Why did the British airforce adopted highly similar Hurricane and Spitfire at the same time?

[tomo pauk]

I didn't mean exact copies or duplicates. Though I'm not sure I agree with your conclusions. Hellcat or Corsair would have been helpful to have on the Russian Front and in the MTO. And I doubt P-47 was harder to maintain even with the turbo.

LW already have had as much Fw 190s as the industry was able to manufacture. For each 3 Corsairs or Hellcats there is 4 Fw 190 that don't get produced?
Someone will need to 1st produce turbo set-up for the German copy of P-47 1st - not a given, considering German (bad) luck with turboes. And then to make sure it works on thousands of aircraft in service, plus patching out the battle damage.

Fuel is definitely a problem regardless what planes the Luftwaffe were flying. But maybe with more and better aircraft in the Mediterranean they might have eventually been able to source some Middle Eastern oil. I don't see any advantage to building aircraft, particularly bombers, that are just going to be shot down.

Germany can't just handwave both better and more aircraft. Especially the high-performance 2-engined aircraft, that also push fuel requirements through the roof.
Without invasion of Soviet Union, Germany stands some chances in seecuring ME oil. Or, force the UK into some workable peace by 1940/41. Historically, peace/armistice vs. UK never happened, invasion happened, so they will never get the oil from ME.

I wouldn't say automatically better, but it seemed to be better in aggregate. Both Bf 109 and MC 202 were performing better at above 20' feet than Spitfire Mk V or merlin P-40, and much better than any Allison engined P-40 or P-39... or any Klimov or Shvestov-engined fighter. With the two speed superchargers they had to always pick the two altitudes where performance was optimal (and they didn't always guess right with this), but the hydromatic seemed to perform well at all altitudes up to it's performance ceiling.

What Bf 109 out-performed than the Spitfire V or Merlinized P-40? MC.202 was not out-pacing the Spitfire V or P-40F above 20k ft, even if it should out-climb the heavy P-40F.
MC.202 and Bf 109F shed a lot of drag due to being small aircraft - see for example Re.2001 and Ki-61 not being that speedy despite the variable-speed S/C on their engines.
P-40N and P-39N/Q were faster than MC.202. P-40B was as fast as the Bf 10E, despite the former being bigger and heavier.
MiG-3 was out-pacing Bf 109F2, despite having the 1-speed S/C on the AM-35A vs. the variable-speed S/C on the German machine. Yak-1 was faster than the Bf109E, despite the engine power being a bit better on the 109E.

Above rated altitude, there is no appeal of the variable-speed S/C. With 100 oct fuel, Allied engines all but negated the supposed disadvantage of the 2-speed drive anyway. See here the power chart of the Merlin 20 series.

I never said it was. But what they needed was more successful designs in the mid war. Like the aircraft I mentioned. Instead they extended the life of pre-war or early war designs past their freshness date. One of the disadvantages of keeping the same design's in action through the war was that the enemy learned the entire performance envelope, quirks and flaws of the design. Certain problems with the 109 for example were well known by late 1942 and were exploited by Allied pilots. With a variety of newer designs arriving it's much harder to develop ideal tactics.

Pray tell, how should the piston-engined mid-war (1942-43) German fighter should've looked?

It's a lot of incremental changes but it's arguable how new they were. Certainly in terms of capability they were very new.

Another question: in order to successfully battle the Allied best past late 1943, what engine should be powering a brave new German fighter - piston engine or jet engine? Not just to equal 430-440 mph turn of speed, but to out-speed them at least 20 mph, and to out-climb them, and to have manageable handling.

I certainly never suggested that. I was pointing out rather that they were failing to produce promising new designs (and it's also true that they failed to develop some good new ones in time).

Me 262 was a promising new design. A lot of people will argue that He 280 was a promising new design. Neither of the two will not be produced in quantities unless/until there are thousands of jet engines available for installation.

So I would say, technically it was possible to make a faster tactical bomber, a real replacement for the pre-war Stuka or the early war Ju 88, but they never really did. The Arado 234 seems to have been quite a promising design but they couldn't get it into large scale production I gather mainly due to engines.

Thanks for the feedback, there are many sentences there that I agree, and some that I will not agree (guess this is why forums exist)
However, the question of what types specifically were supposed to be hard to produce still remains.

 

[Shortround6]

This is a good example of what I was getting at. The US had a different type of industrial culture which took a while to orient toward the new goals, but ultimately was proving superior for this type of warfare.

Part of the "industrial culture" was greater experience in a number of different manufacturing fields.
Ford did NOT design any performance improvements to the R-2800. They left that to P & W.

One of the things they did do was figure out how to make R-2800 cylinder barrels that were originally specified as forgings out of SAE 4140 steel as castings.
Not just cast them but come up with a centrifugal mold (fed with molten steel) that ran at 750rpm with eight indexing molds on on the table. the complete cycle took 3 1/2 minutes.
Ford claimed a better finish with higher bursting strength and that 50% less machining was needed to complete the cylinder barrel compared to the forged barrels.

The US had the ability to design and build new machinery to manufacture items in very large quantities.
It wasn't just big buildings with lots of workers even if laid out with good parts flow.

Wright invested in some specialized machines that in one instance took up 956 sq ft of floor space and needed 17.4 hours per 3 shift day (this seems like a typo) (for 2 machines) compared to general purpose machines that would need 5 radial drills, one radial tapper, one vertical mill with rotary table that occupied an additional 278 sq ft and needed an additional 121.5 man hours per 3 shift day. even if the fist number is off by one place in the number that is still a very substantial savings in labor.

However this also shows the need to both plan the factories and tooling for the size of the orders.

 

[Shortround6]

I wouldn't say automatically better, but it seemed to be better in aggregate. Both Bf 109 and MC 202 were performing better at above 20' feet than Spitfire Mk V or merlin P-40, and much better than any Allison engined P-40 or P-39... or any Klimov or Shvestov-engined fighter. With the two speed superchargers they had to always pick the two altitudes where performance was optimal (and they didn't always guess right with this), but the hydromatic seemed to perform well at all altitudes up to it's performance ceiling.

The is some confusion between the actual supercharger and the drive system.
The Supercharger is the air pump that supplies air to the engine at higher than atmospheric pressure.
There are a few limits to basic supercharger design.
One is you can't spin the tips of the impeller much faster than the speed of sound in the supercharger. A bit fast yes, due to pressure and temperature inside the supercharger the speed of sound inside the supercharger is higher than in free air. Changing the drive system does not change this.
Other things that affect the design is how much boost you are looking for and at what altitude. This is often referred to as the pressure ratio of the supercharger. The Supercharger on the Merlin III was under 3.0:1. It could not compress the air at 16,250ft even 3 times higher than the ambiotic air.
You also have to match the supercharger capacity to the airflow of the engine. Superchargers can cover a range of different airflows but at a certain airflow they start to "choke" and air flow goes down (not just level off) temperature goes up very rapidly and power to drive the supercharger goes up rapidly, which adds to the heat problem. Larger engines need larger superchargers but still have problems with tip speed (you can make the supercharger deeper front to back for more volume).
Something that rarely get's mentioned is that superchargers have certain efficiency range. Most early WW II superchargers were operating at under 70% efficiency which meant that under 70% of the power going to the supercharger was actually compressing the air. The extra power was heating the air over and above the heat generated by simply compressing the air (and was a major source of detonation)


All of these have nothing or little to do with the drive system.

Since the Germans usually operated (until late in the war) at a lower pressure than the British did their superchargers didn't need to use as higher pressure ratio.
German superchargers often weren't very good. Neither were American ones and the less said about the French, the better.

Do NOT confuse the operational height (or service ceiling) of an airplane with the full throttle height of the engine. Spitfire could fly between 1,000 to 2,000ft higher than a Hurricane using the same engine. Put the same engine in a Fairley Battle and the plane's ceiling was 7-8,000ft lower.

"Bf 109 and MC 202 were performing better at above 20' feet"
was due to the size/weight of the planes and not better performance from their engines.

 

[tomo pauk]

"Bf 109 and MC 202 were performing better at above 20' feet"
was due to the size/weight of the planes and not better performance from their engines.

Crux of the matter.

 

[pbehn]

There was a huge difference in scale. Germany gave a lot of advanced warning that war was coming and they would start it, but they never prepared for the war they got involved in. There were over 30,000 B-17s and B-24s made with four engines each that is 120,000 engines with turbos. How many aero engines more than 120,000 did Germany produce in the whole war?

 

[Shortround6]

A bit more.

Wright tended to use supercharger gear ratios of 7.0:1 or 7.14:1 for low gear and 10.0:1 for high gear. Which works out well for illustration.
The power required is proportional to the square of the speed of the impeller.
7 x 7 = 49
10 X 10 = 100
Wright supercharger needed twice the power in high gear as it did in low gear.
Wright superchargers in 1930s weren't very good. In all fairness ALL American engine companies were buying superchargers designs from GE (not turbos, the designs for the actual compressors) and in many cases parts, like the impellers. Allison was sometimes providing parts (like impellers ) as a subcontractor but was not doing design work. GE wasn't doing a very good job but in the early 1930s the fuel would not support high level of boost and so nobody knew any better.
Back the Wright superchargers. Wright went to two speed superchargers not for altitude performance (commercial aircraft were not going to fly much above 10,000ft) and they could supply engines with enough power for DC-3s and other planes to cruise at pretty good speed once they were at cruising altitude (no body wearing oxygen masks).
However the two speed supercharger allowed for 100-200hp more power (from an R-1820) at sea level or low (2-3000ft) for take-off from a short airfield or in hot conditions.
In part because of the less power needed to drive the supercharger and in part because of less pumping losses (throttle was wide open instead of part shut) and part because the air was cooler/denser because the supercharger was not heating it up as much with the slower turning impeller.
In the Late 30s both P & W and Wright were not happy with the GE superchargers and started designing their own.
Hooker in England not only worked on the supercharger that went on the Merlin XX engine, he discovered that some of the equations used to design superchargers were wrong. Test results did not match theory.
With 100 octane and 100/130 fuel and higher boost better supercharger design became mandatory.

Still has nothing to do with the supercharger drive systems. Several British engines were produced with two speed superchargers and had one speed locked out for certain aircraft used on certain missions. Apparently easier to do than setting up different production lines?

 

[Shortround6]

A bit more.
There was a lower limit on the DB 601/5 engine supercharger drive system. Upper limit was a bit over 10:1.

The Germans built the DB 605AS using the supercharger from the DB 603 engine and gained a few thousand meters of altitude. However the bigger supercharger took about 40hp more to run at sea level (and or required the throttle to be closed a bit more) and shows one of the trade-offs.

graph for DB 605 from a Reggiane fighter

Please note the fall off in power at low level. The only thing the hydraulic drive does is smooth out the curve between the lower peak and the upper peak. A two speed supercharger that had been set up with identical ratios would have shown a much steeper valley between the peaks but the low part of the chart and the upper part would be identical.

 

[tomo pauk]

There was a lower limit on the DB 601/5 engine supercharger drive system. Upper limit was a bit over 10:1.

TAIC manual shows, for the Atstuta 21 and 31, low limit being at 7.03:1, upper limit at 9.7:1, while the 10.03 value was without slip (ie. it would've been that value if the S/C is rigidly mounted to the drive?)
Slip at high ratio was supposed to be worth 3%, again per the manual, thus the discrepancy.

Curiously enough, both Atstuta and Ha 40 were with impeller diameter of of 10.25 in (260mm) - the original DB 601A used 240 mm unit??

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

So the DB engine didn't really show much difference in spread between high and low than the Wright engine did.
P & W and RR usually spaced things closer.
B-26 engines were usually 7.6:1 and 10:1 or 9.89:1.
Merlin XX used 8.15 and 9.49.

Please note the Merlin XX used the Hooker designed intake which improved efficiency.

 

[tomo pauk]

Merlin XX used 8.15 and 9.49.

Ironically enough, for the 1-stage V-1710, the band between 7:1 and 10:1 would've been amazing had it received a hydraulic drive for it's S/C some time in late 1941

 

[Shortround6]

Ironically enough, for the 1-stage V-1710, the band between 7:1 and 10:1 would've been amazing had it received a hydraulic drive for it's S/C some time in late 1941

Heck, put a two speed box on it with a set of 7.48 gears and set of 9.60 gears.

Granted with the beefed up construction and the 100/130 fuel the need for the low gear got a lot less.

Edit. we both know that changing the rear end of the Allison required new block castings and new rear end castings/accessory drives and that is why it wasn't done.
I would note that the Merlin wasn't interchangeable either. While some of the British factories changed over at least one stayed making single speed Merlin's until the end, I think.

I think the two speed single stage was adaptable to the two speed two stage.

I would note that Buick and Chevrolet both only make single speed R-1830 engines, though with and without turbos.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

From what I have while Chevrolet only made single stage R-1830 Buick managed 1,100 2 stage C9G January to May 1945. Chevrolet managed 1 J-35 in September and 2 in November 1945. Packard did not stop single stage Merlin production until December 1944.

The RAF to the end wanted single stage Merlins for naval aircraft, Hurricanes, Lancasters and Yorks amongst others, Ford in Britain only produced Merlin 20 series and was still making Merlin 24 and 25 in November 1945, Crewe was still making Merlin 55M in November 1944 and shut down in May 1945. Derby was still making Merlin 32 in April 1945, Glasgow Merlin 25 in November 1944. In September 1945 Ford built 650 out of the 787 Merlins for the month, October 442 out of 545, November 400 out of 516. By the looks of things two stage Merlin was under 10% of British production until March 1943 and peaked around the low 40% mark at the end of 1944.

 

[yulzari]

Folk are looking, not unreasonably, at engineering but there were fundamental flaws in the Luftwaffe that came from the political culture.

Yes they needed different airframes and engines to better match their actual needs, but underlying it all is fuel and training. Training became critical earlier but both would render the Luftwaffe impotent in any attempt to reverse it's decline. No matter what wonder weapons arrived. Without a continuing supply of well trained aircrew aeroplane construction becomes a short life to match the short life of the poorly performing aircrew so you need more put in to just keep up with the losses going out.

France was hopeless at training too. Even worse possibly. But that problem went away when France did.

Britain recognised it from the start and invested hugely in future aircrew across the Commonwealth so the quality of new aircrew grew much better as the war went on. The USA learned from this and their base experience in training some of these themselves plus the sheer mass of population and resources allowing training to be in equally large numbers.

The Finns made training the core of their effort, weeding out the poorer performers for one. By force of circumstance their improved aeroplane performance was limited by cost, a limited production base and availability so they maximised what they had to make the best of what they had. A good Finnish pilot on a Brewster Buffalo was better than an average Soviet one in a Yak. Of course a better Finnish pilot would be even better in a good Yak than a Buffalo.

The Soviets followed their own culture and churned through lots of aircrew having the industrial base and fuel access to make huge numbers of training aeroplanes if not a quality of training to match the Wallies.

Japan followed the German model despite having pre war possibly the best training, in the JNAF at least.

Cunning design of airframes and engines cannot compensate for poorly trained aircrew unless they are in competitive quantities and the balance of aeroplane quality is extreme eg Bf109D v TempestVI.

 

[tomo pauk]

Yes they needed different airframes and engines to better match their actual needs, but underlying it all is fuel and training. Training became critical earlier but both would render the Luftwaffe impotent in any attempt to reverse it's decline. No matter what wonder weapons arrived. Without a continuing supply of well trained aircrew aeroplane construction becomes a short life to match the short life of the poorly performing aircrew so you need more put in to just keep up with the losses going out.

Fuel was indeed critically important, so were the replacement pilots, plus meeting the requirements of an expending air force.
However, by late 1943, LW pilots operating against West were piloting the under-performing aircraft. By early 1944, the situation changed - to the worse. Heaps of pilots just coming from Eastern Front will be hard pressed to cancel-out the 30-40 mph disadvantage at 25000 ft they now 'enjoyed'; a very much different thing than having a 20 mph advantage over the Soviets back in 1943. Actually, it will be impossible for them to cancel out the performance difference just on their training and experience.

The only way to reverse this is to sit them in the jet-powered fighters. German industry could not churn out the required quantity of jet engines as required to the Me 262 program, however.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One other significant factor is that attrition is worse when you have less capable aircraft. In early 1942 German fighters and pilot training were still arguably better than many if not most of the opponents they faced, but Allied tactics and aircraft were rapidly improving. By this time German tactical bombers, which had been so decisive in 1940 and 41, were already suffering heavy attrition and declining effectiveness.

By 1943 Allied fighter quality and training were at parity in the West / Med, and fighter pilot attrition started mounting. entire German fighter wings were being broken (J.G.27 for example) their bomber crews had a considerably shorter life span than the fighter pilots.

If you had a viable replacement for the Ju 87, He 111, and Ju 88 that could escape Allied fighters you wouldn't have needed to train as many aircrew.

If they had won the war in North Africa, which was within reach at one point, they could have pulled in more oil. This would have been much easier if they had faster transport aircraft.

 

[tomo pauk]

One other significant factor is that attrition is worse when you have less capable aircraft. In early 1942 German fighters and pilot training were still arguably better than many if not most of the opponents they faced, but Allied tactics and aircraft were rapidly improving. By this time German tactical bombers, which had been so decisive in 1940 and 41, were already suffering heavy attrition and declining effectiveness.

If you had a viable replacement for the Ju 87, He 111, and Ju 88 that could escape Allied fighters you wouldn't have needed to train as many aircrew.

Indeed, Luftwaffe was in need of replacing/improving of it's tactical aircraft (Bf 109, Ju 87) as well as strategic aircraft (Bf 110, He 111 and Ju 88). Update of the tactical section went okay - the Bf 109 was supported by Fw 190, Ju 87 was also getting supported/replaced by Fw 190. Strategic part was sorely lacking, there was nothing new to replace the Bf 110, He 177 was flawed, and Ju 288 went nowhere. Only the Do 217 project materialized.
A no-nonsense fast bomber never happened.
Not funny when the enemy has you outnumbered and, very soon, out-performed.

If they had won the war in North Africa, which was within reach at one point, they could have pulled in more oil. This would have been much easier if they had faster transport aircraft.

When that point actually existed?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Indeed, Luftwaffe was in need of replacing/improving of it's tactical aircraft (Bf 109, Ju 87) as well as strategic aircraft (Bf 110, He 111 and Ju 88). Update of the tactical section went okay - the Bf 109 was supported by Fw 190, Ju 87 was also getting supported/replaced by Fw 190.

I would amend this to say 'Short range tactical' . One of the issues the Germans and Italians faced in North Africa was that both fighters and their best strike aircraft (still the Stuka primarily until Sicily) was a limitation in range. The DAF and etc. had a small advantage here initially but it kept growing.

I'm going to compare ranges here a bit and to compare like to like I'm going to show the manufacturers max range with maximum fuel. These are obviously ball-park.

Axis

The CR 32 is roughly equal to the Gladiator in air combat, but had interceptor range (700 km)
Macchi 200 also had interceptor (600 km) range. Superior to Gladiator but slightly inferior to Hurricane, starts taking heavy losses against P-40 and is being phased out in 1942.
Cr 42 also had interceptor range (800 km) and is inferior to Hurricane. Is used with moderate success as a short range CAS / strike aircraft.
1941 The Bf 109E to G, pretty much all versions, excellent fighter but as we know had essentially interceptor range. (~ 800 km) which means less than half that as as strike radius.
1941 MC 202 was also quite good but had maybe 750 km range.
The Bf 110 had a short range initially (~800 km) but could be extended by drop tanks to a useful 2,000 km. But they were outclassed already when the Hurricanes arrived.
The Ju 87 varied a lot by type, range for the Ju 87B and D could vary from 800 km to 1,500 km but they could only rarely be used beyond the range of fighter escorts.
The Ju 88 had a good range (2,000 km) albeit with a lighter bomb load, and could often outrun Hurricanes, but started taking heavy losses when they encountered P-40s or Spitfires.
The SM 79 had very good range 2,500 km, though less with a torpedo) but was too vulnerable even to Fulmars. The other Italian bombers were even worse for some reason. It was still useful for anti-shipping strikes but took heavy losses.
Late 1942 Fw 190, when it arrived, had a bit better than interceptor range (maybe 1,000 km but considerably less when carrying bombs). Quite effective against Allied fighters initially.
The Do 217 also had a good range (up to 2,000 km) and good speed (an impressive 350 mph / 560 km/h). They were also quite lethal in anti-shipping strikes around Sicily especially with guided munitions, but they also proved too vulnerable without fighter escort and took heavy losses.

Allies

1940 Gloster Gladiators had interceptor range (650 km) and was equal to the Cr 32 in combat. The Lysander was a bit better on range (1,000 km) but both were highly vulnerable to the newer Axis fighters like MC 200 and Bf 110.
1940 Vickers Wellington has excellent range (almost 3,000 km) and are useful initially, but once the Bf 110s are in Theater it's too vulnerable for front line operations, soon relegated to maritime use.
The Swordfish (also 1940) were effecitve in the maritime strike role but only had 800 km range and were vulnerable to MC 200, Bf 110, or even CR 32.
1941 The Blenheim (260 mph, 2,000+ km range) was adequate initially in spite of a small bomb load, but were taking losses to MC 200 and proved hopelessly vulnerable once the Bf 110's arrived.
Late 1941 The early Boston's arrived had very short range and a small bomb loaad but were fast (350 mph max speed) and had good survival rates.
1941 Beaufighters arrived (2,500 km+ range, 330 mph). They have excellent range and prove very effective as maritime strike aircraft and strafers, though vulnerable to Bf 109 and MC 202 in daylight combat, they are more effective than Bf 110 and can strike almost anywhere.
The first modern DAF fighters (1940-41), Hurricanes, also had 'interceptor' range (~950 km, and less with tropical gear). They proved superior to MC 200 and Bf 110 but inferior to Bf 109E and MC 202.
The Maryland had good range (2,000 km) and speed (300 mph) and could strike well beyond enemy lines and into unprotected areas. It began to take the lead on strikes over the Blenheim in spite of an even smaller bomb load.
Late 1941 Tomahawk (1,000 km range) arrived. they had a particularly good drop tank and could hold their own against Bf 109F and MC 202
Early 1942 Kittyhawk types arrived (1,500 km range with drop tank)
Spitfire Mk V (arriving mid 1942) had interceptor range (~800 km) but helped the Allies achieve parity against the Bf 109 and MC 202 on the front lines.
Then by late 1942 and into 1943 the B-25 (2,000 km), the B-26 (4,500+ km), and the B-24 (2,500+ km) started arriving. B-24s are used in the tactical or opertional role like the others.
In early 1943 P-38s (2,000 km on up to 4,000 km range as various improvements were made) and later P-47s (up to 1,200 km, increasing over time) arrived.
Spitfire Mk IX arrived also in early 1943, giving more of an advantage at the shorter ranges.
The Bostons were also improved to the G standard increasing range to 1,500 km, with heavier armament and speed still in the 330 mph range with more guns.
The Albacore also arrived in 1943. It had decent range (1,100 km) and could dive bomb, but was hopelessly vulnerable to Axis fighters.

The net result of this from my perspective is as follows -

1940 - Allied and Axis had parity in fighter quality and both were short ranged. Axis bombers are arguably more effective.
1941 - Axis has superiority but Allies already have a range advantage and can strike beyond the front lines. Axis can use Stukas to very good effect. He 111 can be used though at risk. Axis bombers are conferring a significant battlefield advantage.
1942 - Axis and Allies approaching parity in fighters, but Allies can reach further and strike beyond the front line. Stukas and Ju 88s still being used but taking mounting losses. He 111 is basically relegated to maritime operations. Ju 87 and Ju 88, and even SM 79 are still quite effective in the Maritime role away from Allied land-based fighters. Malta is severely pressured.
late 1942 through early 1943 - Axis and Allies roughly at parity in fighter combat on the front lines. But the Allies can also send escorted strikes deep behind enemy lines, and increasingly effective shorter ranged strikes with large numbers of fighter-bombers (which aren't as accurate as Stukas but are more accurate than most light bombers). Allied strikes are increasingly telling in the ground war. Axis cannot really do longer ranger strikes and Stukas and Ju 88s are taking heavy losses when used in the land war, even when escorted. Axis presses the Bf 109E into service as a fighter bomber, for which it is not really suited (but it's far less vulnerable than a Ju 87). Allies are striking Axis air bases with their light, medium and heavy bombers and destroying large numbers of Allied aircraft, fuel and supplies on the ground, rapidly increasing attrition of Axis aircraft.
later 1943 into early 1944 - Axis and Allies still at parity with fighters in quality but Allied numerical advantage is growing. Allies can basically pick anywhere they want well beyond the front lines. Axis are losing the ground battle - pushed out of North Africa. Sicily and Southern Italy are taken, and Italian fascist government collapses before the Germans can stabilize the lines. The Fw 190 replaces the Stuka and is effective as a fighter bomber but has short range. The Ju 88 soldiers on but taking mounting losses.
It's also worth noting that by 1943 the Allies had better naval fighters available, Seafire, F4F, which reduced the vulnerability of the Air Forces during amphibious and supply operations.
Conversely, the Axis was failing to supply North Africa already by 1942. Axis shipping losses had reached 35% by August 1942. Their attempts to resupply by air with Ju 52 and Me 323 etc. were famously catastrophic failures. The lack of effective long range fighters, and the availability of both longer ranged fighters and long range bombers and strike aircraft by the Allies was key here

On the Eastern Front it's a different situation. Almost all the Soviet fighters are short ranged and have limited altitude capability. The Axis can still use their Stukas albeit with some losses. The Soviets are still struggling to achieve parity in fighter combat at the front lines in 1943 and are taking heavy losses of their short range ground attack planes (mainly Il-2) and bombers (best being Pe-2) but are starting to stiffen up. Axis can do longer-ranged strikes with Ju 88 and He 111 without escorts. Soviets are only doing longer ranged strikes at night by this point. Ultimately the Soviets win Stalingrad and save Leningrad and Moscow on the strength of their ground forces and start pushing the Germans back largely through sheer numbers and gradually improving ground kit.

The Med was critical though, IMO. The Germans started with their air force being a major asset that helped them win battles in 1941. Stukas blow holes in Allied lines.

By the end of 1942 the situation is reversed, the Allies win arguably their first major ground battle (second El Alamein) largely because of longer ranged bombers being able to operate with acceptable rates of losses (with fighter escort) and helping to smash Axis air units on the ground, and Allied fighter bombers and strafers are taking a significant toll on Axis ground forces. It's still in play through early 1943 but then the Axis forces start to collapse in the MTO and they lose vast numbers of men and materiel, ground soldiers and flight crews. More than they can afford to lose.

Strategic part was sorely lacking, there was nothing new to replace the Bf 110, He 177 was flawed, and Ju 288 went nowhere. Only the Do 217 project materialized.
A no-nonsense fast bomber never happened.
Not funny when the enemy has you outnumbered and, very soon, out-performed.

Rather than just strategic / tactical I'd distinguish three types of strikes: Strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic is production and large scale logistics. Operational is local or regional logistics, airfields, supplies. Tactical is front line military and logistic targets.

Axis had the advantage in tactical and operational initially. They lost their operational strike capability fairly quickly.

Allies eventually owned the Strategic air war but not (arguably) until past the turning point in the war (by early 1944 I'd say, though they had certainly forced the Germans to shift a lot of assets to air defense already in the second half of 1943).

When that point actually existed?

Well one key point was Malta. Operation Pedestal (in August 42) was a very close run thing. It came down to one crippled supply ship - the Ohio, limping into port. If the Axis had better bombers available and managed to completely wipe out Pedestal, IMO they could have taken Malta. That would have made life a lot more difficult for the Allies in north Africa. The Axis failure here allowed the Allies to achieve victory a few weeks later at Second El Alamein.

Other key points happened earlier in 1942, and would include the second battle of Tobruk and Mersa Martruh (Axis victories which could have been further exploited except for the ongoing problem of Malta) on to the First battle of El Alamein (mid 1942). This was exactly at the turning point in the Air War in North Africa.

In this battle the Allies had a 3-1 numerical advantage in planes and 2-1 in tanks. Axis strike aircraft were helpful to their armored thrusts but were no longer as decisive as they had been, and were taking heavy losses. Allied light bombers and fighter bombers were arguably more telling and helped tip the scale toward the Allied side, and medium and heavy bombers (already USAAF units were available) were hitting the Axis supplies as far back as Benghazi (900 km away).

It ended up a stalemate but it was close. If the Axis had smashed the Allies they could have arguably taken Egypt. If they had longer ranged fighters which could better contend with long ranged Allied strikes, if they had say, Fw 190s intead of Stukas (which could survive strikes at a better rate), and some kind of effective longer range strike aircraft that could hit the Allied
operational targets, I think they would have won the battle.

 

[tomo pauk]

It ended up a stalemate but it was close. If the Axis had smashed the Allies they could have arguably taken Egypt. If they had longer ranged fighters which could better contend with long ranged Allied strikes, if they had say, Fw 190s intead of Stukas (which could survive strikes at a better rate), and some kind of effective longer range strike aircraft that could hit the Allied
operational targets, I think they would have won the battle.

Let's say that Op Pedestal is a total disaster, and that British/CW retreat from Malta. That does not automatically that Rommel at El Allamein can double his number of tanks, men and aircraft. Fuel, food, water and ammo required - again, I doubt.
But, let's say that Rommel wins here, with considerable losses to both sides. British/CW retreat to Alexandria and fortify it as-hoc. Axis is stocked up beyond belief again, make siege of Alexandria, that lasts for another month, Alexandria falls in October of 1942. British/CW retreats behind Suez Canal.
Operation Torch starts as per schedual, Axis forces are another 500 miles from Saudi oil fields. They make another daring dash, defeat Allies, run with their halftracks to the 1st oil field and capture it. IOW, Rommel rolls sixes after sixes. In the meantime, Tunisia is captured by Allies.

What can Rommel do with crude oil now?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Let's say that Op Pedestal is a total disaster, and that British/CW retreat from Malta. That does not automatically that Rommel at El Allamein can double his number of tanks, men and aircraft. Fuel, food, water and ammo required - again, I doubt.

He almost won the battle as it was. If he had a significant edge in the air war, and the Allies are suffering supply problems due to the fall of Malta, he probably wins El Alamien.

Of course, I certainly would not say "automatically" anything.

But, let's say that Rommel wins here, with considerable losses to both sides.

If he wins though, it's also not "automatic" that he takes heavy losses. At Tobruk he lost 3,000 men roughly vs 30,000 casualties + captured by the British. He also captures 2,000 trucks and cars, 30 functional tanks, 7,000 tons of water, 5,000 tons of rations and some fuel. A victory at El Alamein could have had similar results.

British/CW retreat to Alexandria and fortify it as-hoc. Axis is stocked up beyond belief again, make siege of Alexandria, that lasts for another month, Alexandria falls in October of 1942. British/CW retreats behind Suez Canal.
Operation Torch starts as per schedual, Axis forces are another 500 miles from Saudi oil fields. They make another daring dash, defeat Allies, run with their halftracks to the 1st oil field and capture it. IOW, Rommel rolls sixes after sixes. In the meantime, Tunisia is captured by Allies.

I'm not sure Torch is automatically successful, at least not the second part. Yes the Americans take Algeria from the Vichy but getting to Tunisia is going to be trickier if Malta had fallen and the British had pulled back to the other side of the Suez. US Army was badly rattled at Kasserine Pass. Without British support, maybe they suffer a much worse defeat / collapse there. Maybe Rommel captures a lot more supplies in the process and keeps forces there instead of turning around.

Nobody can predict the "what if" and I don't want to indulge in Axis victory fanfic, I'm not a fan of that idea... but it's possible the Axis can hold off the Americans in Western Tunisia while pushing the British back in Egypt, and maybe get some oil. Further success might mean more reinforcements from Europe. Without Malta in Allied hands, it's much easier to get supplies across the Med. I admit it's a long shot, and I don't think it would have changed the ultimate outcome of the war, but it might have prolonged it.

What can Rommel do with crude oil now?

Send it to Germany. My only point is that the Germans were beginning to suffer for lack of some longer ranged fighters and better / faster bombers, and it probably made some difference in the outcomes in this region, the strategic goal of which was to cut the Suez canal (major strategic supply problem for the British) and capture some oil, both of which were possible if not likely.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'm not sure Torch is automatically successful, at least not the second part. Yes the Americans take Algeria from the Vichy but getting to Tunisia is going to be trickier if Malta had fallen and the British had pulled back to the other side of the Suez. US Army was badly rattled at Kasserine Pass. Without British support, maybe they suffer a much worse defeat / collapse there. Maybe Rommel captures a lot more supplies in the process and keeps forces there instead of turning around.

As good as Rommel was, even he can't be on two places simultaneously.

Send it to Germany.

Would require hand-waving a lot of things in order to make this happen, like a big fleet of fuel trucks that are stocked up to the brim with gasoline and/or diesel so they can do several trips with crude between the oil fields and someplace in Egypt. Again, requires that Allies have just left everything intact (lumps, lines, towers etc.) and that no attacks are made against the trucks convoys.

Knock-on effects for the Eastern front due to Germany sending stuff earmarked for Easter Front to the N.A. for the best part of 1942?

My only point is that the Germans were beginning to suffer for lack of some longer ranged fighters and better / faster bombers, and it probably made some difference in the outcomes in this region, the strategic goal of which was to cut the Suez canal (major strategic supply problem for the British) and capture some oil, both of which were possible if not likely.

Capable escort fighters were needed as far back as 1940. Same for fast bombers.