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Hi all,
I have to tell you that my friend keeps on repeating the same arguments. These are:
1) The Allies are not able to group 30 carriers for protecting a single convoy nor to supply them.
2) The Allied side is not able to launch a satisfying number of fighters once the radar system detected the approaching German bombers.
3) The Allies are not able to keep a permanent overhead patrol of ~100 fightes airborne.
4) Yes, the German bombers will suffer losses. But: the Allies will loose carriers instead, for multiple losses of lives.
I mean, any of these arguments is the same nonsensical. E.. if a Hs 293 hits a carrier, it would nearly never sink ist, so the main number of the crew would survive. If you are not bored too much, you might like to answer in details. Thank you for your understanding.
Regards, RT
I'll bight at this.
Most allied aircraft carriers were 'escort carriers' which carried aircraft like the wildcat/martlet. These were relatively low performance aircraft but they were sufficient to keep away say a Fw 200 or intercept aircraft such as the Dornier 217. They couldn't keep away something like a B29.
Fw 200 could effectively and accurately destroy merchant ships by level bombing from 12000-16000ft using the Lofte 7 computing bomb sight. They couldn't destroy military ships which were too fast and manoeuvrable. However Do 217 with Fritz-X could destroy fast battleships and with the Hs 293 either a Do 217 or Fw 200 could attack from 10km-16km out from the target, which is out of range of allied anti aircraft guns. However escort carriers could carry aircraft such as the Wildcat able to intercept these aircraft and substantialy neutralise the threat. In General Hs 293B launch range was outside of allied AAA defences and Fritz-X drop height of about 22500ft was above accurate AAA.
Without escort carriers to protect convoys the Fw 200 would have caused enormous damage to allied convoys when they received their computing bombsights in 1942. Prior to that Fw 200 attacks consisted of a relatively low altitude bomb run in which 3 bombs were released. That kind of attack could probably be defended reasonably well with via Oerlikon guns on the deck of the merchant ship.
However for more capable aircraft the rare and expensive fleet carrier might be required to handle a B29 whose performance was such that a Martlet and a Seafire would have difficulty.
Hs 293 had a TV guidance system called Tonne-Seedorf in development that would allow the aircraft to launch the missile and immediately turn around and escape rather than fly parallel to the convoy under attack. It could also hide in clouds. (The 4th version of Tonne-Seedorf 4 was more or less ready for production)
If the Luftwaffe had an aircraft with the performance of the B29 then it would creat big problems for the allies since I doubt the Wildcat/Martlet could intercept.
Such an aircraft would be the Heinkel He 177A7 (with DB613 engines) or Heinkel He 277 with two stage supercharged DB603L/Jumo 213E1 engines or He 274 with turbo charged DB603T engines.
The allies need aircraft carriers carrying the Corsairs or Hellcats, probably only the Corsair or Seafire 46 with two stage griffon had the performance to intercept a B29. They would probably need larger fleet carriers.
A B29 class aircraft attacking at 30,000ft with a guided gravity bomb such as Fritz-X could avoid interception from most allied carrier aircraft and be immune to AAA.
A B29 class aircraft attacking at similar altitude and speed could attack with a glide bomb such as the Hs 293 equipped with TV guidance or a similar autonomous radar homing missile such as the USN BAT would also be hard to intercept. The aircraft would be out of AAA range and would probably need to get no closer than 15-20 miles to target and be able to turn around immediately upon launch.
The Germans had no such aircraft in service. Maybe a Ju 88S as a guidance aircraft with a He 177 as a launch aircraft. The Ju 290B if equipped with the BMW 801TJ (turbo charged) engine was capable of operation at 10000m/33000ft and would have similar performance to the B29 (estimated higher flying but slower)
So yes it would work.
History shows that unescorted bombers easily fell foul of intercepting fighters but the B29 performance was such that all but the best carrier born fighters would likely not intercept them or only with difficulty untill very advanced naval fighters were available.
GrauGeist
The 100-fighter-scenario is not my friend's one, it is my one. I mean, if Britain really gets in danger being cut off from supplies, the Allies would have done everything to avoid this, even for the expense of other theaters. When they have 85 flat-tops in all, they with ease could have sent 30 for a convoy .
30 carriers mean ~600 aircraft! So I say, for the most dangerous part of the journey, between the southern tip of Iceland and the North channel, a portion of 100 of these 600 aircraft can be kept airborne, while others get refuelled an rearmed.
K Koopernic
Thank you for your detailed answer. I appreciate that someone here takes the position of my friend.
You point on Fritz X attacks. I say, in this theater, well below the all-time routes of the low-pressure areas of the Northern Atlantic, Fritz X attacks were impossible, or at least, not promising. Fritz X needed a minimum launch height of 4000 m and free sight. There, you won't have this.
Indeed, my friend keeps on upgrading the He 177 like you do. I think it would be very difficult to have such a version service-ready by the end of 1943. The same for the tv-guided version of the Hs 293. But, ok, if it is seen early enough that such things are needed... But I still wonder what kind of wire and reels would be possible for a wire-guided version of the Hs 293...
Do you, or anybody else, say, the escort carriers were unable to host Corsairs or Griffon-Seafires?
I have to admit it is a nice idea to make use of the overcast and operate the Hs 293 from within the clouds! Does anybody say the fighter multitude still could be guided precisely by the ship radar to chase the bombers?
@Anyone
Do you think a wire-and-tv-guided version of the Hs 293 would have been possible? Or could the Allies have confused the Hs 293 operator by transferring a low-brow tv show to the Tonne-Seedorf system?
Regards, RT
Why not just build more U-boats?
Why not just build more U-boats?
I watched the BBC "World at War" episode on the battle of the Atlantic and it said at the start of the war both sides believed the German surface fleets would be decisive and both were wrong. Doenitz felt the U Boat would be decisive and if he had many more U-Boats at the start things may have run differently.Which is precisely what they did. All things being equal though, they never got to deploy them to the extent that they could be used effectively because the Allies managed to break their naval codes and determine U boat sailings in advance, which led to long range maritime patrol aircraft being fitted with centimetric radar popping out from nowhere, right where the U boats were transitting. Not to mention the scarcity of resources as a result of a punishing and unceasing regime of day and night bombing raids on essential production facilities required for the Reich to wage war, which stifled almost every aspect of the German armed forces from 1943 onwards.
Let's also not forget that despite the construction of four engined prototyes and new weapon systems, the He 177 never overcame the worst of its faults and remained as much of a headache for its crews in service as it had always been, for the rest of the war. That's why the He 111 soldiered on far beyond its use by date.
In theory the idea had enormous merit, but by the end of 1943, it was getting to a point where putting the idea into practise was beyond the capacity of the Luftwaffe.
if he had many more U-Boats at the start things may have run differently.
Doenitz might have built more U-boats if some of the big ships were canceled and the treaty did allow the Germans to build up to 100% of the RN submarine tonnage after the announced such an intention.
However such a shift in building programs would not have gone unnoticed and the British could have shifted their building program/s to more escorts sooner.
A high altitude bomber would be detected by radar at ~100nm or more (20-30min from weapon release range) from the convoy, so no need for a standing CAP.
A B-29 class aircraft rarely operated at full throttle and so can be intercepted by lesser performance fighters (for example, Sea Hurricane IIC, Seafire II/III with a Merlin 46), and if the bomber increases speed to avoid interception it's bomb accuracy will suffer. If the Luftwaffe introduced high altitude bombers, the Allies had the resources to rapidly introduce a variety of escort fighters to counter the threat. As long as fighter interception and AA can inflict 10% or more losses on each attack, the Lufwaffe will rapidly run out of aircraft, especially as Axis resources are limited, so more Axis bombers means less of something else, like fighters, or U-boats.
2ndly the introduction of VT ammo in Jan 1943 for AA dramatically changed the equation in terms of AA accuracy. Provision of VT ammo to the RN and ETO, in general, historically took a back seat to the PTO, but if HMCS Prince Roberts, for example, had had VT ammo (which was just being delivered to the RN/RCN) her AA fire would have been devastating, even against high altitude bombers and to missiles in their terminal phase.
3rd, the Allies were introducing radar aimed CIWS that were capable of destroying a guided glide bomb/missile in it's terminal attack phase, and any radio link is susceptible to ECM, and the Allies were working hard to stay abreast of Axis developments in this area.
The USA didn't have B-29s in 1943. How does Germany get them in numbers? Wherever they are made and stationed in Germany and France in 1943 would become the No 1 target for the allies. A problem for the allies long distance air cover for convoys was finding them when the rendezvous was pre arranged, convoys didn't always make the speeds and course expected and aircraft were frequently affected by winds. How do these fleets of German B-29 find a convoy? Against the "Baby Blitz" operation Steinbock the RAF had 12 squadrons of Mosquito and Beaufighter night fighters. In 1943 the battle of the Atlantic wasn't over there were still many maritime recon aircraft operating in the Atlantic. How do these German B-29s get from and back to base? It may be a great idea to use cloud to avoid defensive aircraft once the wonder weapon is launched, don't those clouds make it hard to find the target in the first place. Why not stop using convoys? What would they do about convoys making smoke? It was common in WW2 to disguise ships with additions to the superstructure, put some scaffolding and canvass on an escort carrier and how do you pick it out from 30 miles away? The B-29 was extremely expensive in every way. The USA couldn't afford to lose B-29s at previous rates of around 3-4% max. How does Germany produce and get into service these masses of B-29s whan they didn't do it with Fw-200s or He-177s? How does Goering stop them all being lost in Stalingrad?
So from the German perspective they send their incredibly expensive bombers using their increasingly scarce fuel carrying expensive weapons out to where a U-boat said a convoy was earlier. Hundreds of miles over the ocean where any mechanical issue is a lost aircraft. With the risk of interception far from escorts. To shoot at a convoy that might be gone or might hide in smoke or might be under a rain cloud and if it isn't they will mostly miss.
Why not just build more U-boats?
Which is precisely what they did. All things being equal though, they never got to deploy them to the extent that they could be used effectively because the Allies managed to break their naval codes and determine U boat sailings in advance, which led to long range maritime patrol aircraft being fitted with centimetric radar popping out from nowhere, right where the U boats were transitting. Not to mention the scarcity of resources as a result of a punishing and unceasing regime of day and night bombing raids on essential production facilities required for the Reich to wage war, which stifled almost every aspect of the German armed forces from 1943 onwards.
Let's also not forget that despite the construction of four engined prototyes and new weapon systems, the He 177 never overcame the worst of its faults and remained as much of a headache for its crews in service as it had always been, for the rest of the war. That's why the He 111 soldiered on far beyond its use by date.
In theory the idea had enormous merit, but by the end of 1943, it was getting to a point where putting the idea into practise was beyond the capacity of the Luftwaffe.
Doenitz might have built more U-boats if some of the big ships were canceled and the treaty did allow the Germans to build up to 100% of the RN submarine tonnage after the announced such an intention.
However such a shift in building programs would not have gone unnoticed and the British could have shifted their building program/s to more escorts sooner.
The original "wonder weapon" scenario was for a B-29 type to approach a convoy at 350MPH launch its wonder weapon from 30 miles out and 30,000 ft and then retire, guiding its weapons by wire connected cameras to the main fleet carriers which it eliminated with a single shot or maybe two. This has now changed to the aircraft flying over the convoy to pick out the carriers at leisure, or not? Smoke was not just used at sea, my region had extensive smoke defences in WW2 to protect the refineries. Most of the time this was not needed because a massive cloud of crap hung over the area most of the time. Here is an article saying how they were used elsewhere in UK BBC - WW2 People's War - Army Apprentice 1942-45. You don't need a big number of small warships to make smoke, just burn oily rags in a drum on the rear of a freighter. This does not interfere with RADAR or ASDIC. Neither you or your friend have address how these wonder planes would be kept secret and protected, or even where they would take off from in 1943. The allies searched the entire North Atlantic for submarines in 1943, the idea that they couldn't set up a picket line of B-24s Wellingtons and other maritime recon aircraft to detect these miracle bombers is fanciful, as is the idea that they wouldn't be shot down each and every time they tried an attack. It seems that all the German designs that they didn't produce were world beaters. maybe because since they weren't produced the most fantastic levels of performance can be projected. In summary the only reason the Germans didn't have B-29 type aircraft in service in 1943 from almost any company that wasn't asked to do it, is because they weren't asked to do it."Smoke screen"
There is a continuing proposal for laying a smoke screen. This figure comes from sea warfare and I have to say, this is nothing useful to protect ships from jeopardies which come from above. Smoke screen can help a number of ships to retreat in an around 90 degree ankle to the screen. I wonder has there ever been an attempt to hide a ship by a smoke COVER.
Furthermore, such screens won't last very long. They are easily blown away by wind and rip while the ships to hide keep on moving forward parallel to it. They hamper the sight of helmsmen and lookouts, the sight of the AA gunners, and hamper own aircraft from taking off. Also, they are not a method to avoid radar detection. More, the probably big number of small warships necessary to lay the screen cannot do submarine hunting at the same time. So I mean, this idea quickly dissolves into smoke.
@Anybody
If it is your opinion the Americans would rather give up Britain than to stop other operations, tell us!
Hope you still enjoy, and regards,
RT