What if lots of B-29-like bombers with glide bombs had attacked very well protected convoys?
- Thread starter Romantic Technofreak
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Instead of Germany putting all that effort into building B-29s, why didn't they just deploy a fleet of Do-STRA/Haunebu flying saucers?
Surely they would have cost about the same to make and but had better range...
Surely they would have cost about the same to make and but had better range...
fubar57
General
.....but weren't they based in Antarctica?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Yes. Yes they were.
But I beleive they had considerable range and didn't need drop tanks.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
...especially in not finding the convoy, they still lost 10 aircraft and their crews while flying within airspace controlled by the Allies.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
That is not necessarily the whole of it, I do believe die Luftwaffe could have done more (early on) than they did historically, though not enough to get decisive results. Countermeassures like the before mentioned rerouting would be employed, though expansion of bases in northern Norway could be a counter-counter. The resources needed to do that would be a large strain, but then again Hitler was already pouring an excessive amount of resources into this region.
That touches on the problem that Germany, at least after USSR and USA were in the war, did not have resources to avoid loosing the war, no matter how cleverly they used what they had or could get.
In any event not even on the allied side were everybody agreeing as to the best use of bombers, that is what targets were strategically the most important. Luckily their ability to tap into enemy signals traffic did assist them immensely in determining how much damage they were doing. Arguably Goering was not the one most sensitive to an indirect strategy, neither was Hitler. If Germany had found themselves in possession of 500 B-29's in, say, early 43, they would probably have been wasted away on raids on England or (though less likely though not unthinkably) support of ground forces in the Mediterranean or Ukraine. They may have caused a delay to the final collapse.
Not even hindsight in addition to 500 miracle planes (not implying B-29's were that, all their merit notwithstanding), could have made up for the overwhelming coalition that the axis fought, no matter how they were expended.
Going purely by the thread title, I would see the question as boiling down to "High-altitude bombers with controlled glide bombs vs convoy with carrier escort". This I personally consider an interesting scenario. With the glide bombs, the bombers can actually threaten ship from very high altitudes. Conversely, carrier aircraft were to my knowledge optimized for low-altitude performance, no?
I would say, the convoy absolutely needs radar first and foremost. Without it, there is no change to get fighters from the carrier up to altitude in time.
Even then though, the defending side needs to develop high-altitude-carrier-based fighter aircraft. I am clueless though, whether this is just a case of optimizing an existing carrier aircraft engine or merging a carrier-lane with another engine, or if it is an engineering nightmare, trying to get the sort of engine that will have a high output and high-altitude into an aircraft that can start and (more importantly) land on a carrier.
Even if the defenders could manage this, the attackers could try to go for ECM to void their radar. I daresay that without radar, the defenders will have a hard time maintaining a high-altitude CAP in sufficient numbers around the clock.
It gets even more fun of the attackers can also attack at night. Now the defenders need night-fighters with high-altitude performance (that can start and land on a carrier). Yay.
I would say, the convoy absolutely needs radar first and foremost. Without it, there is no change to get fighters from the carrier up to altitude in time.
Even then though, the defending side needs to develop high-altitude-carrier-based fighter aircraft. I am clueless though, whether this is just a case of optimizing an existing carrier aircraft engine or merging a carrier-lane with another engine, or if it is an engineering nightmare, trying to get the sort of engine that will have a high output and high-altitude into an aircraft that can start and (more importantly) land on a carrier.
Even if the defenders could manage this, the attackers could try to go for ECM to void their radar. I daresay that without radar, the defenders will have a hard time maintaining a high-altitude CAP in sufficient numbers around the clock.
It gets even more fun of the attackers can also attack at night. Now the defenders need night-fighters with high-altitude performance (that can start and land on a carrier). Yay.
Greetings All,
I apologize if this is a bit of a repost of my earlier post, but I took the time to make better diagrams and source out a couple references. Again, my approach to this discussion is to rely on equipment that would have been realistically available at the time. First off, since the proposal is for an aerial offensive an offensive intended cripple convoy's from North America to the ETO, it would be helpful to show the convoy routes for 1942 - May 1943, the time period when the war in the Atlantic could go either way. His is an illustration also showing the 1942 air gap, prior to the introduction of B-24 Liberator ASW bombers.
As you can see, the convoy routes actually bend quite a ways to the north to minimize the air gap. This gap would be closed beginning in mid-1942 with the introduction of the B-24 and construction of an airfield on the southern tip of Greenland named Blue West 1. In the course of this thread, two possible routes for the air offensive have been proposed, either from the south of France or Norway. Here is a diagram showing those two routes. The maximum proposed distance is 1500 miles with enough reserves for a 300 mile diameter search are to locate and attack a convoy. This distance is based on a HE-177 four engine variant with two externally slung glide bombs, most likely HS-293.
We can see that the northern route of the convoys puts them out of the range France based bombers, however, the transition from Iceland to Londonderry Liverpool is well within range of bombers based in Norway. Based on HE-177 production numbers (from Wikipedia) largest force the LW could field would be around 125 bombers. In the summer of 1943 around 300 bombers. The Battle of the Atlantic was significantly turned in May 1943 and was for all intents and purposes "won" by the Allies. For this thread, anything after June 1943 would need to be involve significantly larger air forces than the LW had available to have a meaningful impact on the war. The next diagram shows the coverage fo P-38 lightnings along the proposed attack routes
We can see that the route from Norway would be under the air coverage of P-38's throughout the entire operation. With P-38's being operation from Iceland in 1942, this is a reasonable scenario. The low number of available HE-177 would enable the low numbers of P-38's to be effective and not overwhelmed by numbers. Given that the proposed attacks would well exceed the range of German fighter escorts, we could also look to DH Mosquito FB equipped with external tanks to intercept bomber formations.
With greater range than the P-38 the Mosquito would have range to not only intercept the bomber stream, but loiter in search or pursuit. I believe this Mosquito variant was available by late 1942. We can also see that a significant portion of the route from France is within range of Mosquitos as well as the potential bases. This would allow for the bomber stream to be intercepted during formation as well as return to base when the bombers are most vulnerable although protected by German air cover. Given the possibility of an extended range HE-177 that could reach the northern convoy route, this diagram shows the range of long range Mosquito variants that first began to appear for photo-recon.
This is a reasonable proposal as the this modification was one of the earliest for the Mosquito and given the airframe's adaptability replacing the camera package for a gun package would be relatively easy. In the above diagram we are looking at bases from Greenland, Iceland, Northern Ireland and SW Britain. Much has been made of the difficulty locating a bomber formation well out to sea, however, picket ships were well in development and available beginning in 1942 with the SCR-268 Radar that had been adapted for picket ships in 1940/41 (range 30 miles) and the later AN/TPS-3 Mobile Radar (range 100 miles) that had been adapted in 1942/43 for use shipboard use. The next digram shows a picket ships along the route from southern France.
The diagram shows 25 picket ships along the flight path and the radius of coverage for the SCR-268. The last diagram shows all types of aircraft as well as the picket stations.
We can see that the northern route from Norway would be under almost continuous attack as well as vulnerable during form up and return. Attacking from Norway, would also require the LW to relocate fighter protection there to protect the bombers during these phases of operation affecting other theaters of the war. Attacking from the south would encounter fewer opposing fighters, but would also be under attack the entire flight and would require extended range operations. Based on production numbers the largest air operation the LW could possibly mount would be around 300 aircraft in early 1943. Given the number of convoys that crossed the Atlantic beginning in 1943, the LW would need to conduct operations several times per month to be have any impact on the war. If we assume a relatively light 15% loss rate for each mission, The anti-shipping squadrons would have lost 60% of the entire fleet after 8 missions. Less than a month of operations assuming good weather and twice a week missions.
I just don't see any way this could be successful.
I apologize if this is a bit of a repost of my earlier post, but I took the time to make better diagrams and source out a couple references. Again, my approach to this discussion is to rely on equipment that would have been realistically available at the time. First off, since the proposal is for an aerial offensive an offensive intended cripple convoy's from North America to the ETO, it would be helpful to show the convoy routes for 1942 - May 1943, the time period when the war in the Atlantic could go either way. His is an illustration also showing the 1942 air gap, prior to the introduction of B-24 Liberator ASW bombers.
As you can see, the convoy routes actually bend quite a ways to the north to minimize the air gap. This gap would be closed beginning in mid-1942 with the introduction of the B-24 and construction of an airfield on the southern tip of Greenland named Blue West 1. In the course of this thread, two possible routes for the air offensive have been proposed, either from the south of France or Norway. Here is a diagram showing those two routes. The maximum proposed distance is 1500 miles with enough reserves for a 300 mile diameter search are to locate and attack a convoy. This distance is based on a HE-177 four engine variant with two externally slung glide bombs, most likely HS-293.
We can see that the northern route of the convoys puts them out of the range France based bombers, however, the transition from Iceland to Londonderry Liverpool is well within range of bombers based in Norway. Based on HE-177 production numbers (from Wikipedia) largest force the LW could field would be around 125 bombers. In the summer of 1943 around 300 bombers. The Battle of the Atlantic was significantly turned in May 1943 and was for all intents and purposes "won" by the Allies. For this thread, anything after June 1943 would need to be involve significantly larger air forces than the LW had available to have a meaningful impact on the war. The next diagram shows the coverage fo P-38 lightnings along the proposed attack routes
We can see that the route from Norway would be under the air coverage of P-38's throughout the entire operation. With P-38's being operation from Iceland in 1942, this is a reasonable scenario. The low number of available HE-177 would enable the low numbers of P-38's to be effective and not overwhelmed by numbers. Given that the proposed attacks would well exceed the range of German fighter escorts, we could also look to DH Mosquito FB equipped with external tanks to intercept bomber formations.
With greater range than the P-38 the Mosquito would have range to not only intercept the bomber stream, but loiter in search or pursuit. I believe this Mosquito variant was available by late 1942. We can also see that a significant portion of the route from France is within range of Mosquitos as well as the potential bases. This would allow for the bomber stream to be intercepted during formation as well as return to base when the bombers are most vulnerable although protected by German air cover. Given the possibility of an extended range HE-177 that could reach the northern convoy route, this diagram shows the range of long range Mosquito variants that first began to appear for photo-recon.
This is a reasonable proposal as the this modification was one of the earliest for the Mosquito and given the airframe's adaptability replacing the camera package for a gun package would be relatively easy. In the above diagram we are looking at bases from Greenland, Iceland, Northern Ireland and SW Britain. Much has been made of the difficulty locating a bomber formation well out to sea, however, picket ships were well in development and available beginning in 1942 with the SCR-268 Radar that had been adapted for picket ships in 1940/41 (range 30 miles) and the later AN/TPS-3 Mobile Radar (range 100 miles) that had been adapted in 1942/43 for use shipboard use. The next digram shows a picket ships along the route from southern France.
The diagram shows 25 picket ships along the flight path and the radius of coverage for the SCR-268. The last diagram shows all types of aircraft as well as the picket stations.
We can see that the northern route from Norway would be under almost continuous attack as well as vulnerable during form up and return. Attacking from Norway, would also require the LW to relocate fighter protection there to protect the bombers during these phases of operation affecting other theaters of the war. Attacking from the south would encounter fewer opposing fighters, but would also be under attack the entire flight and would require extended range operations. Based on production numbers the largest air operation the LW could possibly mount would be around 300 aircraft in early 1943. Given the number of convoys that crossed the Atlantic beginning in 1943, the LW would need to conduct operations several times per month to be have any impact on the war. If we assume a relatively light 15% loss rate for each mission, The anti-shipping squadrons would have lost 60% of the entire fleet after 8 missions. Less than a month of operations assuming good weather and twice a week missions.
I just don't see any way this could be successful.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
My issue is nothing to do with defences it is navigation. Unless you know exactly where you are at all times when you reach the search area, but have been blown 100 miles west and you turn west to continue your search whether you find a convoy or not you will head for the mid Atlantic thinking it is home. By the same token if you are blown 100 miles east and continue the search east when you head home to France you will actually just stroll into the UKs air defences. There were many RAF and USA aircrews lost while training simply because they didn't know where they were in very bad weather, they flew into the ground or ran out of fuel. It took years for the people involved in long distance patrols over the Atlantic to become good at it, as with night time navigation
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
Each one of those bomber's sorties would use about the same amount of fuel as 40 to 50 Bf109s or FW190s, so take those off the Eastern Front. They'd also take about as much effort to manufacture as at least 6 FW190s or Bf109's, so this bomber force would require the elimination of about 3,000 fighters plus each raid would eliminate a minimum of 20,000 fighter sorties. Now, the Allies would need to put extra effort into defending these convoys, but reducing assets sent to the Pacific, which may push victory there off by a few months, and transferring US assets tied up in tertiary theatres, like defense of the Panama Canal, air defense in California, and so forth would probably cover most of those assets needed for Atlantic convoy defense.
Now, to get a high-altitude carrier-based interceptor:
Now, to get a high-altitude carrier-based interceptor:
- Produce the XF6F-4 variant, with a turbocharged engine. Along with this, one could produce a night fighter variant, comparable to the F6F-3N or F6F-5N
- Goodyear built a turbocharged variant of the Corsair, the FG-3; this could also be produced
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
That's great work NevadaK. I appreciate the excellent visual aids.
Shortround6
Major General
The interesting situation is time travel.
The US barely had production B-29s as of Dec 1 1943. 1st production plane left the factory in Sept 1943 however.
"By mid-January 1944, 97 B-29s had been built by Wichita, but unfortunately only 16 of these were flyable."
Somehow the Germans are supposed to come up with something comparable and put into mass production months before the United states?
BTW a He 177 with four separate engines isn't really the answer. Certainly not in 1943.
Using four engine nacelles may solve the inflight fire problem (mostly) but using four separate DB 605 engines certainly doesn't bestow B-29 like altitude capability (or even B-17 altitude capability)
The standard DB 605A won't give the power at altitude needed. The DB 605AS is better but becomes available when? and still won't give the He 177 enough altitude capability to avoid bog standard F4U Corsairs.
The DB 603A isn't going to work either.
The German bomber doesn't have the engines or the defensive armament to come close to making this work (much lower operating ceiling.).
According some sources some the Maritime attacks by KG 40 were not exactly stellar successes
"This aircraft was issued to KG 40 in the summer of 1943, to be used in combination with the Henschel Hs 293 glider-bomb. This was a small radio controlled powered glider designed for use against merchant ships. The He 177 could carry one under each wing, and in theory the Hs 293 could hit a target from a range of up to five miles.
KG 40 began operations with the He 177 in November 1943. Their first major operation came on 21 November and was an attack on a British convoy in the Bay of Biscay. Twenty five aircraft took off, two had to return to base early, one crashed thirty miles away, one was lost in the attack, and two more on the return journey. In return one small merchant ship was sunk, although the crew escaped. One successful aspect of the He 177 was its range. Five days later the same unit launched an attack on an allied convoy off the coast of Algeria, with 21 aircraft. This time they ran into fighters, and six aircraft were lost, although a German troop ship was sunk.
The heavy losses suffered on these two missions forced KG 40 to abandon daylight attacks. Night attacks, with the target ships illuminated by flares, took their place, with even less success, although losses to enemy activity were reduced. "
from Heinkel He 177 Greif (Griffon)
Greetings Fastmongrel,
Unfortunately I can't understand what's happening. I've looked at the post on a couple devices and it works fine. Sorry.
Kk
Greetings Shortround6,
In my opinion, we aren't looking at a B-29 type aircraft, but a more dependable HE-177 with all the other limitations. A lot of emphasis is being placed on flying high to avoid interception, but the reality is the HS-293 needs to be released below 20,000ft and with good line of site. The ability to fly high, would be a useless capability if at the time of attack you are significantly lower.
Kk
Completely agree, pbehn.
I wondered if navigation could be assisted by either a homing signal from a U-Boat or more likely a weather station on the east coast of Greenland, but this would draw a lot of attention and be a compelling target to the Allies. There were clandestine German weather stations established on Greenland, but once the US entered the war, these were hunted and attacked. I can't imagine a homing station set up there to facilitate navigation.
Kk
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,030
- Jun 25, 2013
A homing station on a U-boat would also acquire quite a bit of unwanted attention. This would also require considerable communication with the U-boat for the purpose of strike coordination, which would be somewhat noticeable. Also, given the Luftwaffe's reportedly poor signals security, the strike's course and schedule would be well known to the Allies.
What signals are required for decent radio navigation? I take it stations on occupied France and Norway would not do the trick? Didn't heavy bombers do to their size space for better equipment for radio navigation?
Another thing, what was the allies radar coverage of the Atlantic? Having fighters that could intercept the bombers is fine, but without radar, finding them sounds like an issue.
Also, please let's get away from the B-29 and lets focus more on some purpose-build bomber for that mission. Could have been a Projekt A for all I care, something with long range and high-altitude (don't these two go hand in hand?), though long endurance would also be welcome.
The absolute need for Werhrmacht to obtain meteorological forecasts was satisfied until Kriegsmarine was able to count on a good number of submarines in the middle of the Atlantic, that is, until May 1943, and the U-boot Commanders that did not regularly sent the data were severely reprimanded. In particular, two areas had to be kept under constant control, the areas near Greenland and around Azores, which are meteorologically very important for the weather in Europe, as perturbations move from west to east. After 1943 Kriegsmarine was therefore forced to send submarines with the sole purpose of providing these meteorological data as regularly as possible from those areas. But for the Allies it was strategically extremely important that Werhrmacht didin't get reliable weather forecasts (see what happened for Overlord and Battle of the Bulge) so US Navy sent special task-forces to eliminate them. With the aid of HF-DF stations, based both on the ground and installed on destroyers, meteorological submarines were wiped out from the sea. Even if sending meteorological data was a matter of minutes, if not seconds, emitting radio signals was a deadly assigment for an U-boot: see the fate of U-248, a "meteorological" submarine, sunk by the task force made by destroyer-escorts USS Hayter, USS Otter, USS Varian and USS Hubbard north of the Azores, 16 January 1945.
.
.
- Thread starter
- #140
Romantic Technofreak
Airman
- 37
- Jul 12, 2008
Dimlee
In fact, Germany suffered from a more and more galloping inflation throughout the war, while there still was a great reserve of labour force. Especially, the Nazis had objections against women working. They feared for their fertility. Also, the Nazi brass needed maids to polish their boots. This is not a joke, they really thought like this.
N NevadaK
Great graphic work again, thank you for this!
Sorry if I don't share your focus on Allied fighter development, although all of this could have been created. What of this had been there in autumn of 1943?
You seem to feel a bit safe when you rely on what happened in reality. You should realize that Heinkel He 100 (yes, surface vaporization cooling was possible, if managed correctly, such things are what my friend is able to find out) and Focke-Wulf Fw 187 stood "nearly" ready for production. Attacks on Britain under their escort, and against strategically important targets, and the situation may have changed drastically. Even the first jet fighters could have seen service in autumn 1943 (although I would have them used in the defensive role).
The Messerschmitt Me 261 stood ready for troop testing in the beginning of 1942, but was discontinued. This in a situation when Messerschmitt had a very bad stand because of the failure of the Me 210. Dönitz demanded a reconnoisater which had the properties of the Me 261, but he knew nothing about aircraft development and subsequently did not meddle.
Contrary to the He 177, in the Me 261 the coupled engines worked well, minor engineering trouble notwithstanding. Add radar, and it could find convoys far out (what the Junkers Ju 290 also did, but this one was a transporter). My friend likes to add a quadruple of 37mm cannons, so it could cause considerable damage. Add rockets, and do the same (my friend uses to say, there is always something that will burn). Add bombs, and you can attack an airfield on Iceland. The Me 261 could even reach Goose Bay in Newfoundland. Take the production capacity of the Fw 200, and get a reconnoisater/fast bomber Germany would badly have needed for Atlantic warfare.
(I already commented something to a distance calculator device.)
A Acheron
As I argued before, the Fritz X was not suitable for the North Atlantic theater. The Hs 293 needed a comparedly low height to be launched for technical reasons. So I see no need for a carrier-based high altitude fighter force.
Best regards,
RT
Users who are viewing this thread
Similar threads
