World War 2 Fighter Pilot Says P-47 Better Than P-51

[drgondog]

By the time the most of the fighter groups had converted to the P-51 the Luftwaffe had lost most of their best pilots and their planes were being flown by inexperienced pilots some of them just out of school. This could explain why the P-51 had a better kill/loss ratio than the P-47.

That logic doesn't work very well. The P-47 FG were fighting the same mix of LW pilots in Q1/Q2 1944 as the Mustang fighter pilots and were flying many more sorties per day. The basic comparisons remained the same but the P-51 flew longer, flew deeper and were a match or better than the FW 190/Bf 109 at all altitudes.

Additionally, beginning late summer 1943, the LW realized the existential threat the 8th AF posed to critical strategic targets and began transfer of experienced squadrons from East and Southern fronts into central/east/south Germany, through May 1944.

 

[drgondog]

All of which STILL leads me to wonder why the AF didn't use the Jug in Korea.
In the book "Goodbye, Mickey Mouse" one of Len Deighton's characters state that the AAF liked the Mustang because it was cheaper, or should I say less expensive, than the Jug.
¿Quién lo sabe con certeza?

On P-47N fighter group was in far east when Korea broke out. Japan had three P-51D equipped FGs in Japan, ROK were flying P-51Ds, SAAF and RAAF flew P-51Ds. Logistics overwhelmingly dictated Mustang but additionally the short and often un-prepared runways in S.Korea favored the P-51 over both the P-47N and P-51H.

Much has been said about the vulnerability of the P-51 in-line engine, but the F4U loss rate was only just 1/2% better per sortie and they had shorter missions in general. AAA fire by N.Korea was murderous, even compared to Germany during WWII.

 

[Juha3]

All of which STILL leads me to wonder why the AF didn't use the Jug in Korea.
In the book "Goodbye, Mickey Mouse" one of Len Deighton's characters state that the AAF liked the Mustang because it was cheaper, or should I say less expensive, than the Jug.
¿Quién lo sabe con certeza?

Probably because P/F-47 served with the active-duty USAAF/USAF until 1949, so the FEAF did not have them when the Korean War began. It still served with the Air National Guard until 1953 but logistics spoke strongly in favor of the P-51.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The USAF Far East fighter units were just finishing converting to F-80, meaning F-51 were present from the start with trained pilots, to set up the P-47 meant stocking the supply system, with the range to target requirements in the second half of 1950 F-51 were reissued.

USAF Statistical Digest, Total strength
31 December 1945, 4,378 P-47, 4,819 P-51, 421 F-6
30 June 1950, 850 F-47 on strength, 79 active, 897 F-51 on strength, 99 active, 38 RF-51 on strength, none active

Far East Groups as of end July 1950, fighters, F-80/F-51
8th 70/0
18th 74/0
49th 77/0 (Never issued with F-51 July 1950 to June 1951)
35th 55/42
51st 82/30

End August 1950
8th 33/37
18th 25/43
49th 95/0
35th 42/43
51st 84/0 (no further F-51 on strength)

The 45th Tactical Reconnaissance squadron with F-51 appeared in November 1950.

The 8th lost its F-51 in November 1950, the 35th in May 1951, the 18th still had F-51 end June 1951. The 49th had F-84 arrive in June 1951.

In July 1950 21 F-51 on inventory, all in combat units, 295 F-80, 140 in combat units, August 238/163 F-51, 309/120 F-80, in June 1951, 118/118 F-51, 294/254 F-80, 158/137 F-84, 98/59 F-86.

In August 1950 4,916 sorties, 12,851 F-51 combat hours to 3,693 sorties, 6,327 combat hours F-80, the F-80 were flying more sorties from October, more hours from December.

There is a report the Air National Guard units were F-47 in the east and F-51 in the west of the US.

The 4th, 68th and 3339th "All Weather" squadrons had 33 F-82 between them end July 1951, all still had some end June 1951, F-80 joined the 4th in January 1951 and the 339th in March. The 339th had F-94 joining in April 1951, then lost its F-80 in May.

4th Fighter Group with F-86 arrived in December 1950 as did the 27th with F-84.

As of 30 September 1950 the FEAF had 154 committed F-51 pilots plus 133 F-80 and 8 F-82, as of 30 June 1951 110 F-51, 259 F-80, 12 F-82, 111 F-84, 50 F-86.

 

[NVSMITH]

Probably because P/F-47 served with the active-duty USAAF/USAF until 1949, so the FEAF did not have them when the Korean War began. It still served with the Air National Guard until 1953 but logistics spoke strongly in favor of the P-51.

-BUT: The US was not planning on nor prepared for the war that broke out in Korea. From what I've read the problems faced by ground attack aircraft with liquid cooled engines was noted in WW1 and taken into account, primarily in Europe, in WW2.
-Considering all of what was sent from CONUS to Japan/Korea 1950-53, INCLUDING replacement Mustangs and repair parts for same, didn't anyone even consider sending the AAF's premier ground attack fighter-bomber? And, considering all of the USAR & NG units activated and deployed why not send ANG Jug units?
-Is there a record of Mustang pilots lost in action due to ground fire? Of course Jugs were lost to ground fire as well but if cooling system failure was ID'd as a cause of the loss, might one believe that an aircraft with an air cooled engine might have survived?
-I don't know the answers. I don't believe that the P (or F) 47 would have won the war but I wonder if it might have been a better plane for the job and perhaps spared the lives of some Mustang pilots.

 

[BobB]

-BUT: The US was not planning on nor prepared for the war that broke out in Korea. From what I've read the problems faced by ground attack aircraft with liquid cooled engines was noted in WW1 and taken into account, primarily in Europe, in WW2.
-Considering all of what was sent from CONUS to Japan/Korea 1950-53, INCLUDING replacement Mustangs and repair parts for same, didn't anyone even consider sending the AAF's premier ground attack fighter-bomber? And, considering all of the USAR & NG units activated and deployed why not send ANG Jug units?
-Is there a record of Mustang pilots lost in action due to ground fire? Of course Jugs were lost to ground fire as well but if cooling system failure was ID'd as a cause of the loss, might one believe that an aircraft with an air cooled engine might have survived?
-I don't know the answers. I don't believe that the P (or F) 47 would have won the war but I wonder if it might have been a better plane for the job and perhaps spared the lives of some Mustang pilots.

General Stratemeyer asked that F-47's be sent to Korea but the guys in Washington looking at the big picture said that it was more important to replace all the piston engined fighters with jets. It didn't make sense to set up logistics to support F-47's in Korea and then replace them with jets. It turned out that they didn't replace the F-51's with jets as quickly as they would have liked but their basic reasoning was sound.

 

[drgondog]

I've read the same thing elsewhere. The Mustang was arguably prettier, which also may have been a factor.

Cost of operations is always a factor, but efficiency air to air versus LW, including deep strafing missions beyond P-47 range was The factor.

 

[Shortround6]

I have read (could very well be wrong) that in the late 40s the Mustangs tended to be located in the Western US and the F-47s in the eastern US due to the location of the of the parent factories and logistics.
Any planes flying in the late 40s would be the later models (P-51Ds and P-51Hs) and the later model P/F-47s. Spare parts for earlier versions may no longer be in inventory, many of the earlier aircraft had already been sold as surplus.
USSAF was trying to switch to jets as fast as possible but in the late 40s they were having problems with some of the jet engines which lead to keeping some of the piston engine fighters staying in service longer than planned. Early J-35s in the F-84A/B were only good for 40 hours. Later ones got much, much better.

Sometimes what front line generals wanted was the most effective regardless of cost or supply problems. It was rear area generals that had to figure out logistics and cost. Getting them to agree sometimes lead to fighting that was just short of using bullets.

 

[NVSMITH]

Sometimes what front line generals wanted was the most effective regardless of cost or supply problems.
-A philosophy that worked so well in history. "I'd give 10,00 men to take that position!" sez GEN Hardcase. "Generous SOB, isn't he?" responds a regimental commander.

 

[Frog]

I have read (could very well be wrong) that in the late 40s the Mustangs tended to be located in the Western US and the F-47s in the eastern US due to the location of the of the parent factories and logistics.
Any planes flying in the late 40s would be the later models (P-51Ds and P-51Hs) and the later model P/F-47s. Spare parts for earlier versions may no longer be in inventory, many of the earlier aircraft had already been sold as surplus.
USSAF was trying to switch to jets as fast as possible but in the late 40s they were having problems with some of the jet engines which lead to keeping some of the piston engine fighters staying in service longer than planned. Early J-35s in the F-84A/B were only good for 40 hours. Later ones got much, much better.

Sometimes what front line generals wanted was the most effective regardless of cost or supply problems. It was rear area generals that had to figure out logistics and cost. Getting them to agree sometimes lead to fighting that was just short of using bullets.

The French Armée de l'Air managed to maintain its P-47 for ground attack in Algeria up to 1960.
It must be said that it never receiced any Mustang in its fighter P-51 form but only reconnaissance F-6 variants.

 

[swampyankee]

Cost of operations is always a factor, but efficiency air to air versus LW, including deep strafing missions beyond P-47 range was The factor.

During WWII, yes, but post war, with military budgets and head counts dropping into the realm of the sustainable, costs became important. The P-47 was expensive to purchase, but post-war this wasn't an issue, as most of the aircraft were bought during the war, and it was expensive to keep, and this was something that had to be paid every year.

Even if the P-47 was better, an answer to a question which is, in and of itself, ill-posed (what criteria are being used for "better?" How are they weighted?), would it be enough better to justify the greater cost?

 

[NVSMITH]

During WWII, yes, but post war, with military budgets and head counts dropping into the realm of the sustainable, costs became important. The P-47 was expensive to purchase, but post-war this wasn't an issue, as most of the aircraft were bought during the war, and it was expensive to keep, and this was something that had to be paid every year.

Even if the P-47 was better, an answer to a question which is, in and of itself, ill-posed (what criteria are being used for "better?" How are they weighted?), would it be enough better to justify the greater cost?

Once again, with the realization that I am flagellating a deceased & decaying equine, where does combat efficiency fall into your cost/effectiveness equation?
What of the cost of US/UN/S. Korean lives lost, aircrew and on the ground?
Studying the history of tactical airpower during the nascent USAF years, the treatment of "Pete" Quesada, the loss of the Tactical Air Command in 1948 and GEN Vandenberg's obsession with developing SAC...
"Not a pound for air to ground!"

 

[swampyankee]

Once again, with the realization that I am flagellating a deceased & decaying equine, where does combat efficiency fall into your cost/effectiveness equation?
What of the cost of US/UN/S. Korean lives lost, aircrew and on the ground?
Studying the history of tactical airpower during the nascent USAF years, the treatment of "Pete" Quesada, the loss of the Tactical Air Command in 1948 and GEN Vandenberg's obsession with developing SAC...
"Not a pound for air to ground!"

How does one measure it and quantify it? If you can't, it cannot be talked about in a sensible manner. This is a chronic issue during discussions of military hardware, frequently allied with a blanket statement that cost doesn't matter. If that were actually the case, the F-14 would still be in service.

As for "not a pound for air to ground?" A cute, albeit very silly statement. Name one successful combat aircraft of the past 90 years which did not have an air-ground use.

In any case, this started as a discussion about one pilot's anecdote about his preference for the P-47 over the Mustang. As a pilot who operated both aircraft in combat, he's certainly entitled to his opinion, which does not seem to have been held by the majority of pilots or their commanders. Post-war, when the metaphorical handwriting was on the wall for piston engined fighters, the USAAF, while morphing into the USAF, preferred to keep the Mustang. At the time, the USAF was also dealing with decreasing budgets and associated reductions in force levels, and the simple facts that a) the Mustang was generally considered superior to the P-47 and b) it was cheaper to operate. Whether the P-47 would have been kept had the consensus been it was better than the Mustang by some quantifiable amount and cost more to operate would be a fun question to argue, without possibility of an answer. I don't believe the Thunderbolt was better than the Mustang except in some very limited areas, such as being safer to ditch, and possibly at extreme altitudes.

In any case, it didn't matter which one was better 80 years ago, only that they were both good enough to deal with Messerschmidts and Focke-Wulfs.

 

[Shortround6]

The post war Air Force (1945-1950) was rather chaotic.
Before the war ended they had 5000 Jet P-80s on order. This was cut to 2,000 by the end of 1945. Final totals ???
Republic got a contract for three XP-84's on Nov 11th 1944. It didn't fly until 28th feb 1946 but by that time they contracts for another 100 airframes. Turns out it wasn't a useable fighter plane until 1949. In any given year they had to balance budgets against existing threats (went up a lot in 1948 and later), available money and when they planned/hoped for the new jets to deliver on their promise.
And in the age old (or at least the last 200 years) the battles between the Army, the Navy and then the Air Force and in the Air force the Batte between strategic air and tactical air/defense.

B-36 first flew in 1946, this photo dates from June 1948.
Also shows the US problem. How do you make a single engine or twin engine fighter that can escort these things?
But the US didn't need tactical air when they could drop A-bombs anywhere in the world (it took a number of years for problems of radiation to sink in).

The US in Korea was using what they had which was a far cry from what they wanted which was also quite far from what had planned.