I have nothing to add, here, really. That is to say, you put it that way, I know specifically where you were going with this, now, and we're on the same page.
Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two
- Thread starter nuuumannn
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davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
AF Manual 51-37
YES, that's it! I was trying to remember. I probably have one around here somewhere. Old age is a terrible thing.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
parsifal
Colonel
US Mk13 Aerial Torpedoes:
These were the only aerial torpedoes built by the USN durung the war, but there were about nine different marks that steadily improved the reliability of this weapon as the war progressed.
The following is an excerpt from Nav wapons that gives a prety good indication as to why the USN had so much trouble with torps at the start. They only had 156 new torps at the startt of the war, the reserve stocks dated back to a design developed in 1915!!!!!
"Finally, in 1938 the Mark 13 became the first specifically-designed aircraft torpedo accepted into service in the USN. This became the most common US airborne torpedo of World War II. Markedly different from airborne torpedoes of other navies in that it was short and fat vs. short and thin. Also different in its relatively low speed and long range. A total of 17,000 were produced during World War II.
A total of 156 Mark 13 Mod 0 torpedoes were produced which was enough to provide two loads for each of the four 18-plane torpedo squadrons assigned to the pre-war carrier fleet plus a dozen spares. Mod 0 differed from later mods by having a rail-type tail in which the propellers were in front of the rudders. This was the only US torpedo to ever have this feature. The Newport Torpedo Station was unhappy with arrangement for reasons unknown and the Mod 1 entered service in 1940 with a conventional propeller arrangement, as can be seen in the photographs above. Unfortunately and unlike the Mod 0, the Mod 1 proved to be an unreliable weapon, with only one of ten torpedoes dropped by VT-6 during an exercise in July 1941 having a hot, straight and normal run. Of the others, four sank and could not be recovered while the other five experienced erratic runs.
These problems continued into the early war years, with a mid-1943 analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots found that 36 percent ran cold (did not start), 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total exceeds 100 percent as many torpedoes had more than one defect. The early models were further handicapped by the need to drop them low and slow - typically 50 feet (15 m) and 110 knots - which made the torpedo planes carrying them vulnerable to attack.
These problems were greatly reduced by the latter years of the war. Torpedoes had fin stabilizers, nose drag rings and tail shroud rings added, all of which worked to slow the torpedo after it was dropped so that it struck the water nose-first and at an acceptable speed. These improved the drop characteristics such that the recommended aircraft maximum launch parameters were increased to a height of 2,400 feet (730 m) and a speed of 410 knots.
A lanyard was attached to the tail of the torpedo. When dropped, the lanyard tripped a starting lever, but a water trip delay valve prevented the combustion flask from lighting off until the torpedo had entered the water. When dropped at 150 knots or more, the torpedo would enter the water at an angle of between 26 and 30 degrees. The water needed to be at least 150 feet deep (45 m) and the torpedo assumed its preset running depth after water travel of 300 yards (275 m). The exploder mechanism was armed after water travel of 200 yards (180 m). Depth could be set up to 50 feet (15 m).
The addition of the nose drag ring improved aerodynamic performance by stabilizing the torpedo in flight and reduced air speed by about 40 percent. It also acted as a shock absorber when the torpedo struck the water. The tail shroud ring improved the water run by reducing hooks and broaches and by eliminating much of the water roll which had characterized the earlier Mark 13s. Hot, straight and normal runs now approached 100 percent. To speed availability of the much improved torpedo, the Bureau of Ordnance had tail assemblies built with the shroud ring attached and then shipped these to the fleet for upgrading the existing inventory. By the fall of 1944, the modified torpedo was in general use by the front-line carrier units which were enthusiastic in their praise. On one occasion in early 1945, six torpedoes were dropped from altitudes between 5,000 and 7,000 feet (1,500 to 2,100 m). Five out of the six were observed to make their runs hot, straight and normal. By the end of the war, the USN considered the Mark 13 to be the best aircraft torpedo produced by any nation and it remained in service until 1951.
The Mark 13 has the distinction of having been the last torpedo used by by the US Navy in combat and the world's last use of aerial torpedoes in combat (as of December 2010). On 1 May 1951, following the failure of conventional aerial attacks with bombs, the Navy decided to use torpedoes against the sluice gates of the Hwachon Dam, located on the Pukham River just north of the 38th parallel. The dam waters were being used by the North Koreans to aid their own troop movements and hinder those of the Allies. USS Princeton CV-37 sent five AD-4 and three AD-4N Skyraiders into action and these planes each launched a single Mark 13 torpedo against the dam. One torpedo was a dud and another ran erratic, but the other six blew open the flood gates, successfully ending the North Korean control of the river water.
Modifications
Mod 1 - Improved tail, strengthened propellers, rudders moved in front of the propellers
Mod 2 - 40 knot experimental torpedo, development cancelled
Mod 2A - Mod 2 converted to 33.5 knots, water trip delay valve added to delay firing until water entry to prevent turbine runaway when dropped from over 300 feet (910 m)
Mod 3 - External gyro setting added
Mod 4 - Experimental Model; 50 produced with strengthened after body
Mod 5 - Addition of water trip to Mod 1
Mod 6 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 2A
Mod 7 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 3
Mod 8 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 4
Mod 9 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 5
Mod 10 - Strengthened after body, shroud ring, suspension beam, gyro angle eliminated
Mod 11 - Mod 6 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Mod 12 - Mod 7 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Mod 13 - Mod 9 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Success during World War II
From "US Naval Weapons" by Norman Friedman: "A review of war experience showed a total of 1,287 attacks [this count only includes those launched by carrier-borne aircraft, other US Navy aircraft launched another 150 torpedoes - TD], of which 40 percent (514) resulted in hits, including 50 percent hits on battleships and carriers (322 attacks, including Midway), 31 percent on destroyers (179 attacks), and 41 percent (out of 445 attacks) on merchant ships." Although not mentioned by Dr. Friedman, at least eight Japanese cruisers were struck by aircraft torpedoes during the war. This hit percentage is much too high, but illustrates the over claiming that was typical of all nation's pilots during the war".
These were the only aerial torpedoes built by the USN durung the war, but there were about nine different marks that steadily improved the reliability of this weapon as the war progressed.
The following is an excerpt from Nav wapons that gives a prety good indication as to why the USN had so much trouble with torps at the start. They only had 156 new torps at the startt of the war, the reserve stocks dated back to a design developed in 1915!!!!!
"Finally, in 1938 the Mark 13 became the first specifically-designed aircraft torpedo accepted into service in the USN. This became the most common US airborne torpedo of World War II. Markedly different from airborne torpedoes of other navies in that it was short and fat vs. short and thin. Also different in its relatively low speed and long range. A total of 17,000 were produced during World War II.
A total of 156 Mark 13 Mod 0 torpedoes were produced which was enough to provide two loads for each of the four 18-plane torpedo squadrons assigned to the pre-war carrier fleet plus a dozen spares. Mod 0 differed from later mods by having a rail-type tail in which the propellers were in front of the rudders. This was the only US torpedo to ever have this feature. The Newport Torpedo Station was unhappy with arrangement for reasons unknown and the Mod 1 entered service in 1940 with a conventional propeller arrangement, as can be seen in the photographs above. Unfortunately and unlike the Mod 0, the Mod 1 proved to be an unreliable weapon, with only one of ten torpedoes dropped by VT-6 during an exercise in July 1941 having a hot, straight and normal run. Of the others, four sank and could not be recovered while the other five experienced erratic runs.
These problems continued into the early war years, with a mid-1943 analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots found that 36 percent ran cold (did not start), 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total exceeds 100 percent as many torpedoes had more than one defect. The early models were further handicapped by the need to drop them low and slow - typically 50 feet (15 m) and 110 knots - which made the torpedo planes carrying them vulnerable to attack.
These problems were greatly reduced by the latter years of the war. Torpedoes had fin stabilizers, nose drag rings and tail shroud rings added, all of which worked to slow the torpedo after it was dropped so that it struck the water nose-first and at an acceptable speed. These improved the drop characteristics such that the recommended aircraft maximum launch parameters were increased to a height of 2,400 feet (730 m) and a speed of 410 knots.
A lanyard was attached to the tail of the torpedo. When dropped, the lanyard tripped a starting lever, but a water trip delay valve prevented the combustion flask from lighting off until the torpedo had entered the water. When dropped at 150 knots or more, the torpedo would enter the water at an angle of between 26 and 30 degrees. The water needed to be at least 150 feet deep (45 m) and the torpedo assumed its preset running depth after water travel of 300 yards (275 m). The exploder mechanism was armed after water travel of 200 yards (180 m). Depth could be set up to 50 feet (15 m).
The addition of the nose drag ring improved aerodynamic performance by stabilizing the torpedo in flight and reduced air speed by about 40 percent. It also acted as a shock absorber when the torpedo struck the water. The tail shroud ring improved the water run by reducing hooks and broaches and by eliminating much of the water roll which had characterized the earlier Mark 13s. Hot, straight and normal runs now approached 100 percent. To speed availability of the much improved torpedo, the Bureau of Ordnance had tail assemblies built with the shroud ring attached and then shipped these to the fleet for upgrading the existing inventory. By the fall of 1944, the modified torpedo was in general use by the front-line carrier units which were enthusiastic in their praise. On one occasion in early 1945, six torpedoes were dropped from altitudes between 5,000 and 7,000 feet (1,500 to 2,100 m). Five out of the six were observed to make their runs hot, straight and normal. By the end of the war, the USN considered the Mark 13 to be the best aircraft torpedo produced by any nation and it remained in service until 1951.
The Mark 13 has the distinction of having been the last torpedo used by by the US Navy in combat and the world's last use of aerial torpedoes in combat (as of December 2010). On 1 May 1951, following the failure of conventional aerial attacks with bombs, the Navy decided to use torpedoes against the sluice gates of the Hwachon Dam, located on the Pukham River just north of the 38th parallel. The dam waters were being used by the North Koreans to aid their own troop movements and hinder those of the Allies. USS Princeton CV-37 sent five AD-4 and three AD-4N Skyraiders into action and these planes each launched a single Mark 13 torpedo against the dam. One torpedo was a dud and another ran erratic, but the other six blew open the flood gates, successfully ending the North Korean control of the river water.
Modifications
Mod 1 - Improved tail, strengthened propellers, rudders moved in front of the propellers
Mod 2 - 40 knot experimental torpedo, development cancelled
Mod 2A - Mod 2 converted to 33.5 knots, water trip delay valve added to delay firing until water entry to prevent turbine runaway when dropped from over 300 feet (910 m)
Mod 3 - External gyro setting added
Mod 4 - Experimental Model; 50 produced with strengthened after body
Mod 5 - Addition of water trip to Mod 1
Mod 6 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 2A
Mod 7 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 3
Mod 8 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 4
Mod 9 - Addition of shroud ring to Mod 5
Mod 10 - Strengthened after body, shroud ring, suspension beam, gyro angle eliminated
Mod 11 - Mod 6 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Mod 12 - Mod 7 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Mod 13 - Mod 9 modified to accommodate suspension beam
Success during World War II
From "US Naval Weapons" by Norman Friedman: "A review of war experience showed a total of 1,287 attacks [this count only includes those launched by carrier-borne aircraft, other US Navy aircraft launched another 150 torpedoes - TD], of which 40 percent (514) resulted in hits, including 50 percent hits on battleships and carriers (322 attacks, including Midway), 31 percent on destroyers (179 attacks), and 41 percent (out of 445 attacks) on merchant ships." Although not mentioned by Dr. Friedman, at least eight Japanese cruisers were struck by aircraft torpedoes during the war. This hit percentage is much too high, but illustrates the over claiming that was typical of all nation's pilots during the war".
parsifal
Colonel
Having a brief look at British aerial torpedoes, the Mark XII was the main type for the first half of the war
The RN reports that its airborne launches during the war achieved a hit rate of about 33.5%. The actual stats re as follws
Naval Aircraft 609(total fired) 167(certain hits) 37 (probable Hits) 33.5 (overall percentage Certain and probable)
Source: Nav weapons
Nav weapons says these numbers are almost certainly far too high, the same as the USN hit claims. However, if they are optimistic, then they bring into sharp focus the prospect that the Swordfish was an effective delivery system. Polmar says that overall the carrier borne Swordfish crews achieved hit rates of above 40% generally. He doesnt name his source, and I dont know if his figures are at all comparable to the Nvaweapons stats. However, if they are, then the Swordfish crews as a group are well above the average achieved by all aircraft using torps
The RN reports that its airborne launches during the war achieved a hit rate of about 33.5%. The actual stats re as follws
Naval Aircraft 609(total fired) 167(certain hits) 37 (probable Hits) 33.5 (overall percentage Certain and probable)
Source: Nav weapons
Nav weapons says these numbers are almost certainly far too high, the same as the USN hit claims. However, if they are optimistic, then they bring into sharp focus the prospect that the Swordfish was an effective delivery system. Polmar says that overall the carrier borne Swordfish crews achieved hit rates of above 40% generally. He doesnt name his source, and I dont know if his figures are at all comparable to the Nvaweapons stats. However, if they are, then the Swordfish crews as a group are well above the average achieved by all aircraft using torps
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Ok, I'll give you that the He 177 had some engines problems because of the unique design and that the Fw 200 had a poor back ( maybe because it was designed as an airliner!!??)
But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design. The Stuka was one of the best it not the best, dive bomber of the war. Far more accurate than alot of others available. And I might add that it would appear that most dive bombers had this problem as the last few pages discussing Midway would show.
I think the same argument could be made about the Fairey Battle.
vikingBerserker
Lieutenant General
I think when it comes to what they were designed to do, most of the aircraft listed could do them. Certain ones however seemed to be a complete failure such as the Ba.88 IMO this one wins hands down for this title.
Oreo
Senior Airman
Ok, I'll give you that the He 177 had some engines problems because of the unique design and that the Fw 200 had a poor back ( maybe because it was designed as an airliner!!??)
But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design. The Stuka was one of the best it not the best, dive bomber of the war. Far more accurate than alot of others available. And I might add that it would appear that most dive bombers had this problem as the last few pages discussing Midway would show.
Ok, not trying to pick a fight with you, but did you not notice what I said? I did not specifically say the Ju 87 was inadequate in its roll. I listed it as one of the "Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for"
"appear" is not the same as "is". I stated it that way for the very reason that I was not saying that the aircraft absolutely were inadequate. Only that they have a reputation for being inadequate. Now, there were some bombers, at some times of the war, that were quite able to defend themselves *fairly* well from the fighter opposition they faced. B-29's over Japan, early Mosquitos over Germany, and so on. Other than those few instances, nearly any bomber would be vulnerable if not escorted by sufficient quantities and qualities of fighters. Even B-17's over the Reich. So in this case, it could just be that the Ju 87 was a perfectly good plane as long as it didn't have fighter opposition. Hmm. Having said that, I have an *opinion* that the SBD was a better dive bomber than the Ju 87 because of better survivability (though I lack the empirical data to back up my opinion), better survivability both against enemy fighters and surface fire. The SBD seemed to be relatively well able to stand up for itself, and whoever had the idea of using liquid cooled engines in a surface attack aircraft ought to have their head examined. Nobody in WWII, to my knowledge, ever managed to armor those radiators to make them invulnerable. It would have been an extreme engineering challenge to do so, I'm sure, and I've read that even the Il-2 did not have an armored radiator. Correct me if I'm wrong. It is far easier to just make an engine that doesn't use a radiator.
Ok, ducking for cover.
- Thread starter
- #250
Bombers that had some inherent problems include:
You could add Halifax Mk I to that list. And I agree with Chris on the Ju 87. Itss use as a dive bomber prior to the Battle of Britain showed just how effective a weapon it was - ALL dive bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters, but the combat records of the likes of the Ju 87, Dauntless, D3A Val speak for themselves. The Stuka doesn't deserve to be here.
To a certain degree; the concept to which it was built was heavily flawed, which resulted in its high loss rate.
The Manchester's not as bad as the He 177 - The Manchester III became known as the Lancaster, but the airframe was essentially the same apart from the centre section. Chadwick had always planned for a four engined Manchester.
You could add Halifax Mk I to that list. And I agree with Chris on the Ju 87. Itss use as a dive bomber prior to the Battle of Britain showed just how effective a weapon it was - ALL dive bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters, but the combat records of the likes of the Ju 87, Dauntless, D3A Val speak for themselves. The Stuka doesn't deserve to be here.
To a certain degree; the concept to which it was built was heavily flawed, which resulted in its high loss rate.
The Manchester's not as bad as the He 177 - The Manchester III became known as the Lancaster, but the airframe was essentially the same apart from the centre section. Chadwick had always planned for a four engined Manchester.
Shortround6
Major General
Not only was the original concept heavily flawed, the Battle was never used for the original concept. Using a strategic bomber as a tactical bomber usually didn't work well and when they don't have escorts it usually gets even worse.
Agreed with Chris and nuuumannn. The Ju 87 does not belong on the list. Any dive bomber (Dauntless included) would be on the receiving end of a Turkey Shoot without aircover. That does not change the fact that it was more than adequate for its intended role.
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And there you have it. Hard to pin anything on the aircraft when it's distracted from doing its job.
It was designed as a tactical strike aircraft.
Shortround6
Major General
No, it was not.
It started as a "light weight" bomber when there was some talk of an international treaty limiting the weight of bombers. In the early and mid 30s no "tactical strike aircraft" needed a range of 1000 miles.
The British had plenty of experience with fighters with 20lb bombs, Brisfits, De Havalind aircraft and the Hawker Hind series doing "tactical strikes" and "policing the empire" (dropping bombs on Afghan tribesmen) to know the difference between a tactical bomber and a strategic bomber. The Tactical strike aircraft was the Lysander.
It started as a "light weight" bomber when there was some talk of an international treaty limiting the weight of bombers. In the early and mid 30s no "tactical strike aircraft" needed a range of 1000 miles.
The British had plenty of experience with fighters with 20lb bombs, Brisfits, De Havalind aircraft and the Hawker Hind series doing "tactical strikes" and "policing the empire" (dropping bombs on Afghan tribesmen) to know the difference between a tactical bomber and a strategic bomber. The Tactical strike aircraft was the Lysander.
Fairey Aircraft Since 1915 states the same.
The primary mission was tactical strikes, and the secondary mission was strategic bombing using high level horizontal bombing.
Shortround6
Major General
Somebody spent a little too much money on the "insurance policy" and not enough on the primary mission then.
Specification P.4/34 (Feb 1934 and over two years before the Battle first flies) called for a light bomber capable of tactical support. It was to be fully stressed for dive recovery with a full bomb load. This Specification lead to the Hawker Henley and the Fairey P.4/34 (which was developed into the Fulmar)which had 7 ft less wing span than the Battle, 2 ft less fuselage, 1/2 the bomb load, one less crewman, less range and nearly 1 ton lower take off weight using the same engine. The P.4/34 flew 10 months after the Battle but 6 months before a production Battle joined a service squadron.
If they really wanted a tactical bomber they should have known the Battle wasn't it and it certainly looks like they knew it from the issuing of specification P.4/34
The Lysander had double the gun armament for strafing/flak suppression and could carry a pair of 250lb bombs or a number of light bombs. It would have fared no better than the Battles if given the same missions but it was the "army cooperation" aircraft of the time.
The RAF had been running a "game" on the treasury and army. They were claiming that the army didn't need any new heavy artillery because the RAF and it's aircraft could do the same job as the heavy artillery so the RAF should get the money instead. The Army didn't get any new heavy artillery ( or even much for medium artillery) but the RAF didn't spend any of the money ( or darn little) on tactical bombers. They spent it on long range bombers ( I still hold that the Battle's 1000 mile range was not a tactical need) and on the eve of WW II had to admit that they could not, in fact support the army which lead to a rather mad scramble for heavy artillery and some rather patchwork/stopgap designs.
>edit. One description of the Battle gives a fuel capacity of 212 IMP gallons (254 US gallons/963liters) in two 106 Imp gallon tanks which is a rather ridiculous amount of fuel for a 1000hp tactical bomber. The early DB-7 only had 270 US gallons for a PAIR of P&W R-1830s.<
Specification P.4/34 (Feb 1934 and over two years before the Battle first flies) called for a light bomber capable of tactical support. It was to be fully stressed for dive recovery with a full bomb load. This Specification lead to the Hawker Henley and the Fairey P.4/34 (which was developed into the Fulmar)which had 7 ft less wing span than the Battle, 2 ft less fuselage, 1/2 the bomb load, one less crewman, less range and nearly 1 ton lower take off weight using the same engine. The P.4/34 flew 10 months after the Battle but 6 months before a production Battle joined a service squadron.
If they really wanted a tactical bomber they should have known the Battle wasn't it and it certainly looks like they knew it from the issuing of specification P.4/34
The Lysander had double the gun armament for strafing/flak suppression and could carry a pair of 250lb bombs or a number of light bombs. It would have fared no better than the Battles if given the same missions but it was the "army cooperation" aircraft of the time.
The RAF had been running a "game" on the treasury and army. They were claiming that the army didn't need any new heavy artillery because the RAF and it's aircraft could do the same job as the heavy artillery so the RAF should get the money instead. The Army didn't get any new heavy artillery ( or even much for medium artillery) but the RAF didn't spend any of the money ( or darn little) on tactical bombers. They spent it on long range bombers ( I still hold that the Battle's 1000 mile range was not a tactical need) and on the eve of WW II had to admit that they could not, in fact support the army which lead to a rather mad scramble for heavy artillery and some rather patchwork/stopgap designs.
>edit. One description of the Battle gives a fuel capacity of 212 IMP gallons (254 US gallons/963liters) in two 106 Imp gallon tanks which is a rather ridiculous amount of fuel for a 1000hp tactical bomber. The early DB-7 only had 270 US gallons for a PAIR of P&W R-1830s.<
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Oreo
Senior Airman
Maybe the Battle should be moved up to the top part of my list with the Manchester, He 177, Fw200C, and Botha. However, I shouldn't have put the Botha there because at least the RAF had enough sense to keep it out of combat. The Luftwaffe also had sense enough not to throw the He 70 at the RAF, or the He 70 might be on our list, too. At least the He 70 was not originally designed as a bomber, and the Luftwaffe evidently didn't gamble a whole lot on it, as the RAF did with the Battle. I don't know a whole lot about the He 70, but it seems to have quite a few similarities to the Battle, except that it was not thrown into the fray in WWII (only Spain). If anything, it seems to have been even less capable than the Battle, just looking at the specs.
Most any bomber is vulnerable to fighters unless it is faster than them at the altitude at which it operates, or unless there are no fighters capable of bringing it down in its mode of operation (night bombing, for instance). But some bombers are still more vulnerable than others, just based on their construction, features, armament, and maneuverability, with or without bombload. Then you add in operational hazards, official tactical restraints, crew experience and psychology, and the quality of the fighters and pilots intercepting them, and you are approaching the total formula. Often it isn't a matter of bad aircraft but rather, bad management.
Most any bomber is vulnerable to fighters unless it is faster than them at the altitude at which it operates, or unless there are no fighters capable of bringing it down in its mode of operation (night bombing, for instance). But some bombers are still more vulnerable than others, just based on their construction, features, armament, and maneuverability, with or without bombload. Then you add in operational hazards, official tactical restraints, crew experience and psychology, and the quality of the fighters and pilots intercepting them, and you are approaching the total formula. Often it isn't a matter of bad aircraft but rather, bad management.
I'll let you in on a little secret about our pilots which I doubt will ever make it into Wikipedia. When my Dad was towing targets for the bombers in his FM2 in Kaneohe the off-duty pilots were encouraged to check out the available planes for short hops to keep their skills sharpened. One day an F4U from another base came in for an emergency landing with the Hawaiian police hot on its tail and telephone wires wrapped around one of its wings. The police got no further than the gate, where they were promptly stopped by the guards, and turned back. The pilot probably got a good balling-out, too. But, everybody knew what was going on. They'd dive at the Hawaiian sailboats and rock them with the prop-wash on the way up. While I'm not suggesting the Navy encouraged stunts like that much less trying to fly under telephone wires, they did encourage a degree of risk-taking. Of course, nobody called it that, they called it something like "aircraft familiarization." But, the point was, these pilots were encouraged to know the limits of their aircraft, and that's how they did it, by taking chances. All to say, it would be a mistake to underestimate the degree of skill of these pilots. Especially by the time they were on those carriers, they could operate their aircraft like they were riding a bicycle. And, that's the truth.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
No fight needed and I may have been a bit animated but it was on your list of "appear inadequate" and I was giving my reasons.
