Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
Thanks for the Taranto info

Juha

 

[renrich]

VBF13, NO Avengers were launched from any carrier at Midway. The left over pilots from Hornet's VT8 ferried the Avengers ( six I think but I am not going to look it up) from PH out to Midway. Some of VT8 that was left after Midway wound up later at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and when they ran out of airplanes, they were given 03s and sent to the line.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Six is correct: 4 were shot down and 1 crashed on the way back leaving one extremely shot up one left with a dead gunner landing back at Midway.

 

[Oreo]

Hands down the Manchester

Even worse than the He 177?

 

[Oreo]

Bombers that had some inherent problems include:

Manchester
He 177
Botha
Fw 200C


Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for include:
Battle
TBD
Blenheim
Ju 87
Ventura
Hampden
G3M
G4M
Br 20

 

[razor1uk]

I think that considering the availilable data, that both the TBD and Swordfish cannot be considered as the no.1 worst, as not only has there been demonsrated much data about them and there proponants for the worst, many of which, them or ourselves have chimed in upon this; akin to when you feel like your triing to defend something opinionatedly heartfelt that come hell or divebombing, we woulsn't shift..) that there are others that are likelier one worse than either of those.

As a urine taker, mmm just for the pidgeons since the worst bomber developed in thread towards torpedo bombers....

the Fairley Battle? Su-2? Br.64? IL-2T?...

 

[parsifal]

If you say so - you're original statement was the aircraft was "stressed for dive-bombing." There is no doubt that it did bomb vertically. There is NO evidence that at its design it was "stressed for dive-bombing" as it was a primary function. I showed you the original specifications the aircraft was designed to. It was an aircraft that could do dive bombing (no faster than 200 knots and probably no more G loading than 3 or 4gs) but there is no evidence the aircraft had any dive bombing stress factor built into it way back in 1933. The fact that it was capable of doing dive bombing "just came out that way." Compare it with other aircraft I listed that were dive bombers in performace (dive speeds, equipment, G loading) in the true sense of the word, well that's another story

I have to agree, Swordfish were not designed as divebombers.

Swordfish however did prove to be remarkably strong. as you say, there are numerous sources that attest to its ability to dive bomb. Moreover, such attacks are documented as being verital, or near vertical. Some have described these attacks as more "floating" down rather than a "power dive" because the rate of descent was that gentle. Ther was no problem in fitting roskets and metal blast shields to the undersides of the wings for the Mk II and later. Whilst its a bit dangerous to generalise an often used method of attack against submarines was to track the sub above the cloud cover, tracking the sub by radar, dive down through the cloud , drop flares, and launch a rapid rocket firing attack. These tactics (and others no doubt) delivers at least 22 kills for the swordfish with at least another 16 probables. Operating from 14 escort carriers, thats an impressive tally, and attests to the basic styrength of the aircraft.

One thing further worth noting, the Swordfish was not a small aircraft. I dont know how much difference that makes, but it certainly w as no breeze driven waif at the mercy of the wind and rain . Its operational record shows that. No other carrier borne strike aircraft operated on a regular basis north of the arctic circle. that in itself tells a lot about how it handled rough conditions. It had a high reputation for operating wll in difficult conditions

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I have to agree, Swordfish were not designed as divebombers.

Swordfish however did prove to be remarkably strong. as you say, there are numerous sources that attest to its ability to dive bomb. Moreover, such attacks are documented as being verital, or near vertical. Some have described these attacks as more "floating" down rather than a "power dive" because the rate of descent was that gentle. Ther was no problem in fitting roskets and metal blast shields to the undersides of the wings for the Mk II and later. Whilst its a bit dangerous to generalise an often used method of attack against submarines was to track the sub above the cloud cover, tracking the sub by radar, dive down through the cloud , drop flares, and launch a rapid rocket firing attack. These tactics (and others no doubt) delivers at least 22 kills for the swordfish with at least another 16 probables. Operating from 14 escort carriers, thats an impressive tally, and attests to the basic styrength of the aircraft.

One thing further worth noting, the Swordfish was not a small aircraft. I dont know how much difference that makes, but it certainly w as no breeze driven waif at the mercy of the wind and rain . Its operational record shows that. No other carrier borne strike aircraft operated on a regular basis north of the arctic circle. that in itself tells a lot about how it handled rough conditions. It had a high reputation for operating wll in difficult conditions

In researching over the past several days about this subject, it seems it took "a lot" to even get the Swordfish up to 200 MPH in a dive. Some where I read one pilot stated he needed 12,000 feet for a 200 MPH dive, don't know if that was his personal experience or the norm. The engine had RPM limitations in the dive and just the nature of this aircraft caused it to really slow up when pulling out of a dive (guy wires, fixed landing gear, etc.) There isn't much found in RAF or RN pilot's notes about maneuvering speeds at various weights, but I'll bet dollars to donuts that you're going to start bending the Swordfish if you push it beyond 4Gs.

In dive bombing with the Swordfish, you're not looking at the traditional screaming power dive and high G pull up.....

The slow landing speed made it perfect in foul weather providing you didn't have to deal with variable winds as it only had a 15 knot cross wing component (the same as a Cessna 172!) at the same time it was probably miserable coming aboard ship in an open cockpit

 

[razor1uk]

While an open cockpit can unsuredly be miserable, considering that is splittinghairs as the basis fore or against if nothings else, is following approved 'just' nationalism eh, it could be also be seen as a reason for it, if being the decideing factor yes?

Surely there are one or two others that could be considered worse for the number one spot for Worst WW2 Bomber (when did it saiy Dive Bomber or Naval Dive Bomber) gvivng a lack of evidence, not wheught for it...?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

While an open cockpit can unsuredly be miserable, considering that is splittinghairs as the basis fore or against if nothings else, is following approved 'just' nationalism eh, it could be also be seen as a reason for it, if being the decideing factor yes?

NO. I think no one said anything about this aircraft being on the worse list because of that, and when you're freezing your balls off, I think nationalism isn't even thought of!

BTW, I'll say it again - the Swordfish doesn't belong on this list...

 

[VBF-13]

I dont disagree that torpedo bombers were vulnerable whilst in their final approach, but the allies judged later in the war that divebombing was an even more hazardous undertaking.......the aircraft had to fly in at an ideal height to be shot at, peel off and fall straight out of the sky at a prefdetermined angle along a predictable path, with the pilot struggling against G forces and a (usually) unresponsive aircraft. Truth is, everybody found divebombing and torpedo bombing hazardous work. Midway was not an especially hostile environment.

The advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. For a start, there were no fighters no CAP to contend with, and it was the CAP that destroyed the VTs at Midway. Even if the Japanese had tried to respond to an approaching VT, they would simply have blundered about in the dark, not able to vector or direct their CAP properly. There was no Japanese radar in 1942, much less Radar intergrated into their air defence arrangements. They had no RDF to direct their fighters, and no radar assisted gunnery, which significantly downgrades the effectiveness of their 25mm batteries which all relied on sight for targetting.

As for loss of accuracy, for properly trained crews, such penalty simply does not exist. ive just finished posting hits at taranto establishing that the hit ratio was about 80%. Over the Bismark it was about 35%, whilst at other times in night conditions it varied to a high of 125% down to zero. Accuracy is all over the place, but nowhere is there a consistent pattern that accuracy suffers if the attacks are made at nighht by properly trained crews. Only if your crews and equipments are not sufficiently trained does this become an issue. and thats the problem. But, if the USN had proper aircraft conversions, ASV fitted and crews and tactics worked out beforehand, I dont see any reason why they couldnt expect at least something back for theirt efforts in the TBDs. as its stands, as day bombers, they got nothing except a whole bunch of dead heroes. Even if you dont want to accept that potentially there is no penalty for night trained crews, how can it be argued that getting all your aircraft shot down for nothing is better than say 1 or 2 hits from a fully trained squadron. And neither was this failure an isolated incident. US VTs were spectacularly unsucessful throughout most of the war, mostly because of the crappy torpedo they were given,, but also because of the outmoded tactics that they insisted on clinging to. They had good equipment (eventually). and still they got virtually nothing back from them. Lucky for the USN they had an absolute winner in their divebomber, otherwise they would have been in a world of hurt.

OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.

On the SBDs. The Navy practiced dive-bombing in those literally through the end of the War. Those pilots would score hits on die markers in the Gulf and Atlantic out of bases like NAS Opalaka day and night. You're right about the predetermined angle and that was monitored from the base and went into those pilots' scores. Struggling against G-forces? Sure they were. Coming out of their dives they temporarily blacked out. They expected that and drilled with that expectation. Unresponsive aircraft? Really? Tell that to that task force they sent back to Japan looking like a wet dog that got kicked out of the house for chewing on a shoe. Truth is dive-bombing is hazardous work? Sure it is. This was war.

On your last paragraph, you're in a little over my head. I'm not knocking your torpedo-bombers, as they do sound as though they were much better endowed than ours. To throw off the failure of an unescorted squadron of torpedo-bombers to get off a hit on a task force like that, however, on the theory the torpedos they were carrying were substandard, or on inferior tactics, or on an unsuitability for daylight operations, whatever, is, I find, truly fascinating, I'm sorry to have to tell you that.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.

You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!

 

[VBF-13]

You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!

They dropped them before they were in position, that would be my guess. They had no choice, really. They were like ducks flying into a shooting gallery.

PS: One of you boys start the threads on the torpedoes, I'll lurk and learn in them.

 

[parsifal]

OK, look, I'll tell you right out, I'm not persuaded the Devastators (or, for that matter, the Avengers) failed because they were ill-equipped for the task at hand. They failed because they went in there alone. Your Swordfishes wouldn't have fared any better had they gone in there alone. Those aircraft were the most vulnerable when they were about to deploy their weapons. They needed cover when flying into enemy firepower to occupy and distract that firepower from them, otherwise they were sitting ducks for it.

Swordfish, if attacking in daylight unescorted would have been slaughtered, just like the TBFs and the TBDs. Im not arguing that. Im saying that as part of a night capable weapon system, with adequate torpedoes, properly trained crews, a doctrine and procedure for attacks at night, and an aircraft suited to night operations, they didnt need to be escorted, and had a high probabilty of succeeding. If we assume a similar number of Swordfish in place of the TBDs over the target at night how amny torpedoes might we expect being put into the Japanese carriers?. Anything from 0 to 12, depending on the luck and situation. Lets assume about 30-40% success, that means 3 or 4 topedo hits.

On your last paragraph, you're in a little over my head. I'm not knocking your torpedo-bombers, as they do sound as though they were much better endowed than ours. To throw off the failure of an unescorted squadron of torpedo-bombers to get off a hit on a task force like that, however, on the theory the torpedos they were carrying were substandard, or on inferior tactics, or on an unsuitability for daylight operations, whatever, is, I find, truly fascinating, I'm sorry to have to tell you that.

The Swordfish was not a wonder weapon, but it was suited to the role that it was put. And it enjoyed considerable success. Its apparent weaknesses (it slow speed) helped to also make it an accurate delivery system. i am not denying its basic obsolesence. I am disputing that use of slightly more high performance aircraft in daylight conditions was suicide, and that far more could have been derived from those aircraft (the TBDs) if they had been trained and used at night, using the same tactics as the Swordfish crews.

There is no denying the crappiness of US torpedoes, though this was rectified by early 1944. US VYs still did not enjoy a high success rate even with decent torps, against an enemy that by that stage was clearly on the ropes. Even without torps, having a fully night capable squadron on each carrier would have been a help, not a hindrance to US daylight strikes. It would have allowed tracking of the enemy day or night and thereby greatly increased the utility of the USN CVs

 

[parsifal]

You're probably correct but what made matters worse was our crappy torpedoes. Remember the discussion about VT-8 scoring 4 hits on Japanese carriers? If I remember correctly all 4 torpedoes actually ran below the carriers due to their detonators possibly being destroyed when they were dropped. Interesting scenarios; would be what would have happened if VT-8 had better torpedoes at Midway or if Swordfishes had US torpedoes at Taranto!!!

Thats not as easy as it sounds. The USN did issue certificates of serviceability (i forget the correct phrqasing) for their torpedoes. One has to assume that if launched with sufficient care, and if properly serviced, they could hold their depth properly and explode when the trigger was detonated. If that assumption is correct, and given the slower speed of the swordfish there is at least an arguablke case that a Swordfish armed with a bliss evitt might have gotten a better result. Perhaps not as well....I am not an expert on US torpedoes....

 

[davparlr]

This is the detail of the actual attacks that I found in Kemps book . It differs from the online source, but ther is some doubt about the number of hits obtained.

Individual attacks
(Part I of II)

The first wave

Part II of II

The Second Strike

This has the best detail I have seen and is pretty consistent with the sources I listed with 10 torpedoes launched, most sources I read said 11, but one crashed before launch, and 5 hits. Of course torpedoes into the mud tend to sway the percentage of accuracy, however the problem also existed with the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. All in all, it appears to me that the two attacks were similarly successful. It is just too bad that US Naval command did not study this attack as the Japanese Naval command did.

 

[davparlr]

Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.

There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.

In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.

AF Manual 51-37

 

[parsifal]

This has the best detail I have seen and is pretty consistent with the sources I listed with 10 torpedoes launched, most sources I read said 11, but one crashed before launch, and 5 hits. Of course torpedoes into the mud tend to sway the percentage of accuracy, however the problem also existed with the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. All in all, it appears to me that the two attacks were similarly successful. It is just too bad that US Naval command did not study this attack as the Japanese Naval command did.

The difficulty is that the source material is sometimes inconsistent. The timeline link I originally posted gives three more hits, i dont think that is very credible. Bragadin says that the Libeccio was hit by a dud torpedo, and that an additional hit was achieved on the littorio (but was also a dud). This was the single hit for two aircraft listed by kemp i think. Polmar says that libeccio was hit by a dud torpedo and not a dud bomb the same as Bragadin.

So, we have a choice. we can accept kemps account, and impressive eye witnes account that says 5 hits, we can accept bragadins account whose navy it was that was on the receiving end, and count 7 hits, or we can accept polmars account, a well respected historian on carrier operations, and settle for 6 hits (1 dud); Finally, we can get really funky and accept the online source that lists 8 hits (2 duds)

Nothing is ever simple or straight forward in life

 

[VBF-13]

In primary instrument training in the AF, we were told, on losing attitude information to fly "needle, ball, and airspeed", using turn indicator. The needle told you if you were in a turn and how much of one, the ball told you if you were in a slip, and increasing airspeed told you that you were in a descent and decreasing airspeed told you that you were in a climb. We only studied this and did not practice it.

At NAS Norfolk the Air Force administered the Night Vision Training (Evelyn Trainer) Program for the Naval Aviators in the Atlantic Fleet. At least, in late 1944, that's how it was. I mention that only because when I searched it on Google I was surprised to find more women named "Evelyn Trainer" than any historical data on it.

And, OK, I'll admit it, I thought we could all use the laugh.

PS: Now get off your cans and give me some "Likes" for this!