Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two (1 Viewer)

[FLYBOYJ]

Take a look at:
http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1948/feb48.pdf
page 7 (PDF page 9):
" ...As every naval avaiator knows the TBM was not designed as a dive bomber. It was designed as a torpedo and horizintal bomber. As a result the maximum permissable speeds and G forces are considerably less than those applicable to any other currently operated carrier aircraft..."

The article notes 48 fatal TBM accidents in 30 months, all apparently while doing practice bomb runs.

It doesn't mean that it never prohibited from doing any dive bombing. I think P26 or 28 of the flight manual states something to the effect that "prolonged" vertical dives were prohibited. But again, it was not designed as a pure dive bomber

 

[Shortround6]

What are the esteemed members views of the Battle. I know it faired badly in France in 1940 yet if you look at its specs it does not seem to be such a bad single engined bomber, why the failure in France and does this put it amongst the worst bombers of the war?

As has been mention before in this thread and others the Battle was misused due to a lack of other aircraft. It was not designed or purchased with the intent of using it as a tactical bomber. In the first few years of it's deployment the crews were not practicing the tactical mission. It was a strategic bomber. It had a 3 man crew, pilot, navigator/bomb aimer who crawled into a tunnel under underneath the pilot and use a bomb sight through a window in the bottom of the plane ( much like the TBD when used as a level bomber.) and radio operator/rear gunner. The bomb load was carried INSIDE the wing. Two 250lb bombs side by side in each wing root. 1000lbs total but it could not carry 500lb or 1000lb bombs. It could carry the 1000lb load further than any other singe engine bomber of the time (except perhaps the Wellesy).
It had never been intended for low level attacks or diving attacks. It's large size was due to need for the fuel for the long range, the crew space and the ever present British requirements for the ability to use short grass fields.

 

[renrich]

Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph

do you mean vne 206 mph?

 

[parsifal]

It was an operator's choice NOT to operate the TBD at night, again the Swordfish had no unique feature (except the huevos of the pilot) that enabled it to be operated at night. It had desirable features that made it easier to land and take off from a carrier but outside of that everything else is null

Kind of true, but not fully so. And in this case a half correct statement is as bad or worse than an incorrect statement. The shortcomings in performance of the Swordfish was realized prewar in the RN, and that, combined with the miserable allocation of pilots and pilot training for the FAA, convinced the RN that it had to adapt the force and the equipment to suit those limitations. They adapted the force so that it could operate at night. That is not something you can achieve in a short space of time. Sure a big part of that was training, but the aircraft themselves had to modified in a number of ways to optimise that capability. Things like flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting was altered to assist the night capability. But the big change was the development of ASV radar. The FAA was a major sponsor of that development fopr the specific purpose of fitting them to their strike aircraft. There was never such ugency in the USN.

All of the capabilities were available as possibilities for the USN, that part of your statement is correct and I am certainly not saying that it wasnt possible to adapt US aircraft in the same or more ways as the Swordfish, but neither is it true to say the Swordfish was not modified to suit its night capability.

Lastly, dismissing (or suggesting as not that important) the great deck handling capabilities and low attrition rates is something I fundamentally disagree with. The USN found to its great cost that you cant just decide to put people and aircraft into the air at night without the propert equipment and training. They lost scores of aircraft hopelessly lost and poor deck performers, in many engagements that left aircraft airborne at night. Best example, look at what happened to the USN counterstrikes at the 1st mob flt June 1944.

The RN simply could not afford anything like that sort of atrition. They could not afford to lose even 5 or six pilots in a single engagement for avoidable reasons. For the whole of 1939, the FAA received the grand total of 16 additional pilots. Every single pilot counted, there was just no room for unnecessary attrition. The Swordfish delivered on that score.....it could operate at night, had such pleasant flying and deck handling characteristics as to ensure avoidable losses were minimised. There were many reasons why Swordfish crews loved their mounts, and their safety and reliability was one of them. And they certainly never thought of themselves as the "poor relations" of the TBD squadrons. And their operational results prove in spades that their quiet confidence in their equipment was more than justified.

 

[Shortround6]

While I agree with a lot of what you say the 2nd to the last sentence needs a lot of swallowing. "And they certainly never thought of themselves as the "poor relations" of the TBD squadrons". There were how many TBD squadrons? four? and just how often did the Swordfish and TBD squadrons operate together or even see each other that the Swordfish pilots knew what a TBD could or couldn't aside from what they read in a magazine?

The TBD probably wasn't as good as the Swordfish in many of it's missions. Crap weather anti-sub patrols from small carriers. Neither plane was designed for that role. It is just that the biplane turned out to be better at that.

100 operational TBDs is too few to really tell how good or how bad it really was. They did some good work for the first 6 months but without reopening the production line (foolish with the TBF already being planed in 1940) it's days were numbered no matter how well it did.

The Biplane wasn't magic or else the Albacore would have had a better record. Apparently in an attempt to improve the Swordfish they designed out some of the very things that made the Swordfish so useful.

 

[parsifal]

I agree the wording of my statement was poor. Throughout this whole debate I have been very careful not to denigrate the TBD (because I dont think it deserves it) , or any other US type, Just to state the capabilities of the aircraft concerned. Thats not been the case with the American contributors to this debate. And it is very apparent that many of them "dont get it" about the Swordfish, because its range was limited, and its performance in terms of straight line speed was also poor.

The facts are these for the Swordfish. It had strengthsd that were subtle, but real enough, and that made it not only a good aircraft, it was a great aircraft as history well shows. The types' strengths were used to great advantage, because its operational usage was adapted to suit those strengths. That made its crews supremely confident and successful. The types hidden strengths and the crew confidence fed off each other, the result was a synergy that resulted in the sum of the parts being greater than the powers of each part individually.

You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I agree the wording of my statement was poor. Throughout this whole debate I have been very careful not to denigrate the TBD (because I dont think it deserves it) , or any other US type, Just to state the capabilities of the aircraft concerned. Thats not been the case with the American contributors to this debate. And it is very apparent that many of them "dont get it" about the Swordfish, because its range was limited, and its performance in terms of straight line speed was also poor.

The facts are these for the Swordfish. It had strengthsd that were subtle, but real enough, and that made it not only a good aircraft, it was a great aircraft as history well shows. The types' strengths were used to great advantage, because its operational usage was adapted to suit those strengths. That made its crews supremely confident and successful. The types hidden strengths and the crew confidence fed off each other, the result was a synergy that resulted in the sum of the parts being greater than the powers of each part individually.

You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.

Well said!

 

[RCAFson]

Range Swordfish-546 miles, Vmax-138 mph
Range TBD-716 miles, Vmax-206 mph

The memo I posted earlier tells us the approximate Vmax @ SL speed of the TBD:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...ston-engined-bomber-world-war-two-torp228.jpg
or about 130 knots and this is repeated by 2nd source:

In TBD Units Tillman quotes a TBD pilot:

"The VT-3 officer also realised that the TBD's greatest failing- poor speed - would work in favour of the defenders. A low level approach would permit no more than 130 knots airspeed, whereas a shallow descent from altitude could manage 180 knots or perhaps better, thus reducing exposure time to enemy fighters and antiaircraft guns." p 52

and range:
"...Torpedo crews advised against launching TBD more than 160 miles from the target and favour 150 miles..." p65


The Swordfish had an internal fuel capacity of 168 Imperial gallons (IG) and the ability to accept an internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto) and/or an external 69 IG tank. The TBD had an internal capacity of 150IG (180USG).

Sorry, but no way did the TBD ever have more range than the Swordfish, and you are quoting ranges based upon two different sets of criteria, operational ranges for the Swordfish and theoretical ranges for a pre-war TBD.

The Albacore had 193 IG of internal fuel and could also accept an internal auxiliary fuel tank and/or an external 106IG tank for a total fuel capacity of nearly 400IG and had much better range than the TBD,

 

[RCAFson]

The Biplane wasn't magic or else the Albacore would have had a better record. Apparently in an attempt to improve the Swordfish they designed out some of the very things that made the Swordfish so useful.

The Abacore got a bad rep because of the Taurus II engine problems, but there was only 800 Albacores ever built and they were used very extensively and successfully. There's no doubt that biplanes were of limited use as frontline aircraft during much of WW2, but the Albacore was an all round better aircraft than the Swordfish and far superior to the TBD, IMHO. The Albacore was phased out because the Barracuda took its place on the production lines, while the Swordfish was built in separate factories, but IMHO, the Albacore would have done even better as an ASW aircraft than the Swordfish because of its better range, enclosed cockpit and superior performance.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Kind of true, but not fully so. And in this case a half correct statement is as bad or worse than an incorrect statement. The shortcomings in performance of the Swordfish was realized prewar in the RN, and that, combined with the miserable allocation of pilots and pilot training for the FAA, convinced the RN that it had to adapt the force and the equipment to suit those limitations. They adapted the force so that it could operate at night. That is not something you can achieve in a short space of time. Sure a big part of that was training, but the aircraft themselves had to modified in a number of ways to optimise that capability. Things like flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting was altered to assist the night capability. But the big change was the development of ASV radar. The FAA was a major sponsor of that development fopr the specific purpose of fitting them to their strike aircraft. There was never such ugency in the USN.

All of the capabilities were available as possibilities for the USN, that part of your statement is correct and I am certainly not saying that it wasnt possible to adapt US aircraft in the same or more ways as the Swordfish, but neither is it true to say the Swordfish was not modified to suit its night capability.

Lastly, dismissing (or suggesting as not that important) the great deck handling capabilities and low attrition rates is something I fundamentally disagree with. The USN found to its great cost that you cant just decide to put people and aircraft into the air at night without the propert equipment and training. They lost scores of aircraft hopelessly lost and poor deck performers, in many engagements that left aircraft airborne at night. Best example, look at what happened to the USN counterstrikes at the 1st mob flt June 1944.

The RN simply could not afford anything like that sort of atrition. They could not afford to lose even 5 or six pilots in a single engagement for avoidable reasons. For the whole of 1939, the FAA received the grand total of 16 additional pilots. Every single pilot counted, there was just no room for unnecessary attrition. The Swordfish delivered on that score.....it could operate at night, had such pleasant flying and deck handling characteristics as to ensure avoidable losses were minimised. There were many reasons why Swordfish crews loved their mounts, and their safety and reliability was one of them. And they certainly never thought of themselves as the "poor relations" of the TBD squadrons. And their operational results prove in spades that their quiet confidence in their equipment was more than justified.

Parsifal, while I could agree with the majority of what you posted, you're reading too much into this. Bottom line - once you depart the deck and flying in soup, it's all relative. Back then you're using a map and 4 or 5 instruments to sustain flight and it doesn't matter if you're in a Stringbag, TBD or TBM . One aircraft may offer some advantages over an other (example - stringbag lands at 50/60 knots but has a 15 knot crosswind limitation). Based on what was available back then, there isn't too much more you're going to do to enhance IMC performance. Flame damped exhausts, even the cockpit lighting isn't helping much trying to stay straight and level in 1/4 mile visibility with rain water pouring on you! The RN CHOSE to let loose the Stringbag in some really foul weather. Other aircraft "would have and could have" done the same given the technology and the need of the day. For every advantage the Stringbag had in operating in IMC, I could come up with and equal amount of disadvantages - and this could be said with any other aircraft of the era flying off a carrier into IMC conditions, not taking anything away from the stringbag or any other carrier aircraft.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The memo I posted earlier tells us the approximate Vmax @ SL speed of the TBD

Vmax @ SL speed with a torpedo. The Vmax sea level speed of the TBD was about 205 mph.

 

[Shortround6]

You cannot say the same about the TBD. if anything, from an American perspective the TBD outperfomed the Swordfish, and its crews were probably as well trained as those in the FAA (just that they were not trained in certain areas). The TBDs superior performance was not enough to make any difference to its survivability (compared to the Swordfish). But that extra turn of speed still affected its accuracy as a weapon system (IMO, judging from the operational results) . Moreover, and most importantly, the owners of the TBD did not recognize the shortcomings of the type and failed to adapt its use to suit, because they believed the TBD was "good enough" to operate by day, which by 1940 it was not . So, all things brought together, the TBD wound up being basically a liability to the USN. Not due to any fault of the type....it was one of the better carrier borne torpedo bombers of the late 30's, but because its shortcomings were not recognized and the usage not adapted to suit those shortcomings.

There are some aircraft that performed in combat well out of proportion to their "book" performance figures and other aircraft that had combat results well below what their "book" figures would indicate. The Swordfish is a prime example of performing way out of proportion to it's "numbers".

I don't really believe the the difference between a dropping speed of 110 knots and one of 80-90 knots is going to make that big a difference, compared to dropping at 200kts plus. or dropping from hundreds of feet up. Tell me the Swordfishes slow drop speed made it more accurate than a B-26 and I would readily believe you or some of the late war drop limits.

The problem with trying to evaluate the TBD on operational results is the lousy American torpedo. The TBD may (or may not) have gotten more hits than we know of but the defective detonators may have kept them from going off. Given the small number of torpedoes actually launched by TBDs on operations even a pair of "duds" makes a significant difference to it's "effectiveness".

Nobody's single engine torpedo bombers could operate by day without fighter escort and even most twin engine torpedo bombers couldn't do it. The difference isn't so much the difference between day and night attacks as it is the difference between escorted attacks and un-escorted attacks. The RN may have gone for the night attack with the knowledge that their carrier groups didn't have enough fighters to escort the torpedo bombers in daylight. Or that an escort of Skuas wasn't going to be good enough to keep enemy fighters off the torpedo bombers no matter how well the Skua may have done against twin engine bombers in defending the carrier.

I think the US Navy recognize the shortcomings of the type, rather than order more in 1938 or 39 on March 25, 1939 the Navy asked manufacturers for proposals for the replacement of the TBD. Requirements included a top speed of 300mph with normal fuel load, range of not less than 1000 miles while carrying a torpedo or three 500lb bombs, service ceiling not less than 30,000ft, take off distances and landing speeds with torpedo and either full or half fuel were specified along with max dimensions and max folded width. Now maybe they went the wrong way and should have specifying a 140mph biplane but this specification lead to 13 different design proposals from six manufacturers which were eventually whittled down to three and then finally to the Grumman Avenger. By the time the Avenger went into service it could not conduct a successful Daylight strike without escorts ( but neither could a B-17).

 

[Shortround6]

The Swordfish had an internal fuel capacity of 168 Imperial gallons (IG) and the ability to accept an internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto) and/or an external 69 IG tank. The TBD had an internal capacity of 150IG (180USG).

Sorry, but no way did the TBD ever have more range than the Swordfish, and you are quoting ranges based upon two different sets of criteria, operational ranges for the Swordfish and theoretical ranges for a pre-war TBD.

The Albacore had 193 IG of internal fuel and could also accept an internal auxiliary fuel tank and/or an external 106IG tank for a total fuel capacity of nearly 400IG and had much better range than the TBD,

Can we look at the range thing a bit closer? That "internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto)" replaced the rear gunner did it not? The external 69 IG tank went where? under the fuselage in place of the torpedo?

I can see where they add some capability to the Swordfish but it's not all beer an sausages is it? to get the extra range you either carry no torpedo or you leave the rear gunner home and hope you don't get attacked. Makes the night attack thing even more understandable if you can't even shoot back at any attackers in daylight.

 

[davparlr]

If the USN had gone down the pathway of the RN they would have had several years to prepre their crews and equip their aircraft with the Swordfish. They would have gone into battle, with the most accurate torpedo squadrons in the worls, equipped with ASV radar and fully night capable. At Midway they would not have attacked by day, they would have been looking to launch their torpedo strikes by night, leaving the day strikes to the F4Fs and SBDs. They would not be using the slow and innaccurate Bliss Levitt torpedoes that they did, but the much faster and more accurate whitehead torpedoes.

According to "The First Team", the Japanese position was not identified until 0552, 4 June at a good 200 miles away. Night time combat for torpedo bombers would not have been possible.

To give you some idea of the potency of that combination, at taranto 13 totpedoes were launched......11 hit their target. Against the Bismarck 9 torpedoes were launched, either 2 or three hit their target, in pitch black conditions, flying in a heavy gale.

I could only find 5 or 6 hitting out of 11 dropped and damaging or sinking three battleships or about 55% success. I could find no other ships hit by torpedos.

As an example, at Coral Sea, instead of retreating each day after night fall, the Americans might have been able to follow up their day strikes with deadly night torpedo attacks. Its an idea at least worth lookig at.

The Navy was not about to risk a night battle with the Japanese with 66% of their entire Pacific carrier force while torpedo planes were out looking for ships to hit. When on reconnaissance I don't think they carried torpedoes, at least they didn't when looking for the Bismarck. This was even more true at Midway.

Possibly, though doubtful that they would be as accurate as the Swordfish. The Swordfish's apparent weakness (its slow speed) was also one of its greatest strengths. It was so slow, it could hardly miss. Almost as many Battleships were sunk or disabled at Taranto, with just 13 attack aircraft, as were sunk or disabled at pearl, where there were almost 5 times the number of torpoedoes fired. The Japanese had no problems with their torpedoes, and they were attacking in daylight, in a very low flak environment....yet could only manage a fraction of the accuracy the FAA crews achieved at Taranto. Your explanation of the Swordfish's success (being solely its torpedo) does not stack up when you look at all the facts.

According to "At Dawn We Slept", eight battleships were damaged or sank at Pearl Harbor, not including the training ship Utah, however, at Pearl Harbor other ships were targeted and hit and several ships were hit more than once. All in all, according to the book, there were 19 torpedo strikes on targeted warships out of 36 torpedoes launched, or 53% success rate, or about the same as at Taranto.

True for most types, but not the swordfish. Swordfish got 1/3 of their torpedoes launched into the bismarck, in the dead of night and to boot, in conditions that few other aircraft could fly. neither was this an isolated incident. literally tens of thousands of tons of Axis shipping was sunk by swordfish operating at night.

A couple of errors seem to appear here. First, the first strike of Swordfish had one hit on the Bismarck out of nine dropped. The second strike had two hits out of an unknown number of drops. So, only if the second drop consisted of only two torpedoes will your 1/3 number be true. I suspect it is not. Second, while the weather was indeed terrible, it was not dead of night, being about 2100 hrs. Wikipedia shows a picture of a Swordfish returning to the Ark Royal and it is clearly not pitch dark.
German battleship Bismarck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Oreo]

@ FlybojJ

"Not really true, it depends upon what is being designed and how it is being deployed. Perfect example is Lockheed and the U-2/ TR-1 and SR-71 programs. There weren't a lot of units built but they were paid for the R&D that went into these aircraft - The same later for the F-117A and B-2 -some thing I know "a little about as I worked on both programs. "

Ok, I concede this point. But the money really has to be there in a case like that. Increasingly in modern times, this may be the case, compared to in the past, as military forces world-wide go for quality in small numbers versus adequacy in large numbers.

"Hmmmm - you're basing that on??? The only reason why Boeing didn't have the many coals in the fire during WW2 is because what they had was huge, so huge that they had to "farm out" B-17 production to Douglas and Vega. Douglas didn't "grab" anything, the pie was given to them based on wartime need, and Vega was given the same opportunity."

With all due respect, I think you are splitting hairs with me here. All I am saying is that Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing. That is, they produced a larger number of new designs in the same amount of time. Designs that made it out the door in prototype and/or production examples. Boeing had a very short list by comparison, but everything Boeing considered to be a production machine was fairly well excellent for its time of manufacture. Even Boeing's prototypes that flew but did not receive production contracts, appear to be solid designs, such as the XF8B and XPBB. Douglas, on the other hand, delivered some disappointments along the way in addition to its successes. Now if you would like me to footnote and annotate everything I say, then. . . . . .

 

[parsifal]

According to "The First Team", the Japanese position was not identified until 0552, 4 June at a good 200 miles away. Night time combat for torpedo bombers would not have been possible.

Swordfish were launched at taranto at a range of 170 miles, and the round trip was over 400 miles. Extrapolating for the Midway operation, the TBDs with at least a 100 extra range (apparently), it should be theoretically possible to hold the range and close to a launch point in the evening. Alternatively, launch the SBDs and hold the (in reality nonexistent) night capable torpedo bombers until evening to clean up any cripples.

In any event I dont buy the argument that sacrificing the TBDs was necessary to pull the Zeroes away from McCluskys VBs

I could only find 5 or 6 hitting out of 11 dropped and damaging or sinking three battleships or about 55% success. I could find no other ships hit by torpedos.

Correct, except that you forgot the two aircraft that were shot down, and whilst launching, did so outside range. these torpedoes are believed to have bottomed. I should have checked however. Depending on whether you want to include or exclude the two aircraft lost, you have either 55% or 66%. It is still a record either way...earlier in July three swordfish armed with torpedoes managed to sink 4 ships, including a moored sub, with three torpedoes. Thats a hit rate of 125%.

You might also want to consider the raid on Dakar by Hermes. July 1940, 4 torps launch (2 with contact pistols, 2 with magnetic exploders, set to run 38 feet (too low) , 3 on track, wto with magnetic exploders detonated early, on with contact pistolknocked a hole in the side 24feet by 16 feet (from memory. effectively sank the richelieu 9for a year). Thats an accuracy rate of 75%.

The Navy was not about to risk a night battle with the Japanese with 66% of their entire Pacific carrier force while torpedo planes were out looking for ships to hit. When on reconnaissance I don't think they carried torpedoes, at least they didn't when looking for the Bismarck. This was even more true at Midway.

The USN lacked the night fighting skills for their surface units as wll as their carrier groups i will concede. If they had such skils, they would not have been as reluctant to try a night strike , as you point out. In April 1942, Somerville had been confronted with a similar situation. His was a hopeless fight, but he demonstrated the theory in spades....advance by night, retreat by day. Naguma was never going to fall for that in the bay of bengal, because the April raids were just that...a raid. At Midway the Japanese had to complete a mission....this made their movement forward mandatory. The Americans could approach the battle problem with a much greater level of certainty. same situation applied to Cortal Sea.

Incorrect. The British launched swordfish fully armed as reconnaisance machines during the Bismarck operation, and USN SBDs routinely undertook similar armed recons for all the major battles in 1942

According to "At Dawn We Slept", eight battleships were damaged or sank at Pearl Harbor, not including the training ship Utah, however, at Pearl Harbor other ships were targeted and hit and several ships were hit more than once. All in all, according to the book, there were 19 torpedo strikes on targeted warships out of 36 torpedoes launched, or 53% success rate, or about the same as at Taranto.

The torpedo hits were Arizona (1), Nevada (1) California (2), Utah 92), West Virginia (7), Oklahoma (4), Helena (1), Raleigh (1). That is a total of 19 hits, undertaken in daylight, with little or no flak (the torps were the first ordinance to be launched in the first wave, a deliberate decision by the japanese. The British launched their torpedoes in two waves, 6 with the first wave, and 5 in the second. Two were shot down. There were 41 barrage ballons protecting the harbour and 4200 meters of torpedo netting (they needed 11800m to do the job properly). And the British came by night, in heavy flak conditions.

A couple of errors seem to appear here. First, the first strike of Swordfish had one hit on the Bismarck out of nine dropped. The second strike had two hits out of an unknown number of drops. So, only if the second drop consisted of only two torpedoes will your 1/3 number be true. I suspect it is not. Second, while the weather was indeed terrible, it was not dead of night, being about 2100 hrs. Wikipedia shows a picture of a Swordfish returning to the Ark Royal and it is clearly not pitch dark.
German battleship Bismarck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[/QUOTE]
Sorry bu not correct. according to John Assmussen, ("Bismarck - the fatal torpedo hit"), whilst there is dispute about that last strike (by 15 a/c, 9 launches) it appears most likley that there were three hits in the second strike. There were no hits by the first strike....none were launched at the bismarck, as the Brits mistook Sheffield as the german ship.

Asmussen writes

"The different sources about the history of the Bismarck are disagree about what actually happened during the last air attack against the Bismarck. The outcome of my research seems to state the fact that:
1. Accounts differ as to the number of torpedo hits (two or three) and the order in which they occured.
2. All the sources agree that Bismarck turned to port when the fatal torpedo came towards her.
3. The Bismarck's rudder indicator indicated that the rudder was jammed either 12° or 15° to port. They disagree about that too".

I believe that Bismarck was hit three times by those nine a/c in that last strike

Nav weapons says that there were only 2 hits, but describe the conditions as "The second torpedo attack, this time on Bismarck herself, was made at sunset in unbearable weather conditions, Force 9, with heavy cloud cover and waves 25-40 feet high". Elsewhere the visibility conditions were described as very poor. It was a night attack, believe me

Finally, I suggest that you read your sources before posting them. Not that wiki is great, but relevantly, from the article you posted it says......"The attack went in, in almost darkness, at around 21:00 but once again the Swordfish torpedo bombers found Bismarck with their ASV II radar"

 

[RCAFson]

Can we look at the range thing a bit closer? That "internal 60IG tank (used at Taranto)" replaced the rear gunner did it not? The external 69 IG tank went where? under the fuselage in place of the torpedo?

I can see where they add some capability to the Swordfish but it's not all beer an sausages is it? to get the extra range you either carry no torpedo or you leave the rear gunner home and hope you don't get attacked. Makes the night attack thing even more understandable if you can't even shoot back at any attackers in daylight.

No, the extra internal tank replaces the observer, not the rear gunner, and the Swordfish (and Albacore) was a combined dive bomber/torpedo bomber/recon and ASW aircraft, so leaving the torpedo behind does not preclude offensive operations since the underwing hard points are still usable.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

With all due respect, I think you are splitting hairs with me here. All I am saying is that Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing. That is, they produced a larger number of new designs in the same amount of time. Designs that made it out the door in prototype and/or production examples. Boeing had a very short list by comparison, but everything Boeing considered to be a production machine was fairly well excellent for its time of manufacture. Even Boeing's prototypes that flew but did not receive production contracts, appear to be solid designs, such as the XF8B and XPBB. Douglas, on the other hand, delivered some disappointments along the way in addition to its successes. Now if you would like me to footnote and annotate everything I say, then. . . . . .

Splitting hairs and footnotes - I am doing that because it seems much of what you have to say is based on your opinion rather than fact and do understand if you haven't figured it out by now that many of the members who participate on this site indulge discussion with fact and documented credible evidence (and more times than most provide references for it) and when it's not given are usually called on it...

Now with that said, you made a statement "Douglas's approach was different from Boeing's, and I am basing that from looking at what they designed and built. Douglas built some very good stuff, but they were much more prolific designers than Boeing", what are you basing that on? Douglas built a larger variety of military aircraft in the post WW2 years based on being awarded contracts based on a solicitation from the government. Ed Heinemann and his team just didn't sit around and decide to come up with aircraft to build - they did so based on the government requiring specific aircraft. For example (all from Wiki Sources);

"The Skyhawk was designed by Douglas Aircraft's Ed Heinemann in response to a U.S. Navy call for a jet-powered attack aircraft to replace the older Douglas AD Skyraider (later redesignated A-1 Skyraider)."

"The piston-engined Skyraider was designed during World War II to meet US Naval requirements for a carrier-based, single-seat, long-range, high performance dive/torpedo bomber, to follow-on from earlier types such as the Helldiver and Avenger"

"In January 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a requirement to develop a long-range, carrier-based attack plane that could deliver a 10,000 lb (4,536 kg) bomb load or a nuclear weapon" (A3D requirement)

"US Air Force involvement in the Korean War highlighted an urgent need for a high performance day/night tactical bomber. To speed the availability of such an aircraft it was planned to procure a land-based version of the A3D Skywarrior then being developed for the US Navy. To this end Douglas was given a contract for five pre-production Douglas RB-66A all-weather/night photo-reconnaissance aircraft"

I could dig further and come with specifics about the exact contracts and specifications…

During the post war years and especially after the Korean War there was a boom in military aircraft procurement. Usually the government asked for paper proposals and the government would widdle down the list until 2 or 3 finalists were accepted. At that point each one had to come off with a prototype and a fly-off occurred with winner take all. Sometimes the contractor was paid for their prototype.

During this period Boeing was very busy with the B-47 and B-52 as well as preparing their assault into the commercial aircraft industry. More than likely some of the solicitations that Douglas went after were probably sent to Boeing and they were returned "NO BID" mainly because Boeing was busy with other programs (B-47, B-52 Bomarc, KC-97, KC-50 conversion, KC-135). As a matter of fact Boeing was so busy during this period some of the B-47 production was subcontracted to Lockheed.

You want to say Douglas "were much more prolific designers than Boeing," well that wasn't because Boeing wasn't capable, it was what the government was offering and what companies were able or wanted to bid on.

Now you gave the example of the Boeing XF8B – here's a statement from Wiki regarding this aircraft, its cancellation and Boeing's path in the post war years…

"Although testing of the promising XF8B concept continued into 1946 by the USAAF and 1947 by the US Navy, the end of the war in the Pacific and changing postwar strategy required that Boeing concentrate on building large land-based bombers and transports."

So you see, this is the way it really works. I've worked for Lockheed, Boeing and was a contractor with McDonnell Douglas and several other smaller aviation related defense contractors and been through this process and worked with people in my early years who worked on some of the aircraft spoken about here. Military aircraft design, especially in the post was based on a requirement driven by the government and there was very little "private ventures" being offered up because of the risk of losing money.

So with that this said, you are entitled to your opinions based on what you have read in books or seen on TV documentaries, be advised however that some of us have been employed in this environment and seen firsthand how aircraft manufacturers work and compete with each other as well as the way the government picks and chooses who will build what.

 

[renrich]

Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic. The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.

The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired.

An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks.