What went wrong most for Germany?

I think we know your grandfather was captured at Stalingrad, you have mentioned it just a couple of posts above

I assume that he made it out alive and wasn't one of those who 'disappeared' in the gulags after the war?

R988 said:

I think we know your grandfather was captured at Stalingrad, you have mentioned it just a couple of posts above

I assume that he made it out alive and wasn't one of those who 'disappeared' in the gulags after the war?

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OOps sorry about that, sorry that I posted that over again.

Yes he did make it out in 1946 actually. He was a doctor and for some reason they let him go.

he was, I've read what happened at those camps. Im sorry to what happened to your grandfather.

Well he made it out alive so that is a good thing.

What went wrong most was that their leaders truly believed their own propaganda. They thought that they proved their point after beating France. They thought they didn't need to work any harder at it.

Their own ideals prevented self examination.

Their economy wasn't really on a war footing until about '43 when Al Speer took control of it. By then it was too late.

An old old threadf......


Where do I start with this…..there are just so many errors and so many failures by the german leadership its not funny.


At the top of the list, was the fundamental failure that assumed the war would be won quickly, or at worst in a series of short sharp punctuated campaigns that would not place the fragile German economy too much at risk. This was a fair enough aspiration, given that Germany in 1914-18 had been ground into the dust by a continuous and unrelenting war of attrition. But if anyone had bothered to listen to their opponents, or indeed to the bombast coming from hitler at the time, it would have been quickly apparent that Germany was in fact going into a long drawn out conflict in 1939. The war leadership displayed from all the senior players in the german leadership, not just hitler, was amateur hour in the extreme. They lived and wanted to live in lala land and not face facts. Ultimately this can be traced back to hitler. He had systematically eliminated all opposition to him before the outbreak of the war (in the case of the army), or competent leadership was never there (particularly for the navy) or was suppressed (by Goring in the case of the LW, eg his treatment of Milch and others).


A failure in military thinking to think beyond the concept of the continent, and the decisive battle. Germany was never able to grasp the concept of truly global nature of the war, nor to embark on a globalised view for war aims. From the fuhrer to the lowliest private it was always about winning in Europe. No-one in Germany seems to have ever realised the war was much more than that.


A failure to create a unified command system, in which the available resources were properly distributed and utilised according to the needs and capabilities of the nation and the situation at the front, rather than the personal goals and prestige aspirations of the individuals trying to curry favour with the fuhrer


A failure to match the obvious technological advances obviously present in a people as talented as the germans to the immediate needs of the nation. The Germans never really rationalised and integrated their R&D in the same as the Allies did. The result was that the germans wasted a lot of time on pointless and irrelevant research schemes and had a whole bunch of prototypes at the end of the war, whilst the front line soldiers, sailors and airmen slogged it out with essentially obsolete equipment. Moreover, the constant tinkering of designs even whilst production lines had opened up caused constant delays and stoppages in the production lines that in turn caused serious shortages of equipment at the front. The overweaning desire to try and win the war by quality is understandable, but insisting on top shelf technology when second or third tier was often sufficient greatly increased the unit costs of certain items. Case in point being the cost of a tiger tank in 1942….roughly 20 times that of anequivalent soviet product.


The war industries supporting the front line forces were never properly rationalised nor was equipment properly standardised. Whilst the germans utilised the competitive tender process, they would often give some production work would often be awarded to the losing tender bid as a compensation for all their hard work. This was a luxury the allies did not fall for. A hallmark of the US army for example was its far superior levels of standardisation that greatly eased the logistic issues for the American forces. German failures in their standardisation efforts is most apparent in their motorisation programs. They never achieved satisfactory levels of standardisation here, with the result their soft skinned logistic support and MT was basically kaput from the end of 1942 on. This severely restricted the flexibility of responses open to the germans after that date.


Support echelons like coal production, steel production, rolling stock and the like were never properly or rationally managed. Result was that there was a constant series of bottlenecks in production that were totally avoidable.


As the fortunes of war turned against Germany, the germans never seriously looked for an exit strategy. They needed to search for some form of settlement with at least one of their opponents…..they never really tried to do this


The germans never tried to conduct the war as a coalition, in which the shortcomings and shortages of their allies were addressed. The Axis war effort was firstly attempted as a series of "parallel wars" and later more simply on the basis of serving german needs only. Germany could have offset the obvious failings of her allies for not a lot of cost but always chose not to do this.

A great post Parsival but the shortcomings were obvious. Germany was led by a madman, you had to be mad to take on the whole world. If things had been left to those who were competent and rational then Germany wouldnt have gone to war. At almost every major point there was a screw up but even i Germany had adopted the best possible policy and tactics at all times it is almost imossible to see a victory in the long term.

parsifal said:

The overweaning desire to try and win the war by quality is understandable, but insisting on top shelf technology when second or third tier was often sufficient greatly increased the unit costs of certain items. Case in point being the cost of a tiger tank in 1942….roughly 20 times that of anequivalent soviet product.
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By coincidence I watched "The World at War" concerning Barbarossa last night. when bogged down outside Moscow much of the German equipment didnt work because of lack of low temperature oils/lubricants and design like tank track width. In this case quality and complication were frequently mixed. It is only when a tank works that you can start comparing its properties to the opposition.

The programme also covered the additional liabilities Germany took on having to support its ally Italy in North Africa and getting involved in Crete Greece Romania Hungary all of which were a drain.

The Nazi government certainly did have a world view and was not eurocentric. Almost everything they did, the timetables on which they ran the war, was governed by the certain knowledge that they would always be over matched by an American contribution to the coalition lined up against them. Nazi heads must have spun when Roosevelt announced on 16th May 1940 that US aircraft production would be raised to 50,000 per year. Two weeks later Congress approved the Two Oceans Naval Expansion Plan, shortly thereafter an unprecedented peacetime draft was introduced, intended to raise a trained force of 1.4 million men. The United States may not have been in the war, but the Germans were aware that this enormous accumulation of force was ultimately aimed at them, and the clock was ticking.

The Nazis greatest failing was within the Europe they controlled. Stunning victories in 1940 briefly tipped the balance of economic power in their favour. IF, and it's the big if and most calamitous failing, the Germans had managed to move the economies which they now controlled to their immediate pre-war levels they would have controlled an economic block larger then the British Empire, or the USA, though not both combined. They tried to avail themselves of the window of opportunity which opened, without that sound economic base, but the failure to remove Britain from the conflict and the failure to defeat the Soviet Union in short order doomed them to eventual defeat.
Once the United States became fully committed it was just a matter of time. I always take exception to the notion that the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany whilst everyone else played a peripheral role. The USSR certainly played a significant role, but no more than the vast economic strength of the United States once unleashed.

Cheers

Steve

Steve have you read Gorings interview with Hechler after the war. It certainly does point that there were concerns about US potential, but they were largely dismissed, because the Germans did not believe that the Americans could translate and transfer that force projection effectively to Europe. in other words, a eurocentrist view of the world.

When confronted again with US production figures in 1942, Goring refused to believe it possible. He made a moderately famous comment about how the US would not be able to convert their production of toasters into weapons manufacture so easily.

Goring is the relevant man to look at incidentally given his management of some very key positions within the Reich.. The german view of areas outside Europe was essentially a 19th century imperialist view, further they vastly and irrationally considered they were in a position to dominate that world order.

It was always about Europe for the Nazis, although they would view the influence of the outside world to some extent, it was about how they could position themselves so as to dominate Europe "for the next 1000 years" and all that rubbish. They believed they were the leaders of Europe, born to rule Europe, and hence the world.

In 1940 neither Britain, nor America, posed a direct military threat, but the Germans were well aware of the medium term threat posed by their combined economic potential. Germany's strategic dilemma in 1940 was how to defeat or neutralise Britain before the United States intervened decisively on her side. It was never resolved. The U-boat war was a strategy that ran the highest risk of bringing down the full weight of American power on Germany (even Nazis read their history books) and the Luftwaffe proved incapable of forcing a decision by any means. As long as Britain remained in the war the United States had a means to project their industrial power against Germany, I can't buy into the idea that the Germans ignored this or were unaware of it.

It is fair to say that historians are divided on this point. As examples, Weinberg has argued in at least two of his volumes that the Germans did ignore, or at least under rate, Anglo-American economic potential (for me somewhat unconvincingly) whereas Hillgruber (Hitlers Strategie) makes convincing arguments that it was one of the over riding factors in the Nazis timetable for war.

Tooze quotes the first lines of the report from Germany's Washington embassy on lend- lease, sent to the Foreign Ministry, the OKW, Army and Air Ministry.

'The Lend-Lease Act currently before Congress...stems from the pen of the leading Jewish confidants of the President. It is intended to give him the possibility of pursuing without limitation of influencing the war through all means "short of war". With the passage of the law the Jewish world-view will therefore have firmly asserted itself in the United States.'

The document then continued, listing the huge deliveries which could now be expected by 'England, China, and other vassals'.

I think it can be debated to what extent the American potential drove Nazi plans, but not whether they were a factor. The Germans were well aware of the potential imbalance of economic power and resources which would prove insurmountable over a 'long' war.

Cheers

Steve

The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn't hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.


It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies…..


This numerical advantage for the Allies in just about every case boils down to two things:


1) The Germans lost the war at sea.

2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy's ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.

Wavelength said:

1) The Germans lost the war at sea.

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They never fought it in a meaningful way. They could not compete with the RN and when the Americans joined in (long before they declared war) the odds were even worse. The Kriegsmarine never recovered from the losses of the Norwegian campaign! A half arsed U-boat campaign was about as good as it got, and for a few months it did look promising.

Wavelength said:

2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy's ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.

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An extremely difficult and costly thing to do. It took an enormous effort by the Anglo-American air forces, and the eventual results are debated hotly today. The only sure thing is that the huge strategic campaign waged by the USAAFs ensured the destruction of the Luftwaffe in its efforts to defend against it. A similar campaign (to "grind down the Red Air Force" or destroy Soviet production capacity) was always way beyond the scope of Nazi Germany, even in the most optimistic plans of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Cheers

Steve

Wavelength said:

The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn't hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.


It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies…..


This numerical advantage for the Allies in just about every case boils down to two things:


1) The Germans lost the war at sea.

2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy's ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.

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Yes it does, although there are always exceptions to generalisations. You've cited two examples, but for every example of parity or superiority, there are 20 examples of obsolescence, or more often sheer absence. Time spent and production devoted to introduction of new types had the effect of impeding mass production of weapons systems, meaning that the soldiers at the front struggled with massive shortages whilst the Nazi leadership were able to ogle the fantastic technologies under development.


The nazi penchant for introducing totally new technologies in favour of developing or improving exiting ones using currently on the shelf technology is reflected in the generally poor showing of Germany in the critical supply side of the war.


As to the claim the FW 190A late models were equal or superior to allied types, this claim simply does not stand up to close scrutiny. You have not clarified what you actually mean by the term "late model FW190As, but I assume you are referring to the A6 subtype and subsequent. The earlier A5 subtype introduced in mid 1942 was certainly a shock to the allies when introduced. The LW took advantage of this temporary advantage by a series of nervous tip and run attacks over SE England, until thwarted by the introduction of the Typhoon and spitfire IX, which clearly had this type under control, causing the LW to discontinue its nuisance raids with FW190s.


The subsequent development of the FW 190 A airframe followed several strands of development


Some recon capability, not really a fighter.


A heavy emphasis on ground attack capability as displayed in the F-8 subtype, Certainly a highly capable ground attack weapon, though again, the constant meddling in the design led to a plethora of subtypes and a quite unnecessary brake on outputs. Further and more importantly the fighter bomber versions of the FW 190 design could act as fighters, but were definitely not the equal of later allied fighters like the spitfire XIV or P-51 ,


The general fighter configuration, epitomized in the A6 and A-8 subtypes. These were not designed to match or exceed allied fighter technologies and performance at the time of their introduction in 1943-4. It was adequate, but in no way equal to the later allied types becoming available at that time. Nor were they intended to, though that is implied in your claim. In fact these later types of the basic FW190-A were intended to do two things, vastly improve their levels of protection and secondly to augment the firepower they carried so that they could deal with bombers more effectively. If you had said the FW was developed into an ideal bomber destroyer, I would not object, but you didnt claim that at all. Your claim was that they were superior to allied fighters, which simply is untrue.


The appearance of heavy bombers in vast numbers caused a problem for the German fighter force. The USAAC heavy bombers in particular could absorb heavy punishment. The armament of the Bf 109 and then current Fw 190 were not adequate for bomber-destroyer operations, with the B-17's eventual deployment in the box formations providing their defensive armament with formidable massed firepower from many.50 caliber machine guns or more between all the bombers in such a formation, from almost any conceivable direction. In addition, the Luftwaffe's original solution of Zerstorers while effective against unescorted Allied bomber formations, lacked maneuverability and were eviscerated by the USAAF's fighter escorts in late 1943 and early 1944.

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In response FW took the 190 design, already a great bomber killer design redesigned parts of the wing structure to accommodate larger armament. The Fw 190A-6 was the first sub-variant to undergo this change. Its standard armament was increased from four MG151/20s, an armament able to deal with both bombers and fighters, with four more in two underwing cannon pods for the 30mm weapon ( a weapon of indifferent performance against fighters, but devastating against bombers) The aircraft was designated A-6/R1. The first aircraft were delivered on 20 November 1943. Brief trials saw the twin cannon replaced by the MK 103 autocannon in the outer wing, which then became the A-6/R2. The cannons were blowback-operated, had electric ignition, and were belt fed. The 30mm MK 108 was simple to make and its construction was economical; the majority of its components consisted of just pressed sheet metal stampings. In the A-6/R4, the GM-1 (nitrous oxide) Boost was added for the BMW 801 engine to increase performance at high altitude for very short periods. For protection, 30 millimetres (1.2 in) of armoured glass was added to the canopy. The A-6/R6 was fitted with twin heavy calibre werfer granate 21 unguided, air-to-air rockets, fired from single underwing tubular launchers (one per wing panel). This was again a welcome addition to the capability of the aircradft in dealing with bombers, but virtually of no help in combatting fighters, and caused quite substantial loss of airborne performance.


The increased modifications, in particular heavy firepower, made the Fw 190 a potent bomber-killer, but it was no longer front line material as a pure fighter. The A-7 evolved in November 1943. Two synchronized 13mm (.51 caliber) MG131 machine guns replaced the twin cowl-mount synchronized 7.92mm (.318 cal) MG 17 machine guns. The A-7/R variants could carry two 30mm MK 108s as well as BR 21 rockets. This increased its potency as a Pulk-Zerstörer (Bomber Formation Destroyer). The A-8/R2 was the most numerous Sturmbock aircraft, some 900 were built by Fiesler with 30mm MK 108s installed in their outer wing panel mounts. While formidable bomber-killers, the armour and substantial up-gunning with heavier calibre firepower meant the Fw 190 was now cumbersome to maneuver. Vulnerable to Allied fighters, they had to be escorted by Bf 109s. so much for the claim the later versions of the FW 190A rivalled allied fighters in performance.


more to follow........

In my teens there was a magazine called the history of "World war two" which could be collected to form an encyclopedia. The designs of the German military were in some cases fantastic, machine guns firing around corners and taper bore anti tank guns each with a different round and caliber using exotic materials. The boring plodding Russians basically used as few different types as possible and made them by the million.

Stona, I don't dispute that those two failing would have been difficult to rectify, but those were ultimately required to win the war they brought onto themselves.

parsifal, I never wrote that the FW was superior.

Wavelength said:

The idea that the Germans soldiered on with obsolete equipment doesn't hold up to scrutiny, in my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire. An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets. A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design. A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV. A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34. A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8. I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.

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When trying to decide if one weapon was better than another try flipping the roles, Could a Tirpitz (or 5 of them) performed the same roles as the KGVs? The hundreds of thousands of miles steamed during the course of the war? Of course the Tirpitz was almost 22% heavier at full load so, yes, it should have some advantages in military capabilities. The MK XX I u-boat was a tremendous advance in submarine design but with only two war patrols it is more than a little difficult to credit it with any increase in operational capabilities of the German Navy WW II, potential yes but not in effect. You also have the tank question a bit reversed. The T-34 wasn't really up to the standards of the Sherman despite it's somewhat over blown reputation. In a stand-up gun fight with little movement the Panther was hard to beat. Throw in a road march of several hundred miles before firing the first shot and the Panther starts showing up (or not showing up at the battle field) a few weaknesses.

1) The Germans lost the war at sea.

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Not only lost, they lost bad. In fact there was never any doubt about the Germans failing to win the war at sea. Some debate continuous about the U-boat war but the German surface Navy had about zero chance of winning anything against Royal Navy.

2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy's ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.

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This is one of the great myths of WW II. Give the Germans 3-4000 B-29s and the air bases they had historically and they still couldn't have mounted an effect bombing campaign against the Ural factories. The distances between the air bases and the Factories were simply too great and the logistics of trying to supply a bombing force of several thousand large 4 engine bombers deep within Russia was beyond the Germans ability. Distance from even 120 miles behind Stalingrad to Tankograd was about 950 miles or about the same distance from Norwich to the Polish/Russian border. It is about 550 miles from such a point to Odessa and about 525 miles to Kiev. Amount of rail transport needed for fuel, parts and bombs is enormous. Not to mention feeding the tens of thousands of ground crew needed.

as an example promotional photo of a B-17 and "Crew"


38 men, granted some of the men (gas and oil truck crews) probably serviced more than one aircraft and even some of the others could double up if needed but maintaining heavy bombers on near front line airfields is going to be difficult.

In my opinion. A late model FW-190A, also the Dora, was more or less as capable as a late model Spitfire.


See above for my comments regarding the late model A subtypes. They tended to be adapted for either fighter bomber or ground attack


Now, turning to the FW 190D and comparing that to the 'late model spitfire. The first thing we have to do is define what a 'late model spitfire might be. You could argue that the d subtype began service from the latter part of 1942, and in a technical sense it would be correct to say that. However, until the advent of the D-9 subtype the D did not see a lot of combat service. It was essentially a bunch of proto types until that point.


I will happily stand corrected on this, but the d-9 in my book began to make some impact on combat from July 1944. Flight tests were continuing from that time, but there are also some records of combat from around about that time. There is no doubt in my mind that the 190D was a thoroughly competitive fighter, but it was also essentially forced into the category of one long and expensive prototype as the Germans embarked on seemingly endless detail changes to the basic design. Despite the most dire of situations facing them at the time, they seemed determined to place their dwindling production capabilities at tisk by these continual changes, with their inevitable stoppages and delays to production. Figures are admittedly spongey for the d production numbers, but most sources suggest around 700 were built…..their number 1 fighter, for nearly a year, from the second most important economy in the world, amounted to essentially a pre-production run. One has to wonder why.


An ME-262 was probably a better jet than its contemporary rival jets.


A technological marvel, and an operational failure that made no impact on front line operations until it was way too late, and remained mostly grounded due to issues with serviceability. A war winner not, you don't win wars, or even battles by staying grounded.


A Type XXI U-boat was a revolutionary advance in submarine design.


It was a revolutionary design, but unfortunately for the germans it fits perfectly into the category of an interesting prototype that had no effect on the war, which was my main claim about german production.


A Tirpitz was at least as good and probably better a battleship than a KGV.


The Tirpitz and Bismarck were both laid down in 1936. There is no doubt they were fantastic ships, built in contravention to existing treaties at the time, which the KGVs were, so it should not be a surprise that the Bismarcks were superior as a ship design. It helped that they were vastly bigger, at nearly 53000 tons for the Tirpitz to 42900 for the KGV class. It took an average of 5.0 years to complete the Bismarcks. The KGVs were all laid down after the bismarcks but finished earlier, at an average of 4.5 years building time. And there were five of them, coming from a nation with half the production capacity of Germany. A fairer and more relevant comparison would be to compare the entire class. Against the incomplete PoW and woefully protected hood, the Bismarck, with the Eugen. Five days later, however, against ships led by the Duke of York and the Rodney, the Bismarck rolled over and sank after just 40 minutes. Hardly the stuff of superior design.


A Panther was a far more capable tank than a Sherman and more or less as a good as a T-34.


I think you overrate the quality of the t-34. The Panther was the best all round tank of the war. None came close to it. Yet the productive effort needed to build one, based on the hours per copy, was roughly 20 times that of a t-34, and 5 times that of a Sherman. In the Normandy battles, the Germans needed to achieve an exchange ratio in AFVs of around 7:1 in their favour, One the eastern front in 1944, the odds were even longer, with Dupuy estimating the necessary exchange rate needed to be in the order of 10:1+. just to reach the break even point. They only ever managed 2.3:1 in the west and about 4.5:1 in the east. Moreover there is a strong argument that the germans lost the war because of the Panther. The desire to have the biggest and meanest tank around, delayed the launching of their critical citadelle operation….a classic case of the front line forces being starved of equipment whilst the Nazis pottered around tinkering with the design. And despite its technical excellence, in these critical early deployments the panther was a failure. Of the 200 rushed to the Kursk…..


As at 20 July 1943 when the general retreat was ordered the status of the 200 Panthers was:


2 caught fire and were total write-offs before the campaign started

41 operational

85 not operational but repairable, subsequently lost when the repair workshops were overrun by the soviet counterattack.


16 listed as seriously damaged, located at the regimental repair depots. Fate unknown, but that they were slated to be sent back to Germany for major repairs. Within days of this report the Soviets had overrun the regimental depot where they were located. I do not know if they were evacuated, or not. I think most likely they did not get away.


56 total write-offs, lost in combat. Of these 56, 49 were blown-up to prevent them being captured by the enemy while 7 were captured by the enemy before they could be destroyed


from Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat Supremacy by Jentz, Jentz is notoriously pro-german and these figures are hotly disputed by the Russians. Even so of the starting total of 204 14 July, 156 lost or captured by the end of the month, not a great look for a tank that had lost the battle and probably the war for the germans.


In losing this number, the panther is thought to have destroyed 267 enemy tanks/afvs, for an exchange rate of 1.67:1. Hardly the hallmark of a war winning piece of kit.


A FuMO26 radar was a better fire control radar than a Type 284M and as capable as a Mk8.


And as far as I know never used in anger to any significant degree. A show pony in other words.


I could go on, but Germany lost the war based mostly on numerical inferiority rather than overall weapons quality/obsolesces, and also to a lesser extent, but related, to the incompetence of its bureaucrats.


Germany lost the war because of numerical inferiority. This should not have been the case. Germany in 1938 had a TWI at least 5 times that of the USSR, about twice that of Britain and about 3 times that of france. After the conquest of Europe she also had all that conquest at her disposal. None of it, and none of her home production was used efficiently. Why? a multitude of reasons, but right up there is the desire to make up in quality what she lacked in outputs. Understandable but fraught with problems as it turned out. Wanting the best of everything caused delays in delivery times and rates as production lines were incessantly held up by constant tinkering and detail changes that were of highly questionable bene3fit given the costs to outputs that such changes entailed.


Blaming the faceless 'bureaucrats" is a cop out in my opinion. Those "faceless buraeucrats included men like Speer and milch. There many other, less well know, but still very capable organisers of the war effort. What killed their efforts was the political and military interference. Not just hitler either. The general Staff as a whole never quite got it that the heer and other arms all faced the most dire of crises mid war that needed immediate increases in production.


Germany faced the crisis that she did because she had planned for a series of short wars in which she would have long periods to recover. Her economy was strong on paper, but vulnerable in certain respects. When the war didn't go as planned. Notably Britain failed to surrender and the Russians fought on in front of Moscow, the germans rapidly descended into a series of uncontrolled crises that ultimately lost them the war.


It goes without saying that the Nazis should never have got themselves involved in a war against multiple opponents on multiple fronts. Nonetheless, if we look at each decisive campaign or battle such as El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Normandy, the Bulge… the Allies had a lot more of everything. The Allies had more ships, more tanks, more trucks, more men, more airplanes, more guns, more gasoline, more diesel fuel, more fuel oil, more ammunition, more spare parts, more food, more clothing, more medical supplies…..


This numerical advantage for the Allies in just about every case boils down to two things:


1) The Germans lost the war at sea.


2) The Germans never developed the capability to impede their enemy's ability to produce war equipment or establish general air superiority by using strategic bombing. For example, T-34 tanks were built beyond the range that the Luftwaffe could bomb the factories, and they could not grind down the Red Air Force by forcing the Soviets to defend Soviet air space against strategic bombing the way the Western Allies did to the Luftwaffe in the west.


Your observations about being outnumbered are good and I agree, but your reasons why are about as cockeyed as ive ever seen from a german apologist. Sure losing the war at sea was an issue, but really some refinement of naval theory is required to understand its importance.


There are really two types of naval battle, sea control, and sea denial. Sea control is about maintaining sufficient control over the oceans to allow your own shipping to reap the trade benefits that such control will yield. This was from the allied perspective what the Battle of the Atlantic was all about. It was also the conditions needed in order to execute major naval operations like amphibious operations or bombardments.


The Germans never excercised sea control in the Atlantic. They possessed sea control in the Baltic. For a time they could claim some limited forms of sea control in the coastal ports of western Europe. They never really enjoyed success at controlling the med or even the black sea. After Norway the losses to german shipping were so severe that sea control became a bit pointless for the germans, they no longer possessed sufficient quantities of shipping to make a lot of difference. This affected operations on every front.


The other major form of naval operations centre around the concept of "sea denial"….basically preventing the enemy's safe use of the sea, using weapons like submarines, surface raiders aircraft, mines and the like. The germans were highly successful at this….initially. gradually however the allies got the better of them by a combination of factors.


The british relied on the classic blocakade warfare to try and strangle the germans into surrender. They augmented this with a bombing campaign of German cities. The bombing campaign until 1942, at best was not a success. The naval blockade was somewhat successful, but circumvented by the treaty with the Russians. Then the germans decided the Russians were their enemy and took to them with a dagger. Initially successful militarily, economically it was disastrous for the germans


Despite this, German production should have been adequate to the point they reached but was not. They weren't efficient enough to win the war as it became a truly global event, but they should have done better than they did. Why. There are a few reasons for that. Logistically, German efforts were poor, very poor. Whilst troops at the front in 1941 froze to death and watched their meagre numbers of soft skinned vehicles just fall away, huge stocks of winterized equipment sat idly by at rail sidings in Poland. Whilst Rommel sat starving for fuel and other reserves, massive amounts of manpower tanks and fuel was either just sitting around doing nothing, or sitting in Libyan ports waiting for shipment to the front. Germany failed in the production because of its poor strategic direction, poor logistics, the lack of a long range game plan and just sheer petty inefficiencies in the regime itself.

Wavelength said:

Stona, I don't dispute that those two failing would have been difficult to rectify, but those were ultimately required to win the war they brought onto themselves.

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The Germans could never have competed at sea. What they needed to do, as I wrote above, is find a means of removing Britain from the war before the huge potential of the United States could be developed and projected against her, across the Atlantic Ocean. When this failed, in 1940, the war was lost. I don't believe that the war was lost when the Soviet Union was attacked. I do not demean or diminish the losses inflicted by the Soviets on the Germans, nor the cost at which they came, but ultimately Germany was in an unwinnable war from the moment it lost the Battle of Britain. They lost the BoB because they could barely compete in the air, and from 1940 through to the end of the war they fell further and further behind in both quality and quantity of aircraft and the men to fly and operate them. At the end of the war the British and their Commonwealth allies had just shy of 50,000 qualified aircrew or aircrew in training, none of whom would see action. I don't know the equivalent figure for the Americans, but I would bet it was substantial. The Germans on the other hand were producing fighters with nobody to fly them.
Cheers
Steve