What is a strategic bomber?

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Well a better tank by D Day
More lift capacity
More precision fighter bombers

of course a tank and a lanc arnt the same but we had emphasis in the wrong places at times

I think the question was on why were sausages rationed!

At times maybe so. It is possible to argue with hindsight, but by 1944 we were dependent on the Americans for tanks, lift capacity, though not fighter bombers. Fighter bombers were plentiful, there were reasons having nothing to do with production capacity why they were not specialised ground attack aircraft.

The British weren't planning an invasion in 1940, 1941, 1942, and barely 1943. They were carrying out a strategic bombing campaign for which they needed strategic bombers, all those Lancasters and Halifaxes.

They were doing it on their own for a long period. The US 8th AF joined in, but when was its first raid on Germany? Early 1943 IIRC and then not in great strength. The Americans certainly made up for it later and won the decisive battle against the Luftwaffe. This, arguably, was the only decisive result to come from the entire campaign and the Americans deserve great credit for it.

Cheers

Steve
 
A better tank for D-day does nothing to help the Russians in 1942 or even show them that the British are still in the war. Same for more lift capability.

As for "More precision fighter bombers", I am not sure what you mean? That fighter bombers are more precise than medium/heavy bombers and more should have been made instead? Fighter bombers have lousy range and while good for the tactical battle don't do anything for striking at the means of production. Or for anti-sub work or anything requiring delivering loads at a distance.
Do you mean a better, more precise fighter bomber? That is a three pronged problem with the airframe being outside the three areas. For a precise fighter bomber you need 1, target location/identification form the air. ( a better sensor than the eyeball MK I), a better sighting system and more precise ordnance. The air to ground rockets were pretty crappy and would defy/frustrate even better sights. Bombs are limited in number and not all that precise either. Guns are the most precise but see gun camera footage to see how far off many of those bullet/shell strikes are. Guns also have limited hitting power against armored targets.

British might have done better to put a bit more effort into artillery. While their 'system' and communications took a back seat to none their selection of guns and shells left more than a bit to be desired. Artillery works pretty well 24 hours a day and in dark, rain and snow. Something that cannot be said for fighter bombers.
 
I think there were better uses of the British labour force and economy than building so many Halifaxes and Lancasters.

There probably were, but at the time, not building them was not one of them. The heavy bomber was considered, even once the shooting started and people began to revise their tactics in use to wage modern war, a vital part of defence and attack. it was a bit like the battleship; there was reason to believe and a few forward thinkers had proposed the very thought, that it was obsolete in modern warfare, but it still had a useful and highly productive role. Heavy bombers could unleash enormous destruction on a given area in a relatively small space of time, which was their raison d'etre. A useful tool in unrestricted warfare. The heavy bomber's direct impact on the war is immeasurable - easily said with hindsight, and at the time it was not just a symbol of prestige, but considered a very real means of shortening the war.
 
The Germans spent quite the resources on the Flak arm. More than half a million men were in service as early as 1940, manning not just the guns, but also the reflectors, communications, etc*. The shells manufactured for the guns of 8,8 cm and bigger went between 400 000 and, from 1941, up to 1400 000 per month. Before the BoB, there was something like 10000 light AA and almost 4000 heavy guns under LW control. In 1942, the Gemans were spending 27-28% of total Wehrmacht waepon budget, and 15-17% of total W. ammo budget*. Most of the Flak forces being deployed west of Berlin.
In second half of 1942, RAF estimated that losses due to Flak were 193 aircraft, the damaged A/C numbered 918. Basically, one kill and five damaged aircraft per 24 hours. That was done by 866 heavy Flak batteries (4 guns each = 3464 guns) and 621 light batteries, available in Germany proper and in the occupied West. Introduction of radar meant that the ratio of heavy shells expanded per kill dropped down to 4000.
RAF loosing more aircraft due to mechanical issues, bad weather and faulty navigation, than the Flak in 1941-42?

The RAF's bomber campaign against Germany was pretty effective way to tie up significant German resources even in the days when no targets wee hit.

*for the Flak forces
 
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