Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
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- Dec 6, 2006
The Swede Vejtasa claims are debunked by Lundstrom in his book "The First Team"
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The Swede Vejtasa claims are debunked by Lundstrom in his book "The First Team"View attachment 717103Ouch.
Too bad FAA didn't have SBDs, that was without such bad habits, and was maneuverable
He could have done to the ME-109s what Swede Vejtasa did in his Dauntless against Zeros
Contrary to what you extracted from Campbell, I took my information from the "United States Bombs and Fuzes Pyrotechnics" Manual dated 1 Sept 1945.
Section I Part II - US Army 'M' Series bombs lists the M52-63 weapons (page 12 of the document onwards). Converted from "seacoast artillery shells" of 10-14" diameter. Coastal defence guns were a US Army responsibility not a USN one, although a few of the guns had originally been built for the USN.
Section I Part III - US Navy 'MK' Series Bombs lists no AP weapons.
Section I Part IV - US Army-Navy 'AN' Series Bombs lists the AP 1,000lb Mk 33 & 1,600lb Mk 1
Though it looks alarmingly short in level flight- perhaps the centre-of-gravity issue was just to do with optimising it for cockpit view, and not as I'd suspected the designers sensibly allowing for a heavier engine...The view over short nose of the Skua Mk.I prototype must have been excellent for taxiing, landing, and searching for ships or other aircraft.
I can believe it - the sideways-canted panes are presumably for looking at the deck, though it would make sense that they'd try to do two useful things at once (seems like part of the package on a dive-bomber / fighter hybrid!).Incidentally, I suspect that the flat windscreen section on the Skua reflected worries about optical distortion. The SBD had a through windscreen sight, so there was no distortion. I believe that the D3A had an external telescopic sight and I hope that the optical designers would cancel any distortion from the canopy .
No. The reasons for two-seat fighter-reconaissance aircraft are well-established.
Thanks for the information! Though to my chagrin, I'll observe that if I'd bothered to do more than guessing wildly on the internet, I could have looked up the gist of it in Friedman's British Cruisers and saved you the need to reply...No. Emerald, having spent the first part of 1942 in the Indian Ocean, returned to Portsmouth in Aug for a refit that lasted through until April 1943. During that refit she was fitted with:-
Type 281 air warning radar (aerials on both masts - the after one becoming a tripod to support the aerial)
Type 273 centimetric surface search (lantern on bridge)
Type 285 main gunnery radar
Type 282 x2 for the pom pom directors (she had 2 quad pom-poms fitted during this refit)
And Kingfisher replaced the Osprey
Following that refit she went back to the Indian Ocean until March 1944. At that point she returned home and her catapult & aircraft facilities were removed and her AA armament further strengthened before D-Day.
They presumably also had the same limited charthouse/topmast space as Emerald, even if it wasn't nearly so limited as I'd casually imagined...The old WW1 vintage cruisers operating in the Indian Ocean were amongst the last to be fitted with radar due to the low priority that theatre had for the equipment. By the end of 1942 most either had or were being taken in hand to fit radar of some kind as part of the regular refit process.
Aye, that's what I said!Emerald was refitted 1934-36 as part of which she received SIIL catapult and subsequently operated Hawker Osprey (1934-37), Fairey Seafox (1937-42) and finally the Kingfisher (1943-44). The catapult was not powerful enough to launch a Walrus, so hence the need for the Kingfisher in 1943.
I'll look that up with interest... I've never found a way into the Japanese material, except that I'd acquired the sense that a surprising amount of what the USN thought they knew after 1945 was sourced from simple guesswork and debriefings of IJA officers who had little real knowledge of what the IJN were doing...Different navies had different doctrines about the use of seaplanes / flying boats on capital ships and cruisers.
For the Japanese the seaplane carried on their 8" cruisers was the eyes of the fleet to find the enemy, not the carrier aircraft. Those cruisers would be operating with the fleet alongside the carriers. Take a look at the early carrier operations in WW2. It was Midway before Soryu carried a pair of D4Y-1C Suisei (Judy) aircraft for reconnaissance and 1944 before the C6N Saiun (Myrt) appeared, by which time it had no carriers to operate from.
As for Tone & Chikuma the plan for them was modified while they were building and they were redesignated "scouting cruisers" intended to carry 2 types:-
1. long range for scouting (2 or 4 3 seat aircraft) and
2. shorter range for spotting and AS work (4 2 seaters).
i.e. 6-8 aircraft instead of the usual 4 carried by the heavy cruisers.
To ensure that this increased aircraft complement wasn't damaged by the ship's own guns (more aircraft meant more space required midships to aft) the main armament was concentrated forward. They spent a large part of their wartime careers working with the Japanese carriers. Pearl Harbour & operations in the Indian Ocean in 1942 for example.
Japanese operations in 1942 revealed major weaknesses in their scouting capacity and procedures. Look at operations in the Indian Ocean and at Midway for the proof. One reaction was to see the need for another scouting cruiser. As Mogami had been so heavily damaged at Midway, losing one of her after turrets, she provided an excellent opportunity and platform to augment the scouting forces. As reconstructed she had a capacity of 11 aircraft but initially only carried 7.
As for the conversion of the battleships Ise & Hyuga, the Japanese intention was completely different and had nothing to do with scouting. Their conversion was a reaction to the loss of the carriers at Midway and an attempt to replace them i.e converted battleships as auxiliary carriers not as an increase to the scouting capacity. Various proposals were considered involving full conversion to flush deck carrier with island, removal of 4 turrets and rebuilding aft of the funnel or removal of just turrets 5 & 6. The latter route was chosen because:-
1. shorter time required for conversion
2. minimal effect on other warship construction
3. moderate material & labour cost.
As completed they were intended to operate as a pair as part of a larger carrier group with Junyo & Ryuho, each with 11 modified D4Y2 Suisei (Judy) dive bombers and 11 E13A Zuiun (Paul) floatplanes. Once launched the Judys would either land on a carrier in the group or fly to a land base. Cranes were provided to recover the floatplanes. Although completed in late 1943, their intended airgroup, the 634th Air Group, did not form until May 1944, so too late for the pair to participate in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. They only once seem to have embarked part of their air group for training. When they sailed in Oct 1944 as bait for Japanese operations in the Philippines they sailed without aircraft.
The full story of their conversion was set out in an article by Hans Lengerer, an expert in Japanese warships, in Warship 2009 published by Conway.
Oh, I understand the purpose of the spotter in pre-radar days - I'm just meditating on the fact that that catapult floatplanes off capital ships and cruisers continued to have a use as search-radar platforms covering a larger area (and also preventing the capital ships from hanging out a big flashing "here I am" sign on the masthead), which isn't as immediately obvious...In the USN, aircraft like the SOC Seagull, OS2U Kingfisher and later SC-1 Seahawk had a mix of roles including recce (increasing the horizon of the cruiser force), gunfire spotting for the battleships and even AS work. For the USN pre-war doctrine called for the limited number of carriers to operate individually and separately from the battleships. But the main scouting force was contained in the 18 plane VS scout squadrons on the carriers themselves.
For the RN many of the cruisers would be operating alone, patrolling the sea lanes and a spotter plane increased those horizons in pre-radar days. As WW2 went on that patrol function was taken over by aircraft like the Sunderland, Catalina and Liberator. The best examples are the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. But in a fleet scenario, with a carrier involved the main search activity was carried out by its aircraft, not the spotters on the battleships and cruisers. That way the recce effort could be directed more efficiently and was not so reliant on the sea conditions.
That's part what I meant by "obviously they'd found masthead radar more useful than the Walrus in the Bismarck chase in North Atlantic conditions". Excuse the ironic understatement?The first airborne radar available to the FAA was ASV.II which began to be fitted to Swordfish in the Home Fleet and Force H in March 1941. By the time of the Bismarck chase all 9 aircraft in 825 squadron on Victorious had been fitted but only a handful in the squadrons on Ark Royal. As for not using a Walrus during the Bismark chase I suggest you take a look at the sea conditions that existed throughout most of the time. They were awful. There would have been no means of recovering any floatplane even if they could be launched. The Germans did not operate their Ar 196 aircraft either.
I'd say the reason the surface raider wasn't the threat was largely due to terrible procurement decisions by Raeder, who was trying to continue the campaign he'd been planning with von Hipper in 1918... but that's another discussion...As for Formidable at Cape Matapan, her aircraft lacked radar. For technical reasons that I've never seen explained, ASV.II wasn't made to work on the Albacore until the latter part of 1941. The Swordfish she had on board had been collected in Egypt in February as replacements due to a lack of Albacores in theatre. And Matapan was a night action. Formidable's aircraft had already succeeded in torpedoing Vittorio Veneto in the afternoon and the second strike launched in daylight and went in just after dark to torpedo Pola.
Even in 1942 ASV.II was not a universal fitting. During Somerville's search for the Japanese fleet in April 1942 none of Indomitable's and only some of Formidable's Albacores were radar equipped. A few years ago during some research into this period I discovered a corelation between the aircraft production dates and the complement on each ship. Then in late April there was a reshuffling of airframes between the carriers for unexplained reasons. I suspect however that it might have been about spreading the radar equipped aircraft more evenly through the fleet. Illustious when she arrived in April brought radar equipped Swordfish.
The RN did not so much reject the floatplane as found it no longer had a purpose. Naval warfare had changed. Cruisers patrolling the sea lanes virtually ended in early 1944 for reasons noted above. The submarine not the raider was then the threat even in the expanse of the IO and cruisers made better targets than sub killers. Cruisers were operating almost exclusively as part of a fleet with an increasing number of carriers available to protect them. Those carrier aircraft provided all the air recce and gunfre spotting required (as during Operation Inmate in June 1945 when cruisers of the RN, RCN & RNZN bombarded Truk Atoll with spotting from aircraft on Implacable). Postwar battleships and then cruisers just faded away.
As pointed out above it could not be further from the truth.
The only Fulmars to get radar were those converted as night fighters.
Hypothetically giving the USN Swordfish (but preferably Albacores which the FAA intended to be it's successor) in lieu of the TBD allows us to explore how it differs from the TBD and what additionally capabilities it would have offered the USN.I don't think the USN would be interested in adopting an aircraft the RN had already declared as obsolete as a torpedo bomber in the same year. however, let's roll with your suggestion anyway.
The problem with using the Swordfish as a scout aircraft within the vast Pacific ocean is its poor range – in this respect the Vindicator and Dauntless certainly had the advantage. Why would the USN use the Swordfish – or TBD – as a scout plane when there are far superior aircraft for the role already available?
Not true at all. I don't think the British used the Swordfish as against surface warships very much (apart from the ASW role perhaps?), and I certainly don't recall it being used as a dive bomber against German/Italian warships – could you provide more details on the Swordfish's divebombing record? The Swordfish was a bit slow to be flying over groups of Japanese warships, surely? In any case, most combat aircraft can be used as a dive bomber, the Spitfire was used as a dive bomber, as was the P-40 and Ju-88. Not that you actually need to carry out bombing attacks on enemy shipping using dive bombing tactics.
Why not rephrase your opening suggestion like so: "Let's replace the Swordfish used at used in the Atlantic and Mediterranean with Swordfish…"? Would the TBD not have performed equally as well as the Swordfish during the Battle of Taranto or during the sinking of the Battleship Bismarck or against all other Axis surface shipping (when carrying the right torpedoes)?
Now yes, there are other possible explanations, there's no indication the Fulmar ever actually carried ASV (though I am coming across odd references to them shadowing enemy capital ships at night in the Atlantic) and to an extent I'm just indulging my habit of towing gunnery targets, but it seems like an interesting juxtaposition...
There is little to distinguish Type 271 from Type 273 externally. Type 271 was intended for small ships and 273 for larger ships (cruiser and above). Derek Howse in "Radar at Sea" describes the difference as follows:-Thanks for the information! Though to my chagrin, I'll observe that if I'd bothered to do more than guessing wildly on the internet, I could have looked up the gist of it in Friedman's British Cruisers and saved you the need to reply...
That said, it's not as impressive as it sounds; it's mostly anti-aircraft stuff - Type 281 at the masthead for angle, Type 285 on the director for ranging and Type 282 on the pom-poms themselves, plus associated IFF and D/F kit, all of which is a lot of effort for, what, two quad 40mm?
Now, as you say, she needed second tripod mast added aft to carry the receiving end of the Type 281, presumably because the existing foremast wasn't robust enough for the integrated Type 281B; the surface-search lantern is on top of the charthouse, the only other place for it and a rather low position which would limit range, and there's no proper surface-gunnery set, because there's simply no room for one; so I wasn't completely wrong to hazard a lack of "useful space for radar" which might add to the continued utility of a catapult plane in its traditional roles of surface-search and spotting (a photo of Emerald in Friedman's Naval Firepower claims the lantern is actually only the shorter-range periscope-detecting Type 271, too, though that could be a misidentification; the photo's inaccurately dated "March 1942", which confused me for a while; but the full version on the IWM museum website features the tripod mast aft, confirming that it follows the refit)...
Apologies for the successive edits in this section, too...
They presumably also had the same limited charthouse/topmast space as Emerald, even if it wasn't nearly so limited as I'd casually imagined...
There was a NF variant of the Fulmar II that was fitted with AI radar. The Fulmar was designed for night operations but was not fitted with ASV radar AFAIK.
There is little to distinguish Type 271 from Type 273 externally. Type 271 was intended for small ships and 273 for larger ships (cruiser and above). Derek Howse in "Radar at Sea" describes the difference as follows:-
"The big-ship set, dubbed type 273, was identical to type 271 except for the rwo 3ft circular mirrors (not stabilized in the earlier models) and a slightly larger lantern."
Type 271 aerial within the lantern:-
View attachment 718633
Type 273 aerial within the lantern:-
View attachment 718634
When it comes to looking at radar ranges in WW2 care needs to be taken in comparing like with like. Radars were upgraded as the war went on. Performance could vary from ship type to ship type. And that is before considering the quality of the operators.
The first Type 273 was fitted in the battleship Prince of Wales during her refit at Rosyth in June / July 1941 where it was carried high up in the ship between the forward high angle directors. Being mounted higher on a larger and more stable platform automatically helped increase range. Howse notes that the working range was 19 miles on the battlecruiser Repulse, 18 miles on the cruiser Euryalus and 14 miles on the destroyer Lively.
In comparison, a 271 carried much lower on a corvette could achieve about 6-7.5 miles against a destroyer and 2-2.5 on a submarine (not its periscope).
But as the war went on the performance of each of these sets was improved (differentiated by suffix letters). 271Q for example was first installed in the corvette Marigold in May 1942 as a replacement for one of the very first 271 sets. She was able to detect a sub at 5 miles. The first 273Q went into King George V in July 1942 and achieved 28 miles against the cruiser Cumberland and a submarine at 7.5 miles.
As for Emerald's armament it changed as the war went on (see Raven and Roberts "British Cruisers of World War Two" Appendix 2 War Modifications)
1939 - 7x6" single mounts; 3x4" single HA; 2xsingle pom-pom; 4xquad 0.5"
8/42-4/43 refit - remove 1x6" and all single pom-pom & quad 0.5". Add 2xquad pom-pom with associated directors and 6xtwin 20mm
3-4/44 - remove catapult and add 6 single 20mm
That was a fairly typical RN cruiser light AA armament for the period. The smaller modified Dido, Spartan completed in Aug 1943 had 3 quad pom-pom (one in place of Q turret in the original Dido class) and 6 twin 20mm. The three slightly larger modified Fiji class completed Jan-July 1943 had 3 quad pom-pom (one in place of the triple 6" X turret of the original class) and 8-10 twin 20mm.
Just by way of comparison a US Omaha class cruiser of similar age would have carried something like this in early 1943:-
10x6" (2x2 & 6x1 reduced from 12); 7x3"/50 singles; 2xtwin 40mm and 12x20mm singles (with 1x3" scheduled for replacement with a twin bofors when available).
Radar wise they carried a big SK warning radar (equivalent to Type 281) and a centimetric SG set for surface search (equivalent to Type 271/273). They also received 1/2 Mk 3 sets for gunnery fire control (equivalent of the RN Type 282/284/285 gunnery radars)
When 455 "Sqn Hampdens were called on to bomb the German fleet in the "Channel Dash", they were forced to bomb from low level, due weather and their bombs did not have the height to gain velocity and the bombs were reported as "bouncing off.One of the Skua's weaknesses was that it could only carry a 500lb bomb, which was inadequate against battleships, and provided less destructive power against (Japanese) carriers than the 1000lb bombs that were widely used by other dive bombers. Was the 500lb bomb the product of technical limitations, deliberate doctrinal choice for naval warfare (perhaps torpedoes are for killing ships?), the Air Ministry specification for a non-doctrinal reason, or something else?
I believe I have found the answer, somewhat in plain sight.
According to Neville Jones' The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force, 1923-1939, in July of 1932 the Chief of the Air Staff decided that no bomb larger than 500lbs would be produced. This was despite the fact that operational experience had shown the need for larger bombs, that Trenchard had stated in 1923 that 4000lb bombs would eventually be needed, and that a 1000lb bomb was in trials in 1930.
In 1935, a sub-committee of the Bombing Committee reaffirmed that no bombs over 500 lb should be produced.
Because the Skua was designed to Specification O.27/34, the 500lb limit was in effect, so there was no prospect of a larger bomb being introduced, even Blackburn had thought about going beyond the specification.
To make this even more tragic, early in 1939 the Air Staff called on Bomber Command to plan to attack enemy warships, and specifically to sink at least one German battleship. Beyond the Commander-in-Chief replying that he did not believe that his forces could hit enemy warships, the naval staff produced a paper "expressing the strongest doubts" that any kind of warship could be destroyed by the RAF's 500lb bombs. In other words, the Air Staff had simply ignored the possibility that the RAF might be called on to attack ships by bombing (presumably, they mentally assigned this role to torpedo bombers, which was not totally irrational, but would be impossible with land-based aircraft based in the UK). The contrast with the USAAC, which was obsessed with attacking battleships with high-altitude bombers, and with the IJN, is striking. This provides an example both powerful and subtle of the damage done to the Fleet Air Arm by making it part of the RAF.
tl;dr The RAF wasn't going to buy bombs bigger than 500lbs, so there was no point in designing a dive bomber to carry anything larger.
PS--The belief that more small bombs were better against industrial targets than a few large bombs also influenced the design of the Fairey Battle. Placing four 250lb bombs inside this wings as the primary armament make a thick wing necessary to accommodate them, regardless of the choice of wing profile for takeoff distance and range. The thick wing limited the maximum speed of the Battle after it had dropped its bombs. I cannot make a meaningful statement about the Battle's maximum speed and range if it had a thin wing and carried a single 1000lb (or 500lb) bomb externally.
PPS--The conversation around bombing ships was part of the "Oh, dear, the entire concept of the RAF was that our bomber forces would hit first, hit hard, and keep hitting until we win, but now we don't think that we can pull it off and we're afraid that if we do start bombing, the Luftwaffe will attack our airfields and annihilate Bomber Command, even though we don't think that there's any way that Bomber Command could attack Luftwaffe airfields with any effect, and the government is afraid that if we start bombing, the Germans will retaliate against London, and we agree that it's a risk and that the UK population might crack first and none of our thinking right now is internally consistent" period.
I believe the Argus was laid down as a battleship (1918) but was converted to a Carrier. It went with PQ18 to fly Hurricanes off at max range to Murmansk (Vaenga/Severomorsk). It was the only carrier with lifts big enough to handle a ready to fly Hurricane, though one damaged its U/C on the hump at the bow designed to give aircraft a bit of extra lift on take off, It had to fly wheels down! They did give the Germans a jolt, when they came from nowhere to bomb Kirkennes on the way home. Several FAA aircraft were shot down and it only took 4 days toget the aircrew into Dulag Luft.In 1937/38 Argus was converted to a Queen Bee carrier and was considered an auxiliary not a carrier.
In May 1939 the Admiralty looked forward to its carrier deployment in 1942 in the event of peace, war in Europe and war against Japan. By then it was anticipated that the first 6 armoured carriers would be in service (more were then planned). The plans for the old carriers were as follows:-
Argus & Eagle get no mention at all in any scenario. Argus probably due to her changed status. By 1942 Eagle's boilers were expected to need replaced so, given her other limitations, was probably not considered worthwhile giving a major refit to.
Peace
Furious, C&G & Hermes all in Reserve.
War
Furious was to be a training carrier in home waters.
C&G were to be active with air groups of only 24 aircraft each. Taken along with their proposed locations, it looks like they would be reduced to the trade protection role. European war = Kingston & Freetown. Far East war = Trincomalee and Singapore.
Hermes, with 12 aircraft would have been in the western Atlantic, either in Halifax or Kingston.
Having decided on one carrier, Indefatigable, for the 1939 Programme, at least one more was being planned for each of the 1940 & 1941 Programmes. Much discussion took place around the composition of each Programme.
HiI believe the Argus was laid down as a battleship (1918) but was converted to a Carrier. It went with PQ18 to fly Hurricanes off at max range to Murmansk (Vaenga/Severomorsk). It was the only carrier with lifts big enough to handle a ready to fly Hurricane, though one damaged its U/C on the hump at the bow designed to give aircraft a bit of extra lift on take off, It had to fly wheels down! They did give the Germans a jolt, when they came from nowhere to bomb Kirkennes on the way home. Several FAA aircraft were shot down and it only took 4 days toget the aircrew into Dulag Luft.
Argus's aircraft delivery to Russia actually preceded PQ18 by a year.I believe the Argus was laid down as a battleship (1918) but was converted to a Carrier. It went with PQ18 to fly Hurricanes off at max range to Murmansk (Vaenga/Severomorsk). It was the only carrier with lifts big enough to handle a ready to fly Hurricane, though one damaged its U/C on the hump at the bow designed to give aircraft a bit of extra lift on take off, It had to fly wheels down! They did give the Germans a jolt, when they came from nowhere to bomb Kirkennes on the way home. Several FAA aircraft were shot down and it only took 4 days toget the aircrew into Dulag Luft.
As well as the factual errors already point out, I think that you conflating a number of different events.I believe the Argus was laid down as a battleship (1918) but was converted to a Carrier. It went with PQ18 to fly Hurricanes off at max range to Murmansk (Vaenga/Severomorsk). It was the only carrier with lifts big enough to handle a ready to fly Hurricane, though one damaged its U/C on the hump at the bow designed to give aircraft a bit of extra lift on take off, It had to fly wheels down! They did give the Germans a jolt, when they came from nowhere to bomb Kirkennes on the way home. Several FAA aircraft were shot down and it only took 4 days toget the aircrew into Dulag Luft.
Why?The TBD ... It's unlikely that it could carry ASV radar.
Real Reason were losses after Midway, were pulled from front line service.Why?
The TDB was grossly overweight by 1942 and the airframe wouldn't have been capable of carrying an ASV/ASB radar and a useful weapon load. Additionally it's short range and endurance would have been problematic.Why?
AN/APS-3 was 300 pounds, and had twin scopes, as in the diagram above, for Pilot and operator. Used in other aircraft like TBF and PBYThe TDB was grossly overweight by 1942 and the airframe wouldn't have capable of carrying an ASV/ASB radar and a useful weapon load. Additionally it's short range and endurance would have been problematic.
Even a 1940 current R-1830.IMO, The Devastator with a 1942-current R-1830 and a metric radar would've been just a fine aircraft for ASV patrols.
I'm looking at it's actual combat range and endurance in 1942. The TBD was being forced to TO at ~10400lb in 1942 with an 850hp engine...it was already problematic for TO even on the USN's large flight decks and fast carriers. If we add ASB radar, then we have to delete the torpedo to TO and if we find a target at night we can't attack it.AN/APS-3 was 300 pounds, and had twin scopes, as in the diagram above, for Pilot and operator. Used in other aircraft like TBF and PBY
300 pounds weight for install.
Where are you finding grossly overweight?
TBD had flaws, but that? Had 201 gallons of fuel. It needed the latest R-1830, for starters, and a trip to the wind tunnel for a TBD-2 before the war even started, and more than 130 built
6200 pounds empty was not out of line for an aircraft that size.