Magnon - you are hanging your thesis that the Me 262 was a.) 'specialist interceptor' and b.) a failure at that because it had 'wide turns'?
The Me 163 was a succcess because it didn't have wide turns? The F-4 was a failure because it couldn't fight a MiG 21 in the horizontal? The Spit was a failure because it couldn't out turn a Zero?
Who are referring to relative to 'fail to learn from their mistakes'?? The only 'mistake' I see so far is that the people debating you keep doing so when it is clearly a waste of time.
DragonDog, I'm not at all criticising the Me 262 for its lack of manoeuvrability in the interceptor role. On the contrary. If you are optimising an aircraft for a role, you often have to trade off one quality which is good to have, but not absolutely necessary for the role.
The Mosquito was an excellent aircraft in the fighter bomber role, able to trade off manoeuvrability because it had speed. In this it is a little like the Me 262. The obvious difference being that the Me 262 was a "bomber destroyer," or interceptor.
The Me 262 was a success as far as it went, but my argument has always been that the strategists starved it of strategic materials, such as nickel, which it absolutely needed to make it a truly great aircraft.
If you go back through my posts you can see where I criticised the "Wehrmacht centric" attitude of the German High Command where nickel was allocated primarily to uses such as tank armour. The Me 262 should have come first, the U boats second, and the tanks third. Adolf Galland does the same in "The First and the Last", where he decries the utilisation of the aircraft as a blitz-bomber supporting the Wehrmacht ground troops:
"...during the few weeks until the opening of the invasion while town after town, armaments factories, transport installations, and synthetic fuel plants were destroyed in the unprotected homeland, the General of the Combat Fighters tried to make a bomber of the Me 262..."
"...At last, in August, 1944, the first Blitz bombers went into action against the Allied invasion army, but the chances of success had now become meagre because of the Allied advance. During these actions a few bombs were dropped daily somewhere on enemy territory. Very rarely was one able to say what, if anything, they had hit, or with what result..."
Regards,
Magnon