Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,231
- Mar 18, 2022
Hmmm ok well this an interesting discussion, but it is expanding faster than the shockwave of a 500 kilo semi- armor piercing bomb smashing into a concrete gun barbette at 300 mph. Not to mention diverging from the OP faster than a Leander class light cruiser swinging to starboard after the crew lookout reported a torpedo dropped into the water by a roaring SM.79!
I think we should at this point make a fresh "What If" thread for the ostensible Axis capture and occupation of Malta, and I'll do just that a bit later today. It looks like we can have a pretty in-depth conversation about that.
Before I do that (hopefully later this afternoon or tonight) I just want to make a few points so it won't be bothering me while I'm trying to finish some other work.
1) The British were planning their defenses on Malta for 125 years
Yes, and prior to the British arrival Malta was already a very well fortified redoubt which resisted some powerful attempts to overcome it, notably in the extremely epic "Great Siege" by the Ottomans in the 16th Century. But unfortunately for the British, their first century of preparation on the Island were all done prior to the advent of flying aircraft that drop bombs. So like most coastal defenses built prior to the 1930s (which is to say, most of them), they were already largely obsolete. The next 20 years of that 125 year preparation, while during the era of aircraft, were still done before the advent of extremely dangerous WW2 type strike aircraft, and I don't believe the British were rushing the most modern air defenses to the island or reorganizing the shore batteries with an eye toward contending with waves of Stukas and Ju 88s... (or even flying artillery / naval gun spotters)
This is pretty much the same as at Corregidor in 1942, in my opinion, and in that sense the island defenders are in fact, doomed.
2) But why would they be doomed, there were a lot of them?
I'd love to know exactly how many in 1940, 41, 42, but a reinforced division isn't 25,000 troops. Closer to half that especially if they aren't all at full strength. And we know that Crete was taken in 13 days exclusively with paratroopers (vs 40,000 defenders). An attack on Malta could use both paratroopers and amphibious attacks, maybe starting on Gozo rather than the main island (we can discuss this in a new Malta thread). Because the shore guns can be easily bombed, especially as most are not placed or dug in to defend against heavy air attack (i.e. accurately placed 250kg - 500kg + bombs) and most of the bigger ones anyway are in well known positions that aren't exactly unknown to the Italians and Germans. And I'm also not at all convinced that Malta is more difficult terrain than Crete.
Also, starvation is bad. Running out of ammunition is really bad. If the convoys are stopped and the Axis aircraft are wrecking the place, resupply is going to be a bitch, probably mostly by submarine at night and there won't be enough of anything.
3) But they had a dozen Matildas
Matildas were nice tanks for very early WW2, but look how long they lasted in the major battles in North Africa
4) Was air power a major or even decisive factor in the stalemate and then victory in the two battles of El Alamein?
This almost certainly deserves it's own thread as well. What were the key factors in the improved Allied outcomes: The arrival of Montgomery, the reorganization of the Desert Air Force, or the improvements in kit both in the air and on the ground? Was air power key to victory?
I say yes indeed it was. The Germans won a series of overwhelming tactical victories in every Theater where they were operating in 1940-41, heavily relying on their Stukas and later Ju 88s to blow holes in enemy lines, especially during offensive operations. This was key to their success as their early tanks while pretty good in many important respects (three man turrets, great optics, two machine guns, radios), on the rather critical level of guns and armor were not vastly superior to most enemy tanks they faced and were inferior in many respects to some (especially for example in France). Their lopsided victories, especially on the attack, came down largely to air power. (This is why they were so overly focused on dive bombing with regard to design planning in this era IMO, because they knew how key the Stuka had been to their early so-called "Blitzkrieg" victories ... which I know is a misnomer so don't go correcting me). In North Africa in 1941 or early 42, the Germans had better strike aircraft, and better coordination between ground and air power than the Allies did. Once JG 27 arrived in April 1941, they also had better fighters.
This advantage was still felt in the early months of 1942, but the odds began to shift. The Allies already had some elements which could help them turn the tables, just like the French had some formidable tank types in 1940. But as with the French kit in 1940, there were flaws to be ironed out, tactics to be improved, and a lot of fine tuning to be done to kit and training before they'd have an effective fighting force. And the British had many of the same problems, but the luxury of some time to work everything out. And they did. All of this started to come together specifically in mid 1942. Allied fighter bombers, improved bomber types, better air superiority fighters and fighter tactics.
We can discuss this in the spinoff thread, but I believe the German commanders themselves commented on the problems they were starting to face due to the Desert Air Force and from this battle onward there was increasing acrimony between the Afrika Korps and the Luftwaffe over it.
5) Did the US built medium and light tanks make a big difference compared to the British Cruiser or infantry tanks?
Yes. Yes they did.
6) Can't tanks shoot smoke or use machine guns or back away, or call in artillery?
Yes they can. If they have smoke mortars. If their machine gun is working and can hit the target (if they can see the target). If they can back away faster than the enemy tank or anti-tank gun can sight in and shoot them. Yes if the artillery can hit precisely where the enemy AT guns are before they can aim and shoot their gun.
So let's talk about tanks in the Western Desert for a minute.
The problem is that the AT gun can shoot pretty fast. A Pak 38 (50mm) shoots an average of one round every 5 seconds with a well trained crew. That isn't even long enough for a smoke cannister to obscure anything. It damn sure isn't long enough for a Crusader tank to back away out of range (let alone the turtle-like Matilda). The dreaded Flak 18 (88mm) had an even faster rate of fire, maybe every 3 or 4 seconds, as it was designed as an AA gun originally.
And here is the other problem. The British tanks typically only had one machine gun inside the armor, usually a .303 Besa or a Vickers. As you noted, for various reasons the effective range wasn't that far, maybe 800 meters, maybe 1,000 or to be generous, 1,200. The effective range for a Pak 40 (75mm) AT gun was 1,800 meters, the Pak 38 (50mm) about 1,500 meters . The effective range for a Flak 18 (88mm AA /AT gun) was a rather sobering 8,000 meters (or more). Quite telling in the open desert.
The KwK 40 (75mm) gun on the newest (and pretty rare!) Pz IV F2, in the earlier L43 version, had a range of about 1,000 - 1,500 meters, with a penetration of 70mm at max range. The much more common Kwk 38 (50mm) on the later mark Pz III (basically same as the Pak 38) was about 1,500 meters. Kwk 38 could penetrate about 45mm of armor at 1,000 meters, 30mm at 1,500 meters. Keeping in mind AT guns often attack at least partly from the flank.
The Ordinance QF 2 pounder (40mm) had an effective range of about 1,500 meters, with penetration similar to the Pak 38 or maybe a bit better.
The newer Ordinance QF 6 pounder (57mm) available had an effective range of about 1,600 meters with penetration similar to the KwK 40.
but there was a fatal flaw with the British guns. There is no HE round for either of these! Which means that British tanks are relying exclusively on either their one badly outranged machine gun (if it hasn't jammed or run out of ammunition), or on very quickly arriving, very precise artillery to take out enemy AT guns. Or air strikes before or during the fighting. Aside from the Matilda, most of the British tanks had very thin armor -the Crusader Mk 1 had from about 14mm to about 40mm at it's thickest parts. The Matilda II had a much more impressive 20 to 78mm armor, making it somewhat immune to smaller German AT guns (to their consternation) but it was still hamstrung by the lack of HE shells for it's 2 pounder gun, one machine gun, and a top speed of 15 mph (and that is going forward)
This is where the American tanks were very helpful. The American medium tanks fired a comparatively large (75mm) shell which had an effective HE round and a range of about 1,600 meters. The M3 lee also had another 37mm gun with a 1,400 meter range that had both HE and cannister shells. Both M3 and M4 had two machine guns (a bow gun as well as the coaxial) plus outside the hatch, the M4 had a third heavy machine gun with an effective range of about 2,000 meters (I think the M3 Grant had another .30 cal). They also had gyrostabilizers though few crew knew how to effectively operate them in 1942. The M3 had 38-51mm partly sloped (30 to 53 degrees) armor, while the M4 had 38-60mm partly sloped (later 75mm) armor. it wasn't all good though of course - both M3 and M4 had very high silhouette compared to other tanks (which you can see in that pic of the M3 above, making them easier to spot and hit, and the early M4 had poor ammunition storage plus a weak spot the Germans quickly identified, and often blew up when the armor was penetrated. But so did a Crusader when hit by a KwK 38.
The US M3 light tank was similar to the British "Cruiser" tanks in terms of armor and speed, but it's pretty good 37mm gun (comparable to 2 pounder in AT mode) had HE and cannister ammunition (cannister was for close -250m range, but HE was out to the max range) plus two machine guns rather than one machine gun of most of the British tanks.
All this meant that in aggregate, they had a better chance to hit enemy AT guns before they were destroyed. In practice, when sighted by an enemy AT gun they very likely would be destroyed, but it was a question of how many were lost before the AT gun was knocked out or the tanks were able to cover themselves with smoke and / or back away beyond range. The German 50mm AT guns also had trouble knocking out M3 and M4 medium tanks at range, except with side shots. 75mm guns less so, but the M3 and M4 at least had a realistic chance of knocking them out before dying, unlike anything armed with a 2 pounder and a single Besa.
Over 80% of all tank shells fired during WW2 were either HE or smoke. The reason is a tank crew was far more likely to face enemy infantry or crew served guns than enemy tanks, and when they did find the former, it took more shells to have an effect. If they could see an enemy tank the fight would be over one way or the other much quicker.
Results of a Russian test shooting the American M2 75mm at various tanks from 1,000 meters
If you could hit that close (1-2 meters) to an AT gun with a 75mm HE round, probably you knocked it out.
The problem with British tank charges ... OR slower, cautious combined arms tank plus infantry advances ala Montgomery, is that the Germans had a severe uneven advantage defensively and could take out the British tanks before they could really hit back. Once the M3 Grant tanks arrived, they had a chance to get the (light or medium) AT gun first or second. Maybe they lose 1 or 2 before they get it but they probably won't lose the whole platoon any more. The M4 improved these odds a bit more and was close to immune to the 50mm guns if it was facing the Germans and at longer range.
If they did encounter say a dug in trench with a half dozen 50mm or 75mm AT guns at long range, they had a chance of stopping and holding on long enough to (maybe) call in an artillery strike. That is where 105mm HE is also helpful compared to 88mm 25 pounder HE shell.
Against the 88 though, they were still all pretty well screwed, which was why it was so much more important to hit those with air strikes if possible. They made a special effort to get them at 2nd El Alamein I think with some success.
I think we should at this point make a fresh "What If" thread for the ostensible Axis capture and occupation of Malta, and I'll do just that a bit later today. It looks like we can have a pretty in-depth conversation about that.
Before I do that (hopefully later this afternoon or tonight) I just want to make a few points so it won't be bothering me while I'm trying to finish some other work.
1) The British were planning their defenses on Malta for 125 years
Yes, and prior to the British arrival Malta was already a very well fortified redoubt which resisted some powerful attempts to overcome it, notably in the extremely epic "Great Siege" by the Ottomans in the 16th Century. But unfortunately for the British, their first century of preparation on the Island were all done prior to the advent of flying aircraft that drop bombs. So like most coastal defenses built prior to the 1930s (which is to say, most of them), they were already largely obsolete. The next 20 years of that 125 year preparation, while during the era of aircraft, were still done before the advent of extremely dangerous WW2 type strike aircraft, and I don't believe the British were rushing the most modern air defenses to the island or reorganizing the shore batteries with an eye toward contending with waves of Stukas and Ju 88s... (or even flying artillery / naval gun spotters)
This is pretty much the same as at Corregidor in 1942, in my opinion, and in that sense the island defenders are in fact, doomed.
2) But why would they be doomed, there were a lot of them?
I'd love to know exactly how many in 1940, 41, 42, but a reinforced division isn't 25,000 troops. Closer to half that especially if they aren't all at full strength. And we know that Crete was taken in 13 days exclusively with paratroopers (vs 40,000 defenders). An attack on Malta could use both paratroopers and amphibious attacks, maybe starting on Gozo rather than the main island (we can discuss this in a new Malta thread). Because the shore guns can be easily bombed, especially as most are not placed or dug in to defend against heavy air attack (i.e. accurately placed 250kg - 500kg + bombs) and most of the bigger ones anyway are in well known positions that aren't exactly unknown to the Italians and Germans. And I'm also not at all convinced that Malta is more difficult terrain than Crete.
Also, starvation is bad. Running out of ammunition is really bad. If the convoys are stopped and the Axis aircraft are wrecking the place, resupply is going to be a bitch, probably mostly by submarine at night and there won't be enough of anything.
3) But they had a dozen Matildas
Matildas were nice tanks for very early WW2, but look how long they lasted in the major battles in North Africa
4) Was air power a major or even decisive factor in the stalemate and then victory in the two battles of El Alamein?
This almost certainly deserves it's own thread as well. What were the key factors in the improved Allied outcomes: The arrival of Montgomery, the reorganization of the Desert Air Force, or the improvements in kit both in the air and on the ground? Was air power key to victory?
I say yes indeed it was. The Germans won a series of overwhelming tactical victories in every Theater where they were operating in 1940-41, heavily relying on their Stukas and later Ju 88s to blow holes in enemy lines, especially during offensive operations. This was key to their success as their early tanks while pretty good in many important respects (three man turrets, great optics, two machine guns, radios), on the rather critical level of guns and armor were not vastly superior to most enemy tanks they faced and were inferior in many respects to some (especially for example in France). Their lopsided victories, especially on the attack, came down largely to air power. (This is why they were so overly focused on dive bombing with regard to design planning in this era IMO, because they knew how key the Stuka had been to their early so-called "Blitzkrieg" victories ... which I know is a misnomer so don't go correcting me). In North Africa in 1941 or early 42, the Germans had better strike aircraft, and better coordination between ground and air power than the Allies did. Once JG 27 arrived in April 1941, they also had better fighters.
This advantage was still felt in the early months of 1942, but the odds began to shift. The Allies already had some elements which could help them turn the tables, just like the French had some formidable tank types in 1940. But as with the French kit in 1940, there were flaws to be ironed out, tactics to be improved, and a lot of fine tuning to be done to kit and training before they'd have an effective fighting force. And the British had many of the same problems, but the luxury of some time to work everything out. And they did. All of this started to come together specifically in mid 1942. Allied fighter bombers, improved bomber types, better air superiority fighters and fighter tactics.
We can discuss this in the spinoff thread, but I believe the German commanders themselves commented on the problems they were starting to face due to the Desert Air Force and from this battle onward there was increasing acrimony between the Afrika Korps and the Luftwaffe over it.
5) Did the US built medium and light tanks make a big difference compared to the British Cruiser or infantry tanks?
Yes. Yes they did.
6) Can't tanks shoot smoke or use machine guns or back away, or call in artillery?
Yes they can. If they have smoke mortars. If their machine gun is working and can hit the target (if they can see the target). If they can back away faster than the enemy tank or anti-tank gun can sight in and shoot them. Yes if the artillery can hit precisely where the enemy AT guns are before they can aim and shoot their gun.
So let's talk about tanks in the Western Desert for a minute.
The problem is that the AT gun can shoot pretty fast. A Pak 38 (50mm) shoots an average of one round every 5 seconds with a well trained crew. That isn't even long enough for a smoke cannister to obscure anything. It damn sure isn't long enough for a Crusader tank to back away out of range (let alone the turtle-like Matilda). The dreaded Flak 18 (88mm) had an even faster rate of fire, maybe every 3 or 4 seconds, as it was designed as an AA gun originally.
And here is the other problem. The British tanks typically only had one machine gun inside the armor, usually a .303 Besa or a Vickers. As you noted, for various reasons the effective range wasn't that far, maybe 800 meters, maybe 1,000 or to be generous, 1,200. The effective range for a Pak 40 (75mm) AT gun was 1,800 meters, the Pak 38 (50mm) about 1,500 meters . The effective range for a Flak 18 (88mm AA /AT gun) was a rather sobering 8,000 meters (or more). Quite telling in the open desert.
The KwK 40 (75mm) gun on the newest (and pretty rare!) Pz IV F2, in the earlier L43 version, had a range of about 1,000 - 1,500 meters, with a penetration of 70mm at max range. The much more common Kwk 38 (50mm) on the later mark Pz III (basically same as the Pak 38) was about 1,500 meters. Kwk 38 could penetrate about 45mm of armor at 1,000 meters, 30mm at 1,500 meters. Keeping in mind AT guns often attack at least partly from the flank.
The Ordinance QF 2 pounder (40mm) had an effective range of about 1,500 meters, with penetration similar to the Pak 38 or maybe a bit better.
The newer Ordinance QF 6 pounder (57mm) available had an effective range of about 1,600 meters with penetration similar to the KwK 40.
but there was a fatal flaw with the British guns. There is no HE round for either of these! Which means that British tanks are relying exclusively on either their one badly outranged machine gun (if it hasn't jammed or run out of ammunition), or on very quickly arriving, very precise artillery to take out enemy AT guns. Or air strikes before or during the fighting. Aside from the Matilda, most of the British tanks had very thin armor -the Crusader Mk 1 had from about 14mm to about 40mm at it's thickest parts. The Matilda II had a much more impressive 20 to 78mm armor, making it somewhat immune to smaller German AT guns (to their consternation) but it was still hamstrung by the lack of HE shells for it's 2 pounder gun, one machine gun, and a top speed of 15 mph (and that is going forward)
This is where the American tanks were very helpful. The American medium tanks fired a comparatively large (75mm) shell which had an effective HE round and a range of about 1,600 meters. The M3 lee also had another 37mm gun with a 1,400 meter range that had both HE and cannister shells. Both M3 and M4 had two machine guns (a bow gun as well as the coaxial) plus outside the hatch, the M4 had a third heavy machine gun with an effective range of about 2,000 meters (I think the M3 Grant had another .30 cal). They also had gyrostabilizers though few crew knew how to effectively operate them in 1942. The M3 had 38-51mm partly sloped (30 to 53 degrees) armor, while the M4 had 38-60mm partly sloped (later 75mm) armor. it wasn't all good though of course - both M3 and M4 had very high silhouette compared to other tanks (which you can see in that pic of the M3 above, making them easier to spot and hit, and the early M4 had poor ammunition storage plus a weak spot the Germans quickly identified, and often blew up when the armor was penetrated. But so did a Crusader when hit by a KwK 38.
The US M3 light tank was similar to the British "Cruiser" tanks in terms of armor and speed, but it's pretty good 37mm gun (comparable to 2 pounder in AT mode) had HE and cannister ammunition (cannister was for close -250m range, but HE was out to the max range) plus two machine guns rather than one machine gun of most of the British tanks.
All this meant that in aggregate, they had a better chance to hit enemy AT guns before they were destroyed. In practice, when sighted by an enemy AT gun they very likely would be destroyed, but it was a question of how many were lost before the AT gun was knocked out or the tanks were able to cover themselves with smoke and / or back away beyond range. The German 50mm AT guns also had trouble knocking out M3 and M4 medium tanks at range, except with side shots. 75mm guns less so, but the M3 and M4 at least had a realistic chance of knocking them out before dying, unlike anything armed with a 2 pounder and a single Besa.
Over 80% of all tank shells fired during WW2 were either HE or smoke. The reason is a tank crew was far more likely to face enemy infantry or crew served guns than enemy tanks, and when they did find the former, it took more shells to have an effect. If they could see an enemy tank the fight would be over one way or the other much quicker.
Results of a Russian test shooting the American M2 75mm at various tanks from 1,000 meters
If you could hit that close (1-2 meters) to an AT gun with a 75mm HE round, probably you knocked it out.
The problem with British tank charges ... OR slower, cautious combined arms tank plus infantry advances ala Montgomery, is that the Germans had a severe uneven advantage defensively and could take out the British tanks before they could really hit back. Once the M3 Grant tanks arrived, they had a chance to get the (light or medium) AT gun first or second. Maybe they lose 1 or 2 before they get it but they probably won't lose the whole platoon any more. The M4 improved these odds a bit more and was close to immune to the 50mm guns if it was facing the Germans and at longer range.
If they did encounter say a dug in trench with a half dozen 50mm or 75mm AT guns at long range, they had a chance of stopping and holding on long enough to (maybe) call in an artillery strike. That is where 105mm HE is also helpful compared to 88mm 25 pounder HE shell.
Against the 88 though, they were still all pretty well screwed, which was why it was so much more important to hit those with air strikes if possible. They made a special effort to get them at 2nd El Alamein I think with some success.
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