Why was the Bf 110 obsolete as a night fighter

Okay, it has been pointed out that the percentages are not for total military production but for "percentage distributions of production of weapons (and ammunition).

So throughout the period 1939-45 from14%-30% of all weapons distributed went to anti-aircraft. That's for Army,Air Force,Navy,AA. Was there any other major recipient of military production?

You are splitting hairs and playing with semantics. I originally posted from notes as I'm not in the habit of reading through an entire volume of the "Us Bus" (USSBS) before I post (and my page reference was wrong,it should be 284).

The fact remains that,as I originally said,around a quarter of all the weapons produced went to the anti aircraft arm throughout the war. If you still think that that is an insignificant effort then you are free to do so.
I believe that is an extremely significant amount of production capacity which might have been utilised for other purposes had the Anglo/American aerial onslaught not have been undertaken.

I haven't checked your link but just to keep everyone happy my "paper" version,for which I have fought my way past our Christmas tree, gives the source of the figures as the "Indexziffern der Deutschen Rustungsendfertigung". I'll allow you guys to work out what that is.

I'm still waiting for properly sourced alternative figures from someone else. .

Steve

I think we have to agree to disagree with tante on this matter. people can view the evidence presented and draw their own conclusions. I think its time we moved on. Agreed?

I know,I just never thought of the compilers of Germany's own statistics for armament production as being "apologists" for Bomber Command
Steve

I do wonder however what did the the Flak arm do with those 2-300 U-boots. You know, with supposedly up to 25% of all armament going to the Flak arm and stuff during the war..

Surely someone misunderstood something here.. I suppose the statistic was made on a basis of piece count, not cost count, which might explain why, in 1944 for example, 25% of the 'weapons' went to 'antiaircraft' but only 7 to 10 % went to the 'air force' - an obvious nonsense if the counting would be cost based, to me it seems its piece-based, and the 42 000 pieces of relatively cheap 2cm Flak plus ca. 9000 3.7 cm autocannons that went to the air force can screw those statistics badly (and btw practically none of those were/could be used against strategic bombing).

The Flak arm was also responsible for providing air defense for 'army' troops, as the AA defense was organised under the Luftwaffe and not the Heer. In short in that 25%, whatever it means, also contains many thousends of AA guns on the Eastern Front, for example, not just home defence.

Tante Ju said:

You know, with supposedly up to 25% of all armament going to the Flak arm and stuff during the war..

In short in that 25%, whatever it means, also contains many thousends of AA guns on the Eastern Front, for example, not just home defence.

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It's not supposedly. The statistics are from the German government of the time. You can't run an economy,let alone a war time economy,without good statistics.

As for the second part, those weapons are included. It covers all anti aircraft weapons.It's a point made by Westermann in his analysis too.

Steve

the figures are what they are. They are based on dollar expenditures, not consumption of materials, or units produced.

as far as providing air defence for the army, well certainly they did, but according to Mitcham (Hitlers Legions), 80% (more or less) of the flak guns remained within Germany and Western Europe, even in 1941 (after june). at that stage there were less than 30 divs in france), all of them seriously under strength. It is highly unlikely that these divs remaining in the west had any more need for air defence than their compatriots in the east, and the units in the east were existing with just 20% of available AA. In June 1941 there was just one enemy attacking Germany, and doing a really terrible job of it...supposedly. Good enough to require 805 of available flak to be ranged against it.....

stona said:

It's not supposedly. The statistics are from the German government of the time. You can't run an economy,let alone a war time economy,without good statistics.

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Yes statisics are important are useless to prove your point if one does not understand what they signify. Obviously these statistics do not signify directly the industrial cost. These costs can be measured in cost of these weapons, since they include material, labour, development profit etc. costs. And as shown above, the procurement cost of the two main (but not only) types of Luftwaffe bombers far exceeded by a magnitude the cost of procurement of all AA guns (including those for the use by the Army). From that point onwards, it is illogical to argue that the costs of anti aircraft defenses, and especially, the cost of those weapons systems employed in defense against the Anglo-Saxon bombing campaign in terms of the industrial (war) effort spent on them would exceed or even come close those of other armed branches. It clearly points out that these percentages have been made under some other criteria - for example, piece count. Even if the producing and upkeep costs of a single Ju 88 bomber for example were about 6-8 times that of a single 8.8 cm flak gun, this would not show up in a statistics that would just show something along 'eight flak guns for the flak arm, one bomber for the air force. It would be a simply piece count, and would not show at all that (in this example) the same effort was spent to produce these weapons. You seem to ignore this detail.

parsifal said:

the figures are what they are. They are based on dollar expenditures, not consumption of materials, or units produced.

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Another assumption. Please provide source where it says the tables show 'dollar expenditures'. I did not know the 3rd Reich used dollars for currency... while you are at it, please also provide source for the previous claim that a Tiger II cost 800k RM please, as opposed to the known selling price of ~ 320k RM.

These figures have been accepted and analysed by many post war historians. The Germans (Groehler,Mueller,Koch et alter) followed by various anglo/american authors (Hooton,Webster,Frankland,Westermann et alter). They invariably reach a different conclusion to yours.

You keep demanding references and sources from people but I notice a distinct absence of any valid contribution or alternatives from you. It is easy to sit on the sidelines and keep saying no,but that is not a debate.

With that I will now bow out.

Cheers and merry Christmas!

Steve

And apart from vague and questionable references and the random listing of various authority names, and the blank statement that they all support you, I did not receive any valid arguement from your part. In my view, you found a piece of statistic that you do not understand and apparently do not wish to understand and happily wave it around. I agree that this discussion has run its course and there is no point in pursuing it any further.

Instead, and I agree that we have better things to do now that the holidays have kicked in.

So I wish you a merry Christmas and a really happy new year!

The statistic data for me is clearly on pieces. if was in expenditure, obviously in RM, was surely indicated and indicated if the RM were current or the base year.

westermans analysis is not baseed on the number of guns, though he does have separate figures for that. its based on exepnditures, and is measured in RM. references to dollars are references to the general expenditure of funds.

Yes statisics are important are useless to prove your point if one does not understand what they signify. Obviously these statistics do not signify directly the industrial cost. These costs can be measured in cost of these weapons, since they include material, labour, development profit etc. costs.

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Westermans analysis is measured in RM and dollars and as a percentage of the total German military expenditures on weapons, munitions and delivery systems ("the hardware").

And as shown above, the procurement cost of the two main (but not only) types of Luftwaffe bombers far exceeded by a magnitude the cost of procurement of all AA guns (including those for the use by the Army).

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You havent "shown anything. Youve made some claims, unsupported and proceeded to misquote Westerman left right and centre. apart from that we have nothing of substance from you.....in particular verifiable sources to back up your various claims.

From that point onwards, it is illogical to argue that the costs of anti aircraft defenses, and especially, the cost of those weapons systems employed in defense against the Anglo-Saxon bombing campaign in terms of the industrial (war) effort spent on them would exceed or even come close those of other armed branches.

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Read Westerman. He says that for the first quarter of 1943, the Germans spent a total of RM 132 million on Hardware and munitions, RM 64m on the army, RM 20m on the navy, RM 9m on airborne air defences, and the rest on the flak arm and its munitions. Thats a whopping RM 39 million by my count. (Westerman Page 190)

It clearly points out that these percentages have been made under some other criteria - for example, piece count.

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Westerman elswhere in his anaysis looks at piece counts, but he also spends a lot of time looking and the dollar costs. So no, your unsubstantiated claims are not correct.

Even if the producing and upkeep costs of a single Ju 88 bomber for example were about 6-8 times that of a single 8.8 cm flak gun, this would not show up in a statistics that would just show something along 'eight flak guns for the flak arm, one bomber for the air force.

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Maintenance costs are a different issue, and not the focus of westermans account. However given that the Germans were maintining manpower levels of around 11million men to Britains 3 million, and that the Luftwaffe maintains manpower levels greater than the RAFs, one can at least expect the maintenance costs for the LW to be comparable to those of the RAF.

Westermans analysis is simply about the dollar costs of the flak arm....the hardware and the munitions. He measures it RM, and converts it also into dollars (not sure how he does that), anbd measure that as a percentage of total German miltary expenditures on new equipment and munitions costs.

It would be a simply piece count, and would not show at all that (in this example) the same effort was spent to produce these weapons. You seem to ignore this detail.

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Read Westerman. He does include piece counts elswhere in hias account, but the bits of his book we are referring to are abourt dollar expenditures. He is very clear about that.

Another assumption.

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No, actually a fact. Figures are what they are. If you cant agree that figures are figures, then what do you describe them as?

Please provide source where it says the tables show 'dollar expenditures'.

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Westermans book is ull of them. For just one quarter (he does the same for many of them) at page 190 he provides a detailed brakdown, measured in RM and then also converted to dollars.

I did not know the 3rd Reich used dollars for currency...

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Which is why Westermans analysis is in both dollars and RM. Its legitamate for me to refer to the dollar value of the expenditure, because thats how he expresses it. Read Westerman. This is not about the Tu*rd Reich, or Germany, or you or me. Its about Westermans account, and if you can produce alternative material then that material as well. I am genuinely intered and listening to what alternative matrerial you have on the total cost of air defence for Germany, as a percentage of their total military procurement budgets. I hear you when you say that procurement and munitions are only a part of the total cost, and that is worth having a second look at, but I think it a stretch to argue that a force soaking up such a huge percentage of german procurement spending, and occupying nearly 1 million personnel, is somehow going to have lower maintenance costs .

while you are at it, please also provide source for the previous claim that a Tiger II cost 800k RM please, as opposed to the known selling price of ~ 320k RM.

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Im not going to give you a source, though I have one, becaause it is off topic. RM 320K is the unit cost, biut it does not inlcude the development cost. If you include that, and rememeber there were only 498 produced, the real cost is closer to the figure I have given you.

parsifal said:

westermans analysis is not baseed on the number of guns, though he does have separate figures for that. its based on exepnditures, and is measured in RM. references to dollars are references to the general expenditure of funds.

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Correct.



Steve

stona said:

Correct.



Steve

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I wonder why the 'crop'.

Note that the actual table has no such 'source' listed. It seems it has been doctored and cropped from another table in a misleading manner...

In the last quarter of of 1939, even without any meaningful RAF bomber activity over Germany, 12% of the munition 'distributon' went to the Flak anyway. In the first quarter of 1943, despite a major expansion programme of the Flak (heavy flak units increased overall by 80%, see the much quoted Westernmann - it is no wonder why parsifal picked this figure ) the army received it's peak share from munitions through the whole war, more then ever before, 67%.



Volume 3 - The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy - Page 295 - War Archives Management System

Also note the next table in USSB. It was claimed that the monthly consumption of Flak shells were supposedly 3.5 million rounds / month. This table

http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/action/document/page/149/295/0

Shows that this is completely unfounded (just like some previous stunts with statistics, see Tiger II etc.), the actual avarage consumption of the most common 8,8 cm shells was about 800 000 rounds per month during 1941, 1942 and 1943, raising to about 1.6 million in 1944. There was also a massive surplus of AAA shell production, which meant that the stocks almost tripled during the war, from about 5.7 million rounds in 1 January 1940 to 13 million rounds in 1944. Even in 1945, when things went rapidly downhill, there was a reserve stock of 8 million.

Good grief, it's how the "Indexziffern" were compiled.

Value series at constant prices from which were compiled the indices of finished munitions output (Indexziffern der Deutschen Rustungsendfertigung).

The "indexziffern" were the source for the table above,and many others in the USSBS.

I cropped it from a different part of the same volume but that's irrelevant (hence the crop). I didn't want to type the whole thing out but I have now.

J K Galbraith was an economist. They tend to work in relative units of currency.

Steve

My I kindly suggest the separate thread about the ongoing off-topic matter?

Does AA weapon total include the 20,000 or so Heer flak weapons primarily employed against ground targets? How about 20mm and 37mm weapons on the 241 Schnellboot which were primarily used against naval targets? Flak weapons mounted in WestWall and other fortifications used primarily against ground targets?

All nations used AA weapons for ground defense in an emergency. Germany was different as their flak was duel purpose from 1914 onward. If you count only dedicated AA weapons around major cities and industrial areas the numbers will be a fraction of total German flak.

Firstly, thankyou for finally posting something we can look at and talk about. Unfortunately I couldnt see your tables im afraid except for the one you attached, but it seems to me that we might be comparing apples to oranges. The table you did post, does it measure output in units, or as a percentage of the military budget? If its the former, then it is not entirely compatible to Westermanns figures, since he unequivocally is measuring by cost, not output.

In any event the figures you posted are very similar to some of the output data Westermann has presented elswhere in his work.However your interpretation of that data does appear a bit skewed, since flak guns as a percentage of output (if thats what the table is presenting), more than doubled from 1939 to 1942.

As far as ammunition expenditure is concenrned, Steve has already commented that thre was a remarkable continuity to ammunition expenditure, as a proprtion of overall expenditures. Of course the fact that germany was having to deal with multiple threats might explain this.

The timing I see as completely unimportant. Germany was building up its flak from before the war, thats still an expense, 80% of flak remained either in the west, or within the Reich.....the Germans didnt do that just because they thought it might be cute. They obviouslyhad a threat they wanted to deal with.

I should point out that Westermann is not hostile to the LW or the flak arm. He in fact points out that until 1944 it enjoyed considerable success. Its just that flak as a deterrent was expensive....very expensive.

davebender said:

Does AA weapon total include the 20,000 or so Heer flak weapons primarily employed against ground targets? How about 20mm and 37mm weapons on the 241 Schnellboot which were primarily used against naval targets? Flak weapons mounted in WestWall and other fortifications used primarily against ground targets?

All nations used AA weapons for ground defense in an emergency. Germany was different as their flak was duel purpose from 1914 onward. If you count only dedicated AA weapons around major cities and industrial areas the numbers will be a fraction of total German flak.

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20000 ???? where do you get that figure from. Except for the flak directly attached to field formations and on ships all flak was controlled by the LW. On September 1 1939, the total German flak available (including army and navy) was 2628 heavy guns, 6700 light guns. a year later it had increased to 3095, and the numbers of Lights to 9800. In 1940, the Army consumed 58% of flak ammunition, mostly light AA shells, the the LWs 30%

In 1941, the total ammunitions expenditures (by quantity) was 989000 Heavy shels and 1.9 million light shells. Thats a toatal

1941 also saw the Army attempt to form independant flak forces, inpreparation for Barbarossa. They were strongly oppsed by the LW flak officers (whoi held great sway with Hitler). The Army did get some independant flak battlaions....about 6 in total, but these units were used mostly in the AT and Infantry support role

Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945