What USSR produced is otally irrelevant to his debate.
I brought up USSR aircraft production because of the claim that the US or UK would have difficulty producing large numbers of wooden airframes. There were also several other lines of argument being pushed by various people simultaneously. All are relevant to the discussion to at least some extent. Sometimes when several people are arguing with you in a forum they 'cross the streams' and the arguments become intermingled. What I was saying about the Soviet production was in regard to that one specific issue - producing wooden aircraft. Not engines.
The key questions are a.) When is the earliest possible recognition that the Special Mosquito is a plausible alternative to B-17/24 for long range strategic bombing, b.) when can design/configuration be decided - leading to GFE procurement of specific engine variant of Packard Merlin, and c.) how early could a decision be made to prioritize production. If Merlin 61 series is the engine selected, then the A1 Priority for NAA P-51B must be the loser for Super Mosquito to procede. Alternative would be to seek and fund separate source for both.
I don't see why it would need to be an either / or thing (certainly I wouldn't advocate making fewer Mustangs for any reason) and I don't see why it would need to be sudden or total, as opposed to gradual.
Time is not your friend. Single point decision is not practical. AAF, War Production Board, stakeholders in Packard Production (by international agreement with BAM/RAF) must all agree on path forward.
You seem to pass and wave at serious milestones for both available technology (Merlin 61 or equivilant for combined high/low altitude options) and priority production allocations - for engines, raw material sourcing, labor training, tooling and critical materials. It is boring when you declare victory and state with zippo that some persuasive alien parasite infects AAF top command, R-R and DeHaviland senior officers, with a compulsion to forecast the specifications for a wooden two engine/zero defensive armament bomber as the highest probability successful daylight strategic bomber to go to War against Germany -
In or before 1940.
This makes certain assumptions and combines several arguments. My point was that (I believe) they had the technical means and industrial to have made many more Mosquitoes, and conversely, fewer heavy bombers. Convincing generals of this is a completely distinct issue. I didn't say that "Bomber Mafia" or various others could have necessarily been talked into it, because we know they obviously weren't.
From a technology perspective the Merlin 61 (IMO) was on critical path, leading to best possible earliest delivery of Special Mosquito as mid 1943 for early (and few Packard 1650-3 engines @2 each per ship). For that to happen the P-51B must be delayed for a significant length of time for the 'new' Packard plant to build 1650-3 for Mustangs. The decision to produce the Merlin by license must go to a US based, bigger Packard type company. This project was never going to be high enough priority in Britain for R-R to produce for American Mosquito, as the demand for Spitfire and Lancaster exceeded supply.
I would agree that any conflict with producing Mustangs or engines for Mustangs would be counter-productive. My point in mentioning Hurricanes, Defiants etc. was that some of the industrial capacity used in making those aircraft could have been better used making Mosquitos. I know they didn't use precisely the same engine and I know it requires more effort and materials to make a two-stage engine, intercoolers etc., but if you are making an extra ~5-8,000 Hurricanes after 1942, presumably some of that same industrial capacity could have gone into a couple thousand Mossies. As SR mentioned, Packard did end up producing 17,000 single stage Merlins, out of 55,000 total. I think there was a lot of slack in terms of sub-optimal and even fairly useless aircraft designs being produced
But I do agree however, it would have taken considerable insight, and probably some visionary people in just the right places, to make such a shift. But we did get that kind of vision with some other programs, notably with the development of the Mosquito itself, with the Merlin powered P-51s, and the rapid development of the F6F, to cite three examples. There are never that many visionaries around and in the right places though, needless to say.
Question - how in hell does USSR experience in building with wood assist in speeding up American made Special Mosquito to improve the above project initiation to delivery cycle?
As pointed out earlier, I brought that up to address a different argument someone was making about the production of wooden airframes.
Note: To this critical point, not even the very knowledgable contrbutors on this forum have presented a clear aircraft model, mission profile (presumably by daylight given precision delivery requirements, presumably low level at point of attack) that actual combat results demonstrate before 1943 - point to a solid plan for USAAF to duplicate for 8th AF. But to your constant 'we could do this, we could do that - your words are meaningless until the 'why and how and when' can be nailed down as a basis for review, you can not expect folks to take your dream seriously. It might just be me, but if you can't present logic and facts to support how USAAF leaders could see - and agree- your vision, then you can't baffle them with a blizzard of non correlated examples such as 'what the USSR did'
As I said, there are three distinct arguments in this:
1) Could the Mosquito design do the job - could they perform the raids and have more of an impact on German industry and C3I etc. than the four engined heavies, and could they do it with fewer casualties. I think there is considerable evidence that they could. Then there are sub-arguments dependent on this, such as would the Luftwaffe have contested the Mossie strikes the same way, thus leading to the eventual destruction of their fighter force.
2) Could production of more Mosquitos fewer heavy bombers have been organized? I believe yes but this is still in contention. It breaks down into separate arguments about technology transfer, production of airframes, and production of engines.
3) Could they talk people like Spaaz, LeMay, Harris etc. into the idea? I'd say probably not. And I think that was part of the problem we had.
But if RAF recognized that the proposed strategic capability of the Super Mosquito was better for daylight role- and deemed suitable to attack power grids, refineries, ball bearings, etc. with low losses - why would RAF not take the mission as its own? There would be no replacement of 8th AF B-17s, just a change in RAF doctrine.
I wouldn't see that as a negative...
Last point, arguably introduction of P-51B and resultant destruction of LW Day Fighter ability to resist Overlord - was more important than improving daylight bombing target destruction efficiency. There is no scenario (realistic, fact based) that projects Super Mosquito as more important than P-51B and thus unrealistic that Mosquito could divert NAA committed Merlin 61 based engines from Packard to achieve eary 1944 delivery.
I agree. As to the issue of whether Mosquito production should interfere with or take priority over Mustangs, I would say definitely not. Any solution to number 2 above would have to be done in such a way that did not inhibit production of P-51s. The ideal scenario would be to have Mosquito raids causing sufficient problems for German military high command and production that they would be forced to commit their fighters, which is where the Mustangs (and P-38s and P-47s and Spitfires) would come into play.
