What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[drgondog]

I think the discussion s wandering away from the base question: "How could the Mosquito replace the B-17 for the deep strategic targets?"

IMO - only by delivering precision strikes at low level. For a larger footprint target, the key infrastructure was normally small in comparision and ideal targets to focus on for Mosquito. If the required precision was not attainable with high % of attacks, then wat would the point of sending Mosquitos?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

What 'comparable' bomb load?

Maximum bomb load of a B-17 was 17,600lbs

It was but it's range was only a few hundred miles with that load

 

[33k in the air]

1 on 1 the Mosquito doesn't have the striking power, in sheer weight of bombs. But with the bulged bomb bay they were able to use more destructive bombs - the 4,000lb High Capacity (the cookie) and Medium Capacity bombs.

The problem with the 4.000 lb HC was that it was about as aerodynamic as a brick. Little chance of aiming it with any degree of accuracy. (The U.S. 4,000 lb bomb was at least shaped like a typical bomb. Both the B-29 and B-32 could carry it.)

And the 8th AF bombers were quite accurate in early missions by each aircraft bombing individually. However, this put the bomber formation under more danger, since it took some time for all to bomb. The formation bombing tactics were devised to minimize time over target and provide better mutual defensive fire. The downside is that the bombing became less accurate, as it was spread over the width and length of the formation.

Formation bombing could be very accurate. It all depended on the lead bombardier. If he was on target, the formation was too. If he missed, so did the formation.

 

[33k in the air]

The B-17 had two external racks (one under each wing) that could accommodate up to a 4,000 pound bomb (per rack).

Yes, but how far could they carry them? What was their performance?

B-17s did carry 2 x 4,500lb "Disney" bombs in 4 missions, the longest being to Hamburg. Did they use the external racks at other times?

The external racks were used for a couple of missions (Freeman's Mighty Eight War Manual has a photo of them loaded with 1,000 lb bombs), but they added drag, reduced range, and made formation flying more difficult. It was soon decided those drawbacks outweighed the benefits of additional bomb load.

 

[33k in the air]

The B-17 was rated at 1,000 mile radius with a 6,000lb internal loadout.
Altitude, weather and such will create differences.

With only a load of two 4,000lb external bombs, the range (factoring for drag penalty) will of course be less.

Don't forget formation assembly. That alone chewed up one to two hours.

 

[33k in the air]

What 'comparable' bomb load?

Maximum bomb load of a B-17 was 17,600lbs

That's far more a 'theoretical' maximum load than anything practical.

The maximum internal load was 12,800 lbs — but that consisted of 8 x 1,600 lb AP bombs. AP bombs aren't going to be of much use against industrial targets. The B-17 bomb bay could fit a maximum of either 8 x 1,000 lb SAP bombs or 6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs.

According to the mission details for the 91st Bomb Group, the most commonly carried bomb load by its B-17s was 10 x 500 lbs, followed closely by 12 x 500 lbs. After that came 42 x 100 lb incendiaries, then 5 x 1,000 lbs, and then 6 x 1,000 lbs being somewhat behind that. Other assorted combinations made up the remainder.

 

[wuzak]

The problem with the 4.000 lb HC was that it was about as aerodynamic as a brick. Little chance of aiming it with any degree of accuracy. (The U.S. 4,000 lb bomb was at least shaped like a typical bomb. Both the B-29 and B-32 could carry it.)

That is the fallback position - "the 4.000 lb HC was that it was about as aerodynamic as a brick".

The HC is one of three 4,000lb HE bombs the British had that could be carried by the Mosquito - the others being Medium Capacity (MC) and the General Purpose (GP).

The GP is an older design that looks more aerodynamic to me, but has a lower charge-to-weight ratio of 30%. Not sure how many were made or used.

The MC is a general purpose type bomb with an aerodynamic shape with a charge-to-weight ratio of 58%. And it was used by Mosquitoes.

From British Explosive Ordnance, 1946, which can be found somewhere on this forum.

 

[wuzak]

Formation bombing could be very accurate. It all depended on the lead bombardier. If he was on target, the formation was too. If he missed, so did the formation.

By its very nature, the formation had length, height and, most importantly, width.

While height didn't have much impact on accuracy, and length could be compensated for, the width of the formation meant that bombing by either wing of the formation would be outside the target area. I believe the formations tightened up as the war went on.

 

[Schweik]

I realize this is a late reply, been consulting with doctors about biopsies etc, no fun.

Doesn't matter if Red Army or U.S. Army or British Army, as long as the German people got the message. As for Hamburg... I have no comment, any nation that gasses and incinerates millions of it's own (and other nations) people gets very little sympathy

That seems to be an argument in favor of generalized annihilation of civilians, which I assume we are all here are opposed to?

As far as Japan goes, yeah, I've read the ideas that the Japanese weren't worried about the Americans it was the Russians that really won the war. Perhaps the Japanese government was concerned about the losses in Manchuria but I doubt the average Japanese civilian, which is who we are talking about here would agree. I think they VERY much were influenced by the U.S.A.A.F. bombing campaign.

The thing about totalitarian regimes, is that they don't have to care that much what the people think. The people are ruled by force and do what they are told. In Japan, as we know, the leadership had to care a lot about what the middle grade officer class in the military thought, as this typically led to assassinations.

Sorry for the poor quality, that ain't cordwood stacked up, if you think for a moment that the fire bombing campaign and the atomic attacks had nothing to do with the Japanese surrender I should be interested to hear your views on what did. Also, don't take this as a combative stance from me, far from it, just debate in a friendly way.

The bombing of Japanese cities I'm sure did affect the decision, as did the total destruction of their navy and the surrounding of the Japanese islands by Allied carrier task forces, but the historians seem to believe that the more immediate decision was motivated by the swift annihilation of their large and (they thought) still formidable Manchurian army.

 

[Schweik]

OK and my original statement was "depending on the aircraft, they were partially made of wood" So your point?

My point was that they made tens of thousands out of wood

A a large portion of the aircraft you listed were destroyed on the ground and shot out of the sky, especially during Barbarossa, so again what's your point?

I think that is a gross overstatement. Most of that production (aside from the I-16s and I-153s) was done after Barbarossa and many of those fighter types, Yak series, La 5 series, were and are considered successful.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

My point was that they made tens of thousands out of wood

Most mentioned were actually composite, wood and tube/ fabric with primary structures metal, old fashioned production techniques but still produced good aircraft for the time period. Almost immediately after WW2 wood was no longer used as a primary method of construction on combat aircraft so I think this irrelevant.

I think that is a gross overstatement. Most of that production (aside from the I-16s and I-153s) was done after Barbarossa and many of those fighter types, Yak series, La 5 series, were and are considered successful.

Again irrelevant.

 

[Schweik]

What USSR produced is otally irrelevant to his debate.

I brought up USSR aircraft production because of the claim that the US or UK would have difficulty producing large numbers of wooden airframes. There were also several other lines of argument being pushed by various people simultaneously. All are relevant to the discussion to at least some extent. Sometimes when several people are arguing with you in a forum they 'cross the streams' and the arguments become intermingled. What I was saying about the Soviet production was in regard to that one specific issue - producing wooden aircraft. Not engines.

The key questions are a.) When is the earliest possible recognition that the Special Mosquito is a plausible alternative to B-17/24 for long range strategic bombing, b.) when can design/configuration be decided - leading to GFE procurement of specific engine variant of Packard Merlin, and c.) how early could a decision be made to prioritize production. If Merlin 61 series is the engine selected, then the A1 Priority for NAA P-51B must be the loser for Super Mosquito to procede. Alternative would be to seek and fund separate source for both.

I don't see why it would need to be an either / or thing (certainly I wouldn't advocate making fewer Mustangs for any reason) and I don't see why it would need to be sudden or total, as opposed to gradual.

Time is not your friend. Single point decision is not practical. AAF, War Production Board, stakeholders in Packard Production (by international agreement with BAM/RAF) must all agree on path forward.

You seem to pass and wave at serious milestones for both available technology (Merlin 61 or equivilant for combined high/low altitude options) and priority production allocations - for engines, raw material sourcing, labor training, tooling and critical materials. It is boring when you declare victory and state with zippo that some persuasive alien parasite infects AAF top command, R-R and DeHaviland senior officers, with a compulsion to forecast the specifications for a wooden two engine/zero defensive armament bomber as the highest probability successful daylight strategic bomber to go to War against Germany -

In or before 1940.

This makes certain assumptions and combines several arguments. My point was that (I believe) they had the technical means and industrial to have made many more Mosquitoes, and conversely, fewer heavy bombers. Convincing generals of this is a completely distinct issue. I didn't say that "Bomber Mafia" or various others could have necessarily been talked into it, because we know they obviously weren't.

From a technology perspective the Merlin 61 (IMO) was on critical path, leading to best possible earliest delivery of Special Mosquito as mid 1943 for early (and few Packard 1650-3 engines @2 each per ship). For that to happen the P-51B must be delayed for a significant length of time for the 'new' Packard plant to build 1650-3 for Mustangs. The decision to produce the Merlin by license must go to a US based, bigger Packard type company. This project was never going to be high enough priority in Britain for R-R to produce for American Mosquito, as the demand for Spitfire and Lancaster exceeded supply.

I would agree that any conflict with producing Mustangs or engines for Mustangs would be counter-productive. My point in mentioning Hurricanes, Defiants etc. was that some of the industrial capacity used in making those aircraft could have been better used making Mosquitos. I know they didn't use precisely the same engine and I know it requires more effort and materials to make a two-stage engine, intercoolers etc., but if you are making an extra ~5-8,000 Hurricanes after 1942, presumably some of that same industrial capacity could have gone into a couple thousand Mossies. As SR mentioned, Packard did end up producing 17,000 single stage Merlins, out of 55,000 total. I think there was a lot of slack in terms of sub-optimal and even fairly useless aircraft designs being produced

But I do agree however, it would have taken considerable insight, and probably some visionary people in just the right places, to make such a shift. But we did get that kind of vision with some other programs, notably with the development of the Mosquito itself, with the Merlin powered P-51s, and the rapid development of the F6F, to cite three examples. There are never that many visionaries around and in the right places though, needless to say.

Question - how in hell does USSR experience in building with wood assist in speeding up American made Special Mosquito to improve the above project initiation to delivery cycle?

As pointed out earlier, I brought that up to address a different argument someone was making about the production of wooden airframes.

Note: To this critical point, not even the very knowledgable contrbutors on this forum have presented a clear aircraft model, mission profile (presumably by daylight given precision delivery requirements, presumably low level at point of attack) that actual combat results demonstrate before 1943 - point to a solid plan for USAAF to duplicate for 8th AF. But to your constant 'we could do this, we could do that - your words are meaningless until the 'why and how and when' can be nailed down as a basis for review, you can not expect folks to take your dream seriously. It might just be me, but if you can't present logic and facts to support how USAAF leaders could see - and agree- your vision, then you can't baffle them with a blizzard of non correlated examples such as 'what the USSR did'

As I said, there are three distinct arguments in this:

1) Could the Mosquito design do the job - could they perform the raids and have more of an impact on German industry and C3I etc. than the four engined heavies, and could they do it with fewer casualties. I think there is considerable evidence that they could. Then there are sub-arguments dependent on this, such as would the Luftwaffe have contested the Mossie strikes the same way, thus leading to the eventual destruction of their fighter force.
2) Could production of more Mosquitos fewer heavy bombers have been organized? I believe yes but this is still in contention. It breaks down into separate arguments about technology transfer, production of airframes, and production of engines.
3) Could they talk people like Spaaz, LeMay, Harris etc. into the idea? I'd say probably not. And I think that was part of the problem we had.

But if RAF recognized that the proposed strategic capability of the Super Mosquito was better for daylight role- and deemed suitable to attack power grids, refineries, ball bearings, etc. with low losses - why would RAF not take the mission as its own? There would be no replacement of 8th AF B-17s, just a change in RAF doctrine.

I wouldn't see that as a negative...

Last point, arguably introduction of P-51B and resultant destruction of LW Day Fighter ability to resist Overlord - was more important than improving daylight bombing target destruction efficiency. There is no scenario (realistic, fact based) that projects Super Mosquito as more important than P-51B and thus unrealistic that Mosquito could divert NAA committed Merlin 61 based engines from Packard to achieve eary 1944 delivery.

I agree. As to the issue of whether Mosquito production should interfere with or take priority over Mustangs, I would say definitely not. Any solution to number 2 above would have to be done in such a way that did not inhibit production of P-51s. The ideal scenario would be to have Mosquito raids causing sufficient problems for German military high command and production that they would be forced to commit their fighters, which is where the Mustangs (and P-38s and P-47s and Spitfires) would come into play.

 

[Schweik]

If the Army had swallowed it's pride and had their A-24 pilots go through the Navy's SBD training, it would have been far more potent in the PTO and thus, a potential Ground attack platform in the MTO/ETO. As it was, A-24 pilots were trained to attack at a 30° to 45° angle, more of a "glide-bomb" profile, than using the A-24 as designed.
In all, the Army received 168 A-24 (SBD-3), 170 A-24A (SBD-4) and 618 A-24B (SBD-5) types. That was nearly 1,000 potentially lethal dive-bombers that could have yeilded results at time when it was much needed.

Agree for PTO - I think that was a lost opportunity. But I think A-24 / SBD was too slow for MTO by say, mid-1942. Both due to fighters and German light AAA. They were phasing out Stukas in the MTO some time in late 1942 right? They seem to be mostly replaced by Fw 190s by the time the fighting heats up in Sicily / Italy.

 

[Schweik]

This thread is the best.

It seems to me that the contributors to this thread who favor the Mosquito all cite the Mosquito's speed as making it invulnerable. In the world of what ifs, we shouldn't assume that the Luftwaffe would over arm its fighter force as it did to combat the fleets of heavy bombers, but would instead concentrate on the development of faster interceptors. One could easily imagine that aircraft such as the ME-262 and DO-335 that suffered from poorly managed development programs, would instead be identified early on as solutions to the Mosquito's speed advantage and rather than languish in development hell begin to enter service in 1943. With the speed advantage gone, the Mosquito's value as a daylight bomber significantly diminishes.

I don't disagree with that, I think there would have been an accelerated arms race for faster and better fighters, but I don't think that would have been a one-sided arms race. The British and Americans also had newer faster better designs which didn't make it into the war partly because there wasn't as much urgency after a certain point, because the existing escort fighters were working. Maybe we would have gotten aircraft like P-51H, Spit 24, Tempest VI, Gloster Meteor, de Havilland Vampire, F7F, F8F, P-80 etc. into action a bit sooner as well.

That is the issue with any kind of speculative discussion, we don't know where it would have ultimately gone. Certainly things would have changed, on both sides.

 

[Schweik]

The day missions didn't all run at low level. About 1/3 of them were at medium/high altitude. The higher altitude missions were largely in the first few months of operations. The loss rate was trending down with more low level missions.

The big trick to reducing loss rates was to increase the number of bombers on a mission. The example I use is a similar number of B-17s were being shot down in missions over Germany in early 1944 as were used in mid-late 1943. The main difference in loss rates was that 3 to 4 times s many bombers were being sent.

It is doubtful that had double the number of Mosquitoes (1,452) been sent on the same number of missions that there would have been the double the number lost (96). More likely the number lost would be similar to the historic number.

For the same period what were the losses for B-17s operating over Germany unescorted?

Is there any reason that a Mosquito with two-stage engine couldn't fly in at 30,000 ft then drop down to lower level when getting near the target, perform it's strike and then either fly out at low or high altitude after that?

 

[Schweik]

I would suggest that most oil and industrial targets did not have the same level of protection as the U-boat pens.

I think that drgondog 's thinking is that the AP bombs will penetrate areas were regular HE bombs would not.

In December 1944 the Pölitz synthetic oil refinery was bombed by 200+ RAF bombers, including 617 Squadron using Tallboy bombs.

I don't think you can really harden, or distribute / disperse a refinery, though I'm ready to be proven wrong on that...

 

[GrauGeist]

Agree for PTO - I think that was a lost opportunity. But I think A-24 / SBD was too slow for MTO by say, mid-1942. Both due to fighters and German light AAA. They were phasing out Stukas in the MTO some time in late 1942 right? They seem to be mostly replaced by Fw 190s by the time the fighting heats up in Sicily / Italy.

The Luftwaffe was phasing out the Ju87 in the MTO because they were losing air supremacy.
Take into consideration how well the Ranger's SBDs performed against Vichy targets (naval and ground targets).

 

[Schweik]

I don't remember the exact numbers off hand but I do remember the USN took a pretty good beating in that action ... I posted all the numbers in another thread somewhere.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't remember the exact numbers off hand but I do remember the USN took a pretty good beating in that action ... I posted all the numbers in another thread somewhere.

If you're talking about the Battle of Casablanca, the USN DID NOT take a beating on that one!!!

The SBD was probably from USS Ranger (CV-4) who for the Torch Landings had 18 such aircraft in VS-41. Another 18 SBDs were carried, nine each, on *two escort carriers USS Sangamon (ACV-26) and USS Santee (ACV-29). SBDs from Ranger, besides proving their worth plastering land-based targets, had also socked the French battleship Jean Bart on 10 November 1942 in Casablanca harbor with a pair of 1,000-pound bombs, finishing what the battleship USS Massachusetts had started.

VS-41 lost three aviators in North Africa– ARM George E. Biggs, Ens Charles E. Duffy, and ARM Aubra T. Patterson– and had four others shot down and captured (briefly) by the French.

SBD of Morocco

Yes, a Navy dive bomber on a dirt road in North Africa. It happened. Below we have a U.S. Navy SBD (Scout Bomber, Douglas) Dauntless dive bomber, likely of Carrier Air Group 4’s VS-41 “…

laststandonzombieisland.com

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perhaps S Schweik meant Salerno? The USS Savannah took a guided bomb that almost sank her, and HMS Warspite had X turret permanently disabled by another. Maybe that's what he's referring to.