What went wrong most for Germany?

[Wavelength]

Parsifal,

I'm am not new to this, nor am I a German apologist. The need to prevail at sea, and in the air, is a given.

Thank you, for agreeing that the Germans were not entirely saddled with obsolete weapons.

 

[Wavelength]

What they needed to do, as I wrote above, is find a means of removing Britain from the war before the huge potential of the United States could be developed and projected against her, across the Atlantic Ocean. When this failed, in 1940, the war was lost.

Yes, nevertheless, the only feasible means to accomplish this was to win the Battle of the Atlantic.

 

[Wavelength]

Blaming the faceless 'bureaucrats" is a cop out in my opinion.

Once you study the failings of the KM naval bureaucracies, it becomes clear that is one primary reason why they were unable to compete in the war at sea.

 

[pbehn]

The problem for the German battleships no matter how formidable their designs were was that they needed supplies and repairs after an engagement. The Bismark took a lot to sink it but it was damaged enough to need repair in the Baring straight and further damaged by air launched torpedoes. A similar story for the Graf Spee. Once the supply network of the surface raiders was taken out it didnt matter how good they were. The ships were good, the concept didnt work in practice.

 

[stona]

Once you study the failings of the KM naval bureaucracies, it becomes clear that is one primary reason why they were unable to compete in the war at sea.

The German economy simply couldn't support the shipbuilding programs proposed, and they were never enough to contest naval superiority with the Anglo-American alliance. I often see the 'build more U-boats mantra' repeated...but with what, there was neither the money nor raw materials available.
Post 1939 all shipbuilding comprised a very small percentage of German armaments, spending.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Yes, nevertheless, the only feasible means to accomplish this was to win the Battle of the Atlantic.

And this the Germans could not do with their historical assets/capabilities or with any likely variation.
The super subs were running way too late in timing.
The "not build surface ships--build subs instead" school ignores that the British had a pretty fair Idea of what was going on and such a radical shift in German building programs would have meant a change in the British building programs such as fewer big ships and more escorts. It may have also changed the armament fit of escorts. No surface raiders to torpedo means more depth charges carried early in the war by escorts for example.
Germans could have used more maritime reconnaissance aircraft, but here again a radical shift in numbers from historic would have seen some sort of reply by the British. More patrol aircraft of their own, change in carrier deployment, earlier CAM ships?
Take of platforms for Gladiators? Something?

 

[pbehn]

Also SR the more successful the U Boats were the more Harris would be pressured into using Bomber Command to attack factories and resupply harbours

 

[Zippythehog]

Wavelength, one other very important consideration is that the Wehrmacht lacked motorized transportation to the same degree as the allies. They were still largely a horse and rail army.
Having limited supplies of petroleum ensured that tanks, planes and subs got priority.

 

[parsifal]

This is not quite fully correct. In 1939, when Germany entered the war, the heer enjoyed quite high levels of motorisation. They entered the war with 6 Pz divs, fully motorised, 4 motorised rifle divisions, which more or less permanently had attached as independent units at least a bn of AFVs for support. There were about 5 "Leichte" divs, that in essence were light armoured formations. After the fall of Poland all of these units were converted to smallish Panzer Divs thus enabling the heer to enter the French campaign with 10 fully armoured divs.


In addition to that there were sizable formations of SS and the LW demonstation units, that ultimately became the HG heavy armoured Div (this happened later, but the assets were there from the outbreak of the war).


All of the 30 odd wave 1 Infantry Divs enjoyed high levels of motorisation, better than the equivalent British unit actually. They were assigned nearly 2000 vehicles actually. The standard line infantry ToE still called for just under 1000 vehicles per div in 1939.


The BEF quickly deployed to France in 1939, and initially consisted of 6 divs and 21000 vehicles. Many of these vehicles were not part of the divisional TOE, rather they were attached to the support echelons of each div. The supply head for the BEF remained at Cherbourg rather than move to the channel and thus massive dislocation of the BEFs support echelons occurred after Guderians dash to the sea had been achieved


The levels of motorisation for each division were good, but not as good as those top shelf heer formations in September 1939. Between September 1939 and May 1940 this fundamentally changed with the British army receiving massive amounts of motorised equipment. The BEF was equipped with no less than 87000 vehicles for the 10 divs assigned to the force. All of these vehicles were lost or destroyed. The 90 (or so) divs involved in offensive operations for the heer and its support echelons amounted to 660000 vehicles. In crude terms there were 8700 vehicles per div (including non- divisional support) for the BEF, to 7300 vehicles per div (including non-div support) for the heer. It is often touted that the german army was not motorised, and in terms of what happened 1942 and after, this is true, but in 1940-41, relative to their opponents, the heer was one of the most mechanised formations in the world. Its yet another one of those myths used to explain away why Germany lost…if only theyr were motorised in 1939….sorry but they were motorised to a very high level


Moreover, the depth of british preparations and planning compared to the bumbling efforts of the heer in subsequent campaigns is brought into sharp focus in what happened after Dunkirk. The BEF emerged from the campaign with virtually no equipment particularly for its vehicles. By the following February, these losses in material had been replaced and increased as the british army front line forces gradually increased.


The germans initially reduced the force structure of the heer after the surrender of france, then steeply increased as the decision to invade the USSR was made. German losses in soft skinned vehicles had been heavy during the French campaign, and production at home could not even keep pace with normal wastage, and German industry was slow to pick up the uptake needed to improve the supply of vehicles. They made a conscious decision at the time not to place their economy under strain by increasing military outputs, particularly for vehicles. The supply of spare parts and exchange engines remained far too low. Worse, despite repeated recommendations for rationalisation of the vehicle park, culminating in the Schnell plan, the numbers of different models in army service skyrocketed, made worse by the expedient of drafting into army service various lightweight (and unsuitable) ex-civilian vehicles and foreign manufactured vehicles (mostly french), that were fragile and completely unsuitable for what was about to happen


The vehicles per div (including non-div support echelons) had dropped to 4285 by the time of the Russian invasion, moreover OKOH at some point, without any rational reason to do so, had increased the radius of action for formations (the range at which military formations were deemed capable of operations from their supply heads) for Barbarossa, from 60 miles maximum in the west, to well over a 100miles for operations in the east. Such cavalier changes in operational requirements is utterly inexplicable , but as the inevitable happened and vast quantities of the flimsy soft skinned vehicles were lost and not replaced, the ability of the heer to project its force became less and less. This was made worse by the loss of horse drawn vehicles and draft animals as well which mirrored the crisis in the MT park. In 1939 there were between 5 and 7000 draft animals per div on average in the heer. By the end of 1942, this figure had dropped to about 2000 horses per div.


The effects of all this was that the highly mobile and effective force that existed in 1940 was largely immobilised by 1943. Hitler is often criticised for his stand fast orders, but in reality his order was more realistic than the heers stupid calls to withdraw. By 1943, a wholesale front wide withdrawal in the east was impossible, due to the shortage of MT and draft animals. Only by pooling of resources, closing ones eyes and praying that nothing would happen in quiet sectors was the heer able to shift decreasingly small amounts of the front intact

 

[Wavelength]

Allow me to highlight two particular egregious examples of the failings of the KM bureaucracies, which affected the war at sea at critical times.

The first was the Torpedo Failures Scandal. KM torpedoes usually didn't work for the first year of the war. If they had, the initial U-boat campaign would have been far more effective. U-boats actually had to be recalled and the campaign suspended for a time. Additionally the losses of the German destroyers during the Norway conquest would not have been as severe and RN losses would have been much greater. The responsible people were brought up on charges.

Another was the failure to train KM officers about radar and its capabilities. This was supposed to be done during 1941, but by the close of 1942 it still had made virtually no progress. By Oct 1941 Raeder had to give authority to the MND (Marine Nachricten Dienst) to train officers and a special branch of the MND was created. Still no progress was made. This would go on for not months, but years. Finally, in March 1943 (!) the First Officer of the Scharnhorst was reassigned to jump start the program. He did so in only a few months but by then it was far too late.

Bureaucratic malfeasance of course was not unique to the KM. I could list several examples of British and American failings as well, and the malfunctions of the USN BuOrd (which also had a torpedo failure scandal) are well known, but the KM bureaucracies were especially dysfunctional.

 

[stona]

Bureaucratic malfeasance of course was not unique to the KM. I could list several examples of British and American failings as well, and the malfunctions of the USN BuOrd (which also had a torpedo failure scandal) are well known, but the KM bureaucracies were especially dysfunctional.

I think we could all list numerous failings from all the combatants. I don't think that the failings of the KM stand out above the others.

Cheers

Steve

 

[cherry blossom]

The failure of the Germans to keep their cypher traffic secure was clearly one thing that went very wrong for Germany. It didn't actually decide the outcome of the war but it certainly didn't help.

There is a good book "Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers" by Rebecca Ratcliff which stresses the German confidence that they were clever than their their opponents as a partial explanation of their failure. There were quite early indications that the German codes were insecure and that the Poles had broken Enigma Christos military and intelligence corner: Case 'Wicher' – Information from the war diary of Inspectorate 7/VI and the German Navy also had several good indications that the British were reading their codes.

The really surprising thing was that a much stronger cipher machine existed as at least a prototype from 1939 but there was no urgency in putting it into service. This was the Schlüsselgerät 39 (SG 39) Schlüsselgerät 39 – Wikipedia or https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptolog...lications/wwii/assets/files/german_cipher.pdf. There is some debate about who designed the SG 39 with the NSA site attributing it to Fritz Menzer and Michael Pröse's thesis mentioning the company Telefonbau & Normaluhr (T&N) http://archiv.tu-chemnitz.de/pub/2005/0011/data/DissProese.pdf.

Had only the Luftwaffe decided in 1939 to adopt the SG 39 and had replaced their Enigmas by early in 1941, we could imagine that Bismarck would have reached Brest and that the paratroops attacking Crete would have suffered far fewer loses.

 

[tomo pauk]

I think we could all list numerous failings from all the combatants. I don't think that the failings of the KM stand out above the others.

Cheers

Steve

That is probably true.

It can help if one has bigger pockets, and/or more allies, and/or bigger industry. Germany was not in such position, UK was. Kinda makes mistakes easier to bear and do the right thing afterwards.

 

[pinehilljoe]

IMHO, The economy couldn't support the War aims, and the war was directed ideologically in many instances, not militarily by Hitler.

 

[swampyankee]

What went wrong most for Germany?

Attacking Russia, oil being bombed, Italy switching sides, supporting Japan etc.

Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy, an occupation policy in the parts of the USSR they invaded making Stalin seem like a better choice, and placing a greater priority on industrial-scale murder than on supplying their forces, by using trains to move people to their human abattoirs instead of transporting war materiel.

Supporting Japan did Germany neither any good nor harm. Supporting Hitler got Mussolini hanged; had he sat out the war, like Franco, he'd have gotten to die in bed.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy"

Hardly a strategic flaw .... your words equally describe the USSR. There have been "vile", "obscene" regimes throughout history and some have succeeded.

".... Supporting Japan did Germany neither any good nor harm. Supporting Hitler got Mussolini hanged; had he sat out the war, like Franco, he'd have gotten to die in bed."

Agreed.

 

[Zippythehog]

Parsifal, your comments are very accurate and on point. I was using a gross generalization that referenced the situation from late 42 on.
One other element is that the Nazis truely believed their poo was odorless. They consumed their own propaganda and did not tolerate dissent. Without constructive criticism, no human system will thrive.

 

[swampyankee]

".... Don't forget vile and obscene regime that forced some of the nation's best and brightest into the arms of the enemy"

Hardly a strategic flaw .... your words equally describe the USSR. There have been "vile", "obscene" regimes throughout history and some have succeeded.

".... Supporting Japan did Germany neither any good nor harm. Supporting Hitler got Mussolini hanged; had he sat out the war, like Franco, he'd have gotten to die in bed."

Agreed.

We're not discussing Stalin here. The topic about Germany's strategic blunders, not where they stand in the realm of moral relativism. Their regime's politics, quite literally, drove vast numbers of their most educated people to work for the Allies. Had Hitler not centered his entire ideology around murdering Jews, most of the Manhattan Project's scientists would have been employed at Goettingen, not Los Alamos. Had his troops not treated the Slavs in Ukraine worse than Stalin's had, he'd have had a much more pacific population. Of course, without his racist and anti-semitic ideology, he'd never have been embraced by the German right, because those were two very important points of differentiation from the German left.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... We're not discussing Stalin here."
"... they invaded making Stalin seem like a better choice"
Then why did you introduce the comparison between Stalin and the Nazis?

Nazism is not a moral absolute .... though you clearly think it is.

 

[stona]

He's got a point about a scientific exodus though. Maybe not vast numbers but men like Szilard, Frisch, Peierls, Bethe, Fuchs (more famous later for different reasons), Born, Franck, Wigner, Teller, van Neumann, von Karmann, Rotblat (whose wife was murdered in Majdenek) and probably a few more I've forgotten, most of whom worked directly on the Manhattan Project. Then there's Einstein himself. Later, after Mussolini finally passed anti-semetic laws in 1938, some came from Italy, Segre and Fermi (whose wife was Jewish) would be the most well known. Even Bohr eventually fled Denmark.

Find a copy of Robert Jungk's 1958 book 'Brighter Than a Thousand Suns' or satisfy yourself with this anectdote

"The clearest account of the state of the once-great Gottingen University was given by the mathematician David Hilbert, by that time well advanced in years. About a year after the great purge of Gottingen he was seated at a banquet in the place of honor next to Hitler's new Minister of Education, Rust. Rust was unwary enough to ask: 'Is it really true, Professor, that your institute suffered so much from the departure of the Jews and their friends?' Hilbert snapped back, as coolly as ever: 'Suffered? No, it didn't suffer, Herr Minister. It just doesn't exist anymore!'"

According to Frisch the annual Bohr conference in Copenhagen each year became a 'labour exchange". In September 1933 the Royal Albert Hall in London hosted a benefit for refugee scientists hosted by Ernest Rutherford and with a certain Albert Einstein as the keynote speaker. Initially it was to British universities that many came, but as funds became short, more and more went to the U.S. At Columbia University, a Faculty Fellowship Fund was established and the U.S. government became involved through its formation of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars. The Emergency Committee officially welcomed more than 300 scientists and scholars between 1933 and 1941. Of these, approximately 100 were physicists.
This HAS to have made a difference. The Anglo-American Allies enjoyed a technological lead in most areas throughout WW2, maybe contrary to the popular perception, and it is men like these that contributed to that advantage.

Cheers

Steve