FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I think its safe to say the TBD is on the short list, the Swordfish isn't
Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two (1 Viewer)
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parsifal
Colonel
I dont disagree that torpedo bombers were vulnerable whilst in their final approach, but the allies judged later in the war that divebombing was an even more hazardous undertaking.......the aircraft had to fly in at an ideal height to be shot at, peel off and fall straight out of the sky at a prefdetermined angle along a predictable path, with the pilot struggling against G forces and a (usually) unresponsive aircraft. Truth is, everybody found divebombing and torpedo bombing hazardous work. Midway was not an especially hostile environment.
.
The advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. For a start, there were no fighters no CAP to contend with, and it was the CAP that destroyed the VTs at Midway. Even if the Japanese had tried to respond to an approaching VT, they would simply have blundered about in the dark, not able to vector or direct their CAP properly. There was no Japanese radar in 1942, much less Radar intergrated into their air defence arrangements. They had no RDF to direct their fighters, and no radar assisted gunnery, which significantly downgrades the effectiveness of their 25mm batteries which all relied on sight for targetting.
As for loss of accuracy, for properly trained crews, such penalty simply does not exist. ive just finished posting hits at taranto establishing that the hit ratio was about 80%. Over the Bismark it was about 35%, whilst at other times in night conditions it varied to a high of 125% down to zero. Accuracy is all over the place, but nowhere is there a consistent pattern that accuracy suffers if the attacks are made at nighht by properly trained crews. Only if your crews and equipments are not sufficiently trained does this become an issue. and thats the problem. But, if the USN had proper aircraft conversions, ASV fitted and crews and tactics worked out beforehand, I dont see any reason why they couldnt expect at least something back for theirt efforts in the TBDs. as its stands, as day bombers, they got nothing except a whole bunch of dead heroes. Even if you dont want to accept that potentially there is no penalty for night trained crews, how can it be argued that getting all your aircraft shot down for nothing is better than say 1 or 2 hits from a fully trained squadron. And neither was this failure an isolated incident. US VTs were spectacularly unsucessful throughout most of the war, mostly because of the crappy torpedo they were given,, but also because of the outmoded tactics that they insisted on clinging to. They had good equipment (eventually). and still they got virtually nothing back from them. Lucky for the USN they had an absolute winner in their divebomber, otherwise they would have been in a world of hurt.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
What is the source of your information?
The following sources show either five or six torpedoes hitting their target, one indicates a battleship was struck when the primary target was missed. The first source is the UK national archives site, the second source is the US Navy War College site, both reputable. The last one is rather detailed.
Taranto : Battles : History : Royal Navy
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/...k-at-Taranto,-The--Tactical-Success,-Operatio
The Royal Navy in World War II - Robert Jackson - Google Books
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
I do not like being called someone that posts half truths, especially from someone who has posted the following
1.
When in reality out of 10 drops, only 6 hit.
2.
Apparently there were as many as 18 torpedoes launched by Swordfish against the Bismarck or a ship thought to be the Bismarck that day and only three struck. Some failures, however, were probably due to torpedo failure. Counting missed hits is statistically correct.
3.
When the attack was over at 2105 hours, it was only 15 minutes after sunset and into a 30-40 minute twilight period. Maybe someone who lives around 48 degrees north (Seattle) could go outside at 9:05 PM and make pirep (pilot report) on how bright the" pitch black" night is. I even had a reference to a pix showing a returning Swordfish in a not so dark sky. I went outside about 10 minutes after sunset and it was not pitch dark, in fact I have played sports at that light level. In LA, twilight does not last very long.
4.
Which is correct and I never disagreed but you followed up with this
5.
What I had said this, ". It was not a night attack. Visibility was poor however and radar was needed." So I never said visibility was good.
The weather was indeed miserable and visibility poor and it is a tribute to the Swordfish crew that they were able to fly much less execute the mission. It must also be noted that the first strike failed to establish tracking of the Bismarck and required help from the Sheffield to reestablish contact.
6.
By error, the bombers were the first to attack at Pearl Harbor.
Before making snide remarks of other posters, you may want to verify you own information.
You comment about the Swordfish being better able to attack at night or in bad weather is only partially correct. A good handling stable aircraft is of benefit a night, however in the bad weather present at the Bismarck, the plane would have been a bear to control. Low wing loading, slow aircraft are highly susceptible to strong, gusting winds. In a low altitude situation, high wing loading is greatly preferred for stability, making the attack on the Bismarck all the more impressive.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
Hands down the Manchester
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Sums it up right there
Ok here's an excerpt from the WW2 Swordfish manual:
"Vne = 206 knots and the manual states that the aircraft is designed for maneuvers appropriate to a torpedo-divebomber and training aircraft."
I got the Albacore manual as well, and by way of comparison, it's Vne = 215 knots.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
No Avengers were launched or were present on the Hornet at Midway. Some were launched from the island without fighter escort and only one came back, badly damaged. They were piloted by a portion of VT8 which had been deleted from VT8 on the Hornet.
Renrich, the Avengers didn't come out on the Hornet, they missed that. But I believe they were launched from it once they made it out there from Pearl. Anyway, that's collateral to the reason I mentioned them, which was to point out, they, too, were in that fight, and yet didn't fare any better than the Devastators did, and, for the same reason, no support flying into that task force's "home turf" (in a manner of speaking).
PS: Parsifal, your reply is much longer, I'll get to it later; busy right now...
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
At what speed? At what G limitations? If you fly abrupt maneuvers at or close to Vne you can do structural damage to the aircraft, especially if flying through turbulent air - examine what "maneuvering speed" is on an aircraft. (In modern times it's the green arc on an airspeed indicator).
You also fail to point out the very next sentence, "Spinning and aerobatics are not permitted." Hmmmmm - if you can't do aerobatics which at a minimum may place anywhere from +3 - 5 positive Gs on the aircraft to -1.5 - 3 negative Gs how can you say this aircraft is "stressed for dive-bombing?" How many Gs are being pulled on a dedicated dive bomber when it pulls out of a dive?
From memory and check me if you like...
Stuka 6gs
SBD 5gs
SB2C 5gs (in Tillman's book an SB2C pilot claims 11Gs)
Skua 5gs
BTW, any pitch maneuver over 30 degrees is considered aerobatic - what's the angle of a vertical dive?
Again - where does anything you post say the aircraft was "stressed" for dive-bombing? What's the date of this publication written by the MA who would authorize such maneuvers in the first place???
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davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
The Avengers in the fight were all launched from Midway. They shot down one zero!
OK, I'll buy that. But so what? My point is they were there and they didn't fare any better than the Devastators in the task they were put to and for the same reason.
At what speed? At what G limitations? If you fly abrupt maneuvers at or close to Vne you can do structural damage to the aircraft, especially if flying through turbulent air - examine what "maneuvering speed" is on an aircraft. (In modern times it's the green arc on an airspeed indicator).
You also fail to point out the very next sentence, "Spinning and aerobatics are not permitted." Hmmmmm - if you can't do aerobatics which at a minimum may place anywhere from +3 - 5 positive Gs on the aircraft to -1.5 - 3 negative Gs how can you say this aircraft is "stressed for dive-bombing?" How many Gs are being pulled on a dedicated dive bomber when it pulls out of a dive?
From memory and check me if you like...
Stuka 6gs
SBD 5gs
SB2C 5gs (in Tillman's book an SB2C pilot claims 11Gs)
Skua 5gs
BTW, any pitch maneuver over 30 degrees is considered aerobatic - what's the angle of a vertical dive?
Again - where does anything you post say the aircraft was "stressed" for dive-bombing? What's the date of this publication written by the MA who would authorize such maneuvers in the first place???
I actually downloaded the manuals for the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda (they had a special for all 3) and aerobatics and spins are prohibited in those as well.
The Barracuda manual states:
"49. Flying Limitations
(i) The aircraft is designed for manoeuvers appropriate to a torpedo and dive-bomber, and spinning and aerobatics are not permitted."
The TBM-3 manual also states that spins and aerobatics are prohibited:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...1942949-grumman-eastern-tbm-manual-tbm-3-.pdf
See pages 35-36.
There are numerous accounts of the Swordfish being able to dive vertically, or near vertically with and without torpedoes and bombs and its pilot's notes state that it is a Torpedo-divebomber. I think I've provided enough data to prove that the authours making these statements, such as Charles lamb, War in a Stringbag, and Brown, Wings of the navy are not lying.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
And I think you'll find that the Albacore and Barracuda were also stress higher and had "Dive Bombing" as a SPECIFIC part of their design specification.
And this is related how??? The P-39 flight manual says you can't spin it either!
If you say so - you're original statement was the aircraft was "stressed for dive-bombing." There is no doubt that it did bomb vertically. There is NO evidence that at its design it was "stressed for dive-bombing" as it was a primary function. I showed you the original specifications the aircraft was designed to. It was an aircraft that could do dive bombing (no faster than 200 knots and probably no more G loading than 3 or 4gs) but there is no evidence the aircraft had any dive bombing stress factor built into it way back in 1933. The fact that it was capable of doing dive bombing "just came out that way." Compare it with other aircraft I listed that were dive bombers in performace (dive speeds, equipment, G loading) in the true sense of the word, well that's another story
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parsifal
Colonel
I used a number of sources some on line and some in print. Here is the link to one of the the online sources
Operation Judgement - the Attack on Taranto Timeline
The chief printed sources are
Kemp Lcdr (RN) "Fleet Air Arm At Taranto" London Hebert Jenkins 1954
(Kemp participated in Operation Judgement)
Bragadin Cdr Marc Antonio (Italian Navy) "The Italian Navy In WWII" (Annapolis 1957)
Bragadin is one of the more or les official historians of the italian Navy
Norman Polmar, "Aircraft Carriers in WWII Vol II", McDonald Co 1966
This is the detail of the actual attacks that I found in Kemps book . It differs from the online source, but ther is some doubt about the number of hits obtained.
Individual attacks
(Part I of II)
The first wave
L4A (815) Lt-Cdr. Williamson (Commander) and Lt. Scarlett. (Torpedo)
Arriving at 22.50, they flew over San Pietro Island at 4,000ft, making a slow decent, and flying almost straight across the bay through the Tarantola balloon barrage before launching their torpedo which passed between the destroyer Fulmine and the Lampo striking the Conte di Cavour between the bridge and B turret. Turning away after the attack, they either dipped a wing tip in the water, or were struck by fire from the Fulmine, or both. The result being they crashed into the sea, survived, rescued and taken prisoner.
L4C (815) Sub-Lt. Sparke and Sub-Lt. Neale (Torpedo)
They flew at 4,000ft over San Pietro Island and started to dive. The aircraft was down on the water about half way across the Mar Grande and crossed the Tarantola breakwater. Unable to identify the Littorio, the Cavour was seen and attacked at a range of 700 yards. The torpedo missed its target.
L4R (815) Sub-Lt. Macaulay and Sub-Lt. Wray (Torpedo)
They followed the same approach route taken by the previous aircraft, and again the target was the Cavour which they attacked from 600 yards. The torpedo missed its target.
[Note: At 23:15, aboard the Doria, the crew witnessed two explosions which were mistaken for bombs, but they were probably caused by the torpedoes of L4C and L4R exploding upon contact with the bottom.]
L4K (815) Lt. Kemp and Sub-Lt. Bailey (Torpedo)
They came in from the west, north of San Pietro Island at a height of 4,000ft. Passing north of the cruisers and their balloons they flattened out on a line for the Littorio. The torpedo was dropped at 23.18 from 1,000 yards and struck the ship on her starboard bow.
L4M (815) Lt. Swayne and Sub-Lt. Buscall (Torpedo)
Having become detached from the leader they waited off the harbour for 15 minutes for the arrival of the other aircraft. When the first flare was seen, they came in at 1,000 feet over the westerly breakwater. Flying easterly across the Mar Grande and losing height until reaching the end of the Tarantola breakwater they made a sharp turn to port so as to approach the Littorio from the east. The torpedo was dropped at about 22.15 from 400 yards and they continued passing directly over the ship. The torpedo struck the Littorio abaft the funnels on the port quarter.
E4F (813) Lt. Maund and Sub-Lt. Bull (Torpedo)The last of the torpedo bombers came in over Rondinella Point, north of the cruisers and launched its torpedo from 1,300 yards at the Vittorio Veneto, but the torpedo exploded upon contact with the bottom.
L4P (815) Lt. Kiggell and Lt. Janvrin (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
Their objective was to drop flares along the eastern shore and bomb any convenient target. They came in at 7,000ft over San Vito at 22.58 flying NE and commenced dropping a line of eight flares at half mile intervals from near the point where the Tarantola breakwater meets land. After the flares had been dropped, they turned to starboard looking for a target, and made a dive bombing attack on the most southerly oil storage depot. No results were observed.
L5B (819) Lt. Lamb and Lt. Grieve(16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
They were the stand by flare droppers. Coming in astern of L4P (Kiggell and Janvrin), they saw that the first flares appeared to be illuminating satisfactorily, so no more flares were dropped. They then bombed the same oil storage tanks, but again no results were observed.
E5A(824) Capt. Patch and Lt. Goodwin ( 6x250lb bombs)
Their task was to bomb the line of cruisers and destroyers moored against the quay side on the south of the Mar Piccolo. They came in at 8,500 feet over San Pietro Island at 23.06, crossed the Mar Grande and the canal and to the middle of the western portion of the Mar Piccolo. Two minutes later the target was identified and a dive bombing attack was made from 1,500 feet obliquely across two cruisers from N.W. to S.E. at 23.15. The Libeccio was hit but the bombs failed to explode.
L4L (815) Sub-Lt. Sarra; Sub-Lt. Bowker (6x250lb bombs)
Their initial objective was to attack the cruisers and destroyers in the Mar Piccolo. But coming in at 8,000ft over the western mainland and diving to 1,500 feet over the Mar Piccolo, they were unable to identify the target. Continuing along the southern shore of the Mar Piccolo they attacked the seaplane base from 500ft. They achieved several hits causing an explosion and fire in a hangar.
L4H (815) Sub-Lt. Forde and Sub-Lt. Mardel (6x250lb bombs)
They were separated from the leader and arrived as the first flare was dropped and came in east of Cape San Vito. On reaching te Mar Piccolo they turned, and flying at 1,500ft from NE to SW, delivered their attack on two cruisers. The first bomb hit the water short of the target but the remainder hit the cruiser although no immediate results were observed. Intense A.A. fire from the cruisers moored in the Mar Piccolo was met throughout the dive. They were uncertain whether their bombs had released and circled the western basin of the Mar Piccolo and repeated the attack.
E5Q (824) Lt. Murray and Sub-Lt. Paine (6x250lb bombs)
They came in east of Cape San Vito when the attack was already in progress and the flares were dropping. They continued until the eastern end of the Mar Piccolo was reached and turning to port flew along the southern shore. Their objective was the cruisers and destroyers, which they attacked from 3,000ft, the bombs dropping in a line running from E to W. commencing by the most eastern jetty and extending across four of the destroyers to the most westerly cruiser in the line, hitting the Libeccio but the bomb failed to detonate.
With their individual tasks completed, the last aircraft left Taranto 23.35, landing on Illustrious 01.55.
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parsifal
Colonel
Part II of II
The Second Strike
The second wave of nine aircraft started flying off at 21.28 and 8 aircraft were off by 21.34. L5F (Clifford, Going) was accidentally damaged before take off in a collision with L5Q and had to be struck down to the hangar for repairs to the wing fabric. It was eventually flown off at 21.58.
At 22.05, L5Q (Morford, Green), lost its external overload tank when it became detached, forcing the aircraft to return to the carrier which fired on it as it was not expected, but landed safely. That left only eight Swordfish to take part in the second strike.
At 22.50 the Squadron commenced to climb and at 23.15 when 60 miles away sighted flares and antiaircraft fire from Taranto, which continued until at 23.50. When the northwest shore of the Gulf of Taranto was sighted, the Squadron turned to the north-east at 8,000ft and detached the flare droppers at 23.55.
Lieutenant-Commander Hale's plan was for the all his torpedo bombers to approach from the NW at high altitude. They were to pass north of Rondinella Point and, skirting the cruisers to the north, fly over the balloons, turn southwards and dive quickly to sea level and attack the battleships from the north, as this gave them overlapping targets and a greater chance of hitting something.
Individual attacks
L5A (819) Lt-Cdr. Hale (Commander) and Lt. Carline (Torpedo)
They came in a mile north of Rondinella Point at 5,000ft, glided down over the commercial basin, and steering directly for the Littorio, dropped their torpedo from about 700 yards. [See note after L5K.]
E4H (813) Lt. Bayly and Lt. Slaughter (Torpedo)
As they approached, they were hit by intense AA fire and crashed into the harbour killing both crew. The body of Sub Lieutenant Bayly was found and buried with full military honours, while the body of Lieutenant Slaughter was never found. They were the only aircrew fatalities during the course of the entire raid.
L5H(819) Lt. Lee and Sub-Lt. Jones (Torpedo)
They came in astern of L5A (Hale and Carline) over Rondinella Point, gliding down to a point south of the canal, dropping their torpedo from about 800 yards at the Duilio, striking the ship on the starboard side.
L5K(819) Lt. Torrens-Spence and Lt. Sutton (Torpedo)Following the Flight Leader L5A (Hale and Carline), they came in over Rondinella Point, and glided down to a point south of the canal. Their torpedo was aimed at the Littorio but failed to release at first attempt, so they held their course, tried again and finally released the torpedo manually from 700 yards.
[Note: What is certain is that a torpedo from either L5A or L5K struck the Littorio on its starboard side. But what is not known is who to credit with the hit, as they both launched their torpedoes from similar positions at about the same time.]
E5H (824) Lt. Wellham and Lt. Humphreys (Torpedo)
They came in over Rondinella Point, over Mar Piccolo, and the Town of Taranto, and turned to starboard to the centre of the Mar Grande. Diving to attack, the aircraft was hit by AA fire causing severe aileron damage, putting the aircraft temporarily out of control. Regaining partial control, the torpedo was dropped from about 500 yards aimed at the Vittorio Veneto which missed. After which they received further wing damage from AA fire and, heavily damaged, limped back to Illustrious.
L5B (819) Lt. Hamilton and Sub-Lt. Weeks (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
They came in over Cape San Vito at 7,500 feet, and dived to 5,000 feet, dropping a line of flares at intervals of 15 seconds to the eastward of the harbour. After dropping all flares successfully, they delivered a dive bombing attack from 2,500ft on the oil storage depot, starting a small fire.
L4F(815) Lt. Skelton and Sub-Lt. Perkins (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
Their approach was similar to L5B (Hamilton and Weeks) except that the flares were dropped south-east of the harbour, from between 6,500 feet and 5,000 feet. They then bombed the oil storage depot without apparent success.
L5F(819) Lt. Clifford and Lt. Going (6x250lb bombs)
Due to their flight deck collision with L5Q, they started 25 minutes late and arrived at Taranto when the second attack was already in progress. They came in over the land about 5 miles east of the harbour entrance, and steered straight over the dockyard to the far side of the Mar Piccolo. Turning to port an attack was made from 2,500 feet along the line of cruisers and destroyers from west to east. A stick of bombs was dropped across the cruisers Trento and Miraglia. One bomb hit the Trento causing minor damage, but failing to explode.
L5Q (819) Lt. Morford and Sub-Lt. Green (6x250lb bombs)
They developed trouble with the auxiliary tank shortly after take-off and took no further part in the operation.
The Second Strike
The second wave of nine aircraft started flying off at 21.28 and 8 aircraft were off by 21.34. L5F (Clifford, Going) was accidentally damaged before take off in a collision with L5Q and had to be struck down to the hangar for repairs to the wing fabric. It was eventually flown off at 21.58.
At 22.05, L5Q (Morford, Green), lost its external overload tank when it became detached, forcing the aircraft to return to the carrier which fired on it as it was not expected, but landed safely. That left only eight Swordfish to take part in the second strike.
At 22.50 the Squadron commenced to climb and at 23.15 when 60 miles away sighted flares and antiaircraft fire from Taranto, which continued until at 23.50. When the northwest shore of the Gulf of Taranto was sighted, the Squadron turned to the north-east at 8,000ft and detached the flare droppers at 23.55.
Lieutenant-Commander Hale's plan was for the all his torpedo bombers to approach from the NW at high altitude. They were to pass north of Rondinella Point and, skirting the cruisers to the north, fly over the balloons, turn southwards and dive quickly to sea level and attack the battleships from the north, as this gave them overlapping targets and a greater chance of hitting something.
Individual attacks
L5A (819) Lt-Cdr. Hale (Commander) and Lt. Carline (Torpedo)
They came in a mile north of Rondinella Point at 5,000ft, glided down over the commercial basin, and steering directly for the Littorio, dropped their torpedo from about 700 yards. [See note after L5K.]
E4H (813) Lt. Bayly and Lt. Slaughter (Torpedo)
As they approached, they were hit by intense AA fire and crashed into the harbour killing both crew. The body of Sub Lieutenant Bayly was found and buried with full military honours, while the body of Lieutenant Slaughter was never found. They were the only aircrew fatalities during the course of the entire raid.
L5H(819) Lt. Lee and Sub-Lt. Jones (Torpedo)
They came in astern of L5A (Hale and Carline) over Rondinella Point, gliding down to a point south of the canal, dropping their torpedo from about 800 yards at the Duilio, striking the ship on the starboard side.
L5K(819) Lt. Torrens-Spence and Lt. Sutton (Torpedo)Following the Flight Leader L5A (Hale and Carline), they came in over Rondinella Point, and glided down to a point south of the canal. Their torpedo was aimed at the Littorio but failed to release at first attempt, so they held their course, tried again and finally released the torpedo manually from 700 yards.
[Note: What is certain is that a torpedo from either L5A or L5K struck the Littorio on its starboard side. But what is not known is who to credit with the hit, as they both launched their torpedoes from similar positions at about the same time.]
E5H (824) Lt. Wellham and Lt. Humphreys (Torpedo)
They came in over Rondinella Point, over Mar Piccolo, and the Town of Taranto, and turned to starboard to the centre of the Mar Grande. Diving to attack, the aircraft was hit by AA fire causing severe aileron damage, putting the aircraft temporarily out of control. Regaining partial control, the torpedo was dropped from about 500 yards aimed at the Vittorio Veneto which missed. After which they received further wing damage from AA fire and, heavily damaged, limped back to Illustrious.
L5B (819) Lt. Hamilton and Sub-Lt. Weeks (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
They came in over Cape San Vito at 7,500 feet, and dived to 5,000 feet, dropping a line of flares at intervals of 15 seconds to the eastward of the harbour. After dropping all flares successfully, they delivered a dive bombing attack from 2,500ft on the oil storage depot, starting a small fire.
L4F(815) Lt. Skelton and Sub-Lt. Perkins (16 flares and 4x250lb bombs)
Their approach was similar to L5B (Hamilton and Weeks) except that the flares were dropped south-east of the harbour, from between 6,500 feet and 5,000 feet. They then bombed the oil storage depot without apparent success.
L5F(819) Lt. Clifford and Lt. Going (6x250lb bombs)
Due to their flight deck collision with L5Q, they started 25 minutes late and arrived at Taranto when the second attack was already in progress. They came in over the land about 5 miles east of the harbour entrance, and steered straight over the dockyard to the far side of the Mar Piccolo. Turning to port an attack was made from 2,500 feet along the line of cruisers and destroyers from west to east. A stick of bombs was dropped across the cruisers Trento and Miraglia. One bomb hit the Trento causing minor damage, but failing to explode.
L5Q (819) Lt. Morford and Sub-Lt. Green (6x250lb bombs)
They developed trouble with the auxiliary tank shortly after take-off and took no further part in the operation.
parsifal
Colonel
Neither do I
The rest of your reply is pure personal attack. i dont respond to those
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Gentelmen - play nice. There is a lot of good info here, let's keep it running....
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