Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

[special ed]

I have been fortunate to have known a number of WW2 vets, most all combat vets. One I'll mention now, was a 19 year old Marine captured at the surrender of Bataan. One of the things he told us of POW camp was the saddest day, Christmas 1944 in Japan. He was among those brought to Japan to work the coal mines because it was too dangerous for Japanese. The winter of 44 in Japan had been severe and the heavy snow fall of Christmas eve had collapsed the Canadian barracks and only two men lived.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

It wasn't bloodless.

No it was not, and I assure you I will not tolerate their honor disrespected like that again.

One of my favorite places to visit in Washington DC. I spend hours walking around the monument every time I visit.

 

[GrauGeist]

My family has been fortunate in that they always came home, with the exception of my Uncle Bill (USN) shot down, MIA in Vietnam and several relatives killed in the Civil War.
They did leave a considerable amount of buddies behind, which they would occasionally speak about, but only to recount their exploits (while on leave, stealing the ice cream machine from the Enterprise for their submarine, etc.) and always in the present tense - no matter how long ago they were lost.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I was going to post this in the What Are You Watching thread. I just watched "The Swamp Ghost" on PBS. Those guys up there, kids, in these planes. I had an uncle who was part of a B-24 squadron somewhere in the Pacific. Another uncle part of an airlift unit flying the "Hump". Regret not talking to them about it when I had the chance. I just talk a look at Dad's medals. He was involved in the defense of the Ardennes Pocket. I know I lost a cousin on D-Day. It wasn't bloodless.

My mother never got to meet her father.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

WW2 was an allied effort. I truly believe it could not have been done otherwise. Anyone that denigrates any of them does a dishonor to the greatest generation.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

My family history is an interesting one. My father's side served in the US Army. My Grandfather landed on D-Day on Omaha Beach. He survived and went on to serve in Korea and Vietnam as well. On my mother's side, her family all served in the German Army. My German Grandfather served first on the Western Front (my mom has pics of him in his uniform in front of the Eifel Tower), and later on the Eastern Front to Stalingrad. He was captured, but survived and luckily came home. My German Grandmother's brother, never came home. He is still missing to this day.

Otherwise my family was lucky, and everyone came home.

My wife's family on the other hand, not so lucky. Her Grandfather had five brothers serving on the Eastern and Western Front. None of them came home. The only known one died in August 1944 at the age of 17 in Normandy. We found his grave during our last visit to Normandy.

Point is this, nothing about this war was bloodless. Entire families were wiped out on all sides, and for the US there certainly was no "bloodless victory".

What a slap in the face to those boys still resting overseas...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

"a relatively bloodless victory"

"my supposed anti-American bias"

I'm going to finally call you out - over the years I've seen a total "anti-American bias" in may of your posts, the tone of some of your comments and you're continual comparison of aircraft and leadership as if Canada or the Commonwealth was slighted in some way or another - I lived in Canada for 5 years and found a few smug Canadians with an identity problem and a chip on their shoulders towards the US - ARE YOU ONE OF THEM????

At this point you're on notice. If you have a beef with Americans or some of the content on this forum, don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out or we can facilitate that for you!!!!

 

[Peter Gunn]

My mother never got to meet her father.

Thump, have you seen this site? I've been around it for many years:

AWON

I don't like dwelling on tragedy but what happened to your mom is one of the first magnitude, so sorry to hear she is one of those the above site is dedicated to.

 

[SaparotRob]

Although not strictly related to me, my cousin has a long passed relative (through marriage) who was awarded the Iron Cross by Der Kaiser. If you're Jewish, it's pretty funny.

 

[special ed]

I have mentioned a friend, Herb, on this forum a few times. He flew a Corsair and then Hellcats. He told me that in WW1 he had his father and an uncle in US service and uncles in German service. He had wondered about what may have happened to cousins in German WW2 service and were any of them aviators.

 

[SaparotRob]

My cousin and I get a laugh when we talk about his great uncle and our grandfather. Our grandfather defended Fort Dix against the evil hun.
They never got past Massachusetts.

 

[Peter Gunn]

My cousin and I get a laugh when we talk about his great uncle and our grandfather. Our grandfather defended Fort Dix against the evil hun.
They never got past Massachusetts.

Reminds me of the comedian George Goebel who was a pilot and flight instructor in Oklahoma during WWII. Paraphrasing but...

"I spent the war in Oklahoma because apparently that's where the Army needed me, now I'm not bitter or anything but if you remember, not one Japanese plane got past Tulsa..."

 

[cherry blossom]

There is absolutely no way the Philippines were going to get out of being occupied.
Their geographic location was too dangerous to Japanese interests to be allowed to be under any other authority than Imperial Japan.

I am sorry to come back to this so belatedly but I found it quite difficult to investigate. One problem is that after "The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage", it was hard to find people who might have admitted that they had been strong advocates of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, I am fairly confident that the Pearl Harbor operation was supported by very few Japanese officers, essentially Admiral Yamamoto and some of the Combined Fleet. Even Rear-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, who was one of the planners argued "...we should avoid anything like the Hawaiian operation that would put America's back up too badly" according to "The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy" by Agawa Hiroyuki, page 229. Onishi's views are also given in Prange's "At Dawn we Sleep" on page 261 where he is said to have argued that "If Japan confined its push to the southern regions, even including the Philippines, the Americans would be angry, would even fight, but would remain open to negotiations. However, if it attacked Pearl Harbor, that would make the United States so insanely mad that any hope for a compromise peace would go up in flames." Nevertheless, Yamamoto forced his plan through by offering his resignation and his superior, Admiral Nagano Osami, gave up his objections.

The difficult question is who supported an attack on the Philippines and who preferred the gamble of ignoring the Philippines to the gamble of fighting the USA. Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake, initially Nagano's vice-chief of staff and later commander of the 2nd Fleet under Yamamoto, maintained that Japan should attack Malaya and the Dutch East Indies only according to Prange pages 284-5. Similarly the Navy Minister, Shimada Shigetaro, is reported by Fukudome Shigeru to have opposed attacking America (The Japanese Navy in World War II, ed. David C. Evans, page 6). His predecessor as Navy Minister, Oikawa Koshiro, had been asked by War Minister Tojo Hideki about the prospects for victory against the United States and had replied he was not confident the United States could be defeated.

The most senior officer in the Navy, with the right of access to the Emperor, was Admiral Nagano Osami and, sadly, his views are hardest to understand. The Battle of Midway by Craig L. Symonds, page 91 has:
The first open split between Nagano and Yamamoto came over the wisdom of striking at Pearl Harbor. Nagano believed that it would be possible to seize the British and Dutch possessions in the South Pacific without drawing the United States into the war. He argued that the Pearl Harbor gambit was unnecessary and risky, and that it would pull resources away from the all-important strike southward. Yamamoto saw this as timidity. He opined to an associate that Nagano was "the kind of man who thinks he's a genius, even though he's not," and told another, "Nagano's a dead loss."
Similarly, "The Shattered Sword" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully says on page 24 that the Chief of the General Staff, Nagano Osami, did not wish to attack America.
Louis Morton's "Japan's Decision for War" has "There was only enough oil, Admiral Osami Nagano told the Emperor, to maintain the fleet under war conditions for one and a half years and he was doubtful that Japan could win a "sweeping victory" in that time. His advice, therefore, was to drop the Tripartite Pact and reach agreement with the United States."
I found some more quotes in "War Leadership Concept before the Greater East Asia War: Aftermath of the Imperial National Defense Policy" by Taeru Kurono:
1. On July 31, 1941, upon inquiry by the Emperor concerning the possible war against the United States, Osami Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, replied to the throne that it was doubtful whether Japan could win, not to speak of achieving a great victory as won in the Battle of the Sea of Japan, and if it prolonged, he "had no idea about the consequences," and the Emperor entertained the impression that "how dare we start a war with no prospects of victory."
2. On November 4 1941, Nagano stated, "I am certain that the Imperial Japanese Navy will be victorious for the first two years, but I cannot foresee what will happen if the war becomes prolonged because the future holds various uncertain factors."
3. However, on July 21, Nagano announced that Japan should decide to start the war against the United States promptly because the differences in the military strength of Japan and the United States would enlarge as time passed (Sawamoto Yorio's Diary, entry on July 21, 1941).
There is a biography written with the help of his family called "He Gave the Order: The Life and Times of Admiral Osami Nagano" by F.J. Bradley. I spent a fair time reading the bits available on Google Books and I learnt a good deal about his wives, all four of them as they were unlucky in childbirth, and nothing about IJN policy. However, there may be something on the hidden pages.

Louis Morton's "Japan's Decision for War" is available on the internet and here is a long quote from chapter 4, pages 105-6, which talks about "the Navy" without saying who represented the Navy:

"By the middle of August the two services had agreed on a broad line of strategy. The impetus came from a series of studies presented by the Total War Research Institute, a subordinate body of the Planning Board. Forecasting the course of events during the next six months, the Institute called for the invasion of the Netherlands Indies in November, followed the next month by surprise attacks on British and American possessions in the Far East. Anticipating that the United States and Great Britain would utilize Soviet bases in a war against Japan, the Institute's studies dealt with the problems of economic mobilization; military planning, except in the most general sense, was left to the services.
These studies, as well as others, were discussed heatedly during the tense days that followed the embargo. From these discussions emerged four alternative lines of strategy, all of them designed to accomplish the swift destruction of Allied forces in the Far last and the early seizure of the Netherlands Indies. The first was based on the Institute's studies and provided for the seizure of the Indies and then of the Philippines and Malaya. The second called for a step-by-step advance from the Philippines to Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and Malaya. The reverse, from Malaya to the Philippines, constituted a third line of action and one which would have the advantage of delaying attack against American territory. The fourth plan proposed at this time consisted of simultaneous attacks against the Philippines and Malaya followed by a rapid advance along both axes to the Indies. Admiral Yamamoto's plan for an attack against Pearl Harbor, work on which had begun in January, did not enter into the calculations of the planners at this time.
Army and Navy planners agreed that the first plan was too risky for it would leave Japanese forces exposed to attack from the Philippines and Malaya. The Navy preferred the second plan; it was safe, provided for a step-by-step advance, and created no serious problems. The Army objected to it, however, on the ground that by the time the main objectives in the Netherlands Indies and Malaya were reached the Allies would have had time to strengthen their defenses. The third plan, with its early seizure of Malaya and bypassing of the Philippines, appealed greatly to the Army planners who hoped in this way to gain southeast Asia and delay American entry into the war. But this course, as the Navy pointed out, also placed American naval and air forces in the Philippines in a strategic position athwart Japan's line of communication and constituted a risk of the utmost magnitude. The fourth course, simultaneous attacks and advance along two axes, created serious problems of co-ordination and timing and a dangerous dispersion of forces. But because it was the only course which compromised the views of both groups, it was finally adopted."