Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two

[renrich]

Probably the definitive book on Midway is "Shattered Sword." The book is largely based on Japanese records many heretofore unused. The next best reference is probably "The First Team" by Lundstrom who is referenced often in "Shattered Sword." According to those sources none of the US VTs at Midway got a hit. Many never even got to launch the torps. If one has not read Lundstrom and "Shattered Sword" one is behind the curve and relatively uninformed.

When carrier launched strikes by both sides in daylight have great difficulty or even fail to locate the opposite side's ships how does it work that a night attack especially by AC that can barely go faster than a carrier at flank speed can succeed? At Coral Sea the IJN was behind a weather front that greatly hindered the US AC in finding them.

However I have at long last become convinced that the Stringbag was a war winning AC. I now wonder why the RN did not dust off HMS Victory. Victory would have been a superb stealth warship because her radar signature would be almost negligible since she was mostly wood. Her slow speed would have increased the accuracy of her guns. The Italians would have never detected her approach because she was so quiet and even if they detected her they would have thought they were seeing a mirage.. She could have gallivanted around the Med for months without being replenished which was a weak point of the RN. The FAA might have even cleared her spar deck and launched Swordfishs from her. Just kidding

 

[parsifal]

When carrier launched strikes by both sides in daylight have great difficulty or even fail to locate the opposite side's ships how does it work that a night attack especially by AC that can barely go faster than a carrier at flank speed can succeed? At Coral Sea the IJN was behind a weather front that greatly hindered the US AC in finding them.

For a night strike to work against a moving target, the carier needed a daylight position of last known course and speed of the target. This happened to also be a necessary requirement for the raid into ports. Later, from 1941, the Brits had several aircraft in the squadron fitted with ASVII or ASVIII radar. ASV II had a range of over 40 km unde3r the right conditions for a normal warship....against a small target like a U-Boat conning tower, it was much less relaible (ASV II was better) and range was a maximum of about 10 km. Against TF, the search a/c might have a range of 20-40km. Thats almost as good as a visual search. Since the Swordfish was rated as a TSR (Torpedo/Spotter/Recon) a/c, this might be seen as the recce element of its mission.

Radar could not really assist in the actual attack. Normally a squadron of 12-15 a/c might have 2-3 flare droppers, who also usually carried 3 or 4 250lb bombs. They were the pathfinders, and whilst there was an enormous variation in how they went about their jobs, typically they would climb to about 7000 feet and then drop the magnesium flares in a stick "downwind" of the ship, so that if there was any moonlight or dusklight, such light was coming over the top of the target so that it projected silhouette and therby increased its visibility, whilst at the same time decreasing the visibility of the main attack force. You could classify this part of the mission as the "Spotter" commponent of the TSR. The flare droppers would then try and co-ordinate their attacks with the main force, the torpedo bombers, by carrying out divebombing attacks against the target. If they were lucky and achieved a hit, it would hopefully cause a fire(s) on the ship, illuminating the target even more.

The Torpedo echelons were trained to close the range to 1000 yards or less and attack in waves, usually consisting of pairs or sometimes three aircraft flights. For a torpedo bomber thats virtually point blank range. The Ark Royals Swordfish closed to about 710 yards when they attacked the Bismarck, with the banking aircraft probably passing to within 300 yards of the battleship as they turned away. By the time the torps had completed their runs to the battleship, she was almost presenting her stern fully on to the attack, presenting as narrow a target as she could. Its a testament to the accuracy and stability of that squadron hit the rudder....a virtual bulls eye.

The probelem for the Bismarck, is that by turning away she did two things. Firstly she presented her rudder and screws to the attack, which were the only real vulnerable bits of the hull. secondly the rear flak batteries were being directed by an inferiro director that could not cope with the low speed of the attackers.

Bismarck is the most famous atack carried out at night, but there were literally hundreds of such attacks. The Axis was losing an average of 50000 tons of shipping a month, a lot of it was sunk by Swordfish equipped squadrons. Nuch was also sunk by Beaforts, also operating at night using the same basic techniques. Swordfish are credited with sinking well over 250000 tons of shipping in these night attacks, and with the sinking of at least 22.5 enemy subs, and probably as many as 40. Many of those were done at night and in poor weather, beginning with U-451 in November 1941. The first U-Boat sinking by a Swordfish in daylight was in April 1940, when U-64 was sunk by a Swordfish from Furious (I think it was Furious)

This all takes a well trained crew, and an aircraft set up for the purpose. Because operating at night in the late 30's and early 40's was an inherently dangerous activity, you dont want a particualalry twitchy High Performance a/c....you want docility and relaibility. The Swordfish had this in spades. I dont see why the TBD could not have done a similar job....its just that the USN over-estimated the types survivability in daylight and dismissed too quickly the potentialities of night strike The Americans could have trained their TBD crews

However I have at long last become convinced that the Stringbag was a war winning AC. I now wonder why the RN did not dust off HMS Victory. Victory would have been a superb stealth warship because her radar signature would be almost negligible since she was mostly wood. Her slow speed would have increased the accuracy of her guns. The Italians would have never detected her approach because she was so quiet and even if they detected her they would have thought they were seeing a mirage.. She could have gallivanted around the Med for months without being replenished which was a weak point of the RN. The FAA might have even cleared her spar deck and launched Swordfishs from her. Just kidding

Cheeky....I am sure that if Cunningham had been asked he would have found a use for the old ship.....

 

[parsifal]

Might be appropriate to post some information on ASV radar, which was such an integral part of the Stringbags success

This is not my work, it comes straignt from the U-Boat net site. For some reason it fails to mention when the various radars were fitted to the Stringbag.....I do know that they (ASVIIs) were fitted to some aircraft from the beginning of 1941.

The USN had access to radar via the tizard mission from 1940. they had at least as much time to acquaint themselves with its potentialities from that time, which was aas longas the RN had for most of its formations. It embraced radar for its warships very strongly, but virtually ignored airborne radars until 1942, and were not in a position to use it for carrier aircraft really until 1944. The question begs....why????


British ASV radars

prepared by Emmanuel Gustin

Early Experiments
ASV Mk.I

When radar was developed in Britain in the late 1930s it was clear that any airborne radar had to be vastly different from the gigantic "Chain Home" radar masts that gave early warning to Britain's fighter defense. A dipole antenna operates best when its length is half the wavelength of the radar beam, and to direct the beam in any direction a large array of dipoles is required. Obviously, the number and length of the dipoles would be very limited in an airborne installation. However, at that time there was no sufficiently powerful source of short waves. To be useful, an airborne radar also needed to have a short minimum range, that is, it had to guide the aircraft close enough for its crew to see the target. This could be achieved by using shorter pulses than land radars.

There was little difference, at that time, between the development of AI (airborne intercept, i.e. radar for nightfighter) and ASV (airborne surface vessel, radar for maritime patrol aircraft). In 1938 and 1939, ASV radar had the higher priority.

On 17 August 1937, the very first British airborne radar was flown. Based on the Western Electric 316A valve, it generated 100 Watts of power at a wavelength of 1.25 meters, and was later improved by increasing the wavelength to 1.5 meters. Installed in Avro Anson K6260, this radar proved that it was capable of tracking the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, the battleship HMS Rodney, and the cruiser HMS Southampton, in weather conditions that would have made conventional reconnaissance impossible. It even detected aircraft taking off from HMS Courageous.

The radar was not yet ready for service, however. Development was delayed by what Dr E.G. "Taffy" Bowen, head of the airborne radar group, described as "totally inadequate resources and virtually no administrative back-up." Finally, two antenna configurations were developed for ASV radar. One used a dipole transmitting antenna with a reflector to give a broad beam in the forward direction. The two receiving antennas were on the aircraft's wings, and their polar diagrams overlapped. The direction of the target was determined by comparing the signals from the two receivers, displayed together on a cathode-ray tube, one to the left of the (vertical) baseline and the other to the right. If the target was on the right then the right receiver gave the stronger signal. The vertical timebase indicated the distance to the target. This system gave a range of 10 miles on a 1000 ton ship, and up to 40 miles on a coastline with steep cliffs.

This was introduced as the first ASV radar (Mk.I), and installed on the Hudsons of Coastal Command. By the end of 1940 it was fitted in 24 Hudsons and 25 Sunderlands. About 200 sets were produced. Experience with it was not very good. The radar was unreliable and new equipment, and the manufacturing standard of many components left a lot to be desired. The problems of maintenance and training were enormous. Its usefulness and popularity were increased by Sqdn. Ldr. Lugg, who installed a 1.5 meter beacon at Leuchars. ASV Mk.I then was, at least, useful navigation equipment.

ASV Mk.I was not intended to detect submarines, but after an enquiry from admiral Somerville in late 1939 test were conducted with one of the Hudsons of No.220 Sqdn and the submarine L 27. It was demonstrated that, flying at 1000 feet, the submarine could be detected at 3 miles, broadside on, and this under experimental conditions --- that means that the crew of the Hudson knew exactly where the submarine was. Further tests revealed that when flying at 6000 feet, the range was increased to 6 miles.

A notable improvement was achieved with what called Long Range ASV. LRASV was based on the second antenna configuration developed. It was a sideways-looking system. The transmitter was an array of ten dipoles, installed in five (later reduced to four) pairs on top of the fuselage of the aircraft. The receiving antennas were Sterba arrays, fitted to the sides of the fuselage. Because the transmitter array was a dipole array 18 feet long and the two receivers were arrays 12 feet long, a much better resolution and range could be achieved. The first installation was on a Whitley bomber, in late 1939. LRASV had a range 2.5 times better than the forward-looking system; it could detect submarines at 10 to 15 miles.

ASV Mk.II

Developed at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough in early 1940, ASV Mk.II differed from Mk.I mainly because it was properly engineered, and therefore much more reliable. Although called a 1.5m radar, it actually used 1.7m (176MHz). Range was up to 36 miles. The minimum range was about a mile. Several thousand sets were built, and installed in Hudsons, Sunderlands, Wellingtons, Beauforts, Warwicks, Whitleys, Liberators, and other Coastal Command aircraft. ASV Mk.II was used with both the forward-looking and the sideways-looking LRASV configuration, production being divided approximately equal. Only the LRASV was useful against submarines.

The first success was recorded on 30 November 1940, when a Whitley Mk.VI equipped with ASV damaged U-71 in the Bay of Biscay. By mid-1941 the ASV radar had increased daytime attacks on U-boats by 20%, and made nightly attacks possible.

However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions.

ASV Mk.III

By late 1942, the U-boats carried "Metox", a simple radio receiver, which enabled them to detect the ASV Mk.II radar. This reduced the efficiency of the ASV equipped aircraft considerably, and shipping losses increased again.

The history of ASV Mk.III is rather complicated. Because of personal conflicts, the original group that had developed airborne radar was dispersed. A new team was formed, tasked with the development of centimetric AI radar for nightfighters. The big advantage of a centimetric radar is that the beam can be directed accurately by a relatively small paraboloid reflector. This offered better range and resolution and eliminated the strong ground returns, which were unavoidable with the broad beams of the 1.5 meter radar sets. Centimetric radar was made possible by the development, by J.T. Randall and H.A.H. Boot, of the cavity magnetron. The first was tested on 21 February 1940. By June 1940, GEC had produced the first sealed magnetrons, suitable for use in aircraft.

Development concentrated on AI for nightfighthers, but in the autumn of 1940 the 10cm radar attracted naval interest, represented by Captain B.R. Willett and C.E. Horton. It was demonstrated to them that the ground-based, experimental radar equipment could track ships. On 11 November tests were conducted with the submarine HMS Usk, which was tracked at 7 miles. Some time was spent refining the equipment and defining the antennas, until a cylindrical paroboloid section was chosen for shipboard installations. By March 1941, a fully engineered 10cm radar was on board of the corvette HMS Orchis, and on 16 November 1941 the sinking of U-433 near Gibraltar was attributed to the "Type 271" 10cm radar. By May 1942, 236 ships carried centimetric radar.

Meanwhile, the development of centimetric AI had continued, and in March 1942 it entered operational service. Known as AI Mk.VII, this was a remarkable achievement, and by August 1942 a fully-engineered production model followed, AI Mk.VIII. Tests against submarines had been conducted in April 1941, against HMS Sea Lion, and in August, against HMS Sokol. The radar was effective, but development of the ASV version was slow, much slower than that of AI radar, and the first experimental, centimetric ASV radar was not test flown before December 1941. By the summer of 1942 this so-called ASVS radar was being productionized by Ferranti. But then, on 30 September 1942, Ferranti was told to halt the work. Work on ASVS was stopped, much to the dismay of Coastal Command.

 

[parsifal]

part ii

The reason for this decision was that at the same time, H2S ground-mapping radar was under development for Bomber Command. The two systems had many similarities, and H2S was closer to production. The first test of a ground-mapping centimetric radar had been made on 1 November 1941, and was impressively succesful. A more practical system was flying in a Halifax on 17 March 1942, and immediately attracted the attention of a endless parade of high-ranking officers. This culminated in meeting on Downing Street 10 on 3 July, where Churchill insisted that he wanted 200 sets operational by mid-October. At that time, there was no working H2S radar at all, because the Halifax had crashed. There were still considerable problems in designing the H2S scanner, and it had not yet been resolved whether a cavity magnetron or a klystron would be used to generate the microwave power. The klystron provided insufficient power, but the use of the cavity magnetron meant that it would certainly fall in German hands. By 15 July, it had been decided to use the magnetron anyway. Development was enhanced by the valuable support of Sir Robert Renwick, appointed by Churchill to oversee H2S development, and by Group Captain D.C.T. Bennet, commander of No.8 Group, the "Pathfinder Force" of Bomber Command. By September, a version was ready for service trials. At the end of 1942, 24 bombers, Halifaxes and Stirlings, carried H2S.

Of course H2S Mk.I had been designed for four-engined bombers flying at 20,000 feet, and a hasty demonstration over sea was an annoying failure. Obviously, the system needed to be redesigned for operations at 2,000 feet. This did little to improve the attitude of Coastal Command towards this new radar system, which already suffered from being "not invented here". To some extent to irritation of Coastal Command was justified: There were to be fierce conflicts with Bomber Command over the allocation of radar equipment to H2S and ASV.

In any case, Coastal Command was not going to get any of the four-engined "heavies", so the first installation was made in a twin-engined Wellington bomber. The radar was installled in the nose, with the size of the scanner reflector reduced to 28 inches. This gave a 60 degree field of view in front of the aircraft. The display was the now familiar PPI (Plan Position Indicator), which presented a 'map view' of the relative positions. Coastal Command was still less than eager to support the system, and this slowed development. On 1 March 1943 a Wellington of No.172 Sqdn flew the first patrol over the Bay of Biscay. On 17 March they saw their first U-boat at 9 miles, but the Leigh light failed and the first attack was made on the next day. At the end of March 13 sightings had been made.

By May, Coastal Command detected and attacked most U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. U-boat sightings improved dramatically, and shipping losses decreased drastically, from 400,000 to 100,000 tons per month. Doenitz ordered his submarines to stay on the surface and fight it out with aircraft, but he lost 56 U-boats in April and May. Doenitz reported that the situation had become "impossible". This "temporary setback" was significant enough to be mentioned in a speech by Hitler. This result had actually been achieved by a handful of aircraft equipped with ASV Mk.III.

Meanwhile in the USA, a 10cm ASV radar called DMS-1000 had been developed by the Radiation Laboratory. It was installed in Liberators, but although the first one arrived in the UK in March 1942, it still lacked the Leigh light. The Liberator was used operationally in early 1943, and by the summer the Liberators were closing the "Atlantic gap". Everywhere in the Atlantic, U-boats could now be attacked by ASV-equipped aircraft.

ASV Mk.VI

The British anticipated that the Germans would develop a warning detector for the 10cm ASV, as they had done for the 1.5 meter ASV. (They indeed did, the Naxos system, but it appeared three months after the first use of centimetric ASV radar. It seems that during the interrogation of a captured British officer, the Germans were told that the British were actually detecting the weak emissions of Metox. As this was technically possible, it was believed.)

Therefore ASV Mk.VI was developed. It was more powerful than Mk.III, but it had an attenuator (called Vixen) fitted. The idea was to reduce the power once the U-boat had been detected, so that the operator of any detection device would be fooled into believing that the aircraft was flying away, or at least not coming closer. Development of Mk.VI was once again slowed down by administrative obstructions. On 23 October 1943 Air Marshall Sir John Slessor, then head of Coastal Command, heard about this. Slessor was convinced that the Germans already had a detector for the 10cm radar (they had), and he reacted by writing a very angry letter in which called for disciplinary action, and used terms such as "crass stupidity" and "congenital idiot". Despite whispers about Slessor's imminent court-martial, this managed to create some activity in the Air Ministry. (Coastal Command lost the fight to get the 3cm ASV Mk.VII, however. All 3cm equipment was allocated to Bomber Command.)

There was also ASV Mk.VIA, which allowed the aircraft to lock onto the U-boat and aim its Leigh light directly at it. But this was not ready before the summer of 1944. The even more developed ASV MK.VIB made blind bombing possible.

ASV Mk.VII

The Mk.VII system was a development of a 3cm H2S system. This too was planned in anticipation of a German detector for 10cm waves. However, Bomber Command refused to accept any reduction in its deliveries of the 3cm H2S. When an agreement was reached to release some 3cm radars to Coastal Command, the commander of Bomber Command, A. Harris, telephoned Churchill and managed to reverse the decision. As a consequence, ASV Mk.VII had a low priority, and this decreased even more when the defeat of the U-boats became clear and the ports on the French coast were taken by Allied forces.

But in October 1944, the Allied became aware of two worrying developments: The appearance of a new class of U-boats, and the fitting of the "Schnorkel" to U-boats. The latter was virtually undetectable by 10cm ASV radar. In a meeting on 22 November, it was decided that developments of the 3cm ASV radar offered the best hopes, although experiments with 1.25cm radars were also conducted. The work was undertaken both in Britain, under the aegis of B.J. O'Kane, and in the USA, where the US Navy started the aptly called "Project Hawkeye" in the Radiation Laboratory of the MIT. However, the tests were not concluded before the end of the war.

ASV Mk.XI

The ASV Mk.XI was a centrimetric radar intended for the TBR (torpedo bomber and reconnaissance) aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, the component of the Royal Navy that operated carrier aircraft. It was also known known as ASVX and therefore it sometimes has been called, erroneously, ASV Mk.X.

ASV Mk.XI could be fitted between the main wheel legs of a Fairey Swordfish. In addition to the bulky radome, a Leigh light could be fitted. The radome made the the carrying of torpedoes or large depth charges impossible, so when the target was a ship the Swordfish was accompanied by other aircraft without radar. Against submarines, the radar-equipped Swordfish Mk.III was armed with eight rockets on underwing launches, and also carried flares to illuminate any U-boat it found. Fired at 600 yards, the rockets easily penetrated a submarine's hull.

This radar was also carried by the Fairey Barracuda Mk.III.

ASV Mk.XI had a maximum range of about 60km against ships, and in good conditions and at low altitude (2000 feet) it could detect a surfaced submarine at about 20km. But it could detect a schnorkel only in very calm seas and at distances below 8km. It gave bearings with an accuracy of about 2 degrees.


Sources
•Avionics -- The Story and technology of aviation electronics
Bill Gunston, published by Patrick Stephens Limited, 1990.
•Boffin -- A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio
Astronomy and Quantum Optics
R Hanbury Brown, published by Adam Hilger, 1991.
•Echoes of War -- The Story of H2S Radar
Sir Bernard Lovell, published by Adam Hilger, 1991.
•Wings of the Navy
Capt. Eric Brown, published by Pilot Press, 1980.
•Across the Ether
Stephen Pope, in Aeroplane Monthly, June 1995.
-> Article includes pictures of aircraft with ASV radar and a picture of the Leigh light.
•Brian Wood sent us information on the ASV Mk.XI radar from the original manual.

 

[RCAFson]

This all takes a well trained crew, and an aircraft set up for the purpose. Because operating at night in the late 30's and early 40's was an inherently dangerous activity, you dont want a particualalry twitchy High Performance a/c....you want docility and relaibility. The Swordfish had this in spades. I dont see why the TBD could not have done a similar job....its just that the USN over-estimated the types survivability in daylight and dismissed too quickly the potentialities of night strike The Americans could have trained their TBD crews

The TBD was grossly overweight, underpowered and consequently had very poor range because the engine had to be run at high throttle settings to stay airborne. Adding ASV radar would have been nearly impossible and ultimately pointless because of the poor range. A Swordfish weighed about 8500lb, had 775hp and had 607 sq ft of wing area so it had lots of lifting capacity. The Albacore weighed about 10,500lb, had 1100hp and 623 sq ft of wing area. The TBD weighed 10,000lb+ (maybe as much as 11,000lb), had 900hp but only 422 sq ft of wing area or about the same as a Barracuda which weighed 14000lb but had 1640hp, and the Barracuda was considered underpowered!

 

[Oreo]

FlyboyJ, I really appreciate your vast experience, knowledge, and insight. It is obvious that you know far more than I do about a lot of things. But an objective look at this (see below) post of yours in combination with what I have said here, I think, only shows that your well-documented reply corroborates the "opinions" that I put forth myself. I can't prove your motives for wishing to drag this on into such a spectacle, but it sure does cause me to speculate. I will keep those speculations to myself, however, since they are not documented. Please understand that a person who does not have the background you have, can still come to some accurate conclusions by parsing what little data he does have in a different way. To explain this, I will point out how you stated that the military designs are brought about by government design requirements, not corporate initiative. The fact is, I never said, or tried to imply, that the various companies dreamed up these designs on their own "just because" or without having a military specification issued to them. I was pointing out how Boeing chose to ignore most of these specification requirements and only concentrate on a very few of them and make them very excellent, whereas Douglas evidently jumped at a greater percentage of them. Boeing's choice not to bid on them is a difference from Douglas, which is exactly what I was saying. The reason Douglas was a more prolific designing company was because they chose to bid on more proposals. So when I pointed out this difference, I don't know why you took up the cause as if I were some sort of blasphemous enemy, when in fact, your lengthy reply just brought much more evidence (which I do not have at my fingertips, but you do) that I was right. So thank you for explaining my position in more intricate detail, and adding a perspective that I could never provide to corroborate what I had already concluded.

Splitting hairs and footnotes - I am doing that because it seems much of what you have to say is based on your opinion rather than fact and do understand if you haven't figured it out by now that many of the members who participate on this site indulge discussion with fact and documented credible evidence (and more times than most provide references for it) and when it's not given are usually called on it...

Now with that said, you made a statement "Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing", what are you basing that on? Douglas built a larger variety of military aircraft in the post WW2 years based on being awarded contracts based on a solicitation from the government. Ed Heinemann and his team just didn't sit around and decide to come up with aircraft to build - they did so based on the government requiring specific aircraft. For example (all from Wiki Sources);

"The Skyhawk was designed by Douglas Aircraft's Ed Heinemann in response to a U.S. Navy call for a jet-powered attack aircraft to replace the older Douglas AD Skyraider (later redesignated A-1 Skyraider)."

"The piston-engined Skyraider was designed during World War II to meet US Naval requirements for a carrier-based, single-seat, long-range, high performance dive/torpedo bomber, to follow-on from earlier types such as the Helldiver and Avenger"

"In January 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a requirement to develop a long-range, carrier-based attack plane that could deliver a 10,000 lb (4,536 kg) bomb load or a nuclear weapon" (A3D requirement)

"US Air Force involvement in the Korean War highlighted an urgent need for a high performance day/night tactical bomber. To speed the availability of such an aircraft it was planned to procure a land-based version of the A3D Skywarrior then being developed for the US Navy. To this end Douglas was given a contract for five pre-production Douglas RB-66A all-weather/night photo-reconnaissance aircraft"

I could dig further and come with specifics about the exact contracts and specifications…

During the post war years and especially after the Korean War there was a boom in military aircraft procurement. Usually the government asked for paper proposals and the government would widdle down the list until 2 or 3 finalists were accepted. At that point each one had to come off with a prototype and a fly-off occurred with winner take all. Sometimes the contractor was paid for their prototype.

During this period Boeing was very busy with the B-47 and B-52 as well as preparing their assault into the commercial aircraft industry. More than likely some of the solicitations that Douglas went after were probably sent to Boeing and they were returned "NO BID" mainly because Boeing was busy with other programs (B-47, B-52 Bomarc, KC-97, KC-50 conversion, KC-135). As a matter of fact Boeing was so busy during this period some of the B-47 production was subcontracted to Lockheed.

You want to say Douglas "were much more prolific designers than Boeing," well that wasn't because Boeing wasn't capable, it was what the government was offering and what companies were able or wanted to bid on.

Now you gave the example of the Boeing XF8B – here's a statement from Wiki regarding this aircraft, its cancellation and Boeing's path in the post war years…

"Although testing of the promising XF8B concept continued into 1946 by the USAAF and 1947 by the US Navy, the end of the war in the Pacific and changing postwar strategy required that Boeing concentrate on building large land-based bombers and transports."

So you see, this is the way it really works. I've worked for Lockheed, Boeing and was a contractor with McDonnell Douglas and several other smaller aviation related defense contractors and been through this process and worked with people in my early years who worked on some of the aircraft spoken about here. Military aircraft design, especially in the post was based on a requirement driven by the government and there was very little "private ventures" being offered up because of the risk of losing money.

So with that this said, you are entitled to your opinions based on what you have read in books or seen on TV documentaries, be advised however that some of us have been employed in this environment and seen firsthand how aircraft manufacturers work and compete with each other as well as the way the government picks and chooses who will build what.

 

[Oreo]

So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?

 

[parsifal]

The TBD was grossly overweight, underpowered and consequently had very poor range because the engine had to be run at high throttle settings to stay airborne. Adding ASV radar would have been nearly impossible and ultimately pointless because of the poor range. A Swordfish weighed about 8500lb, had 775hp and had 607 sq ft of wing area so it had lots of lifting capacity. The Albacore weighed about 10,500lb, had 1100hp and 623 sq ft of wing area. The TBD weighed 10,000lb+ (maybe as much as 11,000lb), had 900hp but only 422 sq ft of wing area or about the same as a Barracuda which weighed 14000lb but had 1640hp, and the Barracuda was considered underpowered!

That reduces the ability of the type, but it would not have excluded the type from Night Operations. I dont know about the range issue, but if the type could carry a 1764 lb torpedo , I am certain it could carry a couple of hundred pounds of electronic gear instead. this is not that different to the Stringbag. Its ASV equipped units did not carry a torpedo, neither did they carry the heavy depth charges needed to hurt U-Boats. They usually carried a reduced bombload, rockets, and/or flares.

I cant see too much different to the TBD. Range issue aside, which I havent really bought into (limited range was a weaknes of the Swordfish as well), I cant see why a 15 plane squadron could not have 2 or 3 radar equiped a/c, and 2 or 3 flare droppers (maybe the same 2 or 3 a/c with the remainder carrying the torpedo ordinance. That reduces the overall firepower of the squadron (from 15 down to 9 or 12), in theory, but at least the squadrons would have a chance of hitting their targets. Not as good as the Swordfish, not as good as a high performance daylight VT, but a lot better than getting whole squadrons shot down for nothing......

 

[FLYBOYJ]

. So when I pointed out this difference, I don't know why you took up the cause as if I were some sort of blasphemous enemy, when in fact, your lengthy reply just brought much more evidence (which I do not have at my fingertips, but you do) that I was right. So thank you for explaining my position in more intricate detail, and adding a perspective that I could never provide to corroborate what I had already concluded.

Not a blasphemous enemy, just someone who was a little misinformed about a few things, perhaps too many Osprey books but ok, if you say so...

So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?

 

[Njaco]

Brewster SBN-1

 

[nuuumannn]

Not the Swordfish

I'll see your Brewster and raise you a Blackburn Botha.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The TBD has to be on at least the top 3. In its defense it was obsolete by the time the US entered the war...

Despite being obsolete, the Swordfish does not belong on this list DESPITE also being obsolete at the start of the war. It performed well up to what I consider it's swan song during the Channel Dash in Feb 1942 but I think that raid showed that either the Swordfish or TBD were sitting ducks without escorts if enemy fighters were present. The Swordfish, in some of its more popular raids (Bismarck and Taranto) did not have to deal with fighter opposition, where the TBD, in its swan song was completely mauled.

 

[Shortround6]

Not the Swordfish

I'll see your Brewster and raise you a Blackburn Botha.

THAT Brewster may be too old and produced in too few numbers to qualify. It's successor, the Brewster SB2A Buccaneer/Bermuda gets neither pass and is a true front runner. A fly off between the Buccaneer and Botha?

 

[davparlr]

Swordfish were launched at taranto at a range of 170 miles, and the round trip was over 400 miles. Extrapolating for the Midway operation, the TBDs with at least a 100 extra range (apparently), it should be theoretically possible to hold the range and close to a launch point in the evening. Alternatively, launch the SBDs and hold the (in reality nonexistent) night capable torpedo bombers until evening to clean up any cripples.

This would most likely been fatal and Fletcher would never have done this. The Japanese plan for Midway was to entice the American carriers out to fight and were looking for the carriers. If they had found the American fleet first, it would have been annihilated. The American plan was to surprise the Japanese and attack first. Fletcher could not afford to have his fleet operating in a patrol area of the Japanese for any longer than necessary. As it was, they were fortunate to be missed by the Japanese patrols. The carriers were mobile were difficult enough to find in the daylight, would have been near impossible at night.

Midway was successful only because all of the dominoes fell right. Any variations would probably result in disaster for the US

In any event I dont buy the argument that sacrificing the TBDs was necessary to pull the Zeroes away from McCluskys VBs

It wasn't planned that way.

Correct, except that you forgot the two aircraft that were shot down, and whilst launching, did so outside range

Information I have found was that Lt. Commander Williamson successfully launched his torpedo against the Conte di Cavour before being shot down.

these torpedoes are believed to have bottomed. I should have checked however. Depending on whether you want to include or exclude the two aircraft lost, you have either 55% or 66%. It is still a record either way...earlier in July three swordfish armed with torpedoes managed to sink 4 ships, including a moored sub, with three torpedoes. Thats a hit rate of 125%.

According to "The Royal Navy in World War II", out of ten torpedo drops, six were successful , or 60%.

You might also want to consider the raid on Dakar by Hermes. July 1940, 4 torps launch (2 with contact pistols, 2 with magnetic exploders, set to run 38 feet (too low) , 3 on track, wto with magnetic exploders detonated early, on with contact pistolknocked a hole in the side 24feet by 16 feet (from memory. effectively sank the richelieu 9for a year). Thats an accuracy rate of 75%.

Too small a sample to arrive at a trend.

At Midway the Japanese had to complete a mission....this made their movement forward mandatory. The Americans could approach the battle problem with a much greater level of certainty. same situation applied to Cortal Sea.

The mission of the Japanese at Midway was to draw the Americans into a fight and destroy them. This was what they were prepared to do. Had they detected the carriers before the launch or, even knew of their existence, the outcome would most likely been quite different.

Incorrect. The British launched swordfish fully armed as reconnaisance machines during the Bismarck operation, and USN SBDs routinely undertook similar armed recons for all the major battles in 1942

According to Wikipedia,

Ark Royal's Swordfish were already searching nearby when the Catalina found her. Several torpedo bombers also located the battleship, about 60 nmi (110 km; 69 mi) away from Ark Royal. Somerville ordered an attack as soon as the Swordfish returned and were rearmed with torpedoes.

For search missions I would guess added fuel would be more important than having a 2000 lb torpedo.

(the torps were the first ordinance to be launched in the first wave, a deliberate decision by the japanese.

It was the plan, however, from "At Dawn We Slept"

Although he knew Takahashi had erred, he had no choice but to lead his torpedomen to the target as quickly as possible. However, Takahashi was well on his way. Thus, it happened that bombs instead of torpedoes struck the initial blow.

Sorry bu not correct. according to John Assmussen, ("Bismarck - the fatal torpedo hit"), whilst there is dispute about that last strike (by 15 a/c, 9 launches) it appears most likley that there were three hits in the second strike. There were no hits by the first strike....none were launched at the bismarck, as the Brits mistook Sheffield as the german ship.

Okay, so of the first strike, 9 torpedoes were dropped, all missed their targets, even the ones that targeted the British ship. On the second strike, of 9 torpedoes dropped, three hit their target. So, for the entire strike on Bismarck, 18 torpedoes were dropped and three struck their targets, even the ones that targeted the British ship, or 17%. I agree that reports vary.

If we add up all the drops verses success listed in this site, we get at Taranto, 10 and 6, attack on sub, 3 and 3, Dakar, 4 and 3, Bismarck, 18 and 3, for a total of 35 torpedoes dropped with 15 strikes or 43%. Attacks against moored targets shows, 17 dropped with 12 hits for 70 % but the sample is very small. While this is good, I think the sample is way too small to show superiority of the swordfish over the Japanese.

Interesting enough, according to "Shattered Sword", thought unsuccessful, the most effective torpedo planes at Midway was the four B-26s with three getting close enough to launch torpedoes, one staffed the Akagi, one struck the island of the Akagi and crashed only missing Nagumo by 10 ft and two making it back to Midway, although well shot up.

The Japanese found the B-26s speedy and difficult to bring down".

With a lot ifs, these planes could have changed things at Midway. If they had good torpedoes, if they had trained Navy or Army pilots, and if they had twenty aircraft or so, they could have caused havoc to the Japanese carriers.

Finally, I suggest that you read your sources before posting them. Not that wiki is great, but relevantly, from the article you posted it says......"The attack went in, in almost darkness, at around 21:00 but once again the Swordfish torpedo bombers found Bismarck with their ASV II radar"

Actually, I did not have to check sources. The attack occurred around 2100 hours May 26. A check with sunset at 48 degrees north shows it to be about 2050. It is well known for those who live in the North latitudes that twilight last a long time during this period of time. It was not a night attack. Visibility was poor however and radar was needed. The photo at wiki shows it not to be dark, if the photo is correct.

There is no comparison between the two operations, I agree, however each had its own set of problems no less daunting for the respective combatants. Whilst taranto was a known location, the location of the italian fleet was not. In fact it was an amazing strole of good luck that the italians remained in the harbour since they knew the strike was coming.

This has nothing to do with the difficulty of hitting targets, only having targets to hit.

And in any event Swordfish crews on repeated occasions demonstrated in spades that they could locate, attack and sink targets whose position was not known, moving. And they did it at night.

I don't think the Bismarck falls into this category. They did locate it by radar but I believe they had directions from the Sheffield.

Other reports was that night intercept of the ASV Mk II was mostly ineffective.
British ASV Radars - Technical pages - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net

However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions.

You have not explained why attempting a night strike would be "idiotic". I would suggest that merely reveals set and predictable thinking.

Of course idiotic. The Japanese had almost 140 ships that could be located over maybe a third of a million square miles of sea. On the first night there were no position reports of the Japanese fleet. You would be searching for four ships out of 140 some odd Japanese ship with 40 aircraft flying at a hundred miles and hour with a 38 mile range radar. I don't think I have to calculate the probabilities of the success of that effort to show it won't work.

I agree, except that there is more than one way to skin a cat. For a start with a night capable force, there was absolutely no need to get his TG so banged up as it was. The Japanese had absolutely no defence to night capability at that time. If the Carriers could be located and kept at range in the day(greater than 240 miles for the japanese strike aircraft)

How? This was not an unprotected battleship but several powerful fleets that included carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. with on-going air patrols to locate American ships. I don't think there was radar available on cruisers at this time. This would be very difficult. If the American carriers were discovered, the Japanese would close quickly and dispense with the American fleet per plan.

 

[davparlr]

]during the night Fletcher coul;d have turned his force around , launched at that range (240 miles) and be closing the range with his ships whilst his aircraft were enroute and eturning. His TG would have had about four hours at night to close, whilst the strike hit the japanese and returned. The round trip in that scenario is about 360 miles (240 out, 120 back) ....well within both the TBD and Swordfish capabilities. Provided the strike connects, the Japanese are going to be in no position to retaliate the next morning, and fletcher could have been home in time for tea, with barely a scratch. If the strike fails to connect, the Americans are in a world of hurt, but not really any worse off than they were historically

They would most likely be at the bottom of the sea.

 

[RCAFson]

Other reports was that night intercept of the ASV Mk II was mostly ineffective.
British ASV Radars - Technical pages - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net




Of course idiotic. The Japanese had almost 140 ships that could be located over maybe a third of a million square miles of sea. On the first night there were no position reports of the Japanese fleet. You would be searching for four ships out of 140 some odd Japanese ship with 40 aircraft flying at a hundred miles and hour with a 38 mile range radar. I don't think I have to calculate the probabilities of the success of that effort to show it won't work.

I don't quite understand the fascination with the Swordfish, which predated the TBD in service, and it was no longer the FAA's premier frontline torpedo bomber. From July 1941 onward, the Albacore gradually took over that role. During April 1942 Somerville's carriers carried the Albacore in Indian Ocean, with only the CVE Hermes retaining Swordfish.

ASV II radar was never designed to be able to attack a small target like a sub, and had difficulty detecting them in rough weather or when they were trimmed down. OTOH, ASVII could detect ships easily and a "38 mile range means that each Albacore (or Swordfish) could sweep out a 76 mile swath on the outbound/return legs of search pattern. Ten Albacores could search a 380 mile by 300 mile area in 3 hours at night. Unfortunately Somerville didn't have that many and his night search was unsuccessful, especially as 1 ASV Albacore was lost at sunset and another damaged. Standard FAA procedure was to use flares to illuminate targets on moonless nights, and then attack with bombs or torpedoes.

 

[Oreo]

Not a blasphemous enemy, just someone who was a little misinformed about a few things, perhaps too many Osprey books but ok, if you say so...

LOL-- sometimes it's hard to find good info. . . . getting better at it. . .

So--- have we concluded yet what the worst bomber of WWII was?

I still say He 177. I don't have the "hard evidence" to back it up, but from the several accounts I have read (some of which were not in Osprey Books), it would seem that it was more dangerous to its crew than to its enemies-- or if not actually so, then nearly so. Either way, based on the losses and scarcity of meaningful accomplishments by the (more or less) 1,000 built, I would have to guess (without more evidence than Osprey, et. al, can provide) that the He 177 may have been a severe waste of resources to the Luftwaffe. . . . then again I could be wrong-- maybe I've been brainwashed into thinking this way by Osprey. . . . .

 

[parsifal]

They would most likely be at the bottom of the sea.

I dont agree. You can consider this a reply to the other half truths contained in your response.

Starting firstly with your claims about the bismarck attack. They were carried out after sunset, thats a night attack. i would agree that they could be classified as a dusk attack, if the visibility conditions were better than they were, but they were "attorcious" (those are not my words, they are the words of the official after action report). Ark Royal was undertaking the launches "in the green" (ie with waves crashing over her bow) as early as 1900, the time of the first strike. By that time she had abandoneed all safety precautions to get the second strike airborne. She was no longer zig zagging (and in fact had been spotted by U-554 who fortunately was out of torpedoes). Cloud cover was heavy (several thousand feet thick) and as as low as 2000feet and described in the report as 100% at the time of launch , but was lower than that over the target....perhaps 1000 feet. Strike leader Moffat had wanted to drop down below cloud cover once the strike had located the target by ASV radar at 7000 feet (just above the clouds) and reform the squadron elements for a co-ordinated attack but this proved impossoible because of the very poor visibility. Each element had to attack separately and visibility below the cloud cover was impeding the dusk light and was down to about 1000 yds (horizontal) maximum. There was not sufficient height below the cloud cover to drop flares. A torpedo attack is a highly technical exercise requiring accurate estimates of course speed and the amount of helm being applied. All of these things were severely hampered by the low visibility and sea state, which goes some way to explaining why the attacks wre pressed home to point blank range. Winds were by that stage more than 50 knots, and and wave heights in excess of 40 feet high. I am reasonably sure that the elements approached the target with ASV radars still switched on down to a couple of 1000 feet.

The fatal torpedo hit was achieved at 2105, some 15 mins after sundown. Call the visibility condition good if you like, rely on an unreferenced photo if you like, but the attack on the bismarck was a night strike, undertaken in the most difficult of condition.


Including the missed strikes is statistically flawed. I never said or suggested that this be done. It represents a differenrt subset to consider, as do the other examples. The conditions, training and circumstances are bound to be different in each case, so trying to put them althogether is only good for propaganda purposes. What we can say, is that on one occasikon we had a 60% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 125% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 75% hit, on another occasion we had a 0% hit rate, and and on another occasion we had a 33% hit rate. These separate events cannot, and should not be lumped togetherm, because that tells us nothing,

As for the claim that ships are somehow harder targets at sea, I would dispute that. Where do ships go for protection....if they think they can avoid detection they are better off at sea. if they think they have been detected, they are better off in harbour, with the harbour defences up. How else can the survival of the Tirpitz be explained except that they were heaviliy protected by the harbour defences. if the harbour defences are down, suh as at Pearl, yes, it is a mistake to hide in port. At Taranto the defences were not down, they were just inadequate


Next, your reference to the unreliability of British ASV radar. Ive already posted those articles, and know them very well. They are written by a U-Boat expert, and are referencing radar fixes of U-Boats. I can only repeat my earlier advice, you really should read the articles . Relevantly it says

In relation to ASV I (developed in 1938-9, as an experimental version:

"ASV Mk.I was not intended to detect submarines, but after an enquiry from admiral Somerville in late 1939 test were conducted with one of the Hudsons of No.220 Sqdn and the submarine L 27. It was demonstrated that, flying at 1000 feet, the submarine could be detected at 3 miles, broadside on, and this under experimental conditions --- that means that the crew of the Hudson knew exactly where the submarine was. Further tests revealed that when flying at 6000 feet, the range was increased to 6 miles.

A notable improvement was achieved with what called Long Range ASV. LRASV was based on the second antenna configuration developed. It was a sideways-looking system. The transmitter was an array of ten dipoles, installed in five (later reduced to four) pairs on top of the fuselage of the aircraft. The receiving antennas were Sterba arrays, fitted to the sides of the fuselage. Because the transmitter array was a dipole array 18 feet long and the two receivers were arrays 12 feet long, a much better resolution and range could be achieved. The first installation was on a Whitley bomber, in late 1939. LRASV had a range 2.5 times better than the forward-looking system; it could detect submarines at 10 to 15 miles".

In relation to ASV II which was the type in use at the time of the Bismarck attack

"However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions".

Notice that this comment is directed specifically at the ability of ASV II to achieve sinkings of submarines. i dont know what your experience level is, but a submarine is a lot smaller than a Battleship, or even a merchantman. Ther was no actual problem with the detection (even of the submarine), more the execution of the attack. ASVII could only take you to within a mile or so of the target, after that visual means had to be used to complete the attack. against a submerging or partially submerged submarine, that was a tall ask (though as an aside , in the context of a convoy battle, knowing where the submarine is is as important as actually sinking it, and forcing the submarine to submerge will reduce losses to roughly 1/4 of those if aircover is not there). In the context of a surface ship, ASVII had no significant reliability problems, and no significant operational difficulties, and in many respects, could see further than visual spotting in most conditions (which makes your claim that the USN carriers were in mortal danger if they advanced at night even more absurd.

The allies did not have an effective ASW air search radar until ASV III, and the near simultaneous introduction of the air launched depth charge, in October 1942.

As for your other comments about likely loss of the American Carriers if they were using night strike capability, hardly. Thats your opinion, and you are perfectly entitled to it, but a developed night strike capability for aircraft already of no use in daytime strike, isnt going to make one bit of difference to risks the USNs day strike battles incur. if anything they would greatly help them. Having a credible night search capability would have allowed them to range and have ready daytime strikes at first light, and beat the Japanese to the draw every time. And this was half the battle....who gets in first is the person who locates the enemy first. If the position of the enemy has been plotted and observed all night, there is no blind spot each morning....the Americans can just go ahead and launch, and be home for scones and tea, or in your case flapjacks and coffee I guess ..... Its going to give them added capability to strike at night, not interfere with their operational doctrine (in fact it would greatly help them) . If they want to close and duke it out in daylight as they did at Midway, they can still do that with no real loss in daylight capability (since the TBDs added nothing to the daylight capability anyway) . If they want to launch their TBDs so as to approach at night, they are going to reduce losses on their TBD squadrons, and place greater threat on the Japanese carriers, and pricelessly, maintain a knowledge of the Japanese position which greatly assists achieving first strike capability. Ther is no greater risk to their carriers. The claim that somehow the Japanese surface forces could ambush their carriers and sink them is a total furphy. They would never catch them for a start, and secondly would need to fight their way through the screening forces even if they did., Somerville at least explored the posibilities of this approach in the preceding April, and I have personally been involved in excercises and operations where the carriers advanced toward the enemy at night. with adequate escort (which the US forces had), the risks to carriers is very slight indeed, provided night ASV equipped searchers are used to mainatin the position of the enemy throughout the night from the last known position the previous day.

 

[VBF-13]

In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.

You don't have to be instrument rated to fly at night but I believe all naval aviatiors of the period did have instrument training. Flying instruments in those days were very basic and there were few nav aids used for IMC verctoring and landing.