Agreed.
What if Hitler had followed the Luftwaffe strategic war plan?
- Thread starter Art Medcalf
- Start date
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Hitler was scared shitless throughout all of this thinking and he was very lucky. I don't know if I would call him a genius. Just bold and lucky to get away with things. It could have come crashing down at any time…and eventually it did in Russia and when he declared war on the USA.
FulmenTheFinn
Airman 1st Class
I don't think that's something that would've flown with the British public. Once they were out and peace was signed, that'd have been it. Furthermore the British government would've probably been led by David Lloyd George or some such person, and wouldn't have been looking to re-enter the war. The Britain of the 1940s wasn't the Britain of the 19th century.
She doesn't.
In fact, Hitler had this whole idea about Germany dominating Continental Europe while Britain would dominate the seas. He specifically wanted to preserve the British Empire.
While Hitler never offered concrete terms to Britain (he made an appeal for peace to Britain and France in the Reichstag in October 1939, and one to Britain in July 1940, which can be read in English here and here), accepting peace with Hitler through negotiations via Mussolini (who'd arranged Munich back in 1938 during the Sudeten Crisis), was a real question in May 1940, the pursuit of which was being spearheaded by the by-then-former PM Chamberlain, as well as Foreign Secretary Halifax. Halifax had been both the Conservative Party's and the King's first choice to succeed Chamberlain as PM, and would've been PM, had he not turned it down. His reasoning for turning it down was that he'd had to have given up his seat in the House of Lords, but his real reason was probably that he didn't want Churchill breathing down his neck. He probably also genuinely thought Churchill more suited for the position at that time (Germany had not yet attacked the Low Countries when Halifax made the decision). See also the British War Cabinet Crisis of May 1940.
If Britain had agreed to negotiations, concrete terms probably could've been established, and perhaps some sort of German withdrawal from most of Western Europe conducted in exchange for XYZ (not dissimilar to the 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt).
However Churchill was completely opposed to any kind of peace with Hitler. I don't think he would've made peace even if the entire BEF had been captured at Dunkirk.
Not disagreeing with that premise but I only see that as happening if the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain - probably by keeping up attacks on the airfields rather than switching to the cities and by somehow removing Churchill (a lucky strike perhaps).
Even if this scenario occurred, I still don't see Hitler waiting years before attacking Russia. If anything, he would have been emboldened to attack sooner, perhaps even on the original May 1941 timetable which would have helped the Germans avoid the Russian winter.
That said, this all still needs multiple what ifs to occur…and would have been devastating for the world.
FulmenTheFinn
Airman 1st Class
I think the numbers show that the Germans winning the BoB wasn't in the cards. Not only were they bleeding machines, and more importantly airmen, faster than the RAF, they also lacked the range and force to hit the British aircraft industry in the capacity required. The RAF was always going to out-attrition the Luftwaffe. And then there's RADAR, too.
Mud season lasted exceptionally long in 1941, well into June, and from what I understand from historians like David Glantz, launching Barbarossa in May wasn't therefore really feasible, even if the Germans didn't have to go into Yugoslavia and Greece.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
If Germany did not have to come to Italy's aid in North Afrika, not only would have the German invasion of the USSR gone according to the original launch date, but all the men, machines and material lost in Afrika would have been available on the Eastern Front.
Britain was in serious trouble until the Luftwaffe switched objectives and started bombing cities instead of military targets.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
The weather could not be changed by diverting units from Africa.
The forces sent to Africa were small (tiny?) compared to the forces used in Russia in 1941.
The Panzer divisions in Africa were under strength and the 15 Pz division didn't get to Africa until Aug 1941. The 5th light division arrived piecemeal in March-May 1941 and had one tank regiment, one infantry regiment (two machine gun battalions) and a 1/2 strength artillery battalion and supporting units. Adding that force to the Russian invasion would have done what?
The Greek adventure hurt the Germans, not so much in combat losses but in wear and tear on vehicles.
In many of these battles (Poland, France, NA, Russia) the numbers of tanks lost or out of service due to breakdowns exceeded the number of tanks lost due to combat.
Supporting the African campaign took more effort in 1942 but the effort in 1941 was small.
Britain might have lost the BoB and might have been beaten in 1940 IF, the Germans had thwarted the Dunkirk evacuation to a great degree, if the RADAR CH stations covering the SW UK had been destroyed, if the Luftwaffe had then consolidated the bombing offensive against the RAF airfields until RAF ineffective and if German paratroops/troops had been made to invade. The British Navy were feared for the supposed ability to fight off an invasion, but decisive use of air-power after neutering the RAF should have allowed a combined air/sea invasion.
That is enough of my "what-if's". However, given the way it was and the weather that year, it is more of a "could-have"!
Eng
That is enough of my "what-if's". However, given the way it was and the weather that year, it is more of a "could-have"!
Eng
It is interesting that those planned peak production figures are considerably less than later wartime yearly production, at 1475 planes/ months that's roughly 18,000 a year, compared to about 25,000 in 1943 and 40,000 in 1944.
Perhaps getting away too much from the OP, but as always when it comes to german aircraft production what-ifs, wonder if it's possible to accelerate production more steeply before the war so the Luftwaffe is twice or more larger in 1939 compared to OTL. As it is known, the french at least iirc were believing Luftwaffe has something like 7000 planes or thereabouts in 1938-39, twice as much as they really did. One can imagine the effect of this much larger ATL Luftwaffe on the early years of the war at least.
Perhaps getting away too much from the OP, but as always when it comes to german aircraft production what-ifs, wonder if it's possible to accelerate production more steeply before the war so the Luftwaffe is twice or more larger in 1939 compared to OTL. As it is known, the french at least iirc were believing Luftwaffe has something like 7000 planes or thereabouts in 1938-39, twice as much as they really did. One can imagine the effect of this much larger ATL Luftwaffe on the early years of the war at least.
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yulzari
Tech Sergeant
We are in danger of getting trapped in an USM discussion. I am consciously avoiding reiterating the flagellation of the deceased equine but every serious examination shows it would have been a failure no matter what sixes were thrown by the Germans.
In a wider view the BoB was far more than just an air war and the British were prepared to use any means to thwart an actual invasion. Including poison gas and persistent agents. This determination can be demonstrated by the issuing of gas bombs and spraying apparatus to airfields and bomb racks to second line units and trainers. Essentially the USM would be the offering of a German army presenting itself for defeat in detail.
The German Navy had to fight hard and dirty to reduce the planning down from an uncoordinated absurdity scattered randomly across the entire south coast in a mobile maritime disaster down into a vaguely feasible major raid that might gain a local foothold and depend upon pure luck for any resupply.
Hi,
"every serious examination shows it would have been a failure". By "it", I presume that you generalise the whole thing together to mean, the Invasion would be a failure? That is not the main point I make. Indeed, the absolutely huge efforts required to achieve opposed landings later in WW2 illustrate the real difficulties. No, my points show possible opportunities missed by the Germans that, if they had been achieved, may have allowed the Luftwaffe to win the BoB. Of course, the Luftwaffe never achieved air-superiority over Southern England
(but did they at night?). They might have done it in the day with RADAR knocked-out and Southern airfields effectively disabled.
The effectiveness of CW is often over-emphasised, especially when you refer to its employment via "second line units and trainers". Presumably the skilled first line units were unable to operate effectively in Southern UK but, the second line units and trainers could effectively deliver limited CW and defeat an Army?
As regards the Naval operation, it always seems that there was a lot of wishful thinking on the German side. However, it would also seem that the Royal Navy in 1940 were very cautious of getting their large ships easily in range of air attack.
Overall, the determined British resistance and sacrifice before and during the BoB was successful in deterring an invasion attempt. Nonetheless, if the Germans had consolidated the points that I made, the War might have followed a different course.
Eng
Hi,
Effective use of RADAR to control fighters intercepting raids was a key component in the RAF success in the BoB. Without RADAR, the attrition of Luftwaffe aircraft would have been much lower and daylight raid success would likely have been better.
Eng
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
There are several differences between the Germans gaining control of the air over southern England in the summer/fall of 1940 and the British needing to surrender.
The British were afraid of the German invasion due to poor intelligence although the RN was not convinced of the German ability to invade.
The RN had several traditions dating back centuries. Their job was to keep Britian safe dating back to the Spanish Armada. Another was not leaving the army behind. Not just Dunkirk but shown in 1941 off Greece and Crete. Saving Battleships and Cruisers when a German invasion fleet was at sea was not going to happen. What would they save them for?
British intelligence may have been faulty about German airborne capabilities. Their achievements in Norway and Holland were impressive. But German resources were far from infinite.
The losses of the Ju 52 transports were in the hundreds. Losses of troops were also high and replacing paratroops was harder than replacing normal ground troops. Ability to resupply by air was severely limited in reality. The sea borne invasion/resupply route was pretty much a non-starter in reality.
British were trying everything they could to cover all the bases, rather than just assume things would workout. Germans' ability to base aircraft on coastal airfields after capture by airborne troops is going to be minimal/impossible. German ability to use even light AA was going to be minimal. Having to deliver them by Ju 52 was possible but not likely in any numbers.
Any reasonable assessment of the German navy's ability has to include the losses off Norway and the damage still needing repair.
The British were afraid of the German invasion due to poor intelligence although the RN was not convinced of the German ability to invade.
The RN had several traditions dating back centuries. Their job was to keep Britian safe dating back to the Spanish Armada. Another was not leaving the army behind. Not just Dunkirk but shown in 1941 off Greece and Crete. Saving Battleships and Cruisers when a German invasion fleet was at sea was not going to happen. What would they save them for?
British intelligence may have been faulty about German airborne capabilities. Their achievements in Norway and Holland were impressive. But German resources were far from infinite.
The losses of the Ju 52 transports were in the hundreds. Losses of troops were also high and replacing paratroops was harder than replacing normal ground troops. Ability to resupply by air was severely limited in reality. The sea borne invasion/resupply route was pretty much a non-starter in reality.
British were trying everything they could to cover all the bases, rather than just assume things would workout. Germans' ability to base aircraft on coastal airfields after capture by airborne troops is going to be minimal/impossible. German ability to use even light AA was going to be minimal. Having to deliver them by Ju 52 was possible but not likely in any numbers.
Any reasonable assessment of the German navy's ability has to include the losses off Norway and the damage still needing repair.
Quite. However, given my presumption of German air superiority if they had secured the targets I outlined, there is obviously a strong likelyhood that RN ships would be very vulnerable to the Luftwaffe in strength. Remember the subsequent losses to aircraft of capital ships without air cover in 1941. German submarines would operate with determination and mines would be a great risk.
In rapid advances on the continent, the German Luftwaffe often set-up dispersed airfields on farmland.
Obviously, provisioning weapons and equipment would be dependant upon resupply but fuel might well come from captured British stocks, advancing German forces would take what they needed. That said, the short cross-channel distance was no problem for fighter ops as far as London, or so.
Overall, what I point out is, that if the Germans had succeeded in gaining air superiority in early summer 1940, the possibility of an attempted Invasion would have been far greater and it should not be assumed that the Royal Navy could simply stop it. With air superiority, Goering and Hitler might have pushed for it.
Eng
Totally agree, Hitler regarded the Russians as Sub- Human , Germany were going to occupy Russia (Living Space) and use their natural resources. Hitler expected a quick war so Germany didn't go into Full War Production until Albert Speer took control of War Production. I believe it was Goering who cancelled or slowed down advanced aircraft development on Projects that were more than 12 months from introduction and this was 1942.
(my emphasis)
Care to elaborate the bolded part?
I'd politely disagree.
Germany mobilised Woman into the Workforce slower than the British, Germany also in the early war years were producing non essential goods for consumption. During the Battle of Britain the British built more fighter planes than Germany.
What are the respective numbers and/or percentages wrt. the women in industry?
Production of the non-military goods was still required, people will not just stop living because there is a war, especially since the war is going good as far as both the Nazi leadership and the ordinary man on the street are concerned.
They certainly did.
How do the production figures for tanks, guns, AA guns, all military aircraft made between 1935 and 1939 stack up?
Howard Gibson
Staff Sergeant
Read some stuff by Adam Tooze. The books arerather long. There are some good YouTube videos. Women had been a part of the German economy for quite some time.
Accordingly to Google, (I know it's Google)Germany had a higher percentage of woman in the workforce in 1939 but by 1944 Britain had a higher percentage working in the arms industry. Of course Germany kept up production of non essential consumption in the early years of WW2 they were conquering neighbouring Countries and using their resources and forced labour.As for production of War materials 1935-1940 that's a loaded question because Germany started a build up from 1933 and started const
Accordingly to Google (I know it's Google) Germany had a higher percentage of woman in the general workplace in 1939 but Britain had a bigger percentage working in Armament workplace in 1944.In the early war years Germany were conquering neighbouring Countries and using their resources and forced labour so of course Germany could maintain production of non essential products. As for production from 1935 - 1940 of War Production that's not a fair comparison because Germany since 1933 under the Nazis were expanding production, introducing conscription and marching into the Rhineland(Demilitized Zone)whilst Britain wasn't.
