Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two

[RCAFson]

Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic. The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.

The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired.

An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks.

Why are you continuing to compare the Swordfish with the TBD and TBF and ignoring the Albacore? The Albacore was the RN's frontline torpedo bomber in mid 1942, although the Swordfish had not been fully phased out of CV service it was certainly supposed to have been. In April 1942, Somerville with 2 RN CVs, attempted a night Albacore strike against 5 IJN CVs, in the Indian Ocean, while at Midway it was a case of 3 USN CVs versus 4 IJN CVs. The strike was thwarted by IJN CAP shooting down an ASV Albacore, just at sunset, otherwise the Albacore would have maintained contact and the strike would have gone ahead. With another CV Somerville could have had more scouts out and had a high probability of launching a sucessful night torpedo strike.

I'm not sure that the TBF was considered easy to operate from CVs:

The TBF plane, because of its size and weight, is at present a serious potential liability on board aircraft carriers. Too large a number can reduce flight and hangar deck flexibility and slow up flight deck operations at crucial times. A TBF crash on deck can be handled only after long delay and this might well be fatal under certain conditions. It is recommended that the total number of TBF planes in a carrier of the ENTERPRISE type be limited to 12, resultant space being used for fighters and scout bombers, and that crane tractors capable of hoisting a TBF be provided immediately for all carriers operating this type of plane. The latter recommendation is of urgent importance.
Action Report: 24 August 1942

And this USN report recommends night torpedo attack training:

The limitations in the use of torpedo planes, which have repeatedly been set forth in reports of previous actions, were again amply demonstrated. Although the attack of the enemy torpedo squadron (probably 18 planes) against the ENTERPRISE was executed with obvious skill and great determination, only about nine planes reached a proper release point, and no hits were made. The harassing effect on the Japanese pilots of the extremely heavy and accurate fire of the combined task force and the maneuvers of the ship in combing the wakes of the torpedoes launched were the prime factors in nullifying the attack. The results of the attacks of our own torpedo planes, while not nil, were disappointing. It has been proven time and again that the probability of success of a torpedo plane attack in good visibility against a formation properly defended by fighters and anti-aircraft fire is small and out of all proportion to the losses in planes and men. The conclusion is obvious - that in the present state of the art, torpedo plane operations should if practicable be limited to attacks delivered under conditions of low visibility or in mopping up operations after the defensive power of the enemy formation has been reduced. Thus limited, the torpedo plane is not as valuable, plane for plane, in day operations as is the dive bomber. Accordingly, it is recommended that for the present, the air groups of our large carriers include not more than twelve torpedo planes. Only when torpedo squadron personnel are fully trained and planes are equipped for all aspects of night operations will torpedo planes reach their full effectiveness. We should not abandon them for carrier use; after all, they were the decisive factor in the HORNET attack.
Action Report: 26 October 1942

We can also see how using a shallow dive prior to torpedo release, as per IJN and USN training was extremely hazardous, hence the RN decision to use a dive bomb approach prior to torpedo release for daylight attacks, which was only possible because RN torpedo bombers were stressed for dive bombing as well.

 

[RCAFson]

Albacore versus TBD speeds:

These charts imply a 164 knot speed for the TBD, with torpedo, at SL, and 169 knots clean at SL:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...98-sbd-discussed-flight-data-tbd-1-charts.pdf
yet we know that by 1942, TBD speeds at SL with a torpedo were about 130 knots, and thus is seems likely that clean speed at SL was probably in the range of 135 knots. Maximum speed of an Albacore/Taurus II and 4 underwing deoth cahrges was 140 knots (160 mph) at 4800ft and 150 knots (172) mph clean at the same altitude. Max speed at SL was bout 10 knots less, IIRC.

 

[Shortround6]

Where did the 35knots of speed go?

Old engines in need of overhaul?
Out of true airframes?
Dirty or poor finish on aircraft?
Charts based on 15 degree C day and tropical conditions sucked power and lift?

130kts was close to 60% power cruising speed?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

RN torpedo bombers were stressed for dive bombing as well.

The Swordfish WAS NOT specifically "stressed" for dive bombing. An Air Ministry engineer may have determined that the Swordfish could do dive bombing if needed. Air Ministry specification, S.15/33 defined the need for a spotter-recon aircraft, the torpedo role was added at a later date. When the prototype first flew in 1934 the pre-WW2 dive bombing concept (or fad) really didn't start to fancy military planners, so tell us, where in the Pilot's Notes or any other data does it specify the Swordfish was "stressed" for dive bombing?

I think you're exaggerating on how much of a dive the Swordfish entered when using this tactic, especially when carrying a torpedo.

"Swordfish torpedo doctrine called for an approach at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) followed by a dive to torpedo release altitude of 18 ft (5.5 m)." (Emmott, Norman W. "Airborne Torpedoes"). It was mentioned earlier that the aircraft would barely reach 200 mph in a dive and had a Vne of just over 200 mph, and that would be in a clean configuration. Performing this with a torpedo would have to be done with limitations on the airframe (the airframe is limited to low G maneuvers) and engine as there is a 2350 rpm limitation (from the pilot's notes). So even though there is evidence to support your claim about "dive bombing" I doubt the Swordfish carried it out in the tradition of say an SBD or Val.

 

[RCAFson]

Where did the 35knots of speed go?

Old engines in need of overhaul?
Out of true airframes?
Dirty or poor finish on aircraft?
Charts based on 15 degree C day and tropical conditions sucked power and lift?

130kts was close to 60% power cruising speed?

probably all of the above plus extra weight added for armour, avionics and more guns.

The crusing speeds were also far slower at Midway than the charts would imply:

7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds...
Battle of Midway: USS Hornet Action Report

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Albacore versus TBD speeds:

These charts imply a 164 knot speed for the TBD, with torpedo, at SL, and 169 knots clean at SL.

Did you plug in temperature? If you didn't you're reading the chart wrong. Follow the chart at SL on a "standard day" and it shows about 181 knots = 208 mph.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The crusing speeds were also far slower at Midway than the charts would imply:

The full reference from the link you posted states;

"7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots, climbing to 19,000 feet."

It does not specify why...

 

[RCAFson]

The full reference from the link you posted states;

"7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots, climbing to 19,000 feet."

It does not specify why...

The remainder of the "group" was VB and VF squadrons (SBDs and F4F-4s).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The remainder of the "group" was VB and VF squadrons (SBDs and F4F-4s).

Still no indication why - HOWEVER, if you look on the link you posted to the TBD charts you'll find a fuel consumption chart. 100 knots = 115 mph, so they are crusing on the low end of the chart which would make sense as they needed to extend their range, something I think all Midway carrier aircraft did.

 

[Shortround6]

I am not a pilot but it would seem to me that if I was "lost" I would throttle back to a minimum fuel consumption speed while I figured out where I was.

While action reports do help us separate some book figures from reality we also have to aware of how or why a particular action report may differ from the book figures. One or two action reports with extenuating circumstances (lost?) do not make the manual or book figures invalid.

 

[RCAFson]

The Swordfish WAS NOT specifically "stressed" for dive bombing. An Air Ministry engineer may have determined that the Swordfish could do dive bombing if needed. Air Ministry specification, S.15/33 defined the need for a spotter-recon aircraft, the torpedo role was added at a later date. When the prototype first flew in 1934 the pre-WW2 dive bombing concept (or fad) really didn't start to fancy military planners, so tell us, where in the Pilot's Notes or any other data does it specify the Swordfish was "stressed" for dive bombing?

I think you're exaggerating on how much of a dive the Swordfish entered when using this tactic, especially when carrying a torpedo.

"Swordfish torpedo doctrine called for an approach at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) followed by a dive to torpedo release altitude of 18 ft (5.5 m)." (Emmott, Norman W. "Airborne Torpedoes"). It was mentioned earlier that the aircraft would barely reach 200 mph in a dive and had a Vne of just over 200 mph, and that would be in a clean configuration. Performing this with a torpedo would have to be done with limitations on the airframe (the airframe is limited to low G maneuvers) and engine as there is a 2350 rpm limitation (from the pilot's notes). So even though there is evidence to support your claim about "dive bombing" I doubt the Swordfish carried it out in the tradition of say an SBD or Val.

Air warfare an International Encyclopedia, p214:

Fairey Swordfish
Britsh dive-bomber and torpedo bomber. Regarded as obselete at the beginning of WWII, the Swordfish nevertheless went on to serve in the FAA and the RAF until the end of hostilites. The reason for such longevity was its superb handling, especially during landing, torpedo attack runs and dive-bombing.

If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?

Wings of the Navy, p15-16:

It was hardly neccessary to trim the Swordfish into a dive and 200 knots (371km/h) could be clocked if the neccessary considerable altitude was available; the control forces changing little under these conditions, and dives at torpedo carrying weight to the maximum permitted engine RPM did not produce vibration or flutter. The Swordfish remained stable in all axes - manaouvering precislely in the vertical plane, and it was popularly supposed - although I admit that I never personally confirmed the supposition - that the ideal method of dive bombing was to fly immediately above the target and then turn the Swordfish over to the near-vertical, diving until the target could be seen above the upper wing..."

....5min combat rating of 750 hp at 2525rpm...(p 18 )

The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor - Page 103

The table on the next page compares the Fairey Swordfish, used for both dive-bombing and torpedo work, with the Val and the Kate. The Val was a specialized dive-bomber, whereas the Kate was designed for both torpedo dropping and ...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I am not a pilot but it would seem to me that if I was "lost" I would throttle back to a minimum fuel consumption speed while I figured out where I was.

And lean your mixture!

"Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" in that order...

While action reports do help us separate some book figures from reality we also have to aware of how or why a particular action report may differ from the book figures. One or two action reports with extenuating circumstances (lost?) do not make the manual or book figures invalid.

Yep - and many times one could figure out why a combat report didn't match what "the book" or "chart" said. Range is always a good one. Many people forget that many times when entering a combat area, aircraft were never flown in a straight line with perfect cruising configurations. Many times a flight will zigzag, climb, descend and make gentle turns on a course enabling themselves not to be set up as a stationary target and also enabling scanning for the enemy.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Air warfare an International Encyclopedia, p214:


If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?

Again, show me WHERE it says the Swordfish was specifically "Stressed" for divebombing?

Wings of the Navy, p15-16:
It was hardly neccessary to trim the Swordfish into a dive and 200 knots (371km/h) could be clocked if the neccessary considerable altitude was available; the control forces changing little under these conditions, and dives at torpedo carrying weight to the maximum permitted engine RPM

I mentioned the 200 knot dive on post 89 - it was indicated in the book by Terence Horsley in "Find, Fix and Strike."
That does not mean you're diving with a torpedo at 200 knots

The table on the next page compares the Fairey Swordfish, used for both dive-bombing and torpedo work, with the Val and the Kate. The Val was a specialized dive-bomber, whereas the Kate was designed for both torpedo dropping and ...
The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor - Page 103

Again it proves? There is no argument that the Swordfish was able to dive bomb but it did have limitations. There is no evidence that during its design or inital deployment it was specifically "stressed for dive bombing." Again, it was able to divebomb agree, with limitations

 

[FLYBOYJ]

If you were a torpedo bomber pilot and you had a choice of a long shallow dive, which made you a superb target or a very steep, high speed dive, where you were very hard to hit, which would you chose? Why wouldn't a Swordfish or Albacore pilot use an approach that optimized his chances for success and survival?

I would choose what the aircraft was capable of doing and what I was trained to do. Try doing something different and most of the time you would not have to be worrying about being a superb target...

 

[RCAFson]

Still no indication why - HOWEVER, if you look on the link you posted to the TBD charts you'll find a fuel consumption chart. 100 knots = 115 mph, so they are crusing on the low end of the chart which would make sense as they needed to extend their range, something I think all Midway carrier aircraft did.

The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.

 

[parsifal]

The full reference from the link you posted states;

"7. Torpedo 8, led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, U.S.N., was lost in its entirety. This squadron flew at 100 knots below the clouds while the remainder of the group flew at 110 knots, climbing to 19,000 feet."

It does not specify why...

Without knowing, I would guess the reason would be to increase the endurance of the type. Less speed = longer in the air, and since the USN was not exactly sure of the position of the IJNs carriers, it made sense to keep the birds airborne for as long as possible

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.

We do? Show us!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Without knowing, I would guess the reason would be to increase the endurance of the type. Less speed + longer in the air, and since the USN was not exactly sure of the position of the IJNs carriers, it made sense to keep the birds airborne for as long as possible

Exactly!

 

[Shortround6]

The fuel consumption chart is in knots, and the minimum speed, while carrying a torpedo, is about 105 knots, according to the chart and the chart shows 4.2 AMPG, and we know that fuel consumption, by 1942, was much higher than this.

Maybe the TBDs were refitted with armor and self sealing tanks, do you have a reference for this?

What extra avionics? didn't they come with radios to begin with?

What extra guns? did some get twin .30s in the rear gunner station instead of a single?

 

[VBF-13]

Torpedo Squadron Eight actually made several hits on four of the carriers. They were shot down to the last plane because of their necessarily low and flat approaches required to effectively release their torpedoes. That made them easy targets for the carriers' guns. The SBDs, zeroing-in on their open brake flaps, were able to then utilize that momentum to swing back upward and get out of there. I forget the citation for this, but it might be one of Vice-Admiral Fletcher's accounts. I remember it from long ago, folks, sorry. At any rate, it makes sense.