What if lots of B-29-like bombers with glide bombs had attacked very well protected convoys?

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fastmongrel fastmongrel
One prerequisition for any German success is the appearance of Messerschmitt Me 261 long-range reconnoisaters. They have the speed and range for to perform the task. Give them some radar, and they could find (nearly) any convoy in any weather condition. They also could shadow any convoy by performing alternating patrol service. They are slower than a Corsair, of course, but can confuse and challenge the fighter force. I would even let a bunch of them do the first wave of an attack, for distracting the fighters.
Another trouble for the Germans was exact distance measuremant over thousands of kilometers. A special device for this was service-ready at the end of 1944, when it was too late. Probably change of priorities would have made accessible also this one year earlier.
So, once on the convoy, the Me 261s could have directed the bombers there. But the Allies also would know, if only the reconnoisaters are on the convoy, something is to expect.
On the flightpath outward, the bombers could have been guided by Focke-Wulf Fw 187 long-range fighters (hopefully nobody sees them with their weak engines the real versions had).
On the flightpath inward, the bombers could scatter and were not easy to be found by patrolling Allied fighters. More see below to NevadaK.
Money is nothing, the central bank creates it from nothing. Materiels were there, if you change the production program completely, e.g. cancel He 111 and Ju 88. Factories could have been created or regrouped within about one year.

N NevadaK
First, thank you for your kind words!
When you read what I above say to Fastmongrel, you may imagine that a He 177/Hs 293 force could not successfully stand alone. Fierce attacks on Southwestern British airfields, performed e.g. by numbers of Messerschmitt Me 410s, from weeks before the first big anti-convoy action takes place, would have been necessary as well.
Please take a look at your own map (also, thank you very much for this work). The bend which your route makes off the southern tip of Iceland, in my eyes is the optimal point of attacking the convoys. It is well accessible from Northwest France or Southwest Norway. As I said above, it would be necessary to clear the way for the bombers. E.g. the Allies could have, and would have, occupied Ireland, if they saw this as necessary. From France, the German bombers must have crossed the Southwestern tip of Ireland. The Allies could have placed airfields and radar stations there, which would also become subject of German medium-range attacks. Radar ships were targets as well, the more as they demask themselves as such.
Smoke is no solution, as I argued above. The bombers must stay out of the range of AA fire. I say they would suffer unbearable losses, but for me it is enough to credit them to the carrier fighter force.

swampyankee swampyankee
Seeing Germany as incapable of performing such attacks at the end of 1942, it means the responsibles may have seen themselves capable for this at the end of 1943. The scenario says, what could have happened, had more creative persons taken over in Germany in autumn of 1942.

@All
Please let me return to my questions (my friend's statements) of July 8th. I asked:

1) The Allies are not able to group 30 carriers for protecting a single convoy nor to supply them.

2) The Allied side is not able to launch a satisfying number of fighters once the radar system detected the approaching German bombers.

3) The Allies are not able to keep a permanent overhead patrol of ~100 fightes airborne.

4) Yes, the German bombers will suffer losses. But: the Allies will loose carriers instead, for multiple losses of lives.


So, does still somebody mean:

1) The Allies have better things to do than trying to save Britain and could not or would not group 30 carriers, if needed.

2) Especially under bad-weather conditions of Nothern Atlantic, the carrier force is unable to launch a sufficient number of fighters, the more as the carriers had to turn to the opposite direction for a west-east-going convoy. This not even in case if the presence of Messerschmitt Me 261 reconnoisaters is already noted, so a coming attack is highly probable.

3) Cannot better describe this, than questioned already.

4) Everybody agreed to severe bomber losses. But there "should be" heavier-weighing Allied carrier losses, so this kind of attrition war were more promising for the German side.

Hope you still enjoy, and best regards,
RT
 
Number of carriers by year

1594997573083.png


1594997610566.png
 
Romantic Technofreak said:
fastmongrel fastmongrel
One prerequisition for any German success is the appearance of Messerschmitt Me 261 long-range reconnoisaters. They have the speed and range for to perform the task. Give them some radar, and they could find (nearly) any convoy in any weather condition. They also could shadow any convoy by performing alternating patrol service. They are slower than a Corsair, of course, but can confuse and challenge the fighter force. I would even let a bunch of them do the first wave of an attack, for distracting the fighters.
Another trouble for the Germans was exact distance measuremant over thousands of kilometers. A special device for this was service-ready at the end of 1944, when it was too late. Probably change of priorities would have made accessible also this one year earlier.
So, once on the convoy, the Me 261s could have directed the bombers there. But the Allies also would know, if only the reconnoisaters are on the convoy, something is to expect.
On the flightpath outward, the bombers could have been guided by Focke-Wulf Fw 187 long-range fighters (hopefully nobody sees them with their weak engines the real versions had).
On the flightpath inward, the bombers could scatter and were not easy to be found by patrolling Allied fighters. More see below to NevadaK.
Money is nothing, the central bank creates it from nothing. Materiels were there, if you change the production program completely, e.g. cancel He 111 and Ju 88. Factories could have been created or regrouped within about one year.

N NevadaK
First, thank you for your kind words!
When you read what I above say to Fastmongrel, you may imagine that a He 177/Hs 293 force could not successfully stand alone. Fierce attacks on Southwestern British airfields, performed e.g. by numbers of Messerschmitt Me 410s, from weeks before the first big anti-convoy action takes place, would have been necessary as well.
Please take a look at your own map (also, thank you very much for this work). The bend which your route makes off the southern tip of Iceland, in my eyes is the optimal point of attacking the convoys. It is well accessible from Northwest France or Southwest Norway. As I said above, it would be necessary to clear the way for the bombers. E.g. the Allies could have, and would have, occupied Ireland, if they saw this as necessary. From France, the German bombers must have crossed the Southwestern tip of Ireland. The Allies could have placed airfields and radar stations there, which would also become subject of German medium-range attacks. Radar ships were targets as well, the more as they demask themselves as such.
Smoke is no solution, as I argued above. The bombers must stay out of the range of AA fire. I say they would suffer unbearable losses, but for me it is enough to credit them to the carrier fighter force.

swampyankee swampyankee
Seeing Germany as incapable of performing such attacks at the end of 1942, it means the responsibles may have seen themselves capable for this at the end of 1943. The scenario says, what could have happened, had more creative persons taken over in Germany in autumn of 1942.

@All
Please let me return to my questions (my friend's statements) of July 8th. I asked:

1) The Allies are not able to group 30 carriers for protecting a single convoy nor to supply them.

2) The Allied side is not able to launch a satisfying number of fighters once the radar system detected the approaching German bombers.

3) The Allies are not able to keep a permanent overhead patrol of ~100 fightes airborne.

4) Yes, the German bombers will suffer losses. But: the Allies will loose carriers instead, for multiple losses of lives.


So, does still somebody mean:

1) The Allies have better things to do than trying to save Britain and could not or would not group 30 carriers, if needed.

2) Especially under bad-weather conditions of Nothern Atlantic, the carrier force is unable to launch a sufficient number of fighters, the more as the carriers had to turn to the opposite direction for a west-east-going convoy. This not even in case if the presence of Messerschmitt Me 261 reconnoisaters is already noted, so a coming attack is highly probable.

3) Cannot better describe this, than questioned already.

4) Everybody agreed to severe bomber losses. But there "should be" heavier-weighing Allied carrier losses, so this kind of attrition war were more promising for the German side.

Hope you still enjoy, and best regards,
RT
Click to expand...
Repeating the same stuff and adding new stuff doesn't make them facts or remote possibilities. The He177 was not a B-29 or a B-29 type especially with two glide bombs strapped under its wings. Germany never had the capacity to put fleets of 500 of them in the air at one time. We now have more recon aircraft and Me 410s used to wipe out UK air defences and the allies just let it happen. The fact is in 1944 Germany just had a few He177s they struggled to find and hit London and also struggled to find their way back. Launching attacks from 30 miles away and 30,000 ft could mean the convoy didn't realise it was attacked and more than 4% of bombers used were lost with no defensive action taken at all.
 
SaparotRob said:
That chart is great. By any chance do you have one for RN and IJN?
Click to expand...

Not a list,
At the beginning of World War II, the Royal Navy had 19 battleships and 80 cruisers. 50 older destroyers, along with other smaller crafts, were acquired from America in exchange for various naval bases. When World War II ended, the Royal Navy had 16 battleships, 50 carriers, 62 cruisers, nearly 200 destroyers, 131 submarines and also 9,000 other ships. Throughout the war they lost three hundred and fifty major warships and over one thousand smaller ships. At the beginning of the war there were 134,000 men in the Royal Navy and by the end of the war over 800,000 men were part of the navy. Over 50,000 sailors died in the war. The Royal Marines had about 80,000 men in 1945, and they took part in all of the important landings. The British Royal Navy during World War II - Summary & Facts.
 
Romantic Technofreak said:
fastmongrel fastmongrel


swampyankee swampyankee
Seeing Germany as incapable of performing such attacks at the end of 1942, it means the responsibles may have seen themselves capable for this at the end of 1943. The scenario says, what could have happened, had more creative persons taken over in Germany in autumn of 1942.

@All
Please let me return to my questions (my friend's statements) of July 8th. I asked:

1) The Allies are not able to group 30 carriers for protecting a single convoy nor to supply them.

2) The Allied side is not able to launch a satisfying number of fighters once the radar system detected the approaching German bombers.

3) The Allies are not able to keep a permanent overhead patrol of ~100 fightes airborne.

4) Yes, the German bombers will suffer losses. But: the Allies will loose carriers instead, for multiple losses of lives.


So, does still somebody mean:

1) The Allies have better things to do than trying to save Britain and could not or would not group 30 carriers, if needed.

2) Especially under bad-weather conditions of Nothern Atlantic, the carrier force is unable to launch a sufficient number of fighters, the more as the carriers had to turn to the opposite direction for a west-east-going convoy. This not even in case if the presence of Messerschmitt Me 261 reconnoisaters is already noted, so a coming attack is highly probable.

3) Cannot better describe this, than questioned already.

4) Everybody agreed to severe bomber losses. But there "should be" heavier-weighing Allied carrier losses, so this kind of attrition war were more promising for the German side.

Hope you still enjoy, and best regards,
RT
Click to expand...

While the Luftwaffe did perform large-scale attacks on convoys in the Mediterranean (with significant support for the Italian Air Force in many cases), it never seemed to have done significant planning to expand this to large-scale attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic. I think there are several reasons for this, including that a) the Luftwaffe did not have sufficiently reliable sources of information about convoy locations. The U-boats could maintain much longer time on station than could aircraft, so if a convoy is a few hours late, it could just hang around. An air group couldn't. b) the bomber stream would be subject to attack from aircraft based in the UK and Iceland both going to attack the convoy and on its return c) limitations on the potentially available weapons limited attack altitudes to be well within the engagement envelope of USN carrier aircraft. d) Germany was unable to develop any long-ranged, high-performance aircraft beyond building a couple of prototypes. Producing these aircraft would require sacrifice of other needed equipment. A B-29 required much more than four times the effort to produce than did a P-51.
 
fubar57 said:
Number of carriers by year

Click to expand...
Just curious if that list is counting USS Langley (CV-1) and USS Long Island (AVG-1) as carriers for 1940, as neither were fleet carriers.
Langley had been relegated to seaplane tending and aircraft transport by the late 30's and Long Island's class would soon be considered an "escort" class (CVE).
 
swampyankee said:
A B-29 required much more than four times the effort to produce than did a P-51
Click to expand...

A B-29 may have required twice the effort of a B-17 or B-24. This is part of what made the B-29 such a jump in performance over the earlier bombers.
It weighed empty about twice what the earlier bombers did and when loaded it was twice as heavy if not more. yes it carried about twice the bomb load but also held over twice the fuel.
The B-29s in the manual held 5638 gallons in the wing tanks (other models may have held more) or you could fill up 53 bf109s.

The Germans don't have to build exact B-29s but there is no magic that is going to give B-29 capabilities with a B-17/24 sized bomber, german engineering or no german engineering.
 
Shortround6 said:
A B-29 may have required twice the effort of a B-17 or B-24. This is part of what made the B-29 such a jump in performance over the earlier bombers.
It weighed empty about twice what the earlier bombers did and when loaded it was twice as heavy if not more. yes it carried about twice the bomb load but also held over twice the fuel.
The B-29s in the manual held 5638 gallons in the wing tanks (other models may have held more) or you could fill up 53 bf109s.

The Germans don't have to build exact B-29s but there is no magic that is going to give B-29 capabilities with a B-17/24 sized bomber, german engineering or no german engineering.
Click to expand...
Wow, 53 BF-109's. That really adds perspective to the Axis fuel situation.
 
SaparotRob said:
That chart is great. By any chance do you have one for RN and IJN?
Click to expand...
I think these really show how much of an advantage the allies really had in resources. Everyone is focused on the carriers, but the real telling number is in destroyers and frigates. The frigates were especially developed along British thinking for convoy escort. What you see in two years is the US going from none to 500 frigates. Those frigates were almost exclusively assigned to the North Atlantic and one reason the Battle of the Atlantic was essentially won in May 1943.
 
Romantic Technofreak said:
fastmongrel fastmongrel
One prerequisition for any German success is the appearance of Messerschmitt Me 261 long-range reconnoisaters. They have the speed and range for to perform the task. Give them some radar, and they could find (nearly) any convoy in any weather condition. They also could shadow any convoy by performing alternating patrol service. They are slower than a Corsair, of course, but can confuse and challenge the fighter force. I would even let a bunch of them do the first wave of an attack, for distracting the fighters.
Another trouble for the Germans was exact distance measuremant over thousands of kilometers. A special device for this was service-ready at the end of 1944, when it was too late. Probably change of priorities would have made accessible also this one year earlier.
So, once on the convoy, the Me 261s could have directed the bombers there. But the Allies also would know, if only the reconnoisaters are on the convoy, something is to expect.
On the flightpath outward, the bombers could have been guided by Focke-Wulf Fw 187 long-range fighters (hopefully nobody sees them with their weak engines the real versions had).
On the flightpath inward, the bombers could scatter and were not easy to be found by patrolling Allied fighters. More see below to NevadaK.
Money is nothing, the central bank creates it from nothing. Materiels were there, if you change the production program completely, e.g. cancel He 111 and Ju 88. Factories could have been created or regrouped within about one year.

N NevadaK
First, thank you for your kind words!
When you read what I above say to Fastmongrel, you may imagine that a He 177/Hs 293 force could not successfully stand alone. Fierce attacks on Southwestern British airfields, performed e.g. by numbers of Messerschmitt Me 410s, from weeks before the first big anti-convoy action takes place, would have been necessary as well.
Please take a look at your own map (also, thank you very much for this work). The bend which your route makes off the southern tip of Iceland, in my eyes is the optimal point of attacking the convoys. It is well accessible from Northwest France or Southwest Norway. As I said above, it would be necessary to clear the way for the bombers. E.g. the Allies could have, and would have, occupied Ireland, if they saw this as necessary. From France, the German bombers must have crossed the Southwestern tip of Ireland. The Allies could have placed airfields and radar stations there, which would also become subject of German medium-range attacks. Radar ships were targets as well, the more as they demask themselves as such.
Smoke is no solution, as I argued above. The bombers must stay out of the range of AA fire. I say they would suffer unbearable losses, but for me it is enough to credit them to the carrier fighter force.
RT
Click to expand...

Hey RT,

I think you are being overly optimistic in some of your proposed strategies. For instance, the idea that the LW could blast its way across Britain is a recipe for disaster. Not only does the UK have the most advanced air defense radar system, but it has a very high density of fighter aircraft especially single engine fighters like the spitfire. Your proposed route and target point just south of iceland would be within the range of these single engine fighter aircraft for practically the whole mission, a good portion of it without LW fighter escorts. One could imagine that losses would be similar to US 8th Air Force losses on the order of 25% - 30% per unescorted deep penetration mission. Two or three such attacks and your entire air force is broken. The idea that your bombers would split up and head home alone is also playing into the Allies hand. Single planes would always be visible to radar and history has shown that lone bombers are especially vulnerable. Overall, just seems like a bad idea. Expecting ME-410's to sweep the skies or airfields was never proven out during the war between equals. The UK's radar would never allow for a surprise attack and twin engine fighters are at a disadvantage against single engine aircraft. Really, you want to get your bombers to a position to attack the convoy with minimal losses and the best opportunity to operate unimpeded. To that end, you have to fly around England. Since the LW never knocked out radar in England or defeated the RAF, there is no reason to think that it would be possible in 1942-1943.

The ME-261 doesn't seem like a possibility as it uses a coupled engine with all of its problems. Not a dependable technology and not needed when U=Boats can perform the same tasks more safely.
 
Last edited:
NevadaK said:
The ME-261 doesn't seem like a possibility as it uses a couple engine with all of its problems. Not a dependable technology and not needed when U=Boats can perform the same tasks more safely.
Click to expand...
There were only three Me261s ever built,, all prototypes and all problematic.
The Ju86P was far more reliable and regularly used as high-altitude recon over Britian.
 
NevadaK said:
Hey RT,

I think you are being overly optimistic in some of your proposed strategies. For instance, the idea that the LW could blast its way across Britain is a recipe for disaster. Not only does the UK have the most advanced air defense radar system, but it has a very high density of fighter aircraft especially single engine fighters like the spitfire. .
Click to expand...
During 1943 it also had an increasing number of P-47s and P-51s with very eager trainee pilots and if you are in a Me410 a Typhoon becomes a devastating fighter too, as does a Mosquito.
 
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