Why the Skua Only Carried a 500lb Bomb

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Not quite the true story. From "The Squadrons and Units of the Fleet Air Arm"

800 - left Ark Royal and returned to the U.K. in April 1941, where it re-equipped with 9 Fulmars and broke into 800 Z flight, which went to Victorious in May with 6 aircraft, and 800 Y flight which went to Argus in May. See below re 800 X. It retained the Fulmars until converting to Sea Hurricanes in June/July 1942.

801 - after time on Ark & Furious and ashore it became 800 X flight / squadron (references vary as to exact designation) on 2 May 1941 and converting to 9 Fulmars. That unit then went back to Furious & Ark by mid-May to provide navigational support to Hurricane deliveries to Malta. 800 X remained on Malta until disbanded in Nov 1941.

801 then reformed on Sea Hurricanes in Aug 1941 at Yeovilton. So 801 didn't exist between May & Aug 1941.

803 - arrived Donibristle, Fife on 8 Oct 1940 to convert from Skuas to 12 Fulmars before joining Formidable on 27 Nov and sailing for the Med via Cape Town.

806 - formed 1 Feb 1940 with 8 Skuas & 4 Rocs. It moved to Hatston, Orkney in May and covered the Dunkirk evacuation. In June Fulmars replaced the Rocs and the squadron embarked on the new Illustrious for work up in the Caribbean. On return more Fulmars replaced replaced the Skuas before she left for the Med.
 
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Thank you for the correction/s.

I did run across the bit about squadron 806 and the Illustrious in the Caribbean ?.

" In another flight during their time in Bermuda, all three squadrons on Illustrious were flown from the deck while it was at anchor however when the time came to land an hour later the wind had disappeared. With the crash barrier down in order to use the full length of the deck all the Swordfish managed to land safely without tearing their arrestor hooks out. When it became 806 Naval Air Squadron's turn, Lieutenant Commander Charles Evans was the first to attempt to land and with the higher speed at touch down from the Blackburn Skua the arrestor hook on his aircraft was torn out from the fuselage and he had to resort to applying right rudder and slamming the nose of his aircraft into the ships island in order to prevent it continuing down the deck and falling into the water. The second aircraft to attempt to land still retained enough speed to become airborne again after it had torn its arrestor hook out and had to wait in the air while the rest of the squadron attempted to land, and was in the end instructed to find somewhere on Bermuda to make a forced landing; he chose to land on a golf course, resulting in the aircraft's wings being sheared away by trees. All the other pilots in the squadron then either repeated the commanding officer's actions on their turn to land or continued down the deck and fell into the water, except one other aircraft, which had managed to stop before falling off the deck. Although nobody was hurt from this last incident in Bermuda all the aircraft in the squadron had been damaged and instead of heading straight to the Mediterranean from Bermuda the Illustrious had to return to the Clyde, where they re-equipped with Fulmars, and the squadron was given a few weeks to get acquainted with the new aircraft."

n.wikipedia.org/wiki/806_Naval_Air_Squadron
 
Tell that to all the Luftwaffe aircrew flying HE111s that never returned after meeting Skuas.
 
Yes, often meeting with them when they are at loaded cruising speed.
That was going to be my point: Enemy bombers are arriving at cruise speed:

Aircraft Cruise speed
B5N 164 mph
G3M 170 mph
G4M 196 mph
SM.79 190 mph
He.111 190 mph
TBF 153 mph

Carrier is placing its CAP above the incoming attackers expected altitude. Therefore, fighter is attacking in a dive, so equal or above horizontal top speed. Skua 225 mph. Fleet has outlying ships and Radar assisting fighters in positioning. <I realize Radar is late in game for Skua but it was certainly used against them.> 15-50% speed advantage is sufficient for interception.

The incoming bombers need to stay in formation as stragglers are easily picked off, so maintain cruise speed until last moment. In fact they might not change speed at all, or as noted they might have to slow down to drop torpedoes.

So, while Skua isn't perfect, it was decent 1st monoplane for FAA. Blackburn knew the Skua was supposed to be replaced by spec N.5/38*, a Hercules powered two seat fighter, so Blackburn wasn't setting up high volume production/doing any serious development when the next generation is just around the corner.

*N.6/38 is Roc successor; both '38 specs get revised to N.8/39 and N.9/39 respectively and then RN/FAA is at war with what it has, not what is on drawing board.
 
Tell that to all the Luftwaffe aircrew flying HE111s that never returned after meeting Skuas.
It's not the ones the Skuas caught, but the ones they didn't because the Skua was too slow, too low or too few.

The Fulmar is the FAA's all time highest scoring fighter. But it was unable to prevent unescorted dive bomber attacks from crippling HMS Illustrious and Formidable. Swap out those Fulmars with Skuas and things might be even worse for the RN.
 
Please go to Hurricane Mk I Performance

and go down to the Graph for speed.
316 mph Hurricane I at 16,000ft was good for
295mph at 12,000ft
285mph at 8,000ft
275mph at 4,000ft
262-3mph at sea level.

Any bomber is going to show a similar reduction in percentage of speed from best altitude down to sea level.
With the Skua doing 225mph at 6,500ft it may actually be faster than some of the bombers once you get near sea level.
 
I don't quite understand what you're getting at. CAP from all nationalities frequently failed to prevent unescorted strikes from attacking their carriers. Any determined strike has a good probability of penetrating the CAP screen if the CAP doesn't have sufficient numbers or sufficient advance warning to gain altitude and position for interception; this was certainly the case for Illustrious's CAP at Malta.
 
Exactly what do you mean by "before the war"? 1939 or 1941? The Allies were not so "in the dark" about Japanese aircraft as is sometimes thought.

See Boyd " The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters. Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942" p229.

"British military leaders have attracted harsh criticism for their lack of knowledge of Japanese aircraft performance. Although surviving records here are patchy, accurate performance tables for all Japanese aircraft in use at the outbreak of war had been circulated across the British intelligence community by mid-1941. The exceptional range of many Japanese aircraft, including the new Zero fighter, was identified in these tables. British intelligence also had a reasonably accurate picture if IJNAF aircraft armament. The main bomb types were known, as were details of the Type 91 aerial torpedo."

In a note he refers to a document issued by Air Ministry Air Intelligence in May 1941 and reissued on 13 Dec 1941.

There had been plenty of opportunity to study Japanese aircraft given their involvement on China since 1930. The B5N1 flew its first sorties there as a bomber on 30 Sept 1938 and were operational through to the start of the Pacific war. I believe that the B5N2 version had also been operational over China in 1940/41.

So you do begin ro wonder how much has either been buried in the Archives still to be found or destroyed in the interim.
 
The Royal Navy was well aware, hence the Fulmar existed.
 
What can the TBD do that the Albacore can't? If the FAA said to Fairey; remove the need for divebombing and a high G high Vne airframe, reduce the fuel capacity, strip out the armour and SS tanks do you think they could deliver a TBD? Probably, but why would the FAA want that?

The TBD's fuel capacity is 180usg (200usg on an 8000lb Skua, and 230usg on an Albacore) with no SS tanks and no armour and no provision for aux tanks. It's TO performance at 10400lb and 900hp was terrible and only the long flight decks and high speed of the USN's carriers allowed the TBD to stay in service.

We boost the engine rating to 1200hp and then we have an aircraft that exceeds it's Vne in straight and level flight... We add SS tanks and then the fuel capacity actually falls even further, or we add larger SS tanks and weight increases further and the allowable G limits and dive angle falls even further. So then we strengthen the airframe and we end up with a 12000lb+ aircraft with only a 1200hp engine and again the STOL performance falls and our strengthened airframe has to have tight restrictions on it's Vne, G-limits and dive angles...

The TBD was dead end design.
 
Not saying the British should have adopted the TBD in 1938. Just that it could have pushed some people to think that perhaps the Albacore was not really that good and idea and they needed to get moving on what would become the Barracuda.
Which people do you think needed pushed?

I don't think that you truly appreciate the problems caused by the "strained and antagonistic" (Roskill) relationship that existed between the RN and the RAF in relation to naval aviation in the 1930s. There are no two ways about it, not having complete control over both ship & aircraft development, as in the USN & IJN, definitely held the RN back. Blaming the aircraft companies is an easy way out.

The problems are set out in detail in chapters VII &XIII of Roskill's "Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939".

Looking at the Albacore development story in more detail, it starts with the issue of Spec M.7/36 on 8/9/36 for a single or twin engined Torpedo, Spotter, Recce aircraft with an enclosed crew cockpit to succeed the Swordfish then entering production. Around the same time, 10 July 1936, Spec O.8/36 was issued for a Dive Bomber, Recce aircraft. On 11 Feb 1937 both were combined into Spec 41/36. These Specs seem only to have been issued to Fairey.

Fairey produced 17 designs for M.7/36 including both bi-plane and monoplane, and single & twin engined, layouts and with different types of engine. By Dec 1936 this seeems to have been narrowed down to a monoplane powered by Bristol Taurus or Mercury engine or a Taurus engined biplane (the latter described in one source "as a sop to the Admiralty") after extensive wind tunnel testing at the RAE. They also offered a further 5 designs to meet O.8/36 including both biplane & monoplane designs.

But at a meeting on 22 Jan 1937 the Admiralty selected the Taurus engined biplane for the former role, the reason being

"After having examined various wing arrangements, the conclusion has been reached that, having regard to the present stage of development, the requirements of these specifications are best met by a biplane of orthodox design. This decision is dictated principally by the requirements of take-off, the limitation of dimensions and mechanical difficulties of wing folding."

The Air Ministry then issued a revised and combined Spec on 11 Feb 1937 to which the Admiralty agreed and a contract was issued for 100 on 6 May 1937.

Note the involvement of both the Admiralty & the Air Ministry in this decision making process. But given the way that the Admiralty were excluded from aircraft development in the period, the question arises as to just how fully informed technically they were in arriving at their conclusions. ISTR reading that the relevant inter-service technical committee run by the Air Ministry not the Admiralty, only met some 4 times between about 1930 & 1937. Thereafter, following Inskip, it met much more frequently as relations between the two forces improved somewhat until the eventual handover in May 1939.

And having seen the Admiralty prefer a biplane in Feb 1937 leading to the Albacore order in May 1937, the Air Ministry in Jan 1938 issued a new Spec, S.24/37, that led to the monoplane Barracuda. Someone must have realised pretty quickly that a mistake had been made.

One thing that did seem to come out of the 1937 designs was that the Admiralty disliked the low winged monoplane designs presented by Fairey as it interfered with the observer's view for navigation and spotting purposes. It seems to be why most (all?) of the designs for S.24/37 adopted a high wing e.g. Fairey Barracuda, Supermarine Type 322 and Blackburn B-29.

During recent digging around I have found a 1939 Spec S.15/39 for a torpedo and dive bomber, recce aircraft clearly intended as a Barracuda successor. While Fairey are supposed to have carried out some work on it it went nowhere until 1940 when E.28/40 was issued to Folland for a "Research Aircraft for the FAA" to investigate problems decklanding aircraft of increased weight. It was to be a mid/high wing monoplane using a variety of high lift devices with a Sabre engine. Folland developed the Fo.116 to mock up stage with the Centaurus, the design incorporating variable incidence wings, leading edge slots and Fowler trailing edge flaps. Work stopped in 1943 after the project was abandoned. That coincides with the start of the Fairey Spearfish development programme and a much less restrictive design environment.



I find it interesting that in so far as fighters were concerned, just how quickly the RN moved to change the aircraft designs to be procured once it achieved full control of naval aviation. So we have the interim O.8/38 that led to the Fulmar followed by N.8/39 (two seat front gun) and N.9/39 (two seat turret fighter) drawn up during the period of joint control of the FAA and issued a month after the Admiralty took full control. But by the end of 1939 the Admiralty had rejected all the proposals received and added consideration of new responsibilities for protecting its shore bases while ditching the turret fighter concept altogether, sought designs for a two seat and a single seat fighter with much higher performance than originally contemplated. Those decisions in Jan 1940 led to the Specs for the Firefly & Firebrand (the latter intended as a 400mph aircraft).

Incidentally going back to TBD development, it was one of two prototyped to meet the requirement. The other was a biplane by Great Lakes! But the development of a new TB for the USN from 1934 represented a decision by them to get back into the TB game. It was a role that had virtually disappeared before that. USS Ranger was for example designed without any torpedo storage and did not carry a TB until 1941.
 
If they'd made it a single seater we might have had a winner. Of all the FAA's fighters only the Fulmar, Firefly, Venom, Vixen and Phantom were two seaters. Perhaps staying on topic we should include the Skua as well, though if I had to use my dive bomber as as a fighter I'd rather have SBDs over the Skua.
 
In May of 1940 when the Skuas are performing successful interceptions off the coast of Norway the SBD was not in service.

Monthly Acceptances SBD 1940

June 1
July 1
August 5
September 15
October 13
November 21
December 7
TOTAL 63

The first 57 were the compromised SBD-1s (short ranged) which were not acceptable to the USN and in that navy's great tradition were foisted on handed down to the Marines.
In fact if you compare it to its true contemporaries of early 1940 a case can be made for Skua as the best naval dive bomber in the world. Note that the Val was not cleared for carrier duties until late 1940.
 
What is your intended message here?

The comments on either side of the part you quoted.

SBD doesn't exist when the Skua is operational and claiming kills. Your USN dive bomber alternatives to the Skua are the BT-1 or the SBC-4...oh, or the SB2U. Lack of folding wings would still be a problem for RN carriers, drastically reducing aircraft complement.
 
The article has a number of errors. The 247mph figure is for the Fulmar 1 and Merlin VIII engine using 87 Octane fuel with a combat ceiling of 16000ft. Using 100 octane fuel speed was increased to 255mph. The Fulmar II had a Merlin 30 and a Vmax of 268mph at ~6500ft with a service ceiling of ~23000ft. The Fulmar was in development long before Jan 1940. The only real problem with the Fulmar was that there wasn't enough of them. We have to consider that the Fulmar introduced the monoplane folding wing fighter, with a powerful armament more than a year before either the IJN or USN. The Fulmar was due to be replaced in 1942 with the Fairey Firefly which had a planned speed of ~350mph and 4 x 20mm cannon. Even with it's historical performance (~320mph) , it would have been a formidable naval fighter aircraft in 1942, but it was, of course, delayed into service.
Only two Fulmars were lost trying to defend Hermes, in exchange for four Vals. The 3rd Fulmar loss was well away from that engagement.

Prior to the introduction of long range air-warning naval radar if wasn't possible for carrier based CAP to defeat attacking aircraft formations due to the limitations of non-radar aided GCI; The IJN at Midway being the poster child for this.
 

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