What if? East Vs West 1945

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Italy and many of the countries you mention had powerful communist controlled partisan armies. The Red Army (and NKVD) had already crushed any and all effective resistance that Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia could muster. .....

that is true. communism was spreading to eastern europe long before the war began and somethign that caused tension between countries. and the russians didnt necessarily crush the non-communist opposition in those countries but let germany do it for them when they failed to give aid and support. the polish resistance was holding its own agaisnt german forces but needed help. they asked the advancing soviet troops for support...the soviets chose to stop for a few days and regroup instead and the polish got crushed. when the us was flying shuttle missions to russia stalin got pissed that on one mission the us dropped supplies to pro west guerillas...
but for as many that were fighting how many werent that could have? without major backing a lot of those would have waited for a better climate or better odds to take action.
 
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Is this a spur of the moment decision or is there some national planning involved?

If the USA intends to switch sides there should be discussions with the German Government (or coup plotters) several months before it happens. Part of that planning should include keeping Hamburg and the German rail network intact for U.S. Army use. The USA should also provide Lend-Lease economic assistance to restart German munitions production just as we did for the Soviet Union during 1941 to 1945. In fact we should re-equip European forces to the maximum extent possible so they can do most of the fighting and suffer most of the casualties.
 
do these numbers include any LW ac that would still be operational and serviceable?

No, the planning documentation does not include much in the way of German involvement in such as struggle. In fact, around 10 infantry and 1 armoured division are assumed to have been necessary for rear area security in Germany. That's about 1/6th of total deployable combat strength for the Western Allies.

is there any documentation of how many lw ac there were still flyable at the end of the war?

No documentation that I know of, but the bulk of German aircraft were scrapped fairly rapidly at the end of the war. Many of these were non-servicable, either because the production system had broken down and they didn't have all the parts they needed, or they had been damaged in action and were awaiting repair, or they had just broken down from normal wear and tear.

Luftwaffe serviceability rates plummeted over late 1944, early 1945. This was at the same time as fighter deliveries were peaking, to the point where it was easier to simply easier to requisition new aircraft than repair older ones, which were then left out as targets for marauding fighters. The USAAF and RAF claimed thousands of aircraft on the ground in the last few months of the war (More than 4400 by the USAAF in 1945, 3700 in April alone).

The Luftwaffe also did much of the job themselves, typically rendering aircraft totally unservicable if they couldn't fly them out ahead of the advancing Soviets/Western Allies. They also had a tendency to booby-trap aircraft, hiding bombs in the fuselage or under the aircraft, primed to go off when moved.

The RAF had special units that followed combat units and recovered advanced aircraft (jets/rockets and piston powered aircraft) but pretty much scrapped everything else on site. There are pictures around of dozens of aircraft being bulldozered into shallow graves, or into huge pyramids of scrap metal for recycling. The USAAF had something similar in place - scrapping U/S aircraft and sending a few dozen back to the US for testing.
 
How would Hitler do that?

How do you ensure that your multi-billion dollar bomb doesn't get shot down by a fighter or a $50 AA shell or horror of horrors drops it on some Pz division by mistake? The AA bomb was a very poor tactical weapon

strap it to fieseler storch flown by a 15 year old punk kid and he's guaranteed success! . there isnt a defense that cant be beaten or that doesnt have a serious gap that can be exploited. in 1987 with all the high tech radar, awac capablilties, early warning detection systems and the millions of eyes on the ground....how the hell did a 15 year old kid fly from helsinki into russian airspace and circle red square? i believe with the right plan anything can be accomplished....

The Notorious Flight of Mathias Rust | History of Flight | Air Space Magazine
 
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One of the most interesting conclusions drawn from the planning document is that there were few strategic targets worthy of prosecution in Russia, given the dispersal of Russia's manufacturing base. Russian "lines of communication" (i.e. logistical targets) were considered more profitable to attack.

Combined with the 4:1 manpower inferiority on the ground and the 2:1 inferiority in tactical aircraft, it was assumed that the strategic air forces would therefore be pressed into direct service in support of ground operations. Noted is that this would be "especially at the important crossings of water barriers" in coordination with ground attacks of any Western Allied offensive.

To do this, bases would be needed to be developed in Northwest Europe, as the range from the UK was too great to allow the aircraft to support operations. However, the "elaborate" support/ground organisation of heavy bomber forces meant that it would take "some months" before such a move could be made.

Use of staging airfields was considered as a means to allow some attacks to proceed against lines of communication, but noted that it would reduce the loads carried and effectiveness.

This means that if the balloon went up in July 1945, it would be months before heavy bomber support became properly available a la the operations to support the Normandy campaign, or to fully prosecute operations against Russian supply lines. Until this support is available, the Western Allies are going to face heavy going on the ground and in the air.
 
that is what was what i proposed as a likely scenario. the attack and disruption of supply lines to impede the flow of arms, food, medicine etc. to the front coupled with the diversion of lend lease products away from the soviet union and to the newly acquired eastern allies. Also the use of any pacific base to now attack mainland russia ( Vladivostok, etc)...i.e. the alaskan islands and any other land mass acceptable for B29 operations. i also proposed the use of former LW bases in western germany which while bombed were never put out of commission, hence somewhat available with acceptable repairs. within a few weeks after the cessation of hostilities in europe allied troops took off from the UK, landed at airdromes like nuebiburg, patterborn, munich etc. and iirc were operational within a short period of time. at that point under the "actual" circumstances there was no great urgency to occupy those fields. all hostilities had ceased and all threats were nullified. the notion of further conflict that would have changed that strategy. there would have been an emphasis to occupy and bring those airdromes into a state of readiness so operations could be mounted from them. as the western allies moved west any acceptable farm land would have been converted into new airfields and those would have could be constructed very quickly as the were after the invasion. look at how many operational bases we had between D-day ( june 44) and the first of 45 ( a mere 6 months). there were enough allied aircraft in mainland europe to tempt germany into launching bodenplatte. 1000 plane raids would be shifted, at least at the onset of the continuation, from the strategic to the tactical. high altitude mass carpet bombing would have commenced along the front as it was done during D-day. the time line given was june/july 45. the us ( FDR and highest level generals ) knew it nuke capability that was deploy able very soon. stalin knew most of what he did because FDR was way to generous in regards to keeping joe happy. under this scenario that intel would have dried up slowly and steadily. he may have had an inkling of what was going on but would have been more in the dark. so it would have been imperative for the western allies would to need keep the SU army off balance until the first possible first deployment of an A bomb ( 3 months) ...as the allies already had japan backed up to its mainland, the initiative was with them in the pacific. the question now was "who was the bigger threat" at that point? plus, what would japan's reaction be after viewing the results after seeing see the use of the A-bomb in europe by the allies coupled with the threat "this could be you?" hirohito, proved to be more rational and considerate to his people than both hitler and stalin in the final decision. "operation unthinkable" gives a good grounding for what would happen in a "conventional" war, however, the "nuclear" aspect puts a different spin on the whole thing. the crux is the ability of the US to produce enough A/H bombs. I am interested to see what parasifl has to say about this....as i am sure they have run this scenario where he is. forgive the typos, tense changes, and errors its to late to proofread....
 
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The AA bomb was a very poor tactical weapon.

It wasn't used by the US as a tactical weapon in 1945 and I'm not suggesting that it would be used that way against the Soviet Union.
By late 1945,with the will to build them,the US could have dropped 7-10 Nagasaki type (Mk III) weapons.There were at least 5 and probably 7 assemblies,without Plutonium,built in 1945.
As far as the Soviets knew,unless some of their Cambridge friends told them otherwise,they might have the same again. Do you really believe that this wouldn't have influenced Soviet decision making?
Steve
 
Bobbysocks, I feel your time frame for basing heavy bombers in Germany is a little too generous. It is an order of magnitude more difficult getting facilities ready for a 65000 lb bomber than it is for a 15000 lb fighter.

I'd say six to eight weeks is a realistic timeframe to repair, rebuild and improve existing facilities for heavy bombers.
 
Is the western allies strategic bomber force still any use given that the Soviet production facilities are so far away? Do the Soviets have anything which could actually worry the bombers?
Above 20k I do not think they were in their element.

What about the Sturmoviks? Do they get a nasty suprise when they are clawed out of the sky? Or do they wreak havoc when the wetern allies can't counter them? Who gains air superiority?
American fighters with their 50s may be a bit under gunned (except maybe the P-47) (This would not be a problem for the Brits), but I suspect that the Sturmoviks would be swatted out of the skies just like the Germans did. Huge quantities of fast moving high altitude aircraft booming and zooming could cause havoc with attacking formations.

Equipment is basically what was in service at the end of the war and anything which might reasonably be ready to enter service straight after.
Some American aircraft that I would say could be ready would be the P-80 and P-82 (if pressed). Other aircraft which were already in service but not really engaged heavily but would make an impact would be the F8F, P-51H, P-47M, and P-47N. The Brits also had some super performing aircraft at the end of the war, maybe even the quite capable Vampire. If there was a real threat known earlier even more aircraft could be pressed forward including the powerful XP-72.

The Soviet fighter aircraft tended to be very light and small similar to the Bf-109, which means they were primarily point defense fighters. They tended to designed for lower level combat, highly maneuverable, but ceding altitude, and energy, to the Western allies. Except possibly for a few cases, the P-51D was faster, even at low levels and, if flown like the Navy flew against the Japanese, i.e. keep your speed up and don't dogfight, I think it would still be quite effective. The P-51H, with over 400 mph SL speed and 470 mph top speed at 25k (with racks), and initial climb rate of 5000 f/min, would be difficult to deal with by any Soviet aircraft at any altitude.


I think the strategy would be something the Soviets had not seen yet, intensive deep interdiction of bridges, crossroads, marshaling yards, etc. from FEBA(forward edge of the battle area) to 500 to 1000 miles deep.
This also makes full U.S. commitment to the European Front hard, as we were still ramping up for a possible major invasion of Japan.
War with the Soviets was a major deal and would require a replanning. I would do what MacArthur did in the Pacific, isolate and bypass. Let the half the Navy continue to blockade and starve out Japan and its forces in Indochina and Burma. This would free up a million(?) hardened soldiers and marines for combat with the Soviets and maybe provide a mobile strike force to start a second front, or sent to the eastern front.

Vincenzo said:
I don't think that allied fighter had the range to escort the B-29 to Moscow. Bombing western european Russia is useless was already destroyed.
I think both the P-47N and P-82 has over 1000 mile combat radius, which would allow them to provide escort to Moscow from, say Sweden.

The Battle of the Bulge showed a weakness in the Allied line. It most likely would not have worked at any other location.
I don't see a rapid defeat of Allies by the Soviets. It took them four months to enter Germany and get to Berlin against a massively over-powered enemy with no airpower. With huge resources the allies would not be easier . Without Allied support and with interdiction, I suspect the Soviets would quickly run out of materiel.

Also, there were probably quite a few Luftwaffe pilots running around that would like nothing better than to get into a P-51 and attack the Russians violently.
 

This is also pretty much my thoughts, particularly the second front. The imponderable would be the hearts and minds campaign. Stalin had a strong cadre of talented, well trained operatives as well as fifth columns throughout Europe and Asia. Churchill would be ready to go but would England have the stomach for it after all it suffered –a question in view of Churchill's political fate not long after. But it would be much easier for the Allies to recruit than it was for Hitler, and even his troops were often initially welcomed.

Japan could be isolated under a containment siege, or more likely would agree to a conditional surrender generally on the terms Macarthur instituted. Effort would have to be diverted to China to defeat the Red Army since the conflict would pretty much be a hot war along the lines of the cold war. There are many imponderables along these lines.

As to the first few months the first order of business would be to rein in Patton and establish a series of disciplined retreats to burn through the Soviet supplies and stretch their supply lines. The Soviet tanks would be vastly superior in both quality and quantity, as was their artillery at least in quantity. And, thanks to the US, their army would be motorized. Allied superiority in the air would need to be shifted from strategic to tactical to offset the Soviet advantages and start on attrition with particular attention to trucks. The idea being to revert the Red Army back to horse transport. Heavy bombers would be used, as at St Lo, in a tactical role to carpet bomb any concentrations, which is what the Soviets did with their tanks, artillery and troops when attacking. In the short term this, should bleed and exhaust the red ground force which was overwhelming but extended when overrunning Berlin. Thereafter, with a second Pacific front, it would be air power dismantling the transportation capability of the Soviets. While their factories are remote, this makes their supply lines even longer than Napoleon's and Hitler's. The Soviet's demonstrated unstoppable sweep to and into Germany was against a severely depleted resistance.

If time could be bought –and it most likely could, the US productive might would have stood a good chance of being the deciding factor.
 
The Soviet's demonstrated unstoppable sweep to and into Germany was against a severely depleted resistance.

If time could be bought –and it most likely could, the US productive might would have stood a good chance of being the deciding factor.

That severely depleted resistance was still far stronger than the German forces in the West, and it took the Allies 10 months to advance to central Germany despite fighting a small fraction of the German Army, even though the Allies had undisputed command of the air.
 
I would like to know how the Russians would make large advances when their supply lines are under heavy air attack. The Germans showed that very well to them in 1941. The Allies also could have hit the Russian oil in the Caucasus, which they feared a lot.
 
That doesn't answer my question.

Is this operation planned by the U.S. Government or a spur of the moment decision by Gen. Patton in violation of his orders?
 
RACFson, I don't know where you are with your head, but any Russian advance would have a botteneck of be supplied by rail, which would be certainly targeted by the Allied strategic bombing. So, the "stemroller" is really rolling? ;P

I also would expect a deal with the Allies and Japan. Ironically, the planners from Unthinkable thought the opposite, that the Soviets would ally themselfs with Japan. But particularly, I can see more a negociated peace between Japan and the Allies (maybe behind closed doors) if the Russians started to bring worry, which would free a significant Allied strenght against the Russians. Europe was much important for the Allies, and they would not measure efforts to save it. In the way your posts are, looks like the Allies and the Germans are a bunch of incompetents, while the Soviets can destroy everything without being stopped. I don't think the things would be necessarily in that way.
 
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The Red Army defeated a much stronger German Army than that faced by the Western Allies. You have to be dreaming in technicolour to think that ~90 Allied Divisions are a match for the Red Army that overran central Europe in 1945.

What might or might not happen in a long war is open to debate, but the Red Army in mid 1945 would have quickly overrun and cut to pieces the Allied Armies, simply because of the huge disparity in numbers. Heck, look at what the Red Army did to the IJA in August 1945. The Red Army was at the top of it's game and Eisenhower simply didn't have enough boots on the ground to stand a chance.

 
Yes, the Germans had more divisions in the East, and the quality of them? The LW was a factor? Prove the Russians would overcome the Allied armies and Air Forces. The Heer and the LW smashed much more divisions than they lost in 1941, so what's the point?
 
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Ah, I know your type...

Yes, the Germans had more divisions in the East, and the quality of them? The LW was a factor? Prove they would overcome the Allied armies and Air Forces.

My type? You mean someone who can count?

The Germans were trying desperately to stop the Red Army and they had their best and strongest forces arrayed against them, including what was left of the Luftwaffe. The burden of proof is upon you to demonstrate how the Allied Armies could overcome such a crushing numerical inferiority.

Recall again Jabberwocky's post (number 16 in this thread):

It is a complete fantasy to think that Eisenhower could overcome such a disparity in numbers.
 
The Germans were trying desperately to stop the Red Army and they had their best and strongest forces arrayed against them, including what was left of the Luftwaffe.

Ah, yes, now comes the sensasionalism that the Soviets consumed almost everything from the Germans. The Germans had most of their LAND forces against the Russians, but even in that regard I wouldn't underestimate what was left behind, like the 800,000 men in Norway and the Balkans, not to mention the troops in France - all was for the Western Allies. Also, the LW was shot out of the sky in Tunisia, Sicilly, Italy, France, and eventually Germany. There was not such a thing of the Russians also "destroying" the LW. Also, it was thanks to the Western Allies that the LW did not have fuel. Plus, it was because the Western Allies that the Germans couldn't have all they wanted industrially, and that was caused by the Allied naval blockade of Europe and the bombing. It's incredible that you ignore all those factors when comparing the Soviet victories against the Germans, putting the Western Allies in the position of the latter for comparitive purposes for this scenario, which doesn't have sense. In short: Germany couldn't put full potential against the Russians, while the Western Allies could.

The burden of proof is upon you to demonstrate how the Allied Armies could overcome such a crushing numerical inferiority.

It's up to you, you that are claiming the Russians would overcome the Allied ground and Air Forces. Prove the Russians would not allow their lines of trucks being straffed by Allied fighter-bombers, prove they would not have their railway system attacked by strategic bombers, prove they would not enter in attrition with the USAAF and the RAF, prove they could overcome the Anglo-American air power, prove they would be able to advance in the ground when the enemy controls the skies.

My opinion about this scenario is that the Allies would unlikely advance to Russia, but I also doubt the Russians would dominate the scene like you say.
 
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