Why Did the He 177 Fail?

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Major difference being that Heinkel Engineers had preferred a 4-engine design from the start, and would have avoided at least the engine-related difficulties in development had they taken that route. The RAF also had alternate heavy bomber designs to choose from as well and had the Manchester/Lancaster proven remotely as problematic as the He 177 they could have made do with the Halifax and (to lesser extent) Stirling.

In terms of long range heavy bomber and/or maratime patrol aircraft development in parallel with or preceding the He 177, you've mainly got the Fw 200 (not likely to make a good heavy bomber, possibly better potential to be refined into a more satisfactory military patrol aircraft and useful as a transport) and the much bigger example of the Ju 89, 90, and 290 development programs.

The RLM rejecting/ignoring the Junkers Heavy bomber programs prevented a lot of further development in that direction, but had the Ju 89/successors progressed further and more rapidly (including adopting Jumo 211 and/or DB 601 powerplants), it may have ended up with an evolutionary path similar to that of the B-17 both as a bomber and airliner/transport. (or perhaps more like the B-17 had the Boeing 307 been produced in greater numbers and become a major military transport -the DC-4 ending up displacing it in most useful roles)

Long range/endurance maratime patrol would probably be more useful for the LW than long range heavy bomber. Short/medium range bombers capable of very high loads (more akin to British heavy bomber mission profiles than American ones) would be more significant and easier to escort but the Do 217 would at least partially fill that role as well, likely at lower cost than the 4-engine Junkers bombers and much cheaper and easier to manufacture/operate/maintain than the He 177.

Relegating He 111s predominantly to transport and maratime patrol duties earlier in the war probably would have been a more practical use of those aircraft and crews as well. (albeit still plenty of cases where the 4 engine patrol-bombers would be preferable and compliment the twins)

But any better maratime planning would also imply actual serious cooperation between the LW and Kriegsmarine ... let alone giving the Kriegsmarine their own independent air arm.


Indeed, you'd need both progression of overall design (including armament advancements) as the B-17 saw and capable escort fighters, though in the maratime patrol role not so much need for heavy escort.



SpicyJuan11 said:
What if the issues were seen early on, and the RLM decided to take up Heinkel's counter-proposal the He 177B in 1939? Could it have been in service earlier, how would it perform?
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Avoiding the engine problems entirely would help, but not eliminate the other issues related to advanced/complex/new technology being implemented. Something somewhat more rational and conservative (more like Junkers earlier designs) would more likely reach service satisfactorily much sooner. That said, the more reliable/less troublesome and more numerous nature of the Jumo 211 implies that coupled versions of those may have been at least somewhat less troublesome than the 606/610s, but 4 separate 211s should be the most reliable to work with of all the options. (and could parallel Heinkel's nacelle designs used on the He 111 to save time and take advantage of streamlining/drag reduction experience already applied there) It's somewhat notable that the Jumo 211F of 1941 was rather comparable in power and altitude performance to the contemporary Merlin XX series used on British bombers. (though with significantly more take-off power on 87 octane fuel)
 
As Parsifal pointed out there were procurement and project management issues between the RLM/Heinkel that were part of the problem. Ernst Heinkel claimed that even after rescinding of the dive bombing specification by an apparently flabbergasted Goering in 1942 that Luftwaffe and RLM officers still continued to talk about dive bombing performance. The Photographs of the prototypes show an aircraft with a circular cross section which was changed to a square cross section for reasons of stability (side area) and bomb bay in addition there were the wing structural issues, a simple miscalculation it seems and an indication of poor drawing officer procedures (engineering review) and the problems with the engine installation point to further issues with testing and design. In some ways these were 'scaling issues' that come out of the false assumption that a 30 ton He 177 is just a slightly bigger 15 ton He 111. The He 177 specification seems little more than a scaled up Ju 88 offering greater range indicating conceptual issues.

It may have been that when the Dornier Do 19 and Ju 89 were cancelled the Luftwaffe denied itself the practical experience in developing heavy aircraft.

The structural and other issues and the resulting delays probably obscured the engine issues from the scrutiny they deserved.

Now, consider the likely outcome of a reaction to abandon the paired engines.

1 Decision point 1939 or so when Ernst Heinkel had first flagged the issue. The He 177B enters service sometime in 1941, probably late 1941 or around the same time as the Lancaster. It makes a big difference to the maritime war and all those Fw 200's become supply aircraft.
2 Decision point mid 1941 or so when serious problems are arising in the He 177A0. The He 177 probably enters service in late 1942 so the Luftwaffe has a pretty good bomber in 1943, the U-boat war is not yet over and this aircraft creates lots of problems for the allies.
3 Decision point Mid 1942. This leads to a 4 engine He 177B by the end of 1943.
4 Decision point Late 1942, more or less what happened, leads to a 4 engine He 177B by 1944, too late.

It's worth examining what a He 177 might have achieved.

In the period between 1940 to 1943 the German navy was not supported by adaquete aircraft including long range aircraft. The Ju 290 comes in small numbers in 1943. It is pretty good.

A He 177 that is available from around the same time as the Lancaster enters service, early 1942, creates huge problems for the allies. The aircraft can show up over vast areas of ocean, over 1300 miles from base creating a similar mproblem as the zero,betty and P51 did with their range and the the need of the defenders tio opread their resources thinly.

A 1942 He 177 with computing bombsight has no problem hitting a merchant ship from 12000-14000ft (3500m) and from 1943 its a threat to warships which can't outmanoeuvre its guided weapons. Only a late model destroyer or cruiser has the AAA defences to have a small chance of deterring such an attack, cheap and numerous sloops and frigates essentially no use. The Fw 200 almost always lost encounters with allied aircraft but it would be different with the He 177. It had a speed for instance to make matters difficult for the Martlet/Wildcat on escort carriers and it can dodge and hurt a beufighter. Only the Mosquito is a problem and I would argue the 20mm gun in the tail of a He 177 might win the day on occasion as well.

The He 177 also creates problems for the Soviet factories.

As far as alttide performance goes, its not going to be a problem. The American 1200hp R-1820 and R1830 radials used on the B17/B24 are more or less flat rated to beyond 25000ft but have weighty and bulky superchargers. One can install a larger and more powerful mechanically supercharged engine and with a single stage engine the benefit cross over point will be around 21000ft to 2400ft (for the DB605A).

Since the Germans don't have two stage or turbo charged escort fighters in 1943/44 they are not going to try 30,000ft raids. If we assume production of our 4 engine He 177B starts in 1942 and ramps to 200/month the Germans might, if careful have built 1800 He 177B by 1943 which might allow a 900 aircraft raid in late 1943 escorted by 900 drop tank equipped fighters. What would be the point of forming up at 30000ft over France, it only gives the RAF 15 minutes extra time to prepare. The UK had neglected its AAA radar and defences in favour of offensive radar and so they have no effective AAA till the US loans them SCR-584 and ships proximity fuses in 1944.

Another point is that a 1942 4 engine He 177B with 4 x DB601/605 or jumo 211 engines prepares the way for a late 1943 aircraft with 4 x BMW801TS or DB603A in mid 1943. Historically the He 177A5 had so much extra work, including a lengthened fuselage for the heavier DB610 engines, it makes little difference going from He 177A3-A5 than going from He 177B with DB605 to one with BMW801 or DB603.

You now have an aircraft with a speed of 340mph-360mph. The Luftwaffe will sacrifice a little production for speed. The resources would come from shutting down He 111, Do 217 production.
 

I think one problem is that the German navy wasn't allowed Marineflieger, its own air arm. The German navy in WW1 operated aircraft, mainly airships admittedly, and the present German defence structure has Marineflieger. To be frank I'm not sure if they are part of the modern German Navy or the Luftwaffe as a command, it seems they are part of the NAVY, but anyone having a go at NATO could find German Marineflieger Panavia Tornado aircraft launching active radar homming Kormorant missiles at them. Essentially equal to Exocet but a bit older.

The WW2 Luftwaffe seems to have supported the German Army well but the structure didn't work as well as it needed to for the Kriegsmarine.

In frustration the German navy withdrew all support for standard 4 engine aircraft such as the He 177/He 277/Ju 290, Me 264 and threw whatever weight it had behind twined Dornier Do 335 (Do 635) to provide reconnaissance in a platform that might survive allied patrol and carrier aircraft.

Solving the engine issues completely by say Feb 42 (Lancaster service date) certainly sinks a lot of allied shipping just as the U-boats are loosing effectiveness, saves a lot of German sub mariners, disrupts the crucial arctic supply convoys to Russia and liberates quite a few Ju 290 and Fw 200 for supply tasks and causes some soviet factories lots of problems. It probably makes the baby blitz effective as the He 177 could carry enough "windows" foil to disrupt British radar.

However I think the possibility of repeated Allied style mass raids are out given the fuel and pilot training issues. (though the He 177 probably extends and savers bomber crew lives). That could only happen if a successful convoy war on Britain leads to a collapse in production, fuel and food in the UK.

Now it is perhaps not impossible that the He 177B in the period between 1942 to 1943 might have become a 'scourge' worse than the Fw 200 was in 1940.
 
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If there had been a Marineflieger established (be it land alone, or if their carrier program had continued), that's one more area the Fw 187 may have been very attractive including in its existing 2-seat Jumo 210 powered A-0 form. (long range/endurance coupled with superior radio than an early-war single-seater)

Without bomb racks it would be limited to recon and escort work, and it might not work all that well for lifting heavier loads until upgraded to Jumo 211 or DB 601 engines (or possibly HS 12Ys -including the Czech made 12Ydrs the Germans had access to prior to the invasion of Poland)
 
A maritime version isnt going to sink any ships at all. The USAF proved that with B17's in the Pacific. If you want to hit a ship you got to do it down low. Where it will be increasingly vulnerable to massed AAA from the convoy's in 1943.
 
syscom3 said:
A maritime version isnt going to sink any ships at all. The USAF proved that with B17's in the Pacific. If you want to hit a ship you got to do it down low. Where it will be increasingly vulnerable to massed AAA from the convoy's in 1943.
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Not if the 1943 attack by Fw 200 Condors from 15000ft on Convoy Faith is considered.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_Faith

The three Fw 200's were getting hits for around 50% of their attack runs using their Lotfe 7 bomb sights. The misses being either straddles or near misses (20 yards) or so and the latter against warships engaged in evasive manoeuvres. Had this attack been pressed from He 177 with a larger bomb load a denser stick of bombs might have converted the straddles into hit. The Focke-Wulfs returned the next day and achieved a further hit.

There are a few accounts of this
Convoy Faith.

From 1943 both the Fritz-X and Hs 293 are available to attack warships.
 
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The Germans were beginning to use some sophisticated anti ship ordinance by 1943, like the HS293. The A-5 used on anti shiping strikes late 43 to early 1944 had some reults with these pieces of ordinance.

Im not sure its completely valid to compare with the B-17 under those circumstances
 

I know nothing of how the USAAF tried to use B-17's in the Pacific against Japanese shipping. I imagine they were trying to attack fast warships which are fast, typically up to 30 knots, manuverable and have drills and communication systems to make rapid assessment and course changes in response to enemy action. A Merchantman or troop ship (even a converted 20 knot liner) is in a different situation. The Japanese scored hits against the under defended Prince of Wales and Respulse from around 5000 to 7000ft, rather suicidal altitudes had the ships radars been working. Fall time of a bomb from about 12000ft is about 15 seconds, which is not much time to react.

In the Convoy Faith action the Fw 200's seem to have been chased of by the rather slow Catalina with one German airman severely injured. I'd say that wouldn't have happened had this attack been pressed home by a reliable He 177.

The only allied response would be to beef up the escorts with frontline warships with a much better fire control and radar fit out or to provide escort aircraft carriers. The He 177B with BMW801 engines would seem to be able to outrun a Martlet/Wildcat often used on these carriers.
 
Convoy Faith is NOT what I would have called a convoy, Koopernic. It consisted of two troops ships and a frreighter. later, a couple of destroyers joined.

When I think of a convoy, I think of 20 - 150 ships spaced properly, with interl,ocking field of fire, and proper excorts around the perimeter at a suitable distance.

In a war where almost everyone attacked whenever they could, a few successes don't mean a tactic was necessarily any good. The American Indians won a few battles in the old WIld West but, if a bow and arrows were any good as weapons, we'd be speaking Sioux or Apache now. Because they had a few successes with bow and arrows doesn't mean we should take them up to slay our enemies.

Sure, the Condors had some success, particularly when the victims were lone submarines or unarmed ships taht were themselves unescorted. Large-scale successes against proper convoys, which were the norm rather than the exeption, would NOT have been in the works. If you were over a Heavy Cruiser or bigger ship with the usual armament ... 15,000 feet wasn't much protection anyway.
 
17 B-17s participated in the Battle of Midway and of all the attacks, not a single hit was scored.
 
That's true, but its just not that simple guys. At Bismarck 8 transport out of 8 were sunk and 5 DDs out of 8 by 39 heavy bombers; 41 medium bombers; 34 light bombers, using low level "skip bombing" techniques. All of the ships caught in this trap were steaming at absolutely maximum speed, and the DDs in particular were highly manouverable ships, well defended.

Over the North Sea 1943, CC a/c including LR heavy bombers sank about 1 million tons of Axis shipping. The VLRs also were now accurate enough to hit Uboats with high levels of accuracy.

probably the zenith of high level bombing came in November 1944, with the destruction of the Tirpitz. 30 bombers release at 16000 ft, at least 3 bomb hits. A ship designed to withstand the heaviest ordinance available stood no chance once the bombs were able to hit. That was the problem. up to that time, the accuracy was too hard to achieve. Some good luck, excellent training (bombs dropped by the elite 617 sqn) state of the art bombing aids made it possible to achieve results that had previously eluded level bombing of this target.

The simple assumption often made is that divebombing and torpedo bombing offer4ed greater levels of accuracy. They probably did, but they also made the aircraft delivering those attacks quite vulnerable. The best outcome was to make high level bombing accurate, that way you get the results without the losses
 
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Parcifal: "probably the zenith of high level bombing came in November 1944, with the destruction of the Tirpitz. 30 bombers release at 16000 ft, at least 3 bomb hits. A ship designed to withstand the heaviest ordinance available stood no chance once the bombs were able to hit. That was the problem. up to that time, the accuracy was too hard to achieve. Some good luck, excellent training (bombs dropped by the elite 617 sqn) state of the art bombing aids made it possible to achieve results that had previously eluded level bombing of this target."

It did help that Tirpitz wasn't moving.
 
Actually I wasn't saying bombers couldn't sink ships.

I was saying bombers can't sink ships reliably from high altitude. Also, there is no point in using a Condor if you are within range of anythign else in the inventory, so the Condor would be stalking ships WAY out of range for fighters and planes like the He 111.

Skip bombing soesn't quite qualify since you would need a plane to do that ... not a Condor. And if a Condor came in at 100 feet it would be a HUGE target that every trained gunner in the conflict would love to see in his sights.

So my point was the Condor would not have great success at FLAK altitude agianst large, well-defended convoys. Once they were in range of shore-based fighters and medium-range bombers, it was a case of who had more firepower and better air cover because once they were range of the Germans, they aere also in range of the British.

The Spitifre typically might not have HAD much range for most of the war, but it DID have range enough to intercept a Bf 109 or plural Bf 109s that was (were) closing on a convoy closer to the UK than the continent.

Don't take things out of context. The Condor was NOT a primary attack plane unless it was out of range for any other warplane. If you are the only game in town, you have a captive audience.
 

If a proper convoy was 20-150 ships then an appropriate attack upon it would require at least an equal number of aircraft, ideally twice as many. No point taking on 100 allied ships with "penny packets". Only 200 Fw 200's were produced but He 177 production was initially set to 100 month, it would have been more bar the problems and bar the problems the kind of numbers plausibly attainable in mid/late 1942. There proably weren't enough B-17E available at midway nor was supply logistics enough.

The introduction of the Lotfe 7 bombsight in early 1942 meant the Luftwaffe now had an accurate way of attacking ships from high altitude. A computing bombsight levelled itself and after tracking the target compensated for the targets motion and the aircrafts wind drift. So mlong as the ship didn't change course it could be hit. 1942 is when losses to U-boats started falling of and 1943 is when U-boat losses started going up.

The Luftwaffe has a superb bombsight but no suitable aircraft to use with it.

The allies would no doubt get the measure of it for a while there was a chance to sink ships when there was still shortages of escort carriers and well away from Mosquito fighters.

Using a Fw 200 to attack ships was the same as using modified DC3's. It didn't have enough defensive armament, enough armour, enough speed, enough bombs or even enough range.

Convoy Faith was about 3 troop ships/merchantmen and 3 escorts. Only one of the escorts was a destroyer HMCS Iroquois. The Allied escorts were bulked out by low end frigates and sloops that were slow, had poor fire control, reciprocating steam engines instead of turbines, little armament and what there was only manually trained and whose radar was good for surface search of u-boats only. They were all about screening of U-boats using cheap microwave radar and a sonar. Faith it seems was attacked by, it seems, only 4 Fw 200's. There were two other warships in the distance, one of which was attacked.

Iroquois, the only true destroyer, had a type 291 air search radar that was fine for early warning. It was developed of metric ASV radar and was connected to a PPI display. It also had a secondary role in assisting anti aircraft fire by providing slant range to an accuracy of about 200m, which is pretty miserable.


The fire control on cruisers and the modern American destroyers was better but the many cheap sloops wouldn't cut it and more destroyers would be needed.
 
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Like a lot of other things, a major change in weapons/tactics from one side would would provoke a change in weapons/tactics from the other side.

A much more numerous fleet of long range aircraft attacking convoys at sea would not be met by a wringing of hands and sobbing but a change in priorities with a quicker introduction of AA Frigates for one thing. There was no technical reason the Bay class could not have been built earlier. Providing the additional AA guns would require a change in priorities but the basic hull and powerplants were little changed ( two sets of engines from a Flower class corvette).
No need for 40-50,000hp steam turbine power plant for shooting at aircraft. 5,500hp worth of reciprocating engines would do just fine.

A bit more effort put into escort carriers? return of the CAM ship?

While shooting down a raider in sight of the convoy is great for moral, causing enough damage to keep it from making it hundreds of miles back to base works in the long run just as well. Zipping around at high speed may keep low performing fighters at bay but every minute at high speed is 3-5 minutes worth of cruise. Bombers tend not to accelerate as well as fighters so a bomber caught at cruising speeds may have a several minute window of vulnerability while speed builds up. It took a SPitfire MK V about 2 minutes to from a slow cruise to high speed. A 50,000lb bomber is going to take how long?
 
Koopernic said:
If a proper convoy was 20-150 ships
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A quick look at the admittedly limited data I have to hand for the Battle of the Atlantic would imply that, for the RN at least, about 40 merchant vessels (plus of course all the escorts) was a rough upper limit to what was deemed manageable.

Cheers

Steve.
 
Wouldn't it be useful to cruise above attack height and enter a shallow dive to accelerate more quickly when nearing the target area?

Granted, even if the aircraft's ceiling permits that and situations would still be weather dependent. (clouds are good for hiding, but bad for navigating/spotting, at least once you're in visual range)
 
Determining optimal convoy size is a very complex exercise. if there is no opposition , the most efficient approach is to have no convoy. Convoys need to bge formed, move at the speed of the slowest ship in the group, are cumbersome to manouvre and take time to load, form, move, unload and disperse. If you have big convoys, you need big port handling facilities, otherwise you end up with loaded merchant shipping swinging around its anchor chains outside the port as it waits for a dock berth in the harbour. Againt air attack, a smaller convoy is generally a better option, if you have a ship with area defence assets like an AA ship. You can cluster your shipping around that centre flak ship and maximise your mutual defences. The ship dispositions are failry loose and determined by the TDZs (Tactical Diameters) of the components. If an attack develops, your ships go into hard manouvreing without too much dispersal. The aim is to present as hard a target as possible whilst benefitting from mutual fire zones

against Uboats you want bigger convoys packed as tightly as you can. Your ships maintain as fast a straight speed as possible, use zig zag, but dont deveiate from the MLA. No deviations and no stopping. Absolutely dont turn and try and help stricken vessels. If you straggle, tough bikkies. Your on your own and probably a goner. You absolutely need to do exactly as the Convoy Commodore tells you. If you are lucky enough to have a carrier, use the a/c to scout ahead. Best policy is to alter course to avoid any sighted Uboats. Use your CAG to force the Uboat to submerge and keep him down until the convoy is clear. The best cvonvoys were escorted by well integrated groups that knew how to work together. You have your outer screen and then you have a strategic reserve at the corps or at the back, which you use to plug gaps in the defence, or if you feel aggressive to prosecute contacts hopefully until they are sunk. Angels that have your back covered.

Against surface threats, the tactics are different again. Use the screen to delay whilst the charges scatter as quickly as possible. Use smoke and 9in the modern age) ew to keep the location of the ships as obscure as you can. Call for help. Present yourself as a hard target. Try to confuse your enemy

The average convoy size in the Atlantic (in the HX convoys was 61 ships. main threat was Uboats. In the med where air attack was the main threat the average convoy size was about 15 ships.


It just depends on the source of the threat, and a whole bunch of other factors like port capacity.
 

What "target area"????
A convoy isn't London. One of the main reasons for using maritime reconnaissance planes is finding the convoy/s. If you don't know where the convoy is how do you go into a shallow dive before you reach it?

Once the convoy is spotted you can turn around and execute an attack run. In order to get a number of planes to attack a convoy the plane that does the initial spotting needs to shadow it to guide the other attacking planes (give position up dates). But the plane doing the shadowing cannot be zipping around at high speed burning up fuel at a high rate. The "strike force" may be able to use a shallow dive on the actual bomb run but even a 40 ship convoy doesn't cover a wide area compared to a city and going into the shallow dive before getting a visual (or radar contact) on the convoy may not work too well.

Yes the maritime reconnaissance/strike aircraft can also use radar but the chances of the radar in the plane being better/longer ranged than the radar on the ship/s is pretty slim. The happy time for the Condors was between June of 1940 and Aug/Sept 1941. After that their success as attack planes faded considerably. More/better radar on the escorts, more AA guns (granted light stuff but forcing the attacks higher), CAM ships, escort carriers all contributed.
Using a bomber that is 50-75mph faster in 1942-43 doesn't mean the radar went away, or the even more AA guns, there are even more escort carriers.
The faster, newer bombers will have lower losses than trying to use Condors but they are not going to return the German success rate to that of late 1940.
 
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