USAAF as his service with the RCAF units were not recognized in any way, either by his comrades or by his country after the war. Sadly he died before I could explore this with him in more detail.
Last edited:
No, I believe you're incorrect in this. Mosquitoes couldn't do the job any better than the heavies because the aim was volume of bombs on target and the Mosquito could not produce the same volume for a given number of aircraft. It's strengths were not an advantage in the strategic bombing role and it was no more accurate as a strategic bomber than existing bombers except in a low level role, which would have been hazardous over the factories and what not that the heavies were targetting.
It's been explained to you before but you seem to be avoiding it, the secret to the Mossie's success was its speed and versatility in roles outside of being a strategic bomber, not because it was a strategic bomber, where in operations, its advantages are to much of a degree nullified by the operational needs of the bomber stream.
No, it couldn't and again, the Mosquito as a heavy bomber offered little advantage and a few diadvantages over existing types. The Mosquito is not going to kill less people in the strategic bombing role compared to other types. If your aim in using the Mosquito is to prevent needless deaths, the only answer is to not do bombing. That's it. No Mossie, No B-17, No Lancaster. No strategic bombing raids. Having more Mosquitoes is not going to change anything, except it's going to take a greater number of aircraft to achieve a given goal of destruction of infrastructure, which is why heavies continued in production despite any advantage Mosquitoes might have offered as strategic bombers.
Yes. This is one of the better responses I've seen on this thread. Seriously. Lets move on.
The Mosquito was a fabulous aircraft in the roles to which it was assigned. it was not a replacement for a 4-engine bomber…any 4-engine bomber. See a previous post of mine where I quoted Basil Dickens on this topic.
Last edited:
And I've explained to you but you ignored it - what I am actually pointing out is that the notion that "volume of bombs on target" is an erroneous one. Most of the bombs dropped at night or from high altitude were not hitting the targets. At least as far as if you consider your target to be actual strategic industrial capacity, communications / transportation and other key elements of the enemy war machine. They were hitting their targets in the sense of 'de-housing' a city, but I don't think that is really the purpose of strategic bombing, or at least, not the only purpose. Not the one that really matters.
Nor does Strategic bombing necessarily equate to high altitude bombing, or bombing in massed formations, or bomber streams, or any of that.
I never made the claim, nor would I ever, that a Mosquito could compete with a B-17 or a Lancaster as a 'bomb truck'.
I AM debating the notion that delivering bombs somewhere in the general vicinity of the target, no matter how many or how large, is an efficient way to win a war. It is better to hit the targets at a higher rate of accuracy and with less casualties on your own side. The Mosquito offered the possibility, one which we know was never fully implemented historically, of making much more efficient bombing strikes without incurring the horrific casualties such as suffered by Bomber Command or the 8th Air Force heavy bomber crews.
That depends on your definition of 'Strategic bombing' per above.
Again, I disagree. The number of civilian casualties inflicted during precision raids can be far less than those caused by 'area bombing' of a city.
However, from a military point of view the civilian casualties are somewhat incidental. The point is to win the war. So the real issue is casualties of your own aircrew, vs the amount of actual damage you are doing to the enemy in terms of factories, refineries, railyards, ports, and other targets germane to their war effort, that you actually destroy. I think it's pretty well established that all the 'de-housing' and killing of civilians didn't work very well against the English or against the Germans in terms of 'destroying morale'.
A higher rate of destruction of actual high value targets, combined with a lower rate of per-sortie losses, is part of what differentiates the Mosquito from an aircraft like the B-17, per the OP.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Operation Carthage was a low level "precision raid".
With a force of only 20 Mosquitoes, they managed to kill 55 German soldiers, 47 Gestapo employees (Danish nationals) and 155 civilians, which included 86 school children.
So please explain how precision bombing by Mosquitoes would have reduced colatoral damage.
I don't think that is a really fair comparison, for a number of obvious reasons - That specific raid was considered one of the biggest blunders out of all of those Mossie raids, in terms of civilian casualties, and it was partly because targets like Gestapo HQ were typically located right in the middle of the most densely populated parts of town. Factories (if you can find them or hit them) are typically in industrial parts of town.
But ok, I'll take the challenge anyway.
Lets look at a couple of the biggest raids:
Hamburg included 300 USAAF bombers and 787 RAF, for a total of 1087 bombers. They killed 34,000 civilians = 31 per bomber.
Dresden was 527 USAAF bombers and 769 RAF, for a total of 1296 bombers, causing 25,000 killed = 19 per bomber.
Now some low level raids:
Operation Carthage which you mentioned, was 20 Mosquitos for 155 civilian (not working for Gestapo) casualties. That is just under 8 per bomber
Operation Oyster (aimed at the Philips works, an actual industrial target) was also something of a screw up, that was 47 Venturas, 36 Bostons, and 10 Mosquitos = 93 bombers total. They caused 150 civilian casualties. That is 1.6 per bomber. To me that is probably the more likely ratio.
Operation Jericho, the prison break, was 9 Mosquitos for 37 PoWs killed, = 4 per bomber
How about some more bloody Gestapo raids?
Oslo Raid was 4 Mosquitos, for 80 civlians killed = 5 per bomber.
Aarhus raid was 24 Mosquitos for 10 civilians killed, 0.41 per bomber.
To me it looks like on average, the Mosquito does a lot better, even though we are not really concentrating on industrial targets. But killing fewer civilians isn't the main goal, it's just a happy side effect. The main goal is serious damage to the enemy war-machine, which requires the destruction of the target, whether a factory or a gestapo building, with relatively few aircraft losses. Blowing up a bunch of apartment blocks two miles away from the factory doesn't really help that much.
Some of these commando raids were costly, some were not (Aarhus was particularly successful in aircraft losses too). But we know from postwar analysis that Mosquitos had a much lower loss rate per raid than Lancasters or B-17s.
In the famous 1961 British official history of the bombing campaign, they noted that in 16 raids on Berlin the RAF lost 492 aircraft, mostly heavy bombers. 2,690 men were killed and another 1,000 became POW. They only killed 4,000 civilians on those raids, but what else did they really accomplish? The same analysis said "war production in Berlin did not fall"
To me that is the actual issue. Meanwhile look at that Endoven raid.
In other words, I'm not saying killing (enemy) civilians is unacceptable, there is inevitably going to be some civilian casualties and you can only do so much to prevent it.
I am making a different argument. I'm not saying you can't blow up a factory because there may be a house next to it. I'm saying just shrugging your shoulders and giving up on finding a way to hit the specific targets you need to take out, and 'making a virtue of necessity' to make the policy to simply 'de-house' the enemy, is itself a mistake. No matter how many people were killed in terror bombing in Britain, did it shake their resolve? The Germans and Japanese kept fighting long after all their major cities were wrecked.
I.e. making the bombing of civilians the goal, that was counterproductive, especially in terms of our own lost aircrew.
In 1940 there really wasn't any way to bomb to hit say a synthetic oil plant as opposed to just bombing the nearest city. But by 1943 there was. And that was the Mosquito.
Look at Operation Oyster. The raid was a success, but they lost a lot of planes. The next time they hit Endoven (in March) they only sent the 10 Mosquitos.
Now in theory, sending the other 84 planes would mean more bombs delivered to somewhere in the vicinity of Endoven. Right? Each Ventura could carry 3,000 lbs in theory, probably more like half or a third of that on a raid like this, but lets say 1,000 lb per plane, lets say roughly 2,000 lbs per Boston, all combined that's another 72,000 lbs of bombs. By the arguments people are making in this thread, that equals MORE VICTORY!
But the people in charge, wisely in my opinion, left the 48 Venturas and 36 Bostons at home. They only sent in the 10 Mosquitos. They wanted to hit the factory again, they didn't need bombs scattered around the city and they didn't need to lose another 15 aircraft.
This to me is an analogy of replacing the Mosquitos in the Strategic role. Instead of sending them in as Pathfinders, let them hit the actual targets and forget the area bombing.
I am making a different argument. I'm not saying you can't blow up a factory because there may be a house next to it. I'm saying just shrugging your shoulders and giving up on finding a way to hit the specific targets you need to take out, and 'making a virtue of necessity' to make the policy to simply 'de-house' the enemy, is itself a mistake. No matter how many people were killed in terror bombing in Britain, did it shake their resolve? The Germans and Japanese kept fighting long after all their major cities were wrecked.
I.e. making the bombing of civilians the goal, that was counterproductive, especially in terms of our own lost aircrew.
In 1940 there really wasn't any way to bomb to hit say a synthetic oil plant as opposed to just bombing the nearest city. But by 1943 there was. And that was the Mosquito.
Look at Operation Oyster. The raid was a success, but they lost a lot of planes. The next time they hit Endoven (in March) they only sent the 10 Mosquitos.
Now in theory, sending the other 84 planes would mean more bombs delivered to somewhere in the vicinity of Endoven. Right? Each Ventura could carry 3,000 lbs in theory, probably more like half or a third of that on a raid like this, but lets say 1,000 lb per plane, lets say roughly 2,000 lbs per Boston, all combined that's another 72,000 lbs of bombs. By the arguments people are making in this thread, that equals MORE VICTORY!
But the people in charge, wisely in my opinion, left the 48 Venturas and 36 Bostons at home. They only sent in the 10 Mosquitos. They wanted to hit the factory again, they didn't need bombs scattered around the city and they didn't need to lose another 15 aircraft.
This to me is an analogy of replacing the Mosquitos in the Strategic role. Instead of sending them in as Pathfinders, let them hit the actual targets and forget the area bombing.
MiTasol
Major
I think Schweik and Nuuumannn are both trying to raise valid points that the other is missing.
If you are bombing say an oil refinery tonnage of bombs on target is definitely a prime consideration. The problem with a 1000 bomber raid using a lead bombardier is that the area plastered is massive and if that lead bombardier is a small distance off in his calculations then few if any bombs reach the target and any nearby towns get obliterated instead. Precision strikes always have lower civilian casualties. And yes Operation Carthage killed more civilians that military but that does not mean that every precision strike will do so.
If you are after air superiority, and follow Kenney's methods, then sending 1000 B-17s to bomb a single fighter aerodrome complex to smithereens is a massive waste of resources and will kill a lot of civilians. Sending in a small number of Mosquitoes would be the logical way to do that task. It is horses for courses as they say.
Incidentally, Kenney took command in the SWPA almost 2 1/2 years after the start of the European war where first the Germans targeted civilian (London etc) and industrial targets but ignored the airfields. Their way to deal with the fighters was to draw them into the air to dogfight them.
Then the Brits got air superiority and proceeded to targeted civilians (Hamburg, etc) and industrial targets but ignored the airfields. Their way to deal with the fighters was to draw them into the air to dogfight them. The advantage in that always lies with the defender as he can make an emergency landing and save himself and his aircraft while the attacker not only does not have those advantages but he must watch his fuel and break off and head home if he is to make it across the channel. At that stage he loses a lot of his ability to manouvre for defensive purposes.
Kenney rejected the tactics used first by the Germans and then copied the Brits and instead of sending out aircraft to draw the Japanese into air to air combat he decided that the fast and sure way to obtain air superiority was to destroy the Japanese aircraft on the ground, and to destroy their airports so they could not fly in replacement aircraft. That was a far better way to reduce his own losses to air combat, especially as the Japanese predominantly had plenty of combat experience and his crews had little more than basic training.
For that he used, among other things, the nearest American equivalent to the Mosquito as a multi-role aircraft that he had available, the B-25. Replacing the navigator with a bunch of 50 cals and hanging some more outside the cockpit, both as devised by Pappy Gunn, made the B-25 what could almost be described as the American Mosquito FB.
Then he flew them at altitude to the target, not a choice because of the multiple 13,000 foot plus mountain ranges, and went in and straffed and bombed the Japanese from low altitude. And unlike in Europe where the attacking aircraft lined up like ducks to attack a target his crews often attacked targets from multiple directions at once so that the AA forces did not have a long string of targets that they could shoot at.
Although the Germans had far better AA and radar than the Japanese the advantages the Mosquito brings to doing the same in Europe are its ability to outrun most fighters and it had very low radar signature making it harder for radar to find and track. Also AA is nowhere near as effective against low flying high speed aircraft as the AA crews have little or no time to train their guns on a small target that is only in visual range for seconds.
If you are bombing say an oil refinery tonnage of bombs on target is definitely a prime consideration. The problem with a 1000 bomber raid using a lead bombardier is that the area plastered is massive and if that lead bombardier is a small distance off in his calculations then few if any bombs reach the target and any nearby towns get obliterated instead. Precision strikes always have lower civilian casualties. And yes Operation Carthage killed more civilians that military but that does not mean that every precision strike will do so.
If you are after air superiority, and follow Kenney's methods, then sending 1000 B-17s to bomb a single fighter aerodrome complex to smithereens is a massive waste of resources and will kill a lot of civilians. Sending in a small number of Mosquitoes would be the logical way to do that task. It is horses for courses as they say.
Incidentally, Kenney took command in the SWPA almost 2 1/2 years after the start of the European war where first the Germans targeted civilian (London etc) and industrial targets but ignored the airfields. Their way to deal with the fighters was to draw them into the air to dogfight them.
Then the Brits got air superiority and proceeded to targeted civilians (Hamburg, etc) and industrial targets but ignored the airfields. Their way to deal with the fighters was to draw them into the air to dogfight them. The advantage in that always lies with the defender as he can make an emergency landing and save himself and his aircraft while the attacker not only does not have those advantages but he must watch his fuel and break off and head home if he is to make it across the channel. At that stage he loses a lot of his ability to manouvre for defensive purposes.
Kenney rejected the tactics used first by the Germans and then copied the Brits and instead of sending out aircraft to draw the Japanese into air to air combat he decided that the fast and sure way to obtain air superiority was to destroy the Japanese aircraft on the ground, and to destroy their airports so they could not fly in replacement aircraft. That was a far better way to reduce his own losses to air combat, especially as the Japanese predominantly had plenty of combat experience and his crews had little more than basic training.
For that he used, among other things, the nearest American equivalent to the Mosquito as a multi-role aircraft that he had available, the B-25. Replacing the navigator with a bunch of 50 cals and hanging some more outside the cockpit, both as devised by Pappy Gunn, made the B-25 what could almost be described as the American Mosquito FB.
Then he flew them at altitude to the target, not a choice because of the multiple 13,000 foot plus mountain ranges, and went in and straffed and bombed the Japanese from low altitude. And unlike in Europe where the attacking aircraft lined up like ducks to attack a target his crews often attacked targets from multiple directions at once so that the AA forces did not have a long string of targets that they could shoot at.
Although the Germans had far better AA and radar than the Japanese the advantages the Mosquito brings to doing the same in Europe are its ability to outrun most fighters and it had very low radar signature making it harder for radar to find and track. Also AA is nowhere near as effective against low flying high speed aircraft as the AA crews have little or no time to train their guns on a small target that is only in visual range for seconds.
wuzak
Captain
The aim of Operation Carthage was to destroy the records in Shellhus, the Gestapo headquarters. It was not designed to destroy enemy military members.
There was significant collateral damage, caused by an accident. The raid achieved its goals, the records were destroyed.
How many lives were saved because those Gestapo records were destroyed? Probably hundreds, if not thousands.
How could the Mosquito reduce collateral damage? Consider a raid with the same goal by B-17s on Lancasters. There would have been many more than 155 civilian casualties.
Oil facilities tended to be large areas, so the chances of low level raids accidentally dropping bombs on civilian areas would be much less than in the case of Operation Carthage.
Industrial facilities could be in the middle of a city, but a low level precision attack should cause fewer civilian deaths than formation altitude bombing, which amounted to carpet bombing in effect.
wuzak
Captain
The Mosquito would not be used as, nor considered a, heavy bomber. It could, however, be a strategic bomber.
In a way the Mosquito was a very important strategic bomber - in its role as a pathfinder it was used to identify and mark strategic targets for other bombers. And there were many attacks on strategic targets by Mosquitoes at night, from early 1944.
Strategic bomber does not necessarily require a "heavy bomber".
Heavy bombers were required because of technical limitations in hitting targets, which meant that a lot of bombs had to be dropped.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I've heard this mentioned by several people, I think it's a matter of the unit the individual may be assigned to after their RAF or RCAF tour, I hate to say it but perhaps a bit of jealously was there as well. At the same time you had folks like Gentile and Blakeslee who legends before entering AAF service.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
BINGO!!! And I think that point keeps getting glazed over here.
wuzak
Captain
What is the statistic for volume of bombs on target vs volume of bombs dropped? It was not good.
I have used the example before of the first Schweinfurt, where 80 bombs hit the target factory buildings from >1,000 bombs dropped.
To get 80 hits in a low level strike would require fewer bombs to be dropped.
80 bombs = 20 Mosquitoes (4 x 500lb MC in 1943 for Mosquito).
Assume 20% accuracy at low level. Need 100 Mosquitoes.
Assume 20% loss of bombers before bombing. Need 125 Mosquitoes. Not that I think 20% would be lost on the entire mission.
You are assuming that Mosquitoes during the day would use the same tactics/formation as the RAF at night?
- Status
