What is a strategic bomber?

[stona]

I think that the Luftwaffe's bombing of targets such as those related to the aircraft industry, docks and installations in many British ports and similar targets would certainly be considered part of a strategic campaign.
Unfortunately for them the bombers involved didn't really carry the loads required to mount such a campaign effectively, though they certainly achieved some results in the short term.
You could argue that they were attempting a strategic campaign with what were not really strategic bombers.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

I think that the Luftwaffe's bombing of targets such as those related to the aircraft industry, docks and installations in many British ports and similar targets would certainly be considered part of a strategic campaign.
Unfortunately for them the bombers involved didn't really carry the loads required to mount such a campaign effectively, though they certainly achieved some results in the short term.
You could argue that they were attempting a strategic campaign with what were not really strategic bombers.
Cheers
Steve

I think this is where a large part of the argument comes from.
We are looking back with experience of all of WW II (and beyond) to decide what was an effective strategic bomber (or campaign) and applying those "new" standards to pre-war and early war aircraft.
Everybody over estimated the destructive effects of their bombs, 0ver estimated the civilians likely hood of mass panic, under estimated the time needed to repair bomb damage. they also underestimated the capability of the defense (both AA and fighters).
Just because a plane could not meet the late war or post war 'standards' for a strategic bomber doesn't mean a pre-war aircraft wasn't intended to perform strategic missions. A late 1930's definition of strategic bomber might have been one that could reach a strategic target (factory, energy target or transportation hub) with any sort of bomb load and return home.

 

[stona]

I believe all the RAF's bombers were intended to be part of a strategic force.

The theory of strategic bombing is essentially that the best use of air power is to use it offensively to penetrate deep into the enemy's air space and to disrupt and destroy his economy and war production, thus forcing his surrender. Success is dependant on either fatally compromising the ability to carry on the fight or breaking the will of the people or their leadership to carry on the fight.

RAF doctrine was largely formed by the influence of Trenchard (some would say baleful influence) who had commanded the Independent Bombing Force in WW1. He was unequivocal in his belief that the strategic objective of the RAF was "the overthrow of the enemy by a bombing offensive without which neither the Navy, nor the Army could achieve victory in a continental war." This he continued was "the raison d'etre of an independent Air Force..."

This is what the RAF was set up to do, and it's bombing force, Bomber Command was equipped to do so. Unlike in Germany a decision was taken in 1937 to develop Bomber Command into a force of 1,442 four engine bombers with the capability of striking deep into the airspace of continental adversaries, rather obviously Germany by this time. Concrete runways were also laid at all Bomber Command's bases.

Cheers

Steve

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I think this is where a large part of the argument comes from.
We are looking back with experience of all of WW II (and beyond) to decide what was an effective strategic bomber (or campaign) and applying those "new" standards to pre-war and early war aircraft.

I think SR is right in this. In modern parlance, strategic seems to be defined by a combination of considerations and I expect we are influenced by this perspective:

Individual considerations:

Nature of the target (as has been described)

Purpose or Desired Effect of the damage to be inflicted: The mission's motivation.

Nature of the delivery vehicle (long range (WW2 era 4 engined but post-war; progressively larger number of engined) bombers evolving to now including surface and submarine launched ballistic missiles from their inception with the V-2 which would now be regarded as a tactical or medium-range BM.

Range to the Target Seems to be the most variable of the parameters ranging from your 200-300 miles (cross channel V-2 attacks on London to attacks made at intercontinental distances >3,000 miles.

Nature of the weapon: clearly an important consideration in assigning the appellation: 'strategic' A nuclear weapon carried over an intercontinental distance is typically considered strategic but the same vehicle flying over the same distance but carrying conventional ordnance can be 'tactical' as was the case when US B-2's B-52's flew from US Bases to drop HE bombs on Libya, Kuwait and I believe on Taliban positions in Afghanistan; or for that matter, the RAF Black Buck Vulcan raids on the Falklands from Ascension Island.

 

[Balljoint]

So then we have to look at the Luftwaffe bombing campaign in the early stages of the BoB, where there was a combination of bombing industry (strategic) and bombing military targets (tactical) all with the use of two-engined bombers.

Also, if a flight of single-engined dive bombers were dedicated to an industrial target (or multiple industrial targets during the same mission), would this also fall under a strategic mission?

Or could it be even more subjective? If Sea Lowe was a bluff and the BoB was essentially punishment to induce Britain accommodate Hitler, would the BoB be essentially strategic in its entirety –assuming that terror bombing isn't tactical?

 

[stona]

I don't think that German operations against the RAF itself during the BoB could be considered strategic bombing, though obviously any military campaign serves a larger strategy. The bombing of ports and of course London and other cities was a failed attempt at a strategic campaign.

The switch to London was made expressly to attempt to force the British to negotiate. It was an attempt at one of the very strategic objectives outlined by Trenchard above.
So called terror bombing is strategic bombing. It is an effort to break the will of a people or their leaders to continue the fight.

It's only fair to point out that despite twenty years of planning the RAF had also produced a bomber force incapable of mounting a strategic campaign. It's bombers could not survive by day and couldn't find, let alone hit, anything by night.
In the first five months of the war Trenchard's much vaunted offensive bomber force dropped a grand total of 33 tons of bombs. They did drop a lot of leaflets though

Cheers

Steve

 

[Balljoint]

My point, which was not well put, is that strategic or tactical depends on the purpose to which the bomber is put rather than an intrinsic feature of a bomber. Heavy bombers were used for tactical bombing on the June 6 beaches, at Caen and the very successfully 1500 heavy bomber carpet bombing at St. Lo in operation Cobra that facilitated the Falaise breakthrough. However, the heavies were a blunt if powerful tactical weapons and the classical tactical CAS P-47 chewed up the routed Germans.

Put differently, when Eisenhower was running the show, the heavies were tactical. When command reverted to the AF generals, they were strategic.

 

[wuzak]

My point, which was not well put, is that strategic or tactical depends on the purpose to which the bomber is put rather than an intrinsic feature of a bomber. Heavy bombers were used for tactical bombing on the June 6 beaches, at Caen and the very successfully 1500 heavy bomber carpet bombing at St. Lo in operation Cobra that facilitated the Falaise breakthrough. However, the heavies were a blunt if powerful tactical weapons and the classical tactical CAS P-47 chewed up the routed Germans.

Put differently, when Eisenhower was running the show, the heavies were tactical. When command reverted to the AF generals, they were strategic.

I think I'm with you on this.

A bomber can be designed to primarily perform strategic operations, but it still will be able to perform tactical operations. And Vice Versa.

In other words, the bomber is just a bomber, it is the target which is strategic or tactical.

 

[Shortround6]

I think I'm with you on this.

A bomber can be designed to primarily perform strategic operations, but it still will be able to perform tactical operations. And Vice Versa.

In other words, the bomber is just a bomber, it is the target which is strategic or tactical.

To a large extent I agree with you. However some bombers are biased towards one mission or another. A single engine bomber with just one forward firing MG and a range of 1000 miles is intended for a rather different mission than a single engine "bomber" that carried 4 forward firing MGs and had a range of 500 miles or under even if both carried around 1000lbs of bombs.

AS Stona posted " Unlike in Germany a decision was taken in 1937 to develop Bomber Command into a force of 1,442 four engine bombers with the capability of striking deep into the airspace of continental adversaries, rather obviously Germany by this time."

However NONE of those planned bombers were going to be available before 1940 and most would not be available until 1941 or even 1942 (first operational sorties by 4 engine bombers were in 1941?) . In the meantime the strategic mission/s would have to be fulfilled by the twin engine (or single engine) bombers either in service or going into service in 1937-38-39-40. The twins or single engine bombers might not have been what the British wanted in their wish list but they were what was available and what was technically possible at the time of their design and introduction.

Many countries built twin engine bombers in the 30s with way more range than was needed for "tactical" targets and many of them had a single (or occasionally two) 7.5-8mm MGs firing out the front that could be used for strafing which is pretty poor armament for a "tactical" bomber intended to attack anything even close to the front lines.
The fact that most of these twin engine bombers (and singles) were replaced by 4 engine bombers in just a few years (in some countries anyway) doesn't mean that they were NOT considered strategic bombers when ordered or first built.

 

[GregP]

This would make a good alternate history novel. All we need are characters ... we have a plot ... and we know the ending.

 

[GrauGeist]

Geography can play a part in dictating what is required in a prime bombing force, too.

The bomber ideology of the 1920's and 1930's in Europe was different than Japan's or the U.S.

 

[GregP]

For some strange reason I have always liked the Amiot twins. Like the Amiot 370:

Just LOOKS good. No defensive armamaent to speak of and little to recommend it, but it was fast for the power and time.

 

[stona]

At the beginning of WW2 Germany's tactical bombers attempted to perform a strategic campaign against Britain and failed for a variety of reasons. Britain's strategic bombers attempted a strategic offensive against Germany and also failed, albeit for different reasons.

Subsequently the British developed a large four engine bombing force, designed to operate at night and at astronomical expense. This was only ever intended as a strategic bombing force, both in the sense that Trenchard would have understood in the 1920s and any commander of SAC in the 1960s. This force could be used in a tactical role, as above, but that was not why it was built, certainly not its raison d'etre.

The Germans never developed a strategic bomber force in this sense, in fact they never really produced a viable strategic bomber.

The Americans also developed a strategic bomber force. We all blithely refer to the 8th Air Force throughout the war, but in fact it was renamed United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) and the VIII Bomber Command was redesignated as 8th Air Force. The new 8th AF was always under the control of USSTAF.

The Americans wanted to go much further. Arnold wanted to create an entirely new position (and staff) that of a supreme Allied strategic air commander, something that would allow the USAAF to pursue its strategic objectives unhindered by the considerations of other commanders involved in invasion planning who understandably expected tactical support around the invasion.
The RAF, for reasons of its own never supported this idea and the differences weren't settled until the Cairo conference of 3rd-7th December 1943 at which the creation of USSTAF was a compromise.

I agree that it is targets that are either strategic or tactical, but bomber forces were developed and designed primarily to perform one or the other roles.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Bad-Karma]

Thread needs moar:

 

[l'Omnivore Sobriquet]

Just trying :

The strategic bomber is aimed at the decision-maker : the Prime Minister, the First Secretary, the President, the Front Driver...(i.e. Fürher.)

The tactical bomber is aimed at the soldier.

 

[Shortround6]

To some extent.

A Strategic bomber is also aimed at the factories that make the weapons or the transportation between mines/wells/forests and factories. A tactical bomber can be aimed at the supply routes bringing ammo, fuel and food to the soldier. It gets blurry depending on how far back from the front line you interrupt the supply chain.

The French LeO 451 had a range of 2900km and a small group of them is supposed to have bombed Palermo, Italy ( on Sicily) before the French campaign ended which is hardly a tactical target on the French/Italian front. The Amiot 354 had even more range. Both had a single 7.5mg out the nose which makes for a pretty poor strafing aircraft. Both had longer 'nominal' ranges than the 4 engine Farman F 222/223 bombers although the Farman F 222/223 carried a much heavier load.

 

[stona]

A Strategic bomber is also aimed at the factories that make the weapons or the transportation between mines/wells/forests and factories. A tactical bomber can be aimed at the supply routes bringing ammo, fuel and food to the soldier. It gets blurry depending on how far back from the front line you interrupt the supply chain.

It does get blurry, but less so in WW2 due to the much more limited range of many aircraft. To put this in scale the RAF's 2nd TAF classified its armed reconnaissance sorties as shallow or deep. Deep sorties were those that passed a line roughly 60 miles behind the front, but these were still very definitely tactical missions.

The difference is that you can't bomb someone out of the war by tactical bombing, though you might bomb him out of a battle. Strategic theory of the 1920s and 30s held that strategic attacks on an enemies economy and people could bomb them out of the war altogether, though as Harris conceded, this had never actually been tried.

Both British and US doctrine held that bombing of the enemy people might tip the balance, though in the case of the US it was considered most useful when the enemy was already on the point of collapse, kicking him when he was already down rather than kicking him down as was the case for the British.
Tactical bombing is much more targeted on visible military objectives, though a French railwayman might beg to differ.

Cheers

Steve

 

[mhuxt]

I always wonder whether the Reichsbahn and its satellites in occupied Europe ever kept records of what railway attacks occurred when, and whether those records are available.

I imagine there were a number of Norwegian merchant seamen who felt ambivalent at best about the activities of the coastal command strike fighters.

 

[stona]

I always wonder whether the Reichsbahn and its satellites in occupied Europe ever kept records of what railway attacks occurred when, and whether those records are available.

I imagine there were a number of Norwegian merchant seamen who felt ambivalent at best about the activities of the coastal command strike fighters.

The attacks must have been recorded, at least in local police and military reports. The efforts to fix the damage must also have been recorded. What survives I don't know. It wouldn't surprise me, given the German penchant for record keeping, if the railway itself kept a central record. Who knows what might survive? Maybe a railway historian.

I agree about your Norwegian fishermen, they wouldn't be the only ones either. The difference is that, in whatever euphemistic language the British and Americans might have couched it, strategic bombing deliberately targets civilians.
The moment the USAAF started to use H2S to bomb through cloud on 27th September 1943 any pretence of targeting legitimate military objectives was unsustainable. It was already effectively, unintentionally, area bombing, but now the aiming point became the city centre, just like the RAF.

Tactical bombing kills civilians, and in large numbers particularly when carried out by strategic bombers, but they are not an intentional target. Now we use other euphemisms like 'collateral' to describe such casualties.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Strategic bombing was the product of the idea that heavy bombing could win a war. With the bombing of London by Zeppelins and of cities in the Spanish war there was an idea that this bombing alone would produce enough panic that the citizens would demand peace. Despite this not working on London and England in General it was still believed to be true. A strategic bomber is obviously part of a strategy but strategies change. American strategic bombers may have been designed to flatten cities, they were used to flatten oil plants and eventually to draw the Luftwaffe into combat. The lanc was a strategic bomber but was used in precision raids on ships dams and bridges. The mossie was a precision bomber but was also used to unload explosives over cities at night just to be a nuisance. Much is just a question of what the words mean.