What was the most powerful battleship in a straight duel, May 1941?

[Glider]

The turrets of the Rodney bounced out of their mountings and the interior of the ship was so badly damaged that she could never face a enemy battleship again. There were a lot of flooding and everything on the walls of the ship popped off.

Read the after battle report of the American crew that was on board her taking the ship back to the US for refit.

Henk
I would like to read this report, is it possible to give me a link or name of a book whatever. It would be appreciated as third party views on this type of thing are invaluble.

 

[renrich]

Although Washington is not included in this poll, I would vote for her if she were, as, although the same class, she had an improved armor scheme over North Carolina.

 

[Freebird]

The Rodney never got her refit mate and Go and look at the Books regarding the Bismarck, Robert D Ballard's book had it in it and why dint the other British Battleships have these problems. Look it up.

Your facts are off on this one Henk, it was re-fitted in July 1941, new radars installed.

HMS Rodney
"June 13 1941 - passage to Boston, Mass
July 1941 - under repair refit in Boston Navy Yard
Aug 12 1941 - refit complete. "

HMS Rodney, British battleship, WW2

 

[Freebird]

I am a firm believer that Hoods reputation is reduced unjustifiedly by her rapid demise at denmark street. If You compare Hoods armour layout with that of Nagato, Mackensen class BC´s (also approaches to a fast BB) and Dunkerque, she comes out best. If you set her up against Maryland class BB´s, it´s more difficult to tell in between. I am tempted to give the Marylands an edge due to their consistent armour scheme but it depends on the condition. Only the Nelson appears to be solidly better, but not decisevely better, and her armour scheme was terribly flawed and recognized for poor compromisses. HMS HOOD was better protected against a larger number of threads but definetely had some weak points remaining.

Finally, Rodney was very, very lucky not to get hit. Her armour scheme is defective. The innermounted, inclined main belt does add protection only FOR THE UPPER HULL. It terminates 2 ft. below dwl. ANY IMPACT ON THE WATERLINE AT DISTANCES, AT WHICH THE BELT SHOULD STOP THE PROJECTILE OTHERWISE WILL END UP GOING UNDER THE BELT WELL INTO THE VITALS UNHINDERED. The drawing below is for a projectile with an angle of fall of 16 deg (=ca. 21.000 yards for the 15"/52, if hit on the belt, the projectile achieves partial penetration out to 20.000 yards). The side protection therefore has no immune zone at all for the embedded vitals (machinery spaces magazines).
The turrets are reasonably well protected, the barbettes are not. The 15" barbettes are only above the unarmoured weatherdeck, below the deck it´s two deck deep only 12" thick, which will be defeated out to 30.000 yards and thus beyond any fighting distances. This is important because these thinner barbettes are not shielded by additional citadell armour and weatherdeck armour. It will attract flukes. The CT, too, is only 12" thick. The deck armour over magazines is excellent but the deck armour over machinery spaces is just mediocre and may be defeated starting from 24.000 yards. Finally I would like to stress that the whole waterline length is unprotected (the belt is innermounted) and thus subject to off centre flooding. Add in the UK philosophy of low metacentric stability and You end up with a design asking for problems.

There is something I have been wondering about, it was standard naval tactics to try to bring your broadside to bear on the enemy, as most Battleships had 4 x 2, or 3 x 3 main guns, fore aft. But with the Nelson class it was almost equally effective approaching the enemy 10 or 15 deg. off the bow, as it would be to broadside. If you were improving a design like the "Nelson" class, obviously extending the belt would be better, but what about inclined deck armour? if you always expected to be fired on from the bows, rather than at your broadside, couldn't the ship be designed with heavy inclined deck armour, so that any incoming shells would be impacting at a high oblique angle? I'm thinking that the engine shp displacement would be higher of course, to carry the increased armour. To compensate for the heavier deck armour, if needed, even a slightly weaker {but extended lower} belt, as the ship would plan to always be in action with at least 1 or 2 other British BC's or BB's and would try to never expose the broadside.

 

[Freebird]

LoL thanks for the corrections Freebird, as you might have noticed Battleships aint my main interest

Hey no problem, we all make typos errors sometimes. What was the greatest flaw in the Bismarck? {IMHO} The fact that Germany never completed a CVL to cover for the "raiding forces" . They laid down "Seydlitz" 5 months after "Prince Eugen", which was completed end of July 1940. "Seydlitz" was planned to convert to a light fast carrier, but was obviously not given much priority, as it was never completed. It could have been finished by the spring of 1941, and sent with Bismarck. I don't imagine the "Swordfish" attack on Bismarck would go quite so well if there had been a dozen Me 109's as CAP.

 

[renrich]

The greatest flaw in the Bismarck was having Hitler as the C in C in name and in fact. He knew nothing about naval warfare and wasn't emotionally suited to be C in C. To use a CV as an escort for a BB would be getting it all backwards. During WW2, the BB was no longer "the" capital ship. It was the escort and support for the CV.

 

[Freebird]

The greatest flaw in the Bismarck was having Hitler as the C in C in name and in fact. He knew nothing about naval warfare and wasn't emotionally suited to be C in C.

You have a point there.

To use a CV as an escort for a BB would be getting it all backwards. During WW2, the BB was no longer "the" capital ship. It was the escort and support for the CV.

Only in the Pacific Ren, in the Med the Battleship was still King, mainly because shore-based airpower could neutralize carrier aircraft. The Germans couldn't hope to have a CV striking force like the Japanese unless they built at least 2 or 3 CV's. The surface ships were quite effective at sinking shipping, especially in distant areas, like the south Atlantic. IF the choice was made to use Bismarck, Sharnhorst Eugen as raiders, it would have been sensible to have a CVL as escort. The idea of BB's as escorts for CV's applied more to the wide-open Pacific than it did to the Atlantic or the Med. The Atlantic storms could render aircraft operations difficult for days on end, even if you could launch your TB's, the wave action could make torpedo launch almost impossible. And unguided bombs were almost ineffective against BB's before 1945, unlike CV's. In the Med Battleship actions were more common than CV actions.

 

[renrich]

Freebird, the weather in the North Atlantic was indeed often difficult but it did not prevent CVEs from operating against U-boats. Land based AC made the Med a dangerous arena for all ships. The main reason that there was not the emphasis on carrier warfare in the ETO that there was in the Pacific was that warfare there was continental in nature and there was the availability of land bases for AC and there were not the targets in terms of shipping for the Allies to have used their carriers against. Just think what a nightmare it would have been if the Axis in the ETO had been maritime powers like Japan was and had had the offensive power with carriers that the IJN had. Far fetched as it seems, lets say that Germany and Italy together had a highly trained carrier force with the supporting ships available in 1939. They invade Poland and the war is on. Their Navy sorties and first scours the RN and French from the Med and it becomes an Axis lake and then they go after the RN in the Atlantic. They blockade Britain and the RN has to challenge. They don't even need much help from U-boats and they defeat the RN. The British can't even get the BEF back from France. The only reason the Axis even need BBs is to guard against the enemy slipping up close at night to the carriers while their AC can't operate and for AA support. The war is over and the Axis can then try on the USSR. If Hitler had been smart he would have waited until 1945, like his admirals wanted and built a bunch of carriers. Course the British would not have been asleep nor would the US. Even if the Axis had had navies with the strength of the Central Powers in WW1, with a proportionate strength in carriers, it could have been a different war.

 

[Henk]

Henk
I would like to read this report, is it possible to give me a link or name of a book whatever. It would be appreciated as third party views on this type of thing are invaluble.

Sure mate. The Book is THE DISCOVERY OF THE BISMARCK by Robert D. Ballard that also discovered the Titanic. National Geographic also made a documentary program of it.

freebird, a refit is a big thing for a battleship, not just repairs and replacing the radar. That was just a upgrade and repair. Have a look at when the Japanese Navy refitted their old battleships.

Here is the Barbette B and you can see the hit to the rim of the Barbette.

Here is the pictures of the center propeller and the rudder.

And the stern of the Bismarck.

 

[timshatz]

Ren, I think that hit you are talking about was the Warspite hit on the Italian battleship. Think the range of 28K was the number. Hell of a lucky shot, probably had the Italians wondering "Why me?".

Had no idea the Sharnohorst was that heavily armored. Numbers come up more like a BB than a BC. Lucky for all she was somewhat undergunned.

 

[timshatz]

It is very high indeed for a major calibre gun. But this figure shouldn´t be overstressed. Typically, average rates of fire were much lower. The peak rate of firing was to be established once repeated straddles have been achieved. It is furthely limited by the range in question (time to elevate the barrels) and thus barely ever achieved. There is photographic evidence from the Schmalenbach movie that Bismarck achieved a cyclic rate of fire of 8 to 9 sec. between main gun half salvos (= peak rate of fire 16 to 18 sec.) for the latter part of a single but decisive minute against Hood, the average rate of fire was at about 1 salvo pm for the whole engagement. Crew performance was decisisve.



By 1941 both ships have top edge firecontroll as a system. The rate of fire would help Bismarck, as both the initial rate of fire would be slightly higher (shorter time of flight figures allows shorter salvo intervals in the rangefinding period) as would be the peak rate during effective "full" shooting.
With regards to Grouping, I believe that NC is at an advantage. The US 16"/45 firing a 2700lbs projectile at low velocity is a very good combination and NC went through her gunnery trials, unlike Bismarck, which missed her gunnery trials safe two operational training shootings. Bismarck´s gunnery crew couldn´t be sure of her low salvo dispersion (this actually was testified at Tirpitz gunnery trials later) altough they appeared to have a reasonable idea of it.

NC´s secondary guns are not much of a thread to Bismarck. At first they do lack the range to be of much consequence (17 Kyards), and second, they do lack the punch against Bismarck´s protective scheme. Her non vital ship ends, the zitadell protected hull, the armoured weather deck, the exposed vitals and even her secondary turrets are close to immune vs. 5"/38 for all except point blanc ranges. NC is quite in an opposite condition, her RF´s, 2nd guns and upper zitadell hull do only have splinter protection against 6" rounds and their comm tubes are unprotected. Her ship ends are soft and only her armoured weatherdeck allows a degree of protection at ranges below 19.000 yards. The 5.9"/55 has a range of 25 Kyards, the tertiary 4.1"/65 has a range of 19 Kyards).

Penetration and armour would require some extra thoughts but basically, both ships do reflect their navies thread scenarios well and are optimized for different operational conditions.

Thanks Delc, great post as always.

 

[timshatz]

It is very high indeed for a major calibre gun. But this figure shouldn´t be overstressed. Typically, average rates of fire were much lower. The peak rate of firing was to be established once repeated straddles have been achieved. It is furthely limited by the range in question (time to elevate the barrels) and thus barely ever achieved. There is photographic evidence from the Schmalenbach movie that Bismarck achieved a cyclic rate of fire of 8 to 9 sec. between main gun half salvos (= peak rate of fire 16 to 18 sec.) for the latter part of a single but decisive minute against Hood, the average rate of fire was at about 1 salvo pm for the whole engagement. Crew performance was decisisve.



By 1941 both ships have top edge firecontroll as a system. The rate of fire would help Bismarck, as both the initial rate of fire would be slightly higher (shorter time of flight figures allows shorter salvo intervals in the rangefinding period) as would be the peak rate during effective "full" shooting.
With regards to Grouping, I believe that NC is at an advantage. The US 16"/45 firing a 2700lbs projectile at low velocity is a very good combination and NC went through her gunnery trials, unlike Bismarck, which missed her gunnery trials safe two operational training shootings. Bismarck´s gunnery crew couldn´t be sure of her low salvo dispersion (this actually was testified at Tirpitz gunnery trials later) altough they appeared to have a reasonable idea of it.

NC´s secondary guns are not much of a thread to Bismarck. At first they do lack the range to be of much consequence (17 Kyards), and second, they do lack the punch against Bismarck´s protective scheme. Her non vital ship ends, the zitadell protected hull, the armoured weather deck, the exposed vitals and even her secondary turrets are close to immune vs. 5"/38 for all except point blanc ranges. NC is quite in an opposite condition, her RF´s, 2nd guns and upper zitadell hull do only have splinter protection against 6" rounds and their comm tubes are unprotected. Her ship ends are soft and only her armoured weatherdeck allows a degree of protection at ranges below 19.000 yards. The 5.9"/55 has a range of 25 Kyards, the tertiary 4.1"/65 has a range of 19 Kyards).

Penetration and armour would require some extra thoughts but basically, both ships do reflect their navies thread scenarios well and are optimized for different operational conditions.

Had not really thought about the affect of secondary armament in a BB slugging match. Then again, when you condsider the Kirishima took at least 50 5" hits (estimated) in it's fight with the Washington, that had to have some cumulative effect. But the Kirishima was a BC and not a BB.

 

[renrich]

Tim, thanks for the reference to Warspite. That is probably the hit I was trying to remember and the distance I quoted was wrong. Actually, the Kirishima and her sisters were rated as BBs because they had been remodeled twice, up armored and reengined with bulges added. However their armor was not on the scale of the US fast battleships. The Scharnhorst was actually somewhat typical of German design during WW1. High proportion of displacement devoted to armor versus gun power and engines. My source for those armor figures is a book called "Fighting Ships of WW2" a relatively recent book published in Britain. I hope it is accurate.

 

[Glider]

The Germans had another advantage given by them by the high ROF. Traditional ranging meant firing , watch for the fall, adjust and by this process find the Target.
I think I am right in saying that the Bismark fired rapidly so that more than one salvo was in the air at one time. One deliberately over, one on the range and the third low. Watching the fall enabled the guns to be adjusted almost immediately.

Will have to dig out the book that mentions this but I am pretty sure its right.

 

[renrich]

I have a reference which states that the claimed rate of fire for the new German 15 inch was 3 rounds per minute as opposed to 2 per minute for the new British 14 inch. I do believe that the practise of the Bismarck was to fire 4 gun salvoes so that would speed up rate of fire.

 

[timshatz]

The Scharnhorst was actually somewhat typical of German design during WW1. High proportion of displacement devoted to armor versus gun power and engines. .

Good point. I was thinking that when writing the post. The German BCs at Jutland showed remarkable ability to withstand punishment while the British BCs tended to blow up. Well, at least a few of them.

Different design philosophies at work. That and different firing theories to say nothing of different propellent.

 

[renrich]

I have a book that details the naval battles of WW1 rather thoroughly plus the battle of Jutland is one of the most interesting battles ever fought, to me. There were many factors in play in WW1 as far as the survivability of warships were concerned. Of course armor was important but the German ships were highly compartmented compared to the RN ships which decreased their habitability but they did not concern themselves with that because they were not intended to spend long periods at sea. I have read that the German seamen in Von Spee's command suffered from habitability concerns. Other factors were the performance of the projectiles, fire control, accuracy of the guns themselves(the British guns tended to droop when they got hot) and also visibility. One, because of the tendency of the RN BCs to blow up(including Hood), would conclude that they were extremely vulnerable and practically deathtraps. However, at Jutland, Beatty's flagship Lion was hit 12 times with heavy shells(11 inch and up) and stayed in the fight all day. One shell opened up Q turret(amidships) but the ship probably was saved by a dying Marine flooding that turret's magazine. Tiger was hit 17 times with heavy shells and 4 times with medium or light shells and kept fighting and Princess Royal received hits from 9 heavy shells. The 3 BCs that blew up only were hit 5 times each by heavy shells and Hood may have only been hit by two 15 inch shells. The ship one would want to be on was New Zealand. The Kiwi BC received not a hit all day. Of course her skipper was wearing a Maori skirt which probably explains her luck. My point is that the BCs could take heavy punishment and keep going, just not in certain places.

 

[delcyros]

One, because of the tendency of the RN BCs to blow up(including Hood), would conclude that they were extremely vulnerable and practically deathtraps. However, at Jutland, Beatty's flagship Lion was hit 12 times with heavy shells(11 inch and up) and stayed in the fight all day. One shell opened up Q turret(amidships) but the ship probably was saved by a dying Marine flooding that turret's magazine. Tiger was hit 17 times with heavy shells and 4 times with medium or light shells and kept fighting and Princess Royal received hits from 9 heavy shells. The 3 BCs that blew up only were hit 5 times each by heavy shells and Hood may have only been hit by two 15 inch shells. The ship one would want to be on was New Zealand. The Kiwi BC received not a hit all day. Of course her skipper was wearing a Maori skirt which probably explains her luck. My point is that the BCs could take heavy punishment and keep going, just not in certain places.

British Battlecruisers could take punishment, no doubt but not as much as would be desirebale. If You trace down the hits and differ between critical hits and superficial hits, You will find out that the number of superficial hits (funnel, non vital superstructures, upper hull) is pretty large for TIGER and LION, while the number of critical hits is no larger on them than was on INVINCIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE and QUEEN MARY and sometimes outright lower. HMS LION received two critical hits at Doggerbank and was crippled by them and in return had to be towed home. The number of ciritical hits (hits which affected the waterplane, structural integrity or magazines) on german BC´s was substantially higher in comparison and despite them, most were able to return home on their own power to fight another day. Their design encorporated more structural redundancy, excessive metacentric stability, better compartimentation and thicker armour. The fact that the thickest parts of british BC armour (9") did not gave full protection against the rather light german 11" and 12" projectiles casts serious doubt on their ability to engage their direct opposition. Evidence from the three ACR lost at Jutland also point to problems. The one to disengage in crippled condition could not be safed due to progressive flooding and low metacentric height.
If we delete the losses inflicted by the HSF itselfe and british torpedoe-armed destroyers to see in how far the RN dreadnoughts and BC´s contributed we may get a disappointing impression of the engagement: three torpedoboats and the CL-WIESBADEN can be credited to british capital ship gunnery. Another BC (LÜTZOW) was crippled by capital ship gunnery torpedoes from HMS FALMOUTH, was driven to fast in an attempt to leave the theatre and had to be scuttled in the night as a consequence.

 

[renrich]

No question that Germany sacrifised gun caliber and speed for additional armor in her BCs. Better compartmentation at the expense of habitability was important also. Poor performance of the British projectiles may have had consequences also. The results revealed at Jutland that the German decisions were correct as the KM ships proved very durable.

 

[Udet]

Glider, hello.

I do not know wether "weak sterns" made a design "flaw" in German vessels...not even sure if the assertion has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

What i can say with confidence is that it´d seem the stern section made a weak spot on most combat vessels...have you read about the ill-fated HMS Prince of Wales during her final battle against the land based Japanese aircraft?

Everything seems to indicate HMS Prince of Wales did not fare any better than Bismarck regarding torpedo impacts to the stern section or very close to it for that matter.

One Japanese torpedo that struck the section seem to have doomed the battleship as well; after the impact the ship went "Not under control".

Hits that followed only came to accelerate the process of her going to the bottom of the sea.

Quote:


"It is well documented that the Prince of Wales was hit early on in the battle by a torpedo near the stern. The ship 'whipped' like a tuning fork and there followed a terrible vibration. In fact, the torpedo hit the bossing of the outer port propeller shaft and broke the shaft at one of the joining flanges."

and,

"Prince of Wales was steaming at 25 knots when 9 Bettys appeared low on her port bow, in a moment they released their torpedoes. The battleship frantically shifted from 5.25 secondary armament barrage to small arms rapid fire. The noise was deafening, reaching a crescendo as the planes flew within feet of the guard-rails. Men on the upper deck watched in horror as the tracks of incoming torpedoes drew ever closer. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion, eye witness accounts recall the forward motion of the ship appeared to be halted by the force of this detonation. Being so severe, some of the crew felt the battleship had been thrown in the air.

Within seconds the Prince took on a list of 11 degrees and her speed fell to 15 knots; both her steering gear and main electrical systems had been fatally damage and she could no longer maneuvre with any degree of control. More alarmingly most of the power supplies to her dual-purpose 5.25 guns were inoperative.

AB Alan McIvor was in one of the port 5.25 Gun Turrets (P3). He describes the terrifying noise caused by this explosion.

"A matter of seconds before being hit, we'd been training our gun on one of the planes that had taken part in this first attack. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion. I can best describe the noise as tons of plate glass shattering on a pavement. Immediately, we lost all power to our gun which was stopped whilst training aft"

The result of this initial strike, which incidentally resulted in two torpedoes finding their target, was severe vibrations began running throughout the Prince. This was traced to a damaged propeller shaft, which had been twisted to such a degree that all the watertight shaft seals had blown and the propeller blades were tearing the armour plating off the stern of the battleship. Even though the shaft was immediately shut down, it was too late: the damage was done. In a short while, as a direct result of the stern torpedo hit, the Prince would take onboard over 18000 tonnes of water. This cruellest of blows effectively ended her fighting capabilities. From this point on she would only be able to offer token resistance to the Japanese onslaught."


That "terrible vibration" is cited in several sources i recall consulting; something that apparently was not experienced on Bismarck after the Swordfish torpedo struck her.

In the end it´d appear the Prince of Wales´stern proved much weaker to torpedo impact than Bismarck´s.