Worst aircraft of WW2?

[rhit81]

I have read the whole thread and found it very informative. I am somewhat surprised that more French aircraft have been nominated. I would be inclined to think that the Moraine-Saulnier 406 would have to be the worst aircraft, or at least the most disappointing aircraft, of the war.

It was a design contemporary of the P-36, the Me-109, the F2A Buffalo and Hurricane yet was nowhere near as effective as any of these. It was slaughtered in the Battle of France and disappeared thereafter. The M.S-406 did not even have the excuse of being a "pre-war design" available as it was slaughtered by another pre-war design (admittedly a good one in the ME-109) but a pre-war design nonetheless. No air arm, Allied or Axis, knew anything other than defeat while flying the MS-406. Its poor performance was one of the main reasons the French lost in 1940.

 

[Trautloft]

i have to disagree with you mentioning the MS-406.It claimed a considerable number of german ac, around 200,more then the Hawks or Dewoitines.
They been inferior to the the Bf-109 at that time,the real slaughter happened as Bulgaria tried to fight with them Lightnings and Mustangs in 44'

 

[Vitamin J]

I'd have to say the Primary British Fighter that was used in Japan along with the P-40 Tomahawk,The Brewster Buffalo. They were useless agaist the Japanese. cause it was just like the Japanese planes, no armor.... 5 shots with .30 Calibur and PLOP! Fallin like a lead brick....I pray I don't get reincarnated in the past as a British pilot in Japan. I would never man one of those flying piece of sh**s
I've seen pictures of P-40's still flying with 70-80 bullet holes.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

If you think the P-40 was the worst aircraft you need to ask the Flying Tigers who racked up some impressive kills against the Japanese.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I've seen pictures of P-40's still flying with 70-80 bullet holes.

That says it right there - had it been a Zero with that damage it would of been in 70 or 80 pieces.

I suggest some remedial aviation history - start off with some history channel re-runs and work your way up from there...

 

[ToughOmbre]

Any aircraft built by Brewster. If I'm not mistaken the license-built Brewster Corsairs (thank God not many came off the assembly line) were of poor quality and were never flown in combat.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Any aircraft built by Brewster. If I'm not mistaken the license-built Brewster Corsairs (thank God not many came off the assembly line) were of poor quality and were never flown in combat.

735 Corsairs were built by Brewster and there is NO evidence that I could find to show that these aircraft DIDN'T see combat.

Brewster's quality varied between the late 30s and its ultimate demise in 1946. The company was severely mis-managed, had labor problems and even had some of its corporate officers sued by the Federal Government. The US Navy actually seized the company in 1943...

 

[ToughOmbre]

735 Corsairs were built by Brewster and there is NO evidence that I could find to show that these aircraft DIDN'T see combat.

Stating that they were never flown in combat was a slight exaggeration on my part. Some probably did. My feeling is that most didn't. My source is a Michael O'Leary article in the May 2002 issue of Air Classics, Bent Wing Warrior. O'Leary stated...

"Goodyear proved to be a model of efficiency, delivering Corsairs to combat units at a prodigious rate but Brewster production was disastrous and was terminated after 735 F3As. Pilots considered the F3A to be structurally deficient and to be avoided at all costs. Many of the Brewster-built machines were assigned to training units or shipped to the Royal Navy under Lend-Lease."

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Stating that they were never flown in combat was a slight exaggeration on my part. Some probably did. My feeling is that most didn't. My source is a Michael O'Leary article in the May 2002 issue of Air Classics, Bent Wing Warrior. O'Leary stated...

"Goodyear proved to be a model of efficiency, delivering Corsairs to combat units at a prodigious rate but Brewster production was disastrous and was terminated after 735 F3As. Pilots considered the F3A to be structurally deficient and to be avoided at all costs. Many of the Brewster-built machines were assigned to training units or shipped to the Royal Navy under Lend-Lease."

I've seen the article and know of O'Leary. Take what he writes with a grain of salt. A pilot flying a Brewster, Vought or Goodyear built Corsair wouldn't be able to tell them apart and I cannot see how any WW2 pilot could determine that his aircraft was structurally deficient unless he had strong aircraft maintenance background and really knew what he was looking at (and I could tell you the vast majority didn't).

If the aircraft was structurally deficient, they (Navy and Marine Pilots) wouldn't be allowed to fly them. Now that's not to say that Brewster didn't build some real crap, but eventually those deficiencies had to be corrected for the aircraft to be used operationally at any squadron level....

Knowing what went on at Brewster I doubt the RN would of accepted deficient aircraft, even if they were part of lend lease...

 

[ToughOmbre]

I've seen the article and know of O'Leary. Take what he writes with a grain of salt. A pilot flying a Brewster, Vought or Goodyear built Corsair wouldn't be able to tell them apart and I cannot see how any WW2 pilot could determine that his aircraft was structurally deficient unless he had strong aircraft maintenance background and really knew what he was looking at (and I could tell you the vast majority didn't).

If the aircraft was structurally deficient, they (Navy and Marine Pilots) wouldn't be allowed to fly them. Now that's not to say that Brewster didn't build some real crap, but eventually those deficiencies had to be corrected for the aircraft to be used operationally at any squadron level....

Knowing what went on at Brewster I doubt the RN would of accepted deficient aircraft, even if they were part of lend lease...

Your points are well taken. I'll leave it that Brewster built junk, compared to the other manufacturers.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Your points are well taken. I'll leave it that Brewster built junk, compared to the other manufacturers.

Agree...

BTW I had an uncle who worked for them, he left when labor disputes started then went in the Army.

 

[ToughOmbre]

Agree...

BTW I had an uncle who worked for them, he left when labor disputes started then went in the Army.

My dad worked for Curtiss-Wright. After three years in the Navy ('37-'40), he figured he was working on the assembly line for the duration. Got drafted in 1942, got to visit France in 1944...2nd wave Utah Beach.

 

[comiso90]

I've seen pictures of P-40's still flying with 70-80 bullet holes.

How many Zeros have you seen with 70 or 80 holes?

The P-40s had weaknesses thats why P-40 tactics centered and slashing attacks. As long as the didn't get into a turning fight, they stood a good chance against the Japanese.

 

[Crumpp]

I'll leave it that Brewster built junk, compared to the other manufacturers.

I think all contractors that sub-contracted had that one company which built the lowest quality product.

For Focke Wulf it seems that Focke Wulf Soren was noted as the top quality manufacturer and was charged with building the "example" aircraft which toured the sub-contractor assembly points. This gave the sub-contractor the quality control standard.

That standard was met with varying degrees of success by sub-contractors. NDW (Dornier) was the quite frankly the worst sub-contractor and was noted for poor quality control. Problems with excessive fuel consumption, excessive vibration of the engine, and airframes not able to meet minimum performance standards are some of the investigations Focke Wulf launched into NDW. IMHO this most likely had to do with NDW's practice of further subcontracting out to manufacturers located in Neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland.

Supermarine also had their problems with subcontractors and the RAF notes "rouge" airframes. This is just a by product of producing a complex piece of mass manufactured machinery.

Just like any aircraft manufacturer, the Contractor has to deliver products which meet the contracted requirements. It is standard for aircraft to be inspected upon delivery and they must meet certain performance minimums before and during ferry to the accepting service. NDW had the highest number of rejected airframe from all the subcontractors. Our Focke Wulf is an NDW airframe, btw! AFAIK, NDW FW-190's never developed a "bad reputation" with the Luftwaffe fighter force. They certainly did develop one with Focke Wulf, GmbH however.

This brings up another point on production figures. It is highly unlikely all airframes produced will see service. From any given monthly production figure, on average 50% will be rejected outright. These airframes just do not meet quality control standards and are not accepted for delivery. That is one reason initial production figures are so much lower than preceding months. That does not mean they are scrapped, just that they require additional work or refinement to bring them up to acceptance standards. The airframes then go on to be accepted and enter the accounting policies of the company. From that pool of accepted aircraft many will be tied up in maintenance stock by the gaining service. This can be as high as 75% of the airframes accepted but can vary and tends to be lower with entire assembled airframes.

This can be easily seen in the T3 production figures for the BMW801TS engine. Over 4,000 engines were delivered to the Luftwaffe from Feb. 1944 until Dec. 1944. However 75% of these engines were maintenance stock. Some 900 FW-190A9's were produced by Focke Wulf and sub-contractors and a handful of engine upgrades of older airframes to FW-190A9 standards.

So out of 735 Brewster Corsair accepted airframes with a 75% maintenance stock, we are looking at about 180 airframes in the force. Considering the sheer size of the just the USN and not counting exports, the chances of encountering a wealth of experience on "Brewster Corsairs" alone is pretty low just from the end user pool.

Just to break things down so there is not confusion on my point.

Focke Wulf and sub-contractors delivered ~340 FW190A9 airframes to the Luftwaffe by Sep. 1944. The total SE engine fighter strength of the LW is reported to be ~1810 airframes of all types in Sep 1944. Of these about 1/3 are FW-190A fighters or ~ 600 aircraft. Of the 340 FW-190A9's about 85 will be flying in the force during Sep 1944 at any given time or 14% of the total FW190A's. The rest are either down for maintenance or awaiting issue as a replacement airframe. With the engine exchange program began in July 1944 the percentage is probably a tad bit higher but our SWAG is close.

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, Jagdverbände

Just some food for thought.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Interesting points Crump, but I'd like to know where you substantiate your rejection rates. Brewster did deliver 735 airframes, signed sealed delivered. Any company operating at a 50% rejection rate won't be in business long and well before that the production management would of been history, unless this was the case in Germany. I worked for Lockheed for a number of years and I was told during WW2, the rejection rate was never above 5%.

 

[Crumpp]

It's not a Germany, United States, United Kingdom, or any nationality issue. It is an industrial issue and a manufacturing reality when ever you develop a complex manufacturing system for a given product from the ground up.

Look at "Willow Run", a plant which is held up as a manufacturing miracle of WWII! I don't think an argument can be made that Henry Ford did not have considerable experience in assembly line manufacturering.

By December a total of 107 bombers had been offered to the Army Air Corps, but only 56 were acceptable. Part of the problem was that, as in the auto industry, the plant was using hard steel dies instead of the softer dies more conducive to the multiple changes demanded by the aircraft industry. In the first year alone there were 575 changes required.

Willow Run and the Arsenal of Democracy

It is a fact of business. Generally speaking the more experience your assembly line work force gains and the longer you manufacture a given product, the easier and more efficient that production becomes.

It is only natural that parent companies experience fewer problems with their own design than sub-contractor making someone else's design.

Aircraft are extremely demanding in their maintenance tolerances as you should know having worked for Lockheed. I have no doubt that only 5% of the airframes manufactured by Lockheed during the war were rejected by the services. However I imagine that is percentage of airframes which could not be brought up to acceptance levels and required scrapping and complete remanufacture.

The rejection rates I refer too are the normal deliveries. The vast majority of those airframes rejected for initial acceptance only require some reworking in order to meet acceptance standards.

For example let's say our hypothetical service inspector finds an aircraft that does not pass its magneto rpm check. This is a very common on a hot summer day in an aircooled radial engine. Oil pools on the plugs and they foul! He might lean it to see if they clear but if that does not do the trick, the airframe is rejected. The company does not scrap that airframe; they figure out if there is a problem with the magneto, plugs, or ignition harness and fix it. The next inspection it passes and is accepted for service.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[Crumpp]

Brewster did deliver 735 airframes, signed sealed delivered.

I don't understand where you are percieving there is any claim that Brewster did not deliver 735 airframes to the USN in my post.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't understand where you are percieving there is any claim that Brewster did not deliver 735 airframes to the USN in my post.

All the best,

Crumpp

From this statement...

So out of 735 Brewster Corsair accepted airframes with a 75% maintenance stock, we are looking at about 180 airframes in the force.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

It's not a Germany, United States, United Kingdom, or any nationality issue. It is an industrial issue and a manufacturing reality when ever you develop a complex manufacturing system for a given product from the ground up.

Look at "Willow Run", a plant which is held up as a manufacturing miracle of WWII! I don't think an argument can be made that Henry Ford did not have considerable experience in assembly line manufacturering.



Willow Run and the Arsenal of Democracy

It is a fact of business. Generally speaking the more experience your assembly line work force gains and the longer you manufacture a given product, the easier and more efficient that production becomes.

It is only natural that parent companies experience fewer problems with their own design than sub-contractor making someone else's design.

Aircraft are extremely demanding in their maintenance tolerances as you should know having worked for Lockheed. I have no doubt that only 5% of the airframes manufactured by Lockheed during the war were rejected by the services. However I imagine that is percentage of airframes which could not be brought up to acceptance levels and required scrapping and complete remanufacture.

The rejection rates I refer too are the normal deliveries. The vast majority of those airframes rejected for initial acceptance only require some reworking in order to meet acceptance standards.

For example let's say our hypothetical service inspector finds an aircraft that does not pass its magneto rpm check. This is a very common on a hot summer day in an aircooled radial engine. Oil pools on the plugs and they foul! He might lean it to see if they clear but if that does not do the trick, the airframe is rejected. The company does not scrap that airframe; they figure out if there is a problem with the magneto, plugs, or ignition harness and fix it. The next inspection it passes and is accepted for service.

All the best,

Crumpp

I think we're confusing rejection rate with scrap rate. When you say that an aircraft isn't accepted by the customer, it doesn't mean that there isn't rework performed to make the unit acceptable, I think you might of pointed that out in this post. Each airframe delivered is going to have some type of "corrected rejection" against it, in the aircraft production world this process is known as a "Material Review Board" or MRB. The goal is to limit MRB actions during manufacturing and perhaps that's where you're getting that 75% rejection rate. During WW2 some of the material was furnished by the government (as the case today) to build aircraft and there was actually a scrap rate built into that. If the manufacturer uses up his "scrap allowance" he's paying big penalties to the government, so this is something to be avoided at all costs.

Now as far as parent companies experiencing fewer problems than their sub-contractors - not always the case. There were many subs during WW2 that did well in their niche. McDonnell aircraft was great at making major airframe sub assemblies and eventually came into their own. Rohr Industries made engine QECs and the remnants of that company are still in the same business today - just two examples I could think of.

All in all it is quite rare to find an airframe so "butchered" that the whole thing is rejected and scrapped during manufacturing. Even during the high pace war years a company will monitor the progress of each airframe being assembled and when one is coming down the line there are Quality Assurance folks that will jump all over it to find out why things are going so bad and what's going to be done to fix the problem (My old job). You're talking thousands of dollars even back in the 1940s, and even though there was a war going on, aircraft manufacturers were still there to make money and the thought of scrapping an incomplete airframe for quality deficiencies was incomprehensible.

 

[Crumpp]

Hi FlyboyJ,

So out of 735 Brewster Corsair accepted airframes with a 75% maintenance stock, we are looking at about 180 airframes in the force.

Maintenance stocks are accepted airframes and owned by the gaining service. They are just not issued to operational units in anticipation of the operational unit experiencing a 100% loss to an existing aircraft.

Now as far as parent companies experiencing fewer problems than their sub-contractors - not always the case.

Well there are very few absolutes in life much less business.

However, Dornier is still in business today. In fact many of the companies still exist today. The company that designed the Kommandogerät assisted us in our restoration of a working unit for our aircraft.

Willkommen bei Lindauer DORNIER GmbH

Remember we are discussing in general terms the ability of a sub-contractor to make a specific complex manufacturing product designed by the parent company with more experience manufacturing it. Of course we are ruling out mismanagement as a factor as well.

All in all it is quite rare to find an airframe so "butchered" that the whole thing is rejected and scrapped during manufacturing.

I completely agree. Given the scope and rapid expansion of Lockheed's manufacturing effort during WWII, 5% is an excellent rate. The company has good reason to be proud.

All the best,

Crumpp