Why did the British airforce adopted highly similar Hurricane and Spitfire at the same time?

[GrauGeist]

yeah I meant 2,000 more me 262s, though that is just a wild guess based on very little (i.e. the extra production capacity if you made fewer of the older aircraft designs).

Presumably if they made more jets earlier they lose fewer pilots so fast, so the shortage doesn't become critical as soon.

The problem is, that the engine development took a back seat to other priorities early on, so it wasn't until later in the war that engines would become more reliable (with decreasing strategic materials). This was one of the reasons for the Me262's delay in getting into production.

The He280 was ready for production about the time that the Me262 was going through final testing, but was given the official yawn by the RLM.

In other words, if you wanted jets earlier in the war, you were going to need to get the RLM on board.
This meant giving the jet engine development teams top priority as well as taking the jet aircraft designs seriously.

The time for this to start, would have been in August 1939 when the He178 was first flown, not when the war lost and Germany was looking for wonder weapons to try and save it's ass.

 

[EwenS]

Right, but the Fallschirmjager had already taken heavy losses in Crete, leading Hitler to oppose future airborne ops, and Axis sealift capacity -- and experience in amphibious assaults -- was dubious. An opposed landing on an RN base featuring rough terrain that favors the defender is going to get ugly fast, especially when, unlike Crete, cutting off Allied supplies will be harder (Fliegerkorps X and RA can support the landings, or attack Allied logistics, but can they do both?)



I'm not sure how much more fuel would have been available, but I do know that at second El Alamein, a large number of the Axis vehicles were captured by dint of being abandoned once they ran out of fuel. The Axis would have to have taken Malta ... and then even after that, fueled many divisions to drive on Syria before they would see any return on investment. With the war in Russia at full spate, not likely, in my estimation. And -- the divisions to drive on Damascus, and guard the supply line to and fro', have to come from somewhere. Russia? Nyet. The Balkans, perhaps, but those are largely police divisions by 2nd El Alamein, of questionable combat effectiveness, and pulling them out invites headaches there anyway.




Very true. Don't foget RN subs, though I'm unsure if they could range patrols from the Rock to the eastern Med where they would be needed. Even so, given the paucity of tankers possessed by the Axis, it wouldn't seem to take many subs to do decent interdiction, if they indeed have the range to do so.



It was out of reach due to their inability to project power that far, imo. Keeping, say, ten or twelve divisions secure as they drive 2300 km (comparison: Berlin to Moscow, 1800 km) when those divisions need an estimated 300 tons per day of supplies is a huge ask for a Germany fighting and dying in Russia. You've got to hold Malta. You've got to hold Tripoli. You've got to hold Benghazi, Tobruk, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Beirut. You've got to supply those forces doing the holding.

And then you have to make sure your spearhead is armed, supplied, and in good working order after a 1500-mile drive across what is largely desert. Hope you brought a lot of spare treads, ball-bearings, and POLs ... and recovery vehicles.

Paper here on the proposed Axis invasion of Malta in 1942. Plans were well advanced until Hitler pulled the plug on 20 June 1942, influenced by Rommel's success in North Africa. The Italians continued planning into July, but without German airborne forces it was never going to be possible. Then add Italian agreement in July to send troops earmarked for the invasion to North Africa as reinforcements.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1003811.pdf

Malta is 1,100 miles from Gibraltar and 950 from Alexandria.

 

[tomo pauk]

Jumo made about 6,000 engines and yet only around 300 Me 262s entered service. Somewhere I saw a claim that there was a rebuild program for engines but have no idea if that actually happened. I suspect pilots and logistics were the real bottlenecks

Total production of 2 main platforms for the Jumo 004 was ~1650 per German Wikipedia. Times 2 = 3300 engines required for service aircraft. Since the 004 was a short-life engine, if the Me 262 or Ar 234 was lucky to survive many missions, it is very likely it will get a new engine.
We also don't know how many 004s were destroyed between the factory of origin and before the aircraft powered by them flew.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

When Mussolini declared war about a third of the Italian merchant navy was outside the Mediterranean with much of the rest needed for the economy. It created a shipping problem, but in fact axis supply ships were usually only partially loaded on the North Africa run, to lower the risk of losses, because crating made no sense on such a short voyage but above all the lack of port capacity in North Africa. Worse for the axis the ports became smaller the further east they advanced. Tobruk is about 460 miles from Cairo, Tripoli is 1,260 miles by road from Cairo, more if you stay on the coast road and go through Benghazi, Gazala and Tobruk, there was one road. The US Army, which certainly needed more supplies per unit than the Germans, but had lots more trucks found truck supply uneconomic above about 200 miles.

Well one key point was Malta. Operation Pedestal (in August 42) was a very close run thing. It came down to one crippled supply ship - the Ohio, limping into port. If the Axis had better bombers available and managed to completely wipe out Pedestal, IMO they could have taken Malta. That would have made life a lot more difficult for the Allies in north Africa. The Axis failure here allowed the Allies to achieve victory a few weeks later at Second El Alamein.

The Ohio was fuel, what would force Malta to surrender was food.

The fighting around Alamein quietened down on 26 July. Both sides had fought the other to a standstill, Rommel had consumed much of the supplies captured in Tobruk.

Montgomery arrived on 12 August.

The tanker Ohio arrived in Malta on 15 August.

Rommel's final attack began on 30 August and finished on 3 September.

According to the Italian official history sea cargo to North Africa January to October 1942 had a 10.6% loss rate overall, but 33% in August, 20% in September and 44% in October. That still meant 110,007 tons of dry cargo and 65,872 tons of fuel arrived August to October. For the January to October 1942 period the average arrivals per month were 45,000 tons dry cargo and 21,200 tons fuel, so arrivals August to October were about average. However there was a surge month, April 1942, with under 1% losses, 102,358 tons of dry supplies and 48,031 tons of fuel arrived. If you assume all Axis sea losses are due to Malta forces and Malta ceases offensive operations in August and the Axis mount the surge of April in both September and October then North Africa receives an extra 136,000 tons of dry cargo and 71,500 tons of fuel. Mostly landed in Tripoli given the port capacity issues but some shuttled forward by sea. Also Libya was an Italian economy, of the 1,930,000 tons of cargo June 1940 to January 1943 received in Libya 255,000 tons was for the civil population, 943,000 tons for the Italian Army, 84,000 tons for the Italian Navy, 93,700 for the Italian Air Force and 555,000 tons for the Germans.

If the figures I have are correct there were 2,249 merchant ships in 1,210 convoys with 1,913 escorts to Libya. Or each convoy consisted of 1.86 merchant ships with 1.58 escorts. If the intra Libya figures are correct the supply system also generated 1,180 ship movements in 756 convoys between Libyan ports, average convoy size 1.56 merchant ships plus an unknown number of escorts. That is a lot of shipping movements to deliver under 2,000,000 tons of supplies plus 190,000 men.

So what were the battle winning supplies that that axis would have been shipped and deployed to the front line in Africa in August and September 1942?

8th Army began its attack on 23 October 1942 into a defensive position that was about as tough as the Red Army defences at Kursk in July 1943.

When considering air supply it is the range from the rail heads to North Africa, otherwise go by ship. Athens to Cairo is 700 miles, to minimise impact on the supply situation in North Africa the transport plane would need to carry enough fuel for a return journey. Taranto is about 1,100 miles. In WWII these distances are not going to allow meaningful amounts of supplies.

B-25 doesn't look so great on paper nor does B-26, but they, and the Martin 187 and later model A-20s seemed to be able to operate at acceptable casualty levels whereas Do 217 are dying like flies, so I'd actually say it's an inferior design to the US twin engined bombers. Maybe their relatively heavy defensive guns helped.

About the conclusions drawn on bomber loss rates August to October 1943. How many raids on both sides were low level, how many raids were intercepted, how comparable were the ground defences, how well did any escorts perform and so on. The B-17 loss rates out of escort range attacking Germany would on the face of it give the evidence for an "inferior design". The allies had achieved air superiority in the Mediterranean in mid 1943, the loss lists shows that.

 

[Shortround6]

Malta is a lot smaller than Crete. The Allied occupation of Malta was contributing heavily to the loss of Axis shipping which had reached 35% by mid 1942.

Somewhere we had a thread on the invasion of Crete (may not have been in the title though)
There were several huge differences between Crete and Malta.
Malta had been a British base for many many years, Malta had become a British colony in 1813. Defenders of Malta had figured out where the landing areas/attack routes over centuries. There weren't going to be much in the way of surprises.
Malta has beaches, just not many of them and much of the coast is rock and steep.
The British had been putting as many troops on the Island/s as they thought they could feed. Plus AA guns and other stuff.

Malta camouflage. Granted there may have been fewer than a dozen tanks but the paratroopers had none.

Just google "Malta coast line"
Just about any beach has commanding ground on one or both sides that would need alpine troops to try to get ashore.
Don't forget, the British had over 120 years to build shore batteries, coastal guns.

Maybe the Axis could pull it off, but it was going to far from quick and easy.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

When Mussolini declared war about a third of the Italian merchant navy was outside the Mediterranean with much of the rest needed for the economy. It created a shipping problem, but in fact axis supply ships were usually only partially loaded on the North Africa run, to lower the risk of losses, because crating made no sense on such a short voyage but above all the lack of port capacity in North Africa. Worse for the axis the ports became smaller the further east they advanced. Tobruk is about 460 miles from Cairo, Tripoli is 1,260 miles by road from Cairo, more if you stay on the coast road and go through Benghazi, Gazala and Tobruk, there was one road. The US Army, which certainly needed more supplies per unit than the Germans, but had lots more trucks found truck supply uneconomic above about 200 miles.

There are two types of maritime shipping routes - across the sea and along the coast. The larger ships mostly go across the sea and may need to go to the bigger ports, but from there, traditionally, supplies were dispersed to smaller coastal vessels which can access the many smaller ports. These were still used, I believe, in the WW2 era. In fact they still are today.

The discussion here was about what might happen if the Germans had invested in better air-assets which would include air transport. So presumably that would also be an option.

The Ohio was fuel, what would force Malta to surrender was food.

Without fuel, Malta has no air defense, and being in easy range from Sicily (about 150 km), is therefore highly vulnerable (even without theoretical improved German bombers and escort fighters).

The fighting around Alamein quietened down on 26 July. Both sides had fought the other to a standstill, Rommel had consumed much of the supplies captured in Tobruk.

Montgomery arrived on 12 August.

The tanker Ohio arrived in Malta on 15 August.

Rommel's final attack began on 30 August and finished on 3 September.

The stalemate at first El Alamein probably had more to do with improving Allied air power (qualitatively, quantitatively, and in tactics) and better tanks than with any specific leader. Again, the reason this was brought up was to consider the possible ramifications of better German bombers, based on the premise that Germans had a problem getting some of their more promising designs into mass production, and took too long to develop some new designs. Would it have been better to make significantly improved planes like faster strike aircraft or faster / longer ranged escort fighters, than to do what they did and make incremental improvements to pre-war or early-war designs (produced in massive numbers i.e. tens of thousands).

According to the Italian official history sea cargo to North Africa January to October 1942 had a 10.6% loss rate overall, but 33% in August, 20% in September and 44% in October. That still meant 110,007 tons of dry cargo and 65,872 tons of fuel arrived August to October. For the January to October 1942 period the average arrivals per month were 45,000 tons dry cargo and 21,200 tons fuel, so arrivals August to October were about average. However there was a surge month, April 1942, with under 1% losses, 102,358 tons of dry supplies and 48,031 tons of fuel arrived. If you assume all Axis sea losses are due to Malta forces and Malta ceases offensive operations in August and the Axis mount the surge of April in both September and October then North Africa receives an extra 136,000 tons of dry cargo and 71,500 tons of fuel. Mostly landed in Tripoli given the port capacity issues but some shuttled forward by sea. Also Libya was an Italian economy, of the 1,930,000 tons of cargo June 1940 to January 1943 received in Libya 255,000 tons was for the civil population, 943,000 tons for the Italian Army, 84,000 tons for the Italian Navy, 93,700 for the Italian Air Force and 555,000 tons for the Germans.

Ok so roughly a 100% increase in supplies, ammunition and fuel month after month over what was historically available, without anything else having to be sent from Europe. Seems like that would help. On top of that we can add the theoretical improved strike and escort aircraft, I think then the Allies are looking at trouble.

If the figures I have are correct there were 2,249 merchant ships in 1,210 convoys with 1,913 escorts to Libya. Or each convoy consisted of 1.86 merchant ships with 1.58 escorts. If the intra Libya figures are correct the supply system also generated 1,180 ship movements in 756 convoys between Libyan ports, average convoy size 1.56 merchant ships plus an unknown number of escorts. That is a lot of shipping movements to deliver under 2,000,000 tons of supplies plus 190,000 men.

So what were the battle winning supplies that that axis would have been shipped and deployed to the front line in Africa in August and September 1942?

Again, I suspect the size of those ships varies enormously, as do their routes ... but if the Germans had been able to seize the suez canal that would make it much easier to get shipping in and out of the Mediterranean ports, as well as down into the Red sea, even Gulf of Aden and possibly as far as Iran though I'm sure that would be contested by the Royal Navy.

8th Army began its attack on 23 October 1942 into a defensive position that was about as tough as the Red Army defences at Kursk in July 1943.

When considering air supply it is the range from the rail heads to North Africa, otherwise go by ship. Athens to Cairo is 700 miles, to minimise impact on the supply situation in North Africa the transport plane would need to carry enough fuel for a return journey. Taranto is about 1,100 miles. In WWII these distances are not going to allow meaningful amounts of supplies.

We know what happened historically, the premise here is a 'what if' to do with improved Axis aircraft.

Better transport planes was part of the premise here, and something like a DC 3 could certainly make it from Sicily to Benghazi and back on one load out of fuel (though I'm sure they would refuel in Africa). Sicily may be below the rail head but you can ship massive quantities of cargo in barges across the Straits of Messina with very little effort. I think transport planes could also be used to transport fuel and supplies east to west along the African coast as well as north and south across the Med, in fact Ju -52s and SM 81s were historically.

About the conclusions drawn on bomber loss rates August to October 1943. How many raids on both sides were low level, how many raids were intercepted, how comparable were the ground defences, how well did any escorts perform and so on. The B-17 loss rates out of escort range attacking Germany would on the face of it give the evidence for an "inferior design". The allies had achieved air superiority in the Mediterranean in mid 1943, the loss lists shows that.

Most of the air strikes appear to have been escorted, on both sides, except some of the maritime strikes. And most of the losses were to fighters, based on the records. My point vis a vis bombers is:

There is one threshold where a bomber can attack unescorted, which Ju 88s did with relative impunity in 1941 and well into 1942 in the Med (relatively safe from interception from Fulmars, Skuas, Gladiators, and Sea Hurricanes), and British Beaufighters were also doing. But that window was swiftly closing by the time of Operation Husky (August 43) due to the arrival of a bunch of much better defended Allied aircraft carriers (with Seafires etc.) and the increasing numbers of longer ranged Allied fighters, including P-38s and Kittyhawks. Hence the massive numbers of Ju 88s getting shot down during Husky, the problem being that they outranged their escorts.

There is a second threshold where a bomber or strike aircraft can perform strikes with an escort, do damage to the enemy and suffer an acceptable attrition level. On the Allied side this was true for the Beaufighter, Baltimore, Boston, B-25, B-26, B-17 and B-24, and Hurricane and Kittyhawk fighter-bombers in the Med in mid 1942, but was no longer true for the Blenheim or Wellington. On the Axis side the Ju 87D, Ju 88 and SM 79 could perform maritime raids or attacks on Malta with escorts, as could FW 190s, while most of their older or less capable types (He 111, SM 82, Z 1007 etc.) were not really able to do this any more without suffering prohibitive losses. The problem for the Axis here again was that their escorts lacked the range needed to do some of these Maritime strikes, thus forcing the bombers to do some on their own.

The Do 217 were able to do anti-shipping strikes probably beyond the range of their escorts, and they were doing serious damage to Allied shipping even with small numbers (thanks in part to Fritz, HS 293 etc.) but they were taking 30-50% attrition per strike, which is unsustainable.

So the point here again was whether it might have been worth it for the Germans to develop faster, more survivable bombers and more viable longer ranged fighters.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The discussion here was about what might happen if the Germans had invested in better air-assets which would include air transport.

The best use of the extra capacity would be to lift rail workers and materials and built a coastal rail line.

Supplying War by Van Crevald is dated now but it gives a lot of detail about Rommel's supply, theory and reality. Tripoli was the big port, it could work 5 ships at a time and as the US Army proved time and again ports required supplies and personnel to unload and clear cargo from the port to surrounding depots and it took little to create choke points. And of course if the cargo was being transferred to smaller ships that reduced the ability to land imports, the more coasters the less imports.

OKH was not the most logistics orientated organisation but was wanting Rommel to first stay in western Libya, then stay in Libya because of supply. OKH calculated keeping the original light division supplied 300 miles from Tripoli at the 350 tons per day level required, apart from unit vehicles, 1,170 two ton trucks plus reserves. Over 2,000 tons of lift. By scrimping and requisitioning each army group started Barbarossa with 20,000 tons of truck lift. The circle was squared in North Africa by the lack of fighting and movement, between June 1940 and say December 1942 there were few days of regiment/brigade sized or larger units attacking and few weeks of army movement and lots of pauses in the movements. In late 1942 ther British had extended a rail line into the desert and the Germans managed to bring the part they captured into service but it did not connect to a port and I think required coal.

Without fuel, Malta has no air defense, and being in easy range from Sicily (about 150 km), is therefore highly vulnerable (even without theoretical improved German bombers and escort fighters).

According to Malta Convoys by Richard Woodman Ohio carried diesel and kerosene, the merchant ships carried aviation fuel and kerosene in 4 gallon tins. It would explain why Ohio could take that much damage but not burn.

Malta had a population of around 242,000 people on 122 square miles at most and although its main industry is listed as agriculture it struggled to feed itself and needed fuel for cooking. Malta had previous aviation fuel shortages, offensive operations were curtailed first to enable the air defence to keep operating. Before deciding how vulnerable Malta is consider how much supply could be sent to Sicily to enable large scale air attacks. The capacity of the rail (ferry) links. For the Germans as they moved south in Italy capacity kept shrinking, the average size of the ports and the rail throughput. Then came the shipping available, then came the even smaller ports in North Africa then came that one road to the front.

Malta is vulnerable to what? Having its offensive power destroyed? That had happened before. Invasion? Then the axis forces and supplies are there until July/August/September 1942 and have little more effect on the shipping losses August onwards than if the Malta supplies had been sunk. Malta's offensive power was the most vulnerable, then its defensive airpower, then its AA ammunition, after which the Germans can try the precision air strikes needed to destroy the coastal defences with much reduced chances of casualties.

The Germans reached the Alamein line on 1 July and stopped attacking on 3 July, then spend the next 3 or so weeks largely reacting to 8th Army attacks. That was first Alamein. The Axis ran out of supplies and the allies could not keep taking the losses of the attacks, even with the reinforcements.

The stalemate at first El Alamein probably had more to do with improving Allied air power (qualitatively, quantitatively, and in tactics) and better tanks than with any specific leader.

That is so wrong. The Germans ran out of supplies and fit personnel, the supply issues were a direct result of being so far from their supply sources and being forced to fight. The singular greatest weakness in the British Army was a lack of combined arms doctrine, the desert armour inheriting the cavalry tradition that Napoleon described as best equipment, worst leadership. Grants had been around at Gazala, Shermans had yet to arrive. Montgomery at least managed to make the armour stop doing charges during the axis attack end August. Air Forces and Armies cannot substitute for each other except for small amounts of times under specific circumstances, like guarding the right flank of third army in France in 1944. Around 6 September 1944 a 7th Army ordnance unit, lacking food, sends two trucks loaded with souvenirs 160 miles across the gap between the 7th and 3rd Army, to intercept the Red Ball Express, returning with two truckloads of food sort of situation, any Germans were either locked up in the ports or heading for Germany.

Ok so roughly a 100% increase in supplies, ammunition and fuel month after month over what was historically available, without anything else having to be sent from Europe. Seems like that would help. On top of that we can add the theoretical improved strike and escort aircraft, I think then the Allies are looking at trouble.

No, assuming all axis ships lost September and October 1942 were by forces from Malta (which is not the case) you obtain 19,377 tons of supplies in September, arriving at the front well after Rommel's last attack and 36,977 tons in October. Come November the axis has the need to occupy Tunisia, as of December losses on the Tunisia run went to 28% and did not fall below 20% a month before the big losses March 1943 onwards. Admiral Cunningham paid tribute to the Italian sailors, navy and civilian, for persisting in that situation.

Any increase in supplies would have to come from Germany, just as the breakthrough towards the oil fields and Stalingrad had begun, would need supplies to the Italian rail system and the ships including oil for the escorts, assuming the ships are available. Would take weeks from the decision to arrival in North Africa (a then large cargo ship using well equipped ports took about 3 weeks to completely load and unload). The bulk of the supplies would be landing in Tripoli and need to be moved by road or kept in local storage otherwise the ports choke trying to transfer cargo to coasters as well as import. You then have most of your supplies in say New York with a single road and say sort of the Great Lakes water system to get your supplies to the front line around Fargo and Winnipeg. With the final 200 miles or so needing night driving. Apart from probably around a one to one ratio of fuel used to cargo moved by road (and not much better via the smaller ferry type craft) you will need lots of road making supplies and trucks. In France "In all more than 50% of the total engineer effort at divisional level and above in 21st Army Group was directed to route maintenance." For operations in the Persian corridor the US army found the Studebaker 2.5 ton 6x4 truck/tractor good for 50,000 miles before repair was uneconomic, the 10 ton Mack diesels were good for 100,000 miles. Afrika Korps transport is reported to be 85% British end July 1942, thanks to the advances but the trucks did not some with lots of spare parts.

Sicily may be below the rail head but you can ship massive quantities of cargo in barges across the Straits of Messina with very little effort. I think transport planes could also be used to transport fuel and supplies east to west along the African coast as well as north and south across the Med, in fact Ju -52s and SM 81s were historically.

Air transport costs far more fuel than road transport to move supplies, doing so for supplies already in North Africa would be a bigger drain.

Taranto to Benghazi is around 570 miles, Messina in Sicily to Benghazi is 490 miles. Taranto has direct rail links and can take coasters to supplement the rail links. That might be worth the extra 160 miles round trip. You are still over 700 miles from the front line by road. And there were rail ferries to and from Messina. Train Ferries - Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) - Italian State Railways - Page 1 In any case the desert is practically one big airfield, your airhead could be around Sidi Barrani, over 200 miles behind the front, or further back depending on allied air activity. Athens would be the other end at 420 miles from Tobruk because unless someone hands the axis a big increase in aviation fuel production the amount of supplies for the transports plus what they carry are unlikely to overload the Athens rail link. A major point of air transport is to use fuel in Europe to minimise the use of fuel in North Africa to deliver the supplies.

There is one threshold where a bomber can attack unescorted, which Ju 88s did with relative impunity in 1941 and well into 1942 in the Med (relatively safe from interception from Fulmars, Skuas, Gladiators, and Sea Hurricanes), and British Beaufighters were also doing. But that window was swiftly closing by the time of Operation Husky (August 43) due to the arrival of a bunch of much better defended Allied aircraft carriers (with Seafires etc.) and the increasing numbers of longer ranged Allied fighters, including P-38s and Kittyhawks.

You are mashing several things together, the Ju88 etc. did not do very well in 1940 when unescorted around Britain. Just how many convoys had aircraft carriers present, then how big was the carrier fighter force and how much did that allow per interception given the need for reserves. The Gladiators were gone from the central Mediterranean before the Ju88 turned up. How good was the 1941 radar coverage? Survivable bombers comes down to relative fighter cover, yours versus theirs where the operations take place. Including how good the defender's radar and ground control is, as well as the aircraft performance. The He111 being torpedo bombers would have altitude and speed restrictions when attacking. By mid 1943 the allies had the numbers, the axis could not intercept all incoming raids and knew any losses were probably not going to be replaced or replaced slowly. What percentage of allied operations were intercepted versus axis?

So the point here again was whether it might have been worth it for the Germans to develop faster, more survivable bombers and more viable longer ranged fighters.

The Mosquito was the speed bomber, it took unacceptable losses on daylight operations in 1942/43, all unescorted, many low level. Longer range means more fuel, higher speed similar, the axis in North Africa were supply constrained.

By definition better aircraft should cut casualties but they are not going to change the result in North Africa in mid/late 1942. The fix for that is the supply situation, starting with the North Africa land links, then the ports, then the ports in Europe, then the rail links to those ports. With all improvements having their own increased maintenance supply requirements.

The US Army published a series of histories mostly about the supply system. They show how much had to be done, learnt and invested to create reliable supply lines delivering the right types and quantities of supplies. The German Army certainly used less supplies than the American one, that said under the criteria established by General McNair at least one US army in the ETO was experiencing a supply crisis for all but two months of the campaign.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The best use of the extra capacity would be to lift rail workers and materials and built a coastal rail line.

Supplying War by Van Crevald is dated now but it gives a lot of detail about Rommel's supply, theory and reality. Tripoli was the big port, it could work 5 ships at a time and as the US Army proved time and again ports required supplies and personnel to unload and clear cargo from the port to surrounding depots and it took little to create choke points. And of course if the cargo was being transferred to smaller ships that reduced the ability to land imports, the more coasters the less imports.

Having visited quite a few port towns in this region, I believe most commercial harbors around the Med, on both sides, were set up for both loading and unloading of small and large cargo ships simultaneously, usually on different docks. The docks for the bigger ships often had cranes and large wharves, whereas the smaller coastal vessels can load and unload in much smaller harbors including fishing harbors. Locals have been loading and unloading these around the Med for thousands of years.

Malta had a population of around 242,000 people on 122 square miles at most and although its main industry is listed as agriculture it struggled to feed itself and needed fuel for cooking. Malta had previous aviation fuel shortages, offensive operations were curtailed first to enable the air defence to keep operating. Before deciding how vulnerable Malta is consider how much supply could be sent to Sicily to enable large scale air attacks. The capacity of the rail (ferry) links. For the Germans as they moved south in Italy capacity kept shrinking, the average size of the ports and the rail throughput. Then came the shipping available, then came the even smaller ports in North Africa then came that one road to the front.

As for invading Malta, Let's get real.

Crete is 3,263 square miles and was defended by over 40,000 British / Commonwealth and Greek troops. The Germans captured it in 13 days exclusively with paratroopers which would not have been necessary on Malta. Crete is 200 miles from mainland Greece, about 250 miles from Athens. Losses in taking it were fairly heavy but not compared to most of the major battles in North Africa.

Malta is 122 square miles. Malta Command was about a third of that size garrison, maybe 10,000 or so troops? A dozen Matilda tanks (how many were even operational?) and a few shore guns were not going to stop the Germans if they decided to take it and had full air superiority. Malta is ~100 miles from Sicily.

Both Crete and Malta are rocky and don't have a lot of easily accessible landing zones.

I think it's a safe bet that the Germans could have Malta if they had blocked the convoys and destroyed the British air forces there, which they very nearly did. If the Germans had theoretical better strike aircraft, or frankly if they had just sent a couple more squadrons of their existing Ju 88s and Ju 87s earlier in 1942, they probably could have taken it.

Malta is vulnerable to what? Having its offensive power destroyed? That had happened before. Invasion? Then the axis forces and supplies are there until July/August/September 1942 and have little more effect on the shipping losses August onwards than if the Malta supplies had been sunk. Malta's offensive power was the most vulnerable, then its defensive airpower, then its AA ammunition, after which the Germans can try the precision air strikes needed to destroy the coastal defences with much reduced chances of casualties.

Once Malta's air power is neutralized, it could be taken. Once it is taken, it becomes a base for Axis air and naval (esp. submarine) operations rather than British. This means not only are Axis supply convoys much better protected, increasing their supplies, it means that British supply convoys from the Suez to points west of Libya are going to be all but impossible.

That is so wrong. The Germans ran out of supplies and fit personnel, the supply issues were a direct result of being so far from their supply sources and being forced to fight. The singular greatest weakness in the British Army was a lack of combined arms doctrine, the desert armour inheriting the cavalry tradition that Napoleon described as best equipment, worst leadership. Grants had been around at Gazala, Shermans had yet to arrive. Montgomery at least managed to make the armour stop doing charges during the axis attack end August. Air Forces and Armies cannot substitute for each other

Interesting theories.

Speaking historically and not in terms of any speculation about improved Axis aircraft, I would argue that air power, in particular the DAF, was actually decisive in the shift toward Allied victories in North Africa and the accelerating misfortunes of the Axis. The shift from uneven victories in favor of Rommel to catastrophic defeats.

In practice, by the time of 1st El Alamein, Allied strike aircraft were able to outrange the Axis fighters and fly what I've been pointing out as 'operational' missions against Axis targets well behind the lines, this severely exacerbating all of the Axis logistics problems. Squadrons of Martin 187 bombers for example, were flying strikes (escorted by Kittyhawks) to targets like airfields, supply convoys, and supply and fuel depots in the rear of Axis lines.

Allied fighters switched in mid 1942 to flying proper flights of four and developed the tactic of turning into attacks from above. They had also made changes to their engine boost levels and new types like Spitfire Mk V and P-40F had arrived, all of which helped in contesting the air superiority of the Axis fighter units (and soon led to the breaking of JG. 27).

Shorter-ranged Allied light bombers like Bostons and fighter bombers, mainly Kittyhawks and Hurricanes, were making a much heavier impact on the front lines than previously and were specifically targeting German artillery positions and the 88 mm AT /AA guns which were so pivotal to breaking up Allied tank attacks. They also blasted holes in the infantry lines and broke up Axis attacks. Coordination between ground units and air support had vastly improved. A lot of this reform with the Desert Air Force et al was down to Air Marshal Arthur Tedder

Meanwhile Axis strike aircraft, mainly Ju 87s, Ju 88s, Bf 110 and CR 42 fighter bombers were much less effective than they had been previously and suffered much higher attrition rates. Allied fighters were difficult to avoid and Axis fighters proved to not be very well suited to escort missions (a known problem since the BoB).

On the ground, Grant tanks had much greater ability to knock out Axis AT guns thanks to having HE ammunition for both 37mm and 75mm guns, (Stuart / Honey tanks also had HE and 'shot' ammunition for their 37mm guns) and the 75mm could destroy all available German tanks at their longest range, even if they still could not outrange the best German guns. Larger 105mm howitzers were more effective than the 25 pounder. Larger numbers of halftracks and trucks helped allied troops move around faster and a bit more safely.

All of this improved by the time of second El Alamein by which time these technical advantages and tactical improvements had become decisive (far more than the advantages in numbers).

No, assuming all axis ships lost September and October 1942 were by forces from Malta (which is not the case) you obtain 19,377 tons of supplies in September, arriving at the front well after Rommel's last attack and 36,977 tons in October. Come November the axis has the need to occupy Tunisia, as of December losses on the Tunisia run went to 28% and did not fall below 20% a month before the big losses March 1943 onwards. Admiral Cunningham paid tribute to the Italian sailors, navy and civilian, for persisting in that situation.

Using your previously quoted figures:

"April 1942, with under 1% losses, 102,358 tons of dry supplies and 48,031 tons of fuel:"

"For the January to October 1942 period the average arrivals per month were 45,000 tons dry cargo and 21,200 tons fuel,"

I'm suggesting that if the Axis had control of Malta, their supply losses would drop from the high of 35-40% down to more like the 1% they suffered in April 1942. Maybe we should start another thread about what happens if the Axis took Malta.

You are mashing several things together, the Ju88 etc. did not do very well in 1940 when unescorted around Britain.

Britain had an integrated air defense with radar and a huge amount of fighters compared to Malta mate. None of the German bombers, flying in large formations, did well in the BoB. But some of these same types like the Ju 88 and Ju 87 did quite well in Russia, the Med, and I'd also suggest, in the North Sea, and English channel. Ju 88s did some damage in the Bay of Biscay as well.

Just how many convoys had aircraft carriers present, then how big was the carrier fighter force and how much did that allow per interception given the need for reserves. The Gladiators were gone from the central Mediterranean before the Ju88 turned up. How good was the 1941 radar coverage? Survivable bombers comes down to relative fighter cover, yours versus theirs where the operations take place. Including how good the defender's radar and ground control is, as well as the aircraft performance. The He111 being torpedo bombers would have altitude and speed restrictions when attacking. By mid 1943 the allies had the numbers, the axis could not intercept all incoming raids and knew any losses were probably not going to be replaced or replaced slowly. What percentage of allied operations were intercepted versus axis?

Boy a lot to unpack here.

IIRC all of the strikes I mentioned in the examples I posted previously were intercepted, on both sides.

I would say 'survivable bombers' is not just down to relative fighter cover, it's also down to the performance (including range and speed) of the bomber. Clearly this is what the operational history shows. Allied operations were intercepted pretty consistently until the Axis air forces were broken.

Fighter cover also depends on range of the fighter, especially when it comes to maritime strikes out to sea.

As best i can determine, HMS Indomitable, Illustrious and Formidable were there (Indomitable torpedoed by a Ju 88 or an SM 79 on 16 July, sources dispute who got them) and there were also land based Spitfires operating from Malta and P-40s from Pantelleria flying fleet protection cover. (mostly US) P-40s and P-38s were also flying escort missions.

HMS Indomitable: (55 aircraft)
807 Squadron: 12 Seafire L-IIC
880 Squadron: 14 Seafire IIC
899 Squadron: 14 Seafire IIC
817 Squadron: 15 Albacore

HMS Formidable: (45 aircraft)
885 Squadron: 5 Seafire IIC (deck park only)
888 Squadron: 14 Martlet IV
898 Squadron: 14 Martlet IV
828 Squadron: 12 Albacore

---

Ju 88s actually got to the Med pretty early (I thought 1940?), but I'm not sure if they encountered Gladiators or not.

The Mosquito was the speed bomber, it took unacceptable losses on daylight operations in 1942/43, all unescorted, many low level. Longer range means more fuel, higher speed similar, the axis in North Africa were supply constrained.

This issue about the Mosquito losses has been discussed before, at length.

Mosquito Missions with high losses were mainly during highly risky low-level (and fairly deep penetration) raids against well defended targets like Gestapo HQs in big cities, which basically no other bomber type could even attempt.

Aside from that the British high command chose to mostly use them as pathfinder and night fighter etc. missions which were deemed higher priority for the special advantages of this extraordinary aircraft which was never available in sufficient numbers. I.e. it wasn't used that much as a tactical or operational bomber.

However a more typical example of what I mean can be seen in the famous Eindbhoven raid, "Operation Oyster" in Dec 1942, where you had several Allied types (Bostons ~340 mph, Venturas ~320 mph , and Mosquito Mk IVs ~370 mph*) flying in the same high-risk strike, unescorted. They faced heavy AAA and FW 190 fighters, arguably the most dangerous Axis fighter at that time, and the fastest at low altitude. They lost 9 Venturas (20%) plus 3 more crash landing in England (bringing it up to 25%), 4 Bostons (9%), and 1 Mosquito (10%). Another 37 Venturas (78%), 13 Bostons (36%) and 3 Mosquitos (30%) were damaged.

Part of the trouble the Venturas had was they were the last planes in the strike and hit after the target was on fire and the defenders were alerted. But I think this is the more typical pattern, the faster bombers did a lot better in terms of attrition, everything else being equal, and this certainly proved to be the case in the MTO, for both escorted and unescorted strikes.

By definition better aircraft should cut casualties but they are not going to change the result in North Africa in mid/late 1942.

I disagree, in fact i would argue that they did in fact change the result in North Africa in mid/late 1942, in favor of the Allies. Fortunately for us all. This was a matter not just of decreasing attrition, but increasing effectiveness probably by an order of magnitude.

* quoting what I believe is max speed at optimal altitude here, obviously speed at the low altitude of the strike was less but this is already taking a long time to write and I didn't want to go look that up - feel free to do so.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

For more of the Allied fleet, looks like Illustrious had 20 x Martlets and 10 x Seafires, and the light carrier Unicorn had 33 x Seafires. Unicorn I think was one of the ones which had a lot of trouble operating the Seafires and only flew a few sorties, later it was used to ferry damaged aircraft back to England or somewhere.

 

[EwenS]

Malta
" The situation in Malta
The arrival of two supply ships from HARPOON extended the supplies available in Malta by eight weeks. This seemingly reasonable statement must be read in the context that the entire population was already on starvation rations, serious illness such as poliomyelitis was already afflicting rising numbers including even aircrew, that water and fuel for cooking could only be obtained with great exertion from specified distribution points, and that the reserves of essential supplies for defence, principally aviation fuel and ammunition, were extremely low. It was therefore essential to repeat the HARPOON operation on a larger scale and with arrival before the end of 8.42. It is of interest to quote comment by the then commander of 10th Submarine Flotilla in the island on a conversation with Mr Trench who was responsible for food distribution in Malta:

"Trench said that the present island-wide soup kitchen arrangements are fully organised and working well. The tinned and dehydrated ingredients are issued daily to the organisers, prepared on field kitchens and distributed from fixed points. These ingredients are the ideal for control and orderly administration but the last issue - the absolute last issue from island reserves - occurs in five days, on 15 August. After that we are down to the slaughter of horses and goats, once considered adequate for six months......The present census of animals in the island is estimated to last from five to ten days.

If in fact I chop and change between tinned supplies and slaughter WITHOUT CAUSING PANIC we might last until 25 August."

That is the measure of desperation in the island, the convoy known as Operation PEDESTAL arrived in Malta on 13, 14 and 15.81 The conversation is recorded in Rear Admiral G W G Simpson's autobiography "Periscope view" on page 249."



According to "Operation Pedestal" by Brian James Crabb, the Ohio emptied her entire cargo of aviation fuel on arriving at the oil terminal at Bowling on the Clyde. Her tanks were then cleaned before embarking the following cargo for Malta:-
1,705 tons of diesel oil
1,894 tons of kerosene (paraffin oil)
8,695 tons of fuel oil
1,300 tons of bunker fuel
15 tons of lubricating oils

Some of the kerosene did burn but was relatively easily extinguished.

The other merchantmen, except Waimarama, in the convoy were given mixed cargoes of flour, coal, bombs medical supplies, army equipment, ammunition and petrol. In smaller quatities went wines, spirits, chocolate, biscuits and cigarettes. That way it was hoped that some of everything would reach Malta regardless of what was sunk en route. Waimarama was carrying 11,000 tons of military stores, including TNT, aviation spirit and ammunition. When she was bombed on 13 Aug 1942 she exploded with the loss of 63 of her crew, the highest loss of any of the ships in the convoy.

What is usually forgotten is that further convoys were sailed from Port Said immediately after Second El Alamein. For example MW13 in Operation Stoneage in Nov, and 5 convoys (MW14-18) in Dec, as part of larger operations to supply 8th Army as it moved west.

HMS Furious made 2 further Spitfire delivery runs after Operation Bellows (part of Pedestal) from Gibraltar in Aug & Oct, successfully delivering another 58 aircraft.

Tanks

Grant tanks started arriving in Egypt in Aug 1941 but were missing certain pieces of equipment. After crew trainng etc they entered combat at Gazala at the end of May 1942.

The story of the Sherman only begins with the fall of Tobruk in June 1941. Churchill's request for help was answered by FDR agrreing to send more tanks. On 15 July 1942 a convoy with 212 M4A1 and 90 M4A2 Shermans and 100 M7 Priest SPG left the USA. The next day a ship carrying 51 M4A1 and 32 M7 was sunk. An emergency shipment of 52 M4A1 and 25 M7 was then sent as replacement. But these vehicles did not begin to arrive in Egypt until September 1942, just in time to begin issuing them, and training the crews, prior to Second El Alaein in Oct.

Axis convoy and air routes
Note the starting points in Naples and Taranto

 

[EwenS]

Having visited quite a few port towns in this region, I believe most commercial harbors around the Med, on both sides, were set up for both loading and unloading of small and large cargo ships simultaneously, usually on different docks. The docks for the bigger ships often had cranes and large wharves, whereas the smaller coastal vessels can load and unload in much smaller harbors including fishing harbors. Locals have been loading and unloading these around the Med for thousands of years.



As for invading Malta, Let's get real.

Crete is 3,263 square miles and was defended by over 40,000 British / Commonwealth and Greek troops. The Germans captured it in 13 days exclusively with paratroopers which would not have been necessary on Malta. Crete is 200 miles from mainland Greece, about 250 miles from Athens. Losses in taking it were fairly heavy but not compared to most of the major battles in North Africa.

Malta is 122 square miles. Malta Command was about a third of that size garrison, maybe 10,000 or so troops? A dozen Matilda tanks (how many were even operational?) and a few shore guns were not going to stop the Germans if they decided to take it and had full air superiority. Malta is ~100 miles from Sicily.

Both Crete and Malta are rocky and don't have a lot of easily accessible landing zones.

I think it's a safe bet that the Germans could have Malta if they had blocked the convoys and destroyed the British air forces there, which they very nearly did. If the Germans had theoretical better strike aircraft, or frankly if they had just sent a couple more squadrons of their existing Ju 88s and Ju 87s earlier in 1942, they probably could have taken it.



Once Malta's air power is neutralized, it could be taken. Once it is taken, it becomes a base for Axis air and naval (esp. submarine) operations rather than British. This means not only are Axis supply convoys much better protected, increasing their supplies, it means that British supply convoys from the Suez to points west of Libya are going to be all but impossible.



Interesting theories.

Speaking historically and not in terms of any speculation about improved Axis aircraft, I would argue that air power, in particular the DAF, was actually decisive in the shift toward Allied victories in North Africa and the accelerating misfortunes of the Axis. The shift from uneven victories in favor of Rommel to catastrophic defeats.

In practice, by the time of 1st El Alamein, Allied strike aircraft were able to outrange the Axis fighters and fly what I've been pointing out as 'operational' missions against Axis targets well behind the lines, this severely exacerbating all of the Axis logistics problems. Squadrons of Martin 187 bombers for example, were flying strikes (escorted by Kittyhawks) to targets like airfields, supply convoys, and supply and fuel depots in the rear of Axis lines.

Allied fighters switched in mid 1942 to flying proper flights of four and developed the tactic of turning into attacks from above. They had also made changes to their engine boost levels and new types like Spitfire Mk V and P-40F had arrived, all of which helped in contesting the air superiority of the Axis fighter units (and soon led to the breaking of JG. 27).

Shorter-ranged Allied light bombers like Bostons and fighter bombers, mainly Kittyhawks and Hurricanes, were making a much heavier impact on the front lines than previously and were specifically targeting German artillery positions and the 88 mm AT /AA guns which were so pivotal to breaking up Allied tank attacks. They also blasted holes in the infantry lines and broke up Axis attacks. Coordination between ground units and air support had vastly improved. A lot of this reform with the Desert Air Force et al was down to Air Marshal Arthur Tedder

Meanwhile Axis strike aircraft, mainly Ju 87s, Ju 88s, Bf 110 and CR 42 fighter bombers were much less effective than they had been previously and suffered much higher attrition rates. Allied fighters were difficult to avoid and Axis fighters proved to not be very well suited to escort missions (a known problem since the BoB).

On the ground, Grant tanks had much greater ability to knock out Axis AT guns thanks to having HE ammunition for both 37mm and 75mm guns, (Stuart / Honey tanks also had HE and 'shot' ammunition for their 37mm guns) and the 75mm could destroy all available German tanks at their longest range, even if they still could not outrange the best German guns. Larger 105mm howitzers were more effective than the 25 pounder. Larger numbers of halftracks and trucks helped allied troops move around faster and a bit more safely.

All of this improved by the time of second El Alamein by which time these technical advantages and tactical improvements had become decisive (far more than the advantages in numbers).


Using your previously quoted figures:

"April 1942, with under 1% losses, 102,358 tons of dry supplies and 48,031 tons of fuel:"

"For the January to October 1942 period the average arrivals per month were 45,000 tons dry cargo and 21,200 tons fuel,"

I'm suggesting that if the Axis had control of Malta, their supply losses would drop from the high of 35-40% down to more like the 1% they suffered in April 1942. Maybe we should start another thread about what happens if the Axis took Malta.



Britain had an integrated air defense with radar and a huge amount of fighters compared to Malta mate. None of the German bombers, flying in large formations, did well in the BoB. But some of these same types like the Ju 88 and Ju 87 did quite well in Russia, the Med, and I'd also suggest, in the North Sea, and English channel. Ju 88s did some damage in the Bay of Biscay as well.



Boy a lot to unpack here.

IIRC all of the strikes I mentioned in the examples I posted previously were intercepted, on both sides.

I would say 'survivable bombers' is not just down to relative fighter cover, it's also down to the performance (including range and speed) of the bomber. Clearly this is what the operational history shows. Allied operations were intercepted pretty consistently until the Axis air forces were broken.

Fighter cover also depends on range of the fighter, especially when it comes to maritime strikes out to sea.

As best i can determine, HMS Indomitable, Illustrious and Formidable were there (Indomitable torpedoed by a Ju 88 or an SM 79 on 16 July, sources dispute who got them) and there were also land based Spitfires operating from Malta and P-40s from Pantelleria flying fleet protection cover. (mostly US) P-40s and P-38s were also flying escort missions.

HMS Indomitable: (55 aircraft)
807 Squadron: 12 Seafire L-IIC
880 Squadron: 14 Seafire IIC
899 Squadron: 14 Seafire IIC
817 Squadron: 15 Albacore

HMS Formidable: (45 aircraft)
885 Squadron: 5 Seafire IIC (deck park only)
888 Squadron: 14 Martlet IV
898 Squadron: 14 Martlet IV
828 Squadron: 12 Albacore

---

Ju 88s actually got to the Med pretty early (I thought 1940?), but I'm not sure if they encountered Gladiators or not.



This issue about the Mosquito losses has been discussed before, at length.

Mosquito Missions with high losses were mainly during highly risky low-level (and fairly deep penetration) raids against well defended targets like Gestapo HQs in big cities, which basically no other bomber type could even attempt.

Aside from that the British high command chose to mostly use them as pathfinder and night fighter etc. missions which were deemed higher priority for the special advantages of this extraordinary aircraft which was never available in sufficient numbers. I.e. it wasn't used that much as a tactical or operational bomber.

However a more typical example of what I mean can be seen in the famous Eindbhoven raid, "Operation Oyster" in Dec 1942, where you had several Allied types (Bostons ~340 mph, Venturas ~320 mph , and Mosquito Mk IVs ~370 mph*) flying in the same high-risk strike, unescorted. They faced heavy AAA and FW 190 fighters, arguably the most dangerous Axis fighter at that time, and the fastest at low altitude. They lost 9 Venturas (20%) plus 3 more crash landing in England (bringing it up to 25%), 4 Bostons (9%), and 1 Mosquito (10%). Another 37 Venturas (78%), 13 Bostons (36%) and 3 Mosquitos (30%) were damaged.

Part of the trouble the Venturas had was they were the last planes in the strike and hit after the target was on fire and the defenders were alerted. But I think this is the more typical pattern, the faster bombers did a lot better in terms of attrition, everything else being equal, and this certainly proved to be the case in the MTO, for both escorted and unescorted strikes.



I disagree, in fact i would argue that they did in fact change the result in North Africa in mid/late 1942, in favor of the Allies. Fortunately for us all. This was a matter not just of decreasing attrition, but increasing effectiveness probably by an order of magnitude.

* quoting what I believe is max speed at optimal altitude here, obviously speed at the low altitude of the strike was less but this is already taking a long time to write and I didn't want to go look that up - feel free to do so.

Crete was a closer run thing for the German airborne forces taht is generally admitted, if you look at it carefully and the losses they suffered. With a smaller area to defend Malta would be no walk in the park for them as already explained in earlier posts, particularly in view of the lack of landing beaches for the forces needed to back them up.

The first Luftwaffe units from Fliegerkorps X, incl some Ju88, didn't begin to arrive in the Med until January 1941. And IIRC the Me109s didn't arrive until Feb.

HyperWar: The Mediterranean & Middle East, Vol.I (Chapter XVII)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

According to MAW Vol 1 (which I hate taking down since the binding is terrible and the pages are falling out)

Dec 1940 has 33 and 274 sqns RAF with Hurricane Mk 1, 112 RAF and 3 RAAF with Gladiators (and some Gauntlets)
RAF bombers are one unit of Blenheim IV, four of Blenheim I, three of Wellington, and one Bombay, plus a total of 4 Hurricanes and 12 Lysanders for Army Cooperation
On the Italian side it looks like five squadrons of CR.42s, two of CR 32s, supporting ten squadrons of SM. 79 plus some other stuff (Z.501, Z.506, Ba 65 etc.)
Some G.50s show up later in January.
The first German units to arrive in the zone (it not actually based in NA) are in Jan 41
12 Jan, 1941 shows 92 x Ju 88 (80 serviceable) in Catania and 34 x Bf 110 from III./JG 26 (16 Serviceable) at Palermo, plus 42 x Ju 87 and 41 x He 111
By March 1941 the British had their first 7 Marylands in the area (much better than Blenheims) but these aren't operational until May
Also in March 1941 the Germans get some HS 126
The war is basically Hurricanes and Gladiators vs. Bf 110, CR 42s and G.50s for three glorious months (good for the Allies) until J.G. 27 gets there and becomes operational some time in April.
19 April 1941 is the first claim I see for a BF 109E-7 from J.G. 27.
From this point on Hurricane units start losing from 1-2 in a mission to 7-8 in a single mission. Germans seem to have a mix of 109E-4 and E-7

Just for fun since I took the book down I'll post some more data:

Fulmars are making claims and taking losses also by April. I see Z.1007 and SM 82 on the Italian side.
Jun 1941 sees 250 RAF with the first Tomahawk IIB.. Two squadrons of Marylands operational by then, the rest of the bombers are all Blenheims.
on 29 Jun 1941 JG. 27 loses three Bf 109E down or crash landed in a scrap with Tomahawks of 250 RAF, who lost two Tomahawks in the same engagement. This is the first significant loss of Bf 109s I see.
on 3 Sept 1941 2 SAAF, now flying Tomahawks, seems to have shot down 4 x G.50 for the loss of 1 Tomahawk (allegedly to friendly AA)
Looks like the italians have MC 200 by this point.
12 Oct 1941, 2 SAAF, 3 RAAF and 112 RAAF lose a total of five Tomahawk shot down or crash landed, plus another five damaged or badly damaged, for no gain.
Allies appear to have Beaufighters now.
18 Oct 1941 is the first mention I see of Bf 109F (That is the first mention i see of Bf 109F but I maybe missed something? I thought F2 were there for a while before F4)
23 Oct 1941 is the first mention I see of Hurricane II (a IIB)
TO & E in December 1941 shows: 7 x Hurricane I squadrons, 5 x Hurricane IIa and IIb squadrons, 5 x Tomahawk squadrons, 3 x Maryland and 5 x Blenheim IV (plus a bunch of other bombers and miscelleaneous types further from the front line) all organized into four fighter wings and three bomber wings.
He shows 410 Luftwaffe aircraft
12 Nov 1941 3 x Hurricane I and 1 x Tomahwk all shot down for no gain (all claimed by the Germans as Tomahawks)
20 Nov 1941 4 x Tomahawk 6 x Hurricane I and II, and 5 x Marylands shot down in exchange for 2 x Ju 87 and 5 x Bf 110
22 Nov 1941 7 x Tomahawks (3 more lost to Flak) are shot down in a big fight with J.G. 27, J.G.27 also loses 6 x Bf 109F4 that day, at least 4 to the Tomahawks (this was their biggest loss yet and a big deal for the Luftwaffe which ordered a change of tactics, DAF fighter units didn't realize how many victories they had and were also quite shaken)

 

[EwenS]

You might be interested in these pages:-

The Fleet Air Arm in CRUSADER

BackgroundFleet Air Arm squadrons were quite involved in the Mediterranean battles during Operation Crusader. While no carrier was active in the Med following the sinking of HMS Ark Royal on 13/14 …

rommelsriposte.com

Royal Air Force Strength in November 1941

Background The question of Commonwealth air strength at the start of Operation CRUSADER has been the subject of some debate, with figures ranging from 600 to 1,000 planes being available to Air Mar…

rommelsriposte.com

 

[Shortround6]

A dozen Matilda tanks (how many were even operational?) and a few shore guns were not going to stop the Germans if they decided to take it and had full air superiority.

East coast:
- Fort Bingemma (1x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 10th Coast Bty ?
- Fort Madalena (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 10th Coast Bty ?

West coast:
- Fort San Leonardo (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 23rd H Bty until April 1942, then 6th Coast Bty
- Fort Benghisa (2x 9.2" BL Mk X) - 1939: ?, 1942: 6th Coast Bty ?

2) Inner Fire Command - 1st H Rgt RMA

- 1st Bty (East coast):
Fort Delimara (2x 6" BL Mk VII)
Fort San Rocco (3x 6" BL Mk VII)

- 2nd Bty (West coast):
Fort Tigne (3x 6" BL Mk VII)
Fort Campbell (2x 6" BL Mk VII)

- 3rd Bty (Center):
Fort St. Elmo (12x 6pdr 10cwt QF Mk I)
Fort Ricasoli (6x 6pdr 10cwt QF Mk I)

"During 1941 additional guns were mounted at:-

Isola Battery 2 - 4.7 inch
Taxbiex Battery 2 - 4 inch
St. Angelo Battery 2 - 4 inch
Manoeldone 1 - 4 inch
Bogebba 2 - 12 pdrs.
Delimara 2 - 12 pdrs."

Because shore batteries do not roll, pitch, yaw or in fact move in any direction they are considered to be vastly more accurate than ship mounted guns.
They are (for the big guns) also being feed information from widely separated sites and fire control centers can make much more accurate range measurements and use triangulation.
Targets were plotted on maps.
Shore batteries often used the height of the range finders above sea level as the base of the triangle to figure range and not the 5-15 meters distance of the rangefinder itself.
The Italians need to show up with battleships to out gun the shore batteries. Even 8 in cruisers aren't going to do it.

An old thread on invading Malta in 1940, it may have wandered a bit (imagine that).

Malta 1940

There can be a big difference between being "in commission", "declared operational" and actually being operational. HMS Rodney had had ONE practice shoot with it's 16in guns in the year before it fought the Bismark. How many practice shoots did the new Italian battleships have when they...

ww2aircraft.net

Malta was a much tougher proposition than Crete.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Seems to pale in comparison to the defenses at Corregidor and around Manilla Bay, which had even more formidable guns (12 and 14 inch) and plenty of AAA. They had about 12,000 troops too. But it didn't amount to much good once they lost air superiority.

I know Malta, I'm familiar with the history (and some of the artifacts of prehistory) and geography of that extremely interesting place. I know the story of the other sieges which took place there. And I disagree with you.

If the Germans could take Crete in 13 days it would have probably taken 3 or 4 days to take Malta. I don't think there is any real reason to believe it would have been a harder nut to crack. Stukas and Ju 88 would make short work of the shore defenses, I'm not even sure they would have had to use any of the big guns of the Italian fleet (they may not have had the fuel to move those battleships anyway).

But if you think you are right, and you probably do, by all means let's start another thread to discuss that. It's an interesting scenario.

 

[EwenS]

Where did you get a figure of "maybe 10,000" for the Malta garrison in 1942?

Plenty of information out there on the garrison. 4 brigades with 15 infantry battalions in 1942 with c26,000 troops plus supporting arms.

https://bmh.uk.webeasy.slightlydifferent.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/sites/124/2018/04/Malta-Command-1943.pdf

Although dated 1943, the notes at the foot explain the history of each Brigade.

Also this

The Siege of Malta 1941 - 1942 - The Royal Hampshire Regiment Museum

The Siege of Malta 1941 – 1942 On 21st February the 1st Hampshire left Egypt for Malta to be part of the Malta Infantry Brigade, serving with 2nd Devons and 1st Dorsets. They were to undergo together the bombing of Malta, the famine and all the hardships of the siege. Their role was the defence

www.royalhampshireregiment.org

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

For 1941-42 I've seen figures ranging from 10 - 15,000, but not 25,000 - where do you get that number precisely? Four WW2 British infantry brigades is about 15,000 troops if they are full strength, right?

From that doc you linked it sounds like some units moved to Malta in 1942 and 43.

Even if it was 25,000, which I don't believe it was, there were 40,000 on Crete and the Germans took that pretty quickly didn't they? And the defenders on Malta were in fairly dire straits due to supplies by the time of say Pedestal, as previously pointed out.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Having visited quite a few port towns in this region, I believe most commercial harbors around the Med, on both sides, were set up for both loading and unloading of small and large cargo ships simultaneously, usually on different docks. The docks for the bigger ships often had cranes and large wharves, whereas the smaller coastal vessels can load and unload in much smaller harbors including fishing harbors. Locals have been loading and unloading these around the Med for thousands of years.

So you are confident the WWII axis ports in North Africa were in effect dual ports, one seagoing, one coastal, with independent berthing, loading, transport, warehousing and workforces. Given the problems the allies had I am less confident. And the point about sending rail is ignored.

According to the British Merchant Marine History with 1,600 tons as the smallest ship the average Italian merchant ship was 5,480 tons in 1938. Using a lower limit of 500 tons in June 1940 drops the average to 4,220 tons, deduct those outside the Mediterranean, the liners and the hospital ships and you are down to an average of 3,187 tons and a fleet of 548 ships 1,749,441 tons, all up. Down from a total fleet of 786 ships 3,318,129 tons. All data from The Italian Navy in WWII by M A Bragadin. What is your definition of coaster size wise? One that has the range to go from Tripoli to say Tobruk and back without refuelling. The F lighters the Germans had were around 240 tons with a 1,540 mile range, up to 140 tons of cargo, probably cruising at 7 knots. The general rule the smaller the ship the more fuel it uses to move a given weight of cargo.

According to Bragadin during the war the Italians built another 60 ships, 307,733 tons and salvaged another 24. Other sources were captures/purchases and transfers from Germany. They lost 565 ships of 2,018,616 tons of ships of 500 or more tons, and 759 ships of 87,905 tons of under 500 tons. Of the 883 important convoys sent to Libya 220 attacked by subs, 291 by aircraft

As for invading Malta, Let's get real.

Get real for a hypothetical? It would also help the case by avoiding a confident prediction of victory followed by the question how big is the opponent then discovering the answer is pushing 3 times the estimate. And then coming up with why the numbers should be discounted or other places were tougher.

The allies began evacuating Greece on 22 April, finishing 28 April, 12,712 men lost from a roughly corps sized unit, the evacuated units had lost lots of equipment as well and arrived at Crete or Egypt disorganised, lacking communications and heavier weapons. Little had been done on the Crete defences, the Greeks had needed all their good units and equipment to counter the Italian invasion, those left at Crete lacked training and equipment. Enigma cracked much of the German attack plan but at this stage of the war the trust in it was lower and risk of acting on it was usually considered too great to make full use of it. The attack began on 20 May.

Malta on 1 January 1942, Artillery regiments (battalions), 12th Field, Coast 4th and 1st RMA , Defence 26th, Heavy AA 4th, 7th, 10th, 2nd RMA, 11th RMA, Light AA 22nd, 66th, 74th, 3rd RMA. Malta/Southern/1st Malta/231st Brigade, 5 battalions. Northern/2nd Malta/232nd Brigade, 5 battalions, Central/3rd Malta/233rd Brigade 3 battalions, not sure but it seems the first Durham Light Infantry was present but not under any of the brigades and maybe one other infantry unit. In infantry terms a reinforced division. Go forward to July 1942 and there was the new Western/4th Malta/234th Brigade. Between them the now 4 brigades had 15 battalions. The idea No axis paratroops involved in any attack are a bonus for the garrison, no need to worry about their rear areas.

The Malta over sea invasion would be unique for the axis in Europe, as the allies proved plenty can go wrong well before the enemy intervenes. Have you looked at the evolution of allied landings? The early raids then the steady improvements as each operation provided lessons, enabling Overlord to succeed, with the downside so much effort was put on getting and staying ashore no one thought about Bocage country fighting. Malta provides limited numbers of landing beaches. Operational shore batteries have spent years carefully registering ranges and the axis have limited numbers of landing craft, there is the initial landing and then there is the crucial follow up waves.

I think it's a safe bet that the Germans could have Malta if they had blocked the convoys and destroyed the British air forces there, which they very nearly did.

As has been shown, the country came close to starvation, almost no need to actually destroy the Malta forces if the supply ships are blocked, but that requires being able to have the air and naval combat power as needed to stop the supply ships.

Operation Hercules, most of X Fliegerkorps and forces in Africa to Sicily, joining II Fliegerkorps, there will be a 1 to 2 week pause after the fighting is over in Africa to do this. 3 parachute regiments, 7 to 9 transport gruppen. A week or so to destroy the air defence then systematic elimination of all AA guns. Parachute jumps begin at 1330 hours on X day. Landing force in south west corner at 2400 hours, Gozo in the morning, Calafrana time not given, next day destroy coastal batteries with help from Italian warships. Timetable 18 June end of Theseus (attack on Africa), 29 June to 17 July preliminary operations, 18 July attack. Interestingly the air transports are to approach from the south west and leave that way.

If the Germans had theoretical better strike aircraft, or frankly if they had just sent a couple more squadrons of their existing Ju 88s and Ju 87s earlier in 1942, they probably could have taken it.

Or deployed the Italian Navy more, given the losses to and effects on the June and August convoys. Once again the solution to everything comes across as more and better airpower or destroying the enemy's.

Once Malta's air power is neutralized, it could be taken. Once it is taken, it becomes a base for Axis air and naval (esp. submarine) operations rather than British. This means not only are Axis supply convoys much better protected, increasing their supplies, it means that British supply convoys from the Suez to points west of Libya are going to be all but impossible.

Could a time line be provided? In August 1942 the British were not going to run convoys to Libya, in any case Malta was one base and not necessarily the best for the axis as it required sea supply.

Interesting theories.

Speaking historically and not in terms of any speculation about improved Axis aircraft, I would argue that air power, in particular the DAF, was actually decisive in the shift toward Allied victories in North Africa and the accelerating misfortunes of the Axis. The shift from uneven victories in favor of Rommel to catastrophic defeats.... this severely exacerbating all of the Axis logistics problems.

Interesting air power evangelist theories. The allied air forces were competing with a German decision to keep going forward in June 1942, then stay where they were. They could do the stay but only by giving up on the ability to attack and a lower chance to resist a prolonged attack. Are there any figures on how many supplies, trucks etc. the air forces actually destroyed? At the moment the default win the war option is keep adding airpower.

The structural issues in the WWII British Army start pre WWI, when the men who would become the generals in WWII entered the force, to become an officer in the British Army required an outside source of income, minimum 100 pounds up to 400 pounds for the (social) elite units, this rather narrowed the talent available. As well the best graduates from Sandhurst, like Auchinleck, were sent to the Indian Army where they had little exposure to modern weapons or the officers back in Britain who did. Since Cromwell's day Britain has tended to want a politically reliable army, versus a more competent navy, a small army only needs to find a small number of good commanders. Thrown in the peace time British army is small there is little chance for anyone to practice being a divisional commander or above apart from map exercises. Result, 8th Army had General Cunningham then General Ritchie, requiring Auchinleck to take over both times. Throughout the desert war the Germans made decisions and subsequent actions far faster than the British. The Germans had a supply of both better trained and better experienced officers throughout the desert war, think of how many other German and British armies were in combat to end 1941 then end 1942. Next comes Rommel's communication interception unit doing so well until destroyed at first Alamein and the recall of Colonel Fellers in the same time frame, his near daily detailed reports to Washington were in a code the axis had cracked, while the Ultra system was improving in both numbers of messages cracked but also correctly interpreting them, early the incorrect supply reports submitted by Afrika Korps were believed in London and so put pressure for action on the desert commanders.

Next comes the armour deciding their doctrine, which labelled infantry, anti tank and artillery as support but treated the non armour units as hindrance. It was easy to lure British armour into killing fields and see unsupported charges into axis defensive positions, at times the axis troops would surrender but since there was no infantry to round them up, go back to shooting when the tanks moved on. Almost inevitably the battlefield would be left to the axis to clean up, recover their tanks plus take the British tanks or make sure they were totally destroyed. There are a number of versions of this but the Australian, New Zealand and South African divisional commanders at Alamein had second roles, head of their military mission with appeal rights to their governments. They collectively and forcefully expressed a vote of no confidence in the armoured units, which proved valid when investigated by the new command team. The armour wanted to fight its own war and too many of its commanders would rewrite or ignore orders accordingly.

In theory Jock Columns were a form of combined arms but when one was issued with anti tank guns the commander wondered what to do with them. Trouble is the columns broke up divisions into smaller units easily destroyed by an enemy who kept striking power concentrated.

8th Army could not fight as an army and its corps often could not fight as corps. The attempted stand at the Mersa Matruth by two corps degenerating into everyone out when one corps withdrew without checking what the other was doing, or as summarised by the chair of the Board of Inquiry "XIII corps just disappeared and left X Corps up the pole". One attack in July 1942 is summarised scathingly as "two infantry and two armoured brigades had been employed. They had made three unrelated attacks from three different directions at three different times. A single small panzer division with some twenty or thirty tanks and a fifth rate Italian infantry division easily dealt with all three attacks in succession and inflicted crippling losses". Montgomery made the army fight as a whole and gained more control of the armour, the proposition the airpower could overcome these defects in the army is wrong. The shift in intelligence alone is significant, the return to divisions fighting as such, corps that co-ordinated attacks, armour more likely to act within the plan even more so.

Short term in limited circumstances the services can substitute for each other but the prime mission of each service branch is the defeat of their opposite number, the best way to do that is a common combined services plan taking into account the circumstances. If you like as a simple example the Brooklyn class cruiser going from a 6 inch gun cruiser to a battery of 15 high velocity 152.4mm anti tank guns, with a crew trained to fire at mobile targets and far better rangefinders than your average anti tank unit, but there are plenty of places hidden from naval gunfire, even in range, and by being so close to shore the risk to the cruiser is increased. The army needs to land its heavy weapons as part of the assault.

On the ground, Grant tanks had much greater ability to knock out Axis AT guns thanks to having HE ammunition for both 37mm and 75mm guns, (Stuart / Honey tanks also had HE and 'shot' ammunition for their 37mm guns) and the 75mm could destroy all available German tanks at their longest range, even if they still could not outrange the best German guns. Larger 105mm howitzers were more effective than the 25 pounder. Larger numbers of halftracks and trucks helped allied troops move around faster and a bit more safely.

The British were deploying things like 5.5 inch guns, using them more correctly, the number of 105mm guns was not a major increase in firepower, how many half tracks did 8th Army have at Alamein?

At Gazala the Army had 6 pounder AT guns, along with Grants and Stuarts, and lost lots of them really quickly without doing much to the Afrika Korps. The Stuarts were on the way out at Alamein. The tankers did not think of themselves as artillery, shelling anti tank guns or infantry, so what was the range the US 75mm could knock out a mark IVF2 with its long 75mm gun?

All of this improved by the time of second El Alamein by which time these technical advantages and tactical improvements had become decisive (far more than the advantages in numbers).

The application of much more airpower in Italy in 1944, operation Strangle, with a bigger quality gap, and even more airpower in Normandy with an even bigger quality gap still meant to force the Germans to retreat the army had to attack. By Second Alamein the allied air forces had won their battle over Egypt, next came translating that into effective support, Montgomery had put the 8th Army HQ beside the RAF one for the first time. You are exaggerating airpower effects.

Mosquito Missions with high losses were mainly during highly risky low-level (and fairly deep penetration) raids against well defended targets like Gestapo HQs in big cities, which basically no other bomber type could even attempt.

Aside from that the British high command chose to mostly use them as pathfinder and night fighter etc. missions which were deemed higher priority for the special advantages of this extraordinary aircraft which was never available in sufficient numbers. I.e. it wasn't used that much as a tactical or operational bomber.

Yet the thesis is about quality overcoming losses and includes longer range German fighters which would increase their deep penetration missions for a start. The Richard Davis Spreadsheets, quick search result, which is missing about 50 to 60 sorties versus the list in Mosquito by Sharp and Bowyer, so not final figures, and lists targets is Czechoslovakia as Germany, bomb tonnages by country, Mosquito Day raids 1942/43 Belgium 62.6, Denmark 7.1, France 144.5, Germany 158.7, Netherlands 77.8. Tonnages dropped by sighting method Visual 107.9, Visual (Low Level) 341, Visual Dead Reckoning 1.8. No Gestapo HQ's in the 35 target types given. Lost by country attacked/sorties sent, Belgium 5/107, Denmark 1/9, France 10/195, Germany 26/263, Netherlands 7/109.

What is an "operational bomber"? What is "not used much"? 2nd Tactical Air Force had its Mosquito units, mostly used for night interdiction. Bomber Command Mosquito sorties are twice as much as Stirling, coming in at number 4 in the sorties by aircraft type list.

Operation Oyster, 6 December 1942, 1 Ventura crashed in the North Sea inbound, 1 more shot down when they flew too near an airfield inbound. Mosquitoes were limited to Boston speed on the run in but acted as decoys, luring taking off fighters away. Venturas attacked the target 6 minutes after the Bostons. Bostons intercepted outbound over the North Sea. The Bomber Command Losses books say fighters shot down 3 Bostons and 1 Ventura, Flak 3 Bostons (2 made it back to Britain), 6 Venturas and a Mosquito, 2 more Venturas lost cause of damage unrecorded, one of these made it back to Britain. Michael Bowyer reports bird strikes damaged 6 Bostons, 16 Venturas and a Mosquito while flak damaged 4 Bostons and 16 Venturas, fighters damaged a Mosquito and a Boston and suspects some Venturas were lost to phosphorus splash from bombs. I also suspect there are some bird and flak damaged aircraft, so you cannot just add the numbers together. The different times and routes chosen plus it is easier for flak to hit a formation of 40+ versus 12 means there were different levels of exposure.

WO 169/3861 (Eighth Army), a document from the G(AFV) Branch dated 'End Sept.' [1942] headed "Tank Overhaul Programme." It gives the overhaul mileage limit/annual mileage rate/time in workshops for overhaul (weeks) as:

Crusader 1200 / 3000 / 8
Valentine 2500 / 3000 / 8
Matilda 1000 / 3000 / 8
Stuart 3500 / 3000 / 4
Grant 1500 / 3000 / 8

Which firstly shows how few miles per year the tanks were expected to do, and the distance they could travel before they needed a major overhaul. You would expect the time between overhauls to be at least basically related to the great "reliability" tag. And indeed looking at the above the Stuart became the Honey, and the Valentine has a good reputation for reliability.

 

[Shortround6]

Even if it was 25,000, which I don't believe it was, there were 40,000 on Crete and the Germans took that pretty quickly didn't they? And the defenders on Malta were in fairly dire straits due to supplies by the time of say Pedestal, as previously pointed out.

Make sure you are comparing apples to apples.

From Wiki so correction welcome.

United Kingdom:
18,047[1][a]
Greece:
10,258[1] – 11,451[2]
New Zealand:
7,702[1]
Australia:
6,540[1]
Total:
42,547[1]

Now context is always important. The British had over 125 years to figure out how to defend Malta, yes there were decades of neglect in there and there were several major revolutions in technology (some of the old muzzle loading cannon were still there because they weren't worth hauling away).
However the British didn't arrive on Crete until Oct/Nov of 1940 when the Italians attacked Greece. British were trying to set up air fields and harbor/s for support of RAF and RN. British ground troops relieved Greek troops so they could go to the mainland and fight the Italians. They took a large percentage of the machine guns, mortars and light artillery.
Germans attack beginning of April 1941 and everything goes pear shaped for the Allies very quickly.
Basically Crete become a escape area for a small Dunkirk. Most, but not all, British commonwealth troops are evacuees from mainland Greece and equipment (weapons) varies from pretty good to none (not even rifles) Greeks on Crete are mixed. Some are remnants of Greek garrison or military/training schools, in no case do they have a full outfit of guns or ammo. RN only delivered about 10% of the planned supply supplies due to German Air attacks. The RN was trying to evacuate about 10,000 troops that didn't have rifles ( did get get around 7,000 out).
British AA was eight 3in guns and 20 40mm Bofors guns for the whole Island.
Germans began the Attack on the 20th of May so the British preparations were quick and not well supplied.

Maybe Malta could not have held out. But the situations were a lot different than a "simple men divided by square miles" formula suggests.

 

[Shortround6]

I would note that the British pre war thinking hamstrung the British tanks.
The whole "fire on the move" thing with gunner using his shoulder to control the elevation (primitive stabilization system) meant that the British tanks had a practical range of about 800yds. British tank commanders had 3 choices if they started taking fire from guns 800-1500yds away.
1.Pop smoke and retreat.
2.Don't pop smoke and retreat.
....Call for artillery to shell position with HE and or smoke.
3. charge and try to get within 800 yds where the co-ax machine guns would start to have some effect. closer is better.

BTW one battle that saw a few German 88s take out around a dozen Matilda's was the result of inflexible planning.
There was was battery of 25pdr guns assigned for fire support, it completed it's initial fire mission. Mounted up and was driving to the next firing position (using the quad tractors) and got bogged down in a sand wadi and didn't reach the new firing position. Either high command didn't know, or had no other available artillery battery in position. In any case the tanks thought they were going to get fire support, they didn't get it. They were shot to pieces.
Maybe not all the time but the the practice of "The Charge" wasn't that that the tankers had not progressed past cavalry sabre thinking but they actually had a understanding of what the capabilities of their weapons were ( pop smoke meant two large grenades, not the modern 6-12) and then you had to stand on the top of the hull, reloading the two launchers (connecting up the electrical wires), assuming you had spares in the the tank. The co-ax machine gun was actually effective at 1200-2000 yds but not in a British tank with that stupid elevation system and sight. (might have been a very good system in France where most of the shots were at close range.