What went wrong most for Germany?

[stona]

I'll just add that all the above is quite separate from the so called 'hunger plan'. The need to feed the Wermacht and the German home population meant that millions would die elsewhere.
On 2nd May 1941 the State Secretaries representing all the major Ministries met with General Thomas to discuss the forthcoming occupation. Point two of the final minutes actually dwarfs even the conclusions of the Wannsee Conference.

"2. If we take what we need out of the country, there can be no doubt that many millions will die of starvation."

How many millions is not listed, but Herbert Backe put the 'excess population' of the Soviet Union as between 20 and 30 million. This is similar to the figure used by Himmler, who addressed a group of SS Gruppenfuehrer about the forthcoming 'Volkstumskampf' (race war) a week before Barbarossa was launched.

"...through military actions and the food problems 20 to 30 million Slavs and Jews will die."

Unlike other aspects of German planning, like Generalplan Ost, this was not secret in any sense of the word. The hunger plan was agreed between the Wermacht, all key civilian Ministries and the Nazi political leadership. It was referred to in official instructions and instructions issued about its implementation to thousands of subordinates. No effort was made to hide the wider rationale of the individual acts of brutality required to carry it out. The soldiers of the Wermacht, taking horses, vegetables, barrels of apples and grain supplies, burning farmsteads,leaving the civilian population with literally nothing were as complicit in the plan as the men who made it.
Again the roots of this can be traced to WW1. The necessity of securing the food supply of the German population was as obvious to Corporal Schmidt as it was to Adolph Hitler. If this was to be at the expense of the population of the Soviet Union, then so be it. It too lay at the root of Germany's racial war.

Sometimes even writing about the Nazi regime leaves a bad taste in the mouth.

Steve

 

[Robert Porter]

Honestly I think what went wrong for Germany in WW2 the most is its leadership. Hitler insisted on very direct control of his forces, and their use. The decisions he made, often overruling experienced field commanders, I believe directly led to the loss of the war. As time progressed he became more and more unstable. I mean he might have been politically savvy, but he was a corporal in WW1 and not exactly a military genius, yet he chose to wear a military uniform the majority of the time. And he infamously made or caused to made, very bad tactical and strategic decisions. His reluctance to press forward at Dunkirk let the majority of the British Expeditionary Force escape, his hesitation at D-Day allowed allied forces the toe hold they needed. His switch from attacking RAF bases to bombing cities during the BoB driven by pride due to the bombing of Berlin was another example, followed closely by the decision not to invade England.

It is rather scary to me when I think of the places where a decision made differently might well have altered the outcome of the war. Had the US not had England available as a staging area and place to launch attacks from in concert with the allies I don't think America would have had as much impact on the outcome of the war as quickly.

He was also easily swayed in his priorities, squandering or causing to be squandered money and resources on fanciful weapons systems, and of course architecture. His largest mistake in my opinion was opening a 2 front war. From what I have read his hatred of communism drove him to make decisions that his command staff strongly objected to. And of course his massive programs to eradicate other races and undesirables both at home and in captured territories consumed huge amounts of resources that could have been otherwise used. Both in terms of transportation as well as the various troops used to round up, transport, confine, and kill those prisoners.

So in short I truly believe they would have eventually lost the war, but it could have been a very different outcome, especially if Sea Lion had been launched. It might even have been a negotiated end rather than an outright defeat, at least initially.

 

[swampyankee]

I want to be fairly precise here: Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin were dictatorial rulers who felt it their authority was more important than people's lives. This is completely independent of the economic system they promulgated (crony capitalism for the nazis and state-ownership and central control for the bolsheviks). Fascism, it's even more corrupt child, nazism, were ideologies based around a sense of victimization of the ruling classes; the nazis, especially, blaming Germany's defeat on liberals and Jews, on the stupid basis that the kaiser and German Army were invincible, so it must have been a stab in the back; Hitler became its cultish leader. Bolshevism was based on the victimization by the ruling classes, but it was more a cultish cabal based around Lenin and a few of his cronies.

This need to blame somebody else for Germany's WW1 defeat was the entire basis of nazi ideology: they believed that only some international conspiracy of their inferiors (everybody else) was keeping them from their rightful place. This ideology justified, in the nazi mind and to many persons in the German military the slaughter of Slavs, Jews, and Rom, the murder of captured French colonial troops, US African-Americans, and vicious reprisals in occupied territories. That the bolsheviks frequently behaved no better is no justification for German behavior.

What Germany did wrong militarily is not separable from their ideology because that ideology demanded that they maltreat German Jews to the point of pushing them into the hands of Germany's enemies, it demanded that they prioritize extermination of the non-Gemanic peoples, and demanded that they treat the Slavs in conquered territories so badly that Stalin began to look good. After all, they were so superior that they could not lose, so diverting finite rail transport to shuttle people to death camps was irrelevant. It's just lucky for Germany that there was Stalin; had there not been, the peace treaty Germany signed would have made the Treaty of Vienna, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and Treaty of Versailles look incredibly generous.

 

[stona]

It has been said that the devil's greatest trick is convincing people that he doesn't exist.
The greatest trick of the German military class at the end of WW1 was establishing the 'stab in the back' legend as fact, at the same time thereby abdicating responsibility for defeat. It was defeat, absolute and unequivocal. Some Germans, even today, don't like to admit it. The German armies were not stabbed in the back, they were defeated on the fields of battle.
The roots of Nazi ideology are deeper than just the defeat in WW1, and the ideology itself was opportunistic and shifting. That defeat, or, as you correctly say, the need to blame someone for it, were certainly an important factor, even a critical factor, but there was more to it than that.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Robert Porter]

Both of the previous posts point to why WW2 began, and to some extent why resources were spent on reducing the non germanic populations, reprisals etc. But ideology while it played a central role I agree with Stona, there was a lot more in play, mostly really bad leadership. Heck we had a version of the same issue with Johnson and his cronies trying to run Vietnam from DC. Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).

 

[swampyankee]

Both of the previous posts point to why WW2 began, and to some extent why resources were spent on reducing the non germanic populations, reprisals etc. But ideology while it played a central role I agree with Stona, there was a lot more in play, mostly really bad leadership. Heck we had a version of the same issue with Johnson and his cronies trying to run Vietnam from DC. Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).

Nazism was, ultimately, a cult centered around Hitler. Jeff Davis' management of the Civil War is probably an equal or better analogy than Johnson's of Vietnam; much of the strategy in Vietnam was a result of what he was told by his military advisors, including those in uniform. It also gets people away from their antipathy to Johnson's success in enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments.

 

[Robert Porter]

Nazism was, ultimately, a cult centered around Hitler. Jeff Davis' management of the Civil War is probably an equal or better analogy than Johnson's of Vietnam; much of the strategy in Vietnam was a result of what he was told by his military advisors, including those in uniform. It also gets people away from their antipathy to Johnson's success in enforcing the 14th and 15th Amendments.

I forgot about Davis to be honest, but he is good analogy. But Johnson with his infamous sand tables, often delayed significantly action that then was ineffective due to the nature of the conflict. And it was actually the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments that he supported, but actually very reluctantly. It was his party that did most of the work behind the Civil Rights Act and it's follow on with Johnson a very public figure head for the publicity and public face, but in several different biography's of him some not very supportive quotes he made about the whole issue figure fairly prominently. Lets just say his private beliefs did not seem to dovetail with his public statements.

 

[Robert Porter]

Because I am often asked to cite sources to back that kind of claim up, read Robert Caro's biography. A good example is here: Lyndon Johnson was a civil rights hero. But also a racist.

 

[stona]

Bad leadership translates directly into battle/war losing decisions, especially when a personality cult is involved or a psychopath (Stalin) or sociopath (Hitler) or a Narcissist (Mussolini).

It doesn't even need the cultism. I am reminded, in the context of the thread of Ludendorff's description of his supposedly war winning offensive in 1918.

"We shall punch a hole into [their line]. For the rest we shall see."

The March 1918 offensives actually left the Germans in a worse position strategically than it had been at the beginning of the year. They say history repeats itself, and it certainly did in 1943/44

Cheers

Steve

 

[Fighterguy]

Honestly I think what went wrong for Germany in WW2 the most is its leadership. Hitler insisted on very direct control of his forces, and their use. The decisions he made, often overruling experienced field commanders, I believe directly led to the loss of the war. As time progressed he became more and more unstable. I mean he might have been politically savvy, but he was a corporal in WW1 and not exactly a military genius, yet he chose to wear a military uniform the majority of the time. And he infamously made or caused to made, very bad tactical and strategic decisions. His reluctance to press forward at Dunkirk let the majority of the British Expeditionary Force escape, his hesitation at D-Day allowed allied forces the toe hold they needed. His switch from attacking RAF bases to bombing cities during the BoB driven by pride due to the bombing of Berlin was another example, followed closely by the decision not to invade England.

It is rather scary to me when I think of the places where a decision made differently might well have altered the outcome of the war. Had the US not had England available as a staging area and place to launch attacks from in concert with the allies I don't think America would have had as much impact on the outcome of the war as quickly.

He was also easily swayed in his priorities, squandering or causing to be squandered money and resources on fanciful weapons systems, and of course architecture. His largest mistake in my opinion was opening a 2 front war. From what I have read his hatred of communism drove him to make decisions that his command staff strongly objected to. And of course his massive programs to eradicate other races and undesirables both at home and in captured territories consumed huge amounts of resources that could have been otherwise used. Both in terms of transportation as well as the various troops used to round up, transport, confine, and kill those prisoners.

So in short I truly believe they would have eventually lost the war, but it could have been a very different outcome, especially if Sea Lion had been launched. It might even have been a negotiated end rather than an outright defeat, at least initially.

Exactly! Hitler's micro-management of so many aspects, without expert knowledge, severely hampered German efforts. The push to develop the many wonder/super weapons, Tiger tank, Me-262, V-1 & V-2 rockets, and a host of others, versus continued improvement/modifications of current (proven) designs, hampered the German war production effort. Opening a second front certainly didn't help either. I'd argue, invading Poland was done too early.

 

[swampyankee]

Exactly! Hitler's micro-management of so many aspects, without expert knowledge, severely hampered German efforts. The push to develop the many wonder/super weapons, Tiger tank, Me-262, V-1 & V-2 rockets, and a host of others, versus continued improvement/modifications of current (proven) designs, hampered the German war production effort. Opening a second front certainly didn't help either. I'd argue, invading Poland was done too early.

Invading Poland was an essential war aim, as there were many Jews to murder and Slavs to enslave, both of which were key parts of the nazi ideology. The Allies were getting stronger, and there was a finite window where invading Poland could succeed.

 

[stona]

The Nazi management of the German economy made the war inevitable at sometime close to the actual time. The Germans were well aware of British and others' rearmament which further limited their options.
The murder of millions of Jews was not in itself a war aim in 1939, but once these people fell under German control it became inevitable, even if it didn't actually start in an organised way for some time.
The removal and enslaving of the populations in the eastern occupied territories and exploitation of their resources was a war aim. In the West the aim was to use the existing economies to German advantage, but their management was so inept that none of the ever returned to their pre-invasion levels. Major economies, like France, never came close.That's just one more thing that the Germans got wrong.
Cheers
Steve

 

[swampyankee]

The Nazi management of the German economy made the war inevitable at sometime close to the actual time. The Germans were well aware of British and others' rearmament which further limited their options.
The murder of millions of Jews was not in itself a war aim in 1939, but once these people fell under German control it became inevitable, even if it didn't actually start in an organised way for some time.
The removal and enslaving of the populations in the eastern occupied territories and exploitation of their resources was a war aim. In the West the aim was to use the existing economies to German advantage, but their management was so inept that none of the ever returned to their pre-invasion levels. Major economies, like France, never came close.That's just one more thing that the Germans got wrong.
Cheers
Steve

Of course, the most rational German option would have been to not start the war.

 

[stona]

Of course, the most rational German option would have been to not start the war.

German option, yes. But the Nazi regime had painted itself into an economic corner, while at the same time alarming it's neighbours into crash armaments programmes (albeit on nothing like the scale of their own, but they were starting from close to zero).
Had the Germans not invaded Poland when they did, or at a date not far removed, then the stability of Germany, her economic survival, and certainly the survival of the Nazi regime would all have been threatened.
By 1939 the 'not starting the war' option didn't exist anymore, it hadn't for at least a years, possibly longer, depending whose interpretation of the data you believe.
The only option was a regime change, this could have prevented a war, but at some cost to Germany. There are a lot of reasons why this didn't happen.
When Hitler intervened in Czechoslovakia there were many voices raised in protest among the military leadership. Beck's analysis, widely accepted, expected an immediate French attack on Germany's western frontier, and this prospect, frankly, scared the sh*t out of the German Army. When the attack on Poland was launched there was hardly a dissenting voice, so total was the control of the regime.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Robert Porter]

German option, yes. But the Nazi regime had painted itself into an economic corner, while at the same time alarming it's neighbours into crash armaments programmes (albeit on nothing like the scale of their own, but they were starting from close to zero).
Had the Germans not invaded Poland when they did, or at a date not far removed, then the stability of Germany, her economic survival, and certainly the survival of the Nazi regime would all have been threatened.
By 1939 the 'not starting the war' option didn't exist anymore, it hadn't for at least a years, possibly longer, depending whose interpretation of the data you believe.
The only option was a regime change, this could have prevented a war, but at some cost to Germany. There are a lot of reasons why this didn't happen.
When Hitler intervened in Czechoslovakia there were many voices raised in protest among the military leadership. Beck's analysis, widely accepted, expected an immediate French attack on Germany's western frontier, and this prospect, frankly, scared the sh*t out of the German Army. When the attack on Poland was launched there was hardly a dissenting voice, so total was the control of the regime.

Cheers

Steve

Agreed! The Nazi party had indeed painted itself into a corner in multiple ways. Their economic aims were unsustainable without a war time economy and territorial acquisition, but they had also roused the population and came to power by flogging public opinion over the way they were treated by the allies at the end of WW1, indeed in the 30's a recurring party theme was regaining territory and the populations lost by treaty at the end of the previous war. Basically in order to stay in power they had to deliver on their promises to their constituents which could only be done via invasion and conquest. Then the ideology kicked in and they had to deal with the vast numbers of "undesirables" in the conquered territories.

 

[Fighterguy]

It should be noted, as has been previously stated by historians, that Germany's wartime armaments production output increased despite allied strategic bombing efforts. "Hero worshippers" of the Soviet war effort conveniently ignore, or are unaware of the consequences the allied bombing and other campaigns had on preventing much of that production being sent to the Eastern front. All those 88mm guns, aircraft, and other resources that had to remain in France and the German homeland to protect the Reich, fighting a multi-front war in the North Atlantic and North Africa. Add to that, the German proclivity towards over-sophistication and uber weapons development, caused a massive waste of dwindling resources. It's said, that the production of one Tiger tank expended the resources of what it took to produce three fighter aircraft. Add to that, the rush to field weapons platforms such as the Tiger 1, Panther, Me 262, and others, without sufficient testing and flaw correction. However, in spite of that, the Germans had a 3:1 tracked AFV combat loss rate over the Soviets (it should be noted, that "1" for German losses includes vehicles surrendered to the Allies at the end of the war). If it weren't for the British, Germany would've been triumphant. Germany's inability to defeat the British before "crossing the Rubicon" into Russia was the pivotal error.

The Nazi agenda's compulsive drive toward ethnic cleansing, in my opinion, was one of many contributing factors.

 

[stona]

The question should not be what German production did, we know that in a qualified way it increased.
The question should be what it might have achieved with no bombing.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Fighterguy]

My point exactly! Had the Germans been free to concentrate their efforts on one belligerent at a time, the outcome may have been far different.

 

[Robert Porter]

Goes to my failure in leadership point, I have seen no end of books and "alternative history" type fiction that points out possible ways Germany may have won the war, or at least been able to fight it to a conclusion that left it with considerably more territory than it started with. But ONLY if the genocides did not happen. Those acts alone would have doomed Hitler no matter what else.

 

[stona]

Someone else (apart from Manstein) just made the point that the war was lost for Germany when Britain remained undefeated in 1940. This led almost inevitably to the projection of US economic and then military power across the Atlantic.
With no war in the east, Germany would still have lost eventually. Possibly not so catastrophically