Why was P-36 so successful in the battle of France?

[MIflyer]

It wouldn't have worked at all, the cabin heater the British specified to get out of the contract totally ruined the P-39/P-40s performance.

In AK the P-39 pilots found that since the engine was not up front and warming the air bound for the cockpit by its mere presence leading the parade, that cold air tended to leak in. They put tent caps over the holes for the nose machine guns and taped up one of the doors. But ironically, given the location of the engine and radiator, cabin heat should have been no problem.

Presumably the earliest P-39's provided would have been the Airacobra I/P-400 with 20MM hub guns - if they had been ready - and 200 of those were shipped to the USSR.

 

[Denniss]

The H75A-1 had about 200 more horsepower and a better prop than the Bf 109D so it should have better speed and acceleration. The 109D probably had no armor.
ZG 2 was a destroyer unit that had to use 109D until sufficient 110 were available.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I gather 110s did pretty well in the Battle of France...?

 

[keithwwalker]

I gather 110s did pretty well in the Battle of France...?

I'm reading a book on the Defiant, & the 110 was a new weapon system, Spitfires & Hurricanes didn't do great against them as tactics haven't been formulated yet

 

[keithwwalker]

By the way, how much sabotage was there of French built aircraft? Until 1941 the Socialists in France opposed fighting the Nazis because they were friends with their idols, the Soviets. The invasion of Poland was in fact a joint invasion by Germany and the USSR. At least a Curtiss built airplane was going to be put together correctly.

I think you have that backwards, it was fascists, not communists, that were sabotaging aircraft.

 

[GrauGeist]

I think you have that backwards, it was fascists, not communists, that were sabotaging aircraft.

No, it was Communists, not Fascists.

An excerpt from State Capitalism and Working-Class Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry

(Part three, Chapter seven)

"As if all this were not enough to weaken the spirit of national unity, the last week of August 1939 brought one more blow—the Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact. Its announcement stunned public opinion in France, as it did everywhere, and bewildered the French Communist Party. By the end of September Communist militants found themselves having to accept an almost incomprehensible change in political line—defending the pact, condemning the Daladier regime, and calling for peace in a war they were suddenly required by the Comintern to portray as a rivalry between imperialist powers. After years of serving as the staunchest advocates of antifascism, the PCF had to become a pro-peace party. This shift created havoc in the CGT, compromised militants, and gave the Daladier government an excuse to ban the party, close down Communist newspapers, dismiss more than twenty-seven hundred Communist municipal councillors, deprive PCF senators and deputies of their seats, dissolve hundreds of Communist-led CGT locals, and arrest about thirty-four hundred militants.
...

Of course, the Nazi-Soviet Pact greatly compounded their troubles. The full scope of the catastrophe took a while to comprehend, partly because it took several weeks for the PCF to adopt the Stalinist line of opposing the war and partly because some militants did not face up to the brutal reality of the pact until the Soviet army invaded Poland on 17 September. Once the party fell into line with the Comintern, Communist militants at the plant level faced agonizing choices—to abandon the party altogether, to stick with the party but ignore as much as possible the call to oppose the war effort, or to adhere to the party strategy of opposing the "Imperialist war." Some militants, though dismayed by the pact, nevertheless felt compelled to close ranks behind the party at a time when the PCF was under such brutal governmental attack. A few militants may have had the ironic good fortune of a Henri Jourdain, who after eluding the police in Paris went to Marseille for naval duty, where he remained isolated from the party leadership, unable to get underground copies of L'Humanité and ignorant of the pro-peace position of the party during the phoney war. Most militants, however, were put in an untenable position politically and forced into either internment, clandestine activities, or a quiet withdrawal from trade union politics. Their influence in the factories diminished accordingly.

But their influence did not disappear entirely. Militants met secretly, distributed tracts anonymously, and supported workers in efforts to protest working conditions through slowdowns and a few rare work stoppages. Many militants followed the pragmatic tactic of remaining silent on political issues while encouraging workers to defend their immediate interests. Military officials in the Paris region reported brief slowdown strikes at the Renault-Caudron plant in Issy-les-Moulineaux as well as at Bréguet in Aubervillier and SNCM in Argenteuil. Police officials believed Communist agitators lay behind a discernible decline in output at SNCASE in Villacoublay, as in several other armament factories. But it is hard to say how much moral authority Communist militants really wielded during the phoney war in the company of the skilled workers who had followed their lead since 1936. The police and the military have left only a sporadic record of political activity in the factories, and their reports are undoubtedly colored by the anti-Communist hyperbole that was characteristic of these months. It is certainly safe to say that many Communist militants contributed to the atmosphere of disaffection, distrust, and resentment that the government's tough labor policies produced throughout the defense sector. As one police official reported, "Up to now [revolutionary propaganda] does not seem to reach the mass of the working population. . . . However, it finds a sympathetic hearing among factory workers, especially in aircraft construction." It is not surprising to find government officials concerned with the continuing presence of the PCF in the most strategically sensitive of defense industries, the one in which the party had done so well before the general strike of 1938. Nevertheless, repression and the Nazi-Soviet Pact kept Communists in the shadows, limiting what militants could accomplish as agitators on the shop floor.

However torn many Communists may have felt between their responsibility to defend the new pro-peace position and their Popular Frontist commitments to national defense—and many of them must have felt conflicted indeed—few militants went so far as to engage in sabotage in the aircraft industry. To be sure, there were plenty of rumors about sabotage to keep the military police busy, and on rare occasions such rumors had something to them. In May 1940 six young workers at SNCAC were arrested for allegedly placing brass wires in twenty Gnôme-et-Rhône engines. In Bordeaux rolled-up copies of the left-wing newspaper Populaire bordelaiswere discovered hidden within a wing to disrupt flap motion. Prosecutors at Riom turned up about a half-dozen cases of this sort. One air force official reported graffiti on factories walls reminding readers "that one hour delay at work is an hour won for the victory of the proletariat." Police surveillance undoubtedly had some effect. Moreover, subtle slowdowns by stealthy militants could have escaped the attention of policemen and supervisors; right-wing critics of the government asserted that they were common. But in fact PCF leaders were not inclined to promote sabotage, and on two occasions clandestine issues of L'Humanité condemned rumors of desertion and sabotage as "provocations." The errors of new workers who were inexperienced, overworked, and poorly trained posed a much more serious problem than did the efforts of a few saboteurs.

If the PCF's stance toward war production turned out in practice to be ambiguous—condemning the war but repudiating sabotage—employers and government officials tried hard to isolate militants. Repression ranged from dismissal of Communist militants from the administrative councils of the national companies to mass firings and reassignments to the army. In his defense at the Riom trial La Chambre went so far as to contend that Daladier's decision to dissolve the Communist Party "had its origins" in La Chambre's warnings about the strength of the PCF in the aircraft industry. From September through June military police rooted out workers suspected of slowing down production. And nonCommunist personnel were by no means immune. In a major purge at SNCM, the nationalized engine-building firm, only 51 of the 102 employees fired or reassigned to the army were so treated "for Communist propaganda." Socialist militants, in fact, also complained of the reprisals they endured. Spanish refugees suffered especially cruel treatment since many of them had taken jobs in the aircraft plants of southwestern France and, as anarchists and Communists, were then thrown into internment camps after the outbreak of war. But for the most part the Air Ministry directed its efforts against French Communists; as late as June 1940 two hundred "Communist leaders considered the most dangerous" to the industry were arrested."​

 

[MIflyer]

Hubert Beuve-Mery, future founder and editor of the newspaper Le Monde, wrote:

"The Americans constitute a real danger for France... If they cling to a veritable cult of the idea of liberty, they don't feel the need to liberate themselves from the servitudes that their capitalism entails."

He wrote that in MAY 1944. And we all know what happened early in June.

 

[GreenKnight121]

No, it was Communists, not Fascists.

An excerpt from State Capitalism and Working-Class Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry

(Part three, Chapter seven)

eleted text about general situation and listing a FEW isolated incidents of communist-perpetrated sabatoge

But in fact PCF leaders were not inclined to promote sabotage, and on two occasions clandestine issues of L'Humanité condemned rumors of desertion and sabotage as "provocations." The errors of new workers who were inexperienced, overworked, and poorly trained posed a much more serious problem than did the efforts of a few saboteurs.

If the PCF's stance toward war production turned out in practice to be ambiguous—condemning the war but repudiating sabotage—employers and government officials tried hard to isolate militants. Repression ranged from dismissal of Communist militants from the administrative councils of the national companies to mass firings and reassignments to the army. In his defense at the Riom trial La Chambre went so far as to contend that Daladier's decision to dissolve the Communist Party "had its origins" in La Chambre's warnings about the strength of the PCF in the aircraft industry. From September through June military police rooted out workers suspected of slowing down production. And nonCommunist personnel were by no means immune. In a major purge at SNCM, the nationalized engine-building firm, only 51 of the 102 employees fired or reassigned to the army were so treated "for Communist propaganda." Socialist militants, in fact, also complained of the reprisals they endured. Spanish refugees suffered especially cruel treatment since many of them had taken jobs in the aircraft plants of southwestern France and, as anarchists and Communists, were then thrown into internment camps after the outbreak of war. But for the most part the Air Ministry directed its efforts against French Communists; as late as June 1940 two hundred "Communist leaders considered the most dangerous" to the industry were arrested."​

So the communist leadership did NOT approve the workers actually doing sabotage - and your own text says that there were FEW such incidents... and many more of both communist and non-communist workers simply working slowly!

 

[Greg Boeser]

You pretend to pay, we pretend to work.

 

[GrauGeist]

Seems to me that "working slowly" would also be a form a sabotage...

 

[Vincenzo]

we have to know if there were some wage contrasts at time, or if they working slowly but within the contract range

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It was definitely both communists and fascists interfering with French military production before WW2. They were in a moment of extreme polarization which might seem familiar to some. There was also a lot of general mistrust in the French government due to the debacle of WWI, which was widely believed to have been grossly mismanaged. National unity is an ephemeral thing. Nobody was really considering the possibility that the Germans would just take over, but it had actually happened a few generations before, albeit briefly, during the Franco Prussian War. It wasn't yet clear to most precisely what kind of German government they were dealing with.

 

[FalkeEins]

A pilot account from GC II/7;

".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring of 1940 GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520. This 'expérimentation opérationelle' had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service. Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

and on the Bf 110 (from a forthcoming article 'Sharks in the Blitzkrieg' - ZG 76 over France)

"...The Bf 110 was a heavy fighter designed for bomber escort and ground strafing. During the period May-June 1940, it largely lived up to its promises, successfully attacking troop and tank columns, rail convoys and troop concentrations while providing effective protection for He 111 and Do 17 bomber formations. In addition, even if swirling dogfights were not their speciality, even if they did not return the eighty-eight victories claimed, the aviators of the Stab and II./ZG 76 shot down at least thirty-eight RAF and Armée de l'Air aircraft (maybe forty - 'claim inflation' of around 100% was common during the campaign in the west). For all this, the 'Sharks' and the Stab of ZG 76 lost eleven Bf 110s and twelve airmen (three POWs were released after the fall of France) ...

and on the H-75 (French P-36)

" ... the H-75 may have been the plane of the French aces but it was also the plane of defeat....it could not hunt, but when hunted it could bite back..." (French author Persyn on the H-75)

French aviation blogger "Drix" is more scathing about the "Curtiss", as the French usually refer to the H-75;

" the qualities of the Curtiss have been largely overestimated - it achieved what it achieved thanks the high quality of the French aces that flew it.."

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

A pilot account from GC II/7;

".. The Dewoitines were being delivered to us piecemeal ('..au compte-goutte..') Finally five pilots and five mechanics flew to Toulouse on board a Bloch 220 on the afternoon of May 14. Once there more surprises awaited us - the aircraft were not ready for a variety of reasons..(...) ..during the spring of 1940 GC I/3 in Cannes had been tasked with operational testing of the D.520. This 'expérimentation opérationelle' had established a listing of no fewer than 132 changes that would have to be made to production machines before they were suitable for service. Obviously this had an impact on the rate of production of the aircraft. More seriously however, the CGT (communist trade union at the Toulouse factory) had received an order from the PCF (French communist party) to 'go-slow' on the production of the D.520 as a direct result of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The airfield at Francazal was literally awash with aircraft that we couldn't use while our pilots continued to die at the controls of their Ms 406s...our five pilots finally returned with their aircraft ten days later on the 24th.."

and on the Bf 110 (from a forthcoming article 'Sharks in the Blitzkrieg' - ZG 76 over France)

"...The Bf 110 was a heavy fighter designed for bomber escort and ground strafing. During the period May-June 1940, it largely lived up to its promises, successfully attacking troop and tank columns, rail convoys and troop concentrations while providing effective protection for He 111 and Do 17 bomber formations. In addition, even if swirling dogfights were not their speciality, even if they did not return the eighty-eight victories claimed, the aviators of the Stab and II./ZG 76 shot down at least thirty-eight RAF and Armée de l'Air aircraft (maybe forty - 'claim inflation' of around 100% was common during the campaign in the west). For all this, the 'Sharks' and the Stab of ZG 76 lost eleven Bf 110s and twelve airmen (three POWs were released after the fall of France) ...

and on the H-75 (French P-36)

" ... the H-75 may have been the plane of the French aces but it was also the plane of defeat....it could not hunt, but when hunted it could bite back..." (French author Persyn on the H-75)

French aviation blogger "Drix" is more scathing about the "Curtiss", as the French usually refer to the H-75;

" the qualities of the Curtiss have been largely overestimated - it achieved what it achieved thanks the high quality of the French aces that flew it.."

I think the issue wasn't so much that the Curtiss wasn't good, as that the other modern French fighters (D.520, Bloch 152, maybe VG 33) had not had time for their 'shakeout' - so there were lots of small but telling 'teething' problems, the pilots weren't used to them and didn't know their strengths and weaknesses well enough to work out specific tactics with them. Many of the D.520 units went into action literally days after receiving their aircraft.

Both the P-36 and the D.520 did pretty well in combat against Allied forces during the Torch landings a couple of years later, and both continued to find use as fighters well into the war in various Theaters, D.520 being used in Italy and the Balkans, Hawk in India as we have discussed.

The 'can't hunt, but can bite back when hunted' I think is a reference to the altitude and speed limitations of the P-36. It's not going to be able to 'hunt' Bf 109s because it's anemic above 15,000 ft and doesn't have the speed to catch them. But in a Tactical War such as in France (or over North Africa / the Middle East, or Burma) this isn't such a severe limitation, because the main job is to either escort or intercept Tactical bombers, and Hawks were quite effective in that role. German pilots made basically the same observation about the P-40 in North Africa in 1941-43, but they also noted that they were dangerous to tangle with when escorting bombers.

D.520 has the same altitude limitation as the P-36, and isn't as maneuverable or as easy handling, but is potentially faster, comparable to a Bf 109E, has a cannon in the nose, and has (better) armor and SS tanks. So if they had time to work them up, the French pilots very likely would have made a better showing for themselves in the D.520. Bloch 152 I'm not so sure about, I think they too would have done better with more time for a proper shakeout, but the design may have been more flawed overall. VG 33 looks good on paper but I'm not sure how that would translate in the field, it was more of an experimental 'light fighter' design.

The P-36 was a mount that was more or less already 'debugged', and it let the French pilots utilize their skill. Pilot quality was probably pretty good, depending on the unit. If they had gone into action 6 months earlier with the P-36 I don't think they would have done so well.

 

[Shortround6]

VG 33 looks good on paper but I'm not sure how that would translate in the field, it was more of an experimental 'light fighter' design.

It also had the highest wing loading of the time. Potential for growth maybe somewhat limited?

The French oversold the "light fighter" concept to a remarkable degree.
The VG-30 was powered by a Potez D.12 engine of 17.6 liters (1072 cu in) that was a flat 12 cylinder air cooled engine. The engine weighed 330kg dry and was good for 510hp at take-off and 480hp at 3,000 meters in 1938. Performance was probably not too great. If it flew at all.
The VG-30 was re-powered by a H-S Xcrs engine of 27 liters and was a V-12 liquid cooled engine, This engine was 380kg (?) but needs a radiator and coolant. Engine may have given 670hp for take-off and 690hp at 4,000meters. Performance was still not what they wanted.
The VG-31 got a H-S Y-31 of 860hp.
The VG-32 got an Allison V-1710
The VG-33 got the same H-S Y-31 of 36 liters, weight 470-490kg (plus coolant and radiator) had 860hp for T-O and 830hp at 3250 meters.

Weight was just under 5,400lbs or about 250lbs less than an M-S 406.
Whatever it started out as by the time you get an 900hp engine into it and a 20mm cannon and four 7.5 mgs it really isn't lighter than it's competition.

 

[tomo pauk]

The VG-30 was re-powered by a H-S Xcrs engine of 27 liters and was a V-12 liquid cooled engine, This engine was 380kg (?) but needs a radiator and coolant. Engine may have given 670hp for take-off and 690hp at 4,000meters. Performance was still not what they wanted.
The VG-31 got a H-S Y-31 of 860hp.
The VG-32 got an Allison V-1710
The VG-33 got the same H-S Y-31 of 36 liters, weight 470-490kg (plus coolant and radiator) had 860hp for T-O and 830hp at 3250 meters.

Fench Wikipedia states 485 km/h for the VG.30 powered by the HS 12X engine (ie. similar performance as the Bf 109D or Hurricane I). Supposedly the propeller was not very good, per the article. Problem with 12X is that, for each of these engines manufactured, one 12Y is not manufactured?
The HS12Y-31 was well behind the curve, it was even worse than the HS 12Ys the Czechs were making pre-war. The HS 12Y-45 was much better, especially above 3000m, but those required fuel of greater octane rating (CR was 7:1, vs. 5.8:1 for the -31), and probably were not available in quantity sufficient for both D.520 and VG.33 production?

Size of VG.33 was very close to the Yak-3 - yes, not much of capacity to stretch it, bu it does not need to have it, with Germany just across the border. Main problem of the VG.33 was that it was too late?

 

[FalkeEins]

..main problem of the VG 33 was that only prototypes were tested - and the manufacturer did everything possible to ensure performance figures looked good, ie lighter, smaller etc etc

 

[Shortround6]

Size of VG.33 was very close to the Yak-3 - yes, not much of capacity to stretch it, bu it does not need to have it, with Germany just across the border. Main problem of the VG.33 was that it was too late?

The French have got several things going against them.

The Russians had light weight guns which gave them more fire power per KG of installed weight.
The Russians had slightly larger airframes to do the larger jobs, like fighter bomber with a pair of 100kg bombs?

The French could fit more powerful H-S engines but I don't know how soon that tops out. The H-S Y-51 maybe as far as that goes?

do we have the performance for a fully combat capable VG.33 or is it a prototype?
Several photos seem to be missing radio antennas for instance?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think the French are getting a bit mistreated here. They bungled the defense of their homeland against the German invasion, and they certainly had some ugly planes in the early to mid 30s, but French design seems to have been pretty good to me by the eve of the war, French industry was quite sophisticated and advanced and they had designers as good as anywhere else in the world. Their problem was more with bureaucracy and national unity, but those were also not entirely unique problems.

The Dewoitine D.520's built in 1940 was one of the best fighters in the world at that time, in my opinion.

----------------------------D.520 ------------------------------Yak 1 (early)
Length-------------------8.6m------------------------------8.5m
Span----------------------10.2m----------------------------10m
Power--------------------950 hp---------------------------1,100 hp
Speed--------------------560 km-------------------------- 540 km
Climb --------------------14.3 m/s------------------------ 13.1 m/s
Range -------------------1250 km ----------------------- 700 km
Guns --------------------- 1 x 20mm, 4 x 7.5mm ---- 1 x 20mm, 1 x 7.62mm

So the D.520 is slightly bigger, slightly faster, better armed, has double the range, and is made of stressed skin instead of questionably laminated wood*. Probably better protected and armored too, and has a working radio, and a variable pitch propeller. Plus a built in fire suppression system! And slow walking communist unions or not, French planes built in 1939-40 had a much better production / manufacturing standard than what the Soviets were making probably even by late 1942.

They definitely had a little room for improvement for the HS 12Y - they certainly had the 12Y-51 at 1,000 hp, but were already testing 1,200 hp variants (12Y-89) and the 1,600 hp 12Z which was supposed to go into the VG-39bis. The French seemed to think they were going to work and I've yet to see convincing evidence they wouldn't, eventually. The question is when, how soon could they have them working and in new planes.

D.520s made in 1940 were still holding their own in in combat in 1943, so I think it wasn't such a bad design. I'm not sure how great of a fighter bomber it would have made but the French had some pretty good fast bomber designs too, including the Breguet -693, the LeO 45, the Bloch 174 (a fast recon plane but could be used as a bomber) plus the American Martin 167 and DB-7, with Martin 187's already in the pipeline. Not to mention P-40Bs and weird stuff like P-38s with no turbo.

The VG -33 looks quite good on paper, wing loading or not, especially if you presume that they could get a 1,200 hp engine in it, but being a wooden plane and a 'light fighter', very hastily put together, it kind of smells of desperation. We really can't be sure how a production version would have performed, would it be another mess like the Bloch 152 or the Potez 630, or a slightly cheaper D.520?

Overall though I'd say what the French were really missing was another 3-6 months to get ready. Maybe if they and the British had sent arms to Poland or put tanks and artillery in Belgium early on, I don't know. I'm sure delaying the war was impossible but if they had some more time, their air defense would have been quite a bit more formidable. They had ignored the problem for a long time but by late 1939 they were scrambling fast to get it together, and they had put together some nice aircraft.


* I think the Russians eventually improved their wood lamination processes but they were having trouble with it early on.

 

[tomo pauk]

The French have got several things going against them.

The Russians had light weight guns which gave them more fire power per KG of installed weight.
The Russians had slightly larger airframes to do the larger jobs, like fighter bomber with a pair of 100kg bombs?

Fighter that carries the bombs was not a thing for the French back then.
French problems were of far greater magnitude than whether their guns weighted 50 or 40 kg.

The French could fit more powerful H-S engines but I don't know how soon that tops out. The H-S Y-51 maybe as far as that goes?

do we have the performance for a fully combat capable VG.33 or is it a prototype?
Several photos seem to be missing radio antennas for instance?

Already the -45 is a major step-up vs. the -31 engine, talk 20% more power above 4 km.
Seems like there was not enough of VG.33s produced in order that we can have the performance figures for the series-produced examples?