I still say it could have been much worse, and that everyone was lucky that engine debris didn't enter the pressure cabin.
Given the containment ring is supposed to catch any debris and prevent fuselage penetration, and during certification one blade is exploded off to make sure it works there was minimal chance of fuselage penetration. The failure of the adjacent blade presumably introduced vibration which, combined with the cowling damage from containing the failed blade, caused the cowlings to fail and separate.
The belly damage appears primarily, maybe completely, to be to the composite
non structural aerodynamic fairings and was almost certainly caused by the cowlings - not the blade segments.
If you poke around the net you can find videos of engine certification tests, blade failure, bird ingestion, etc and some are very dramatic and the finally certified cowling contains all the damage. It will be interesting to see why this cowling failed. The second blade? corrosion? fatigue? other factors? Only time will tell. If deemed necessary new certification standards or inspection procedures will be introduced.
Certification and inspection procedures changes have prevented any engine debris from entering fuel tanks since the 1985 Manchester accident.
For a minor overview of that accident and the initial changes that resulted from that accident go to
https://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_feb89.pdf
You will note on page 6 some of the US mandated modifications which were never applied to the Concorde.
Not covered in this article are any of the mandatory changes to seat coverings, seat bolsters, cabin linings, etc, requiring the rapid installation of fire retardant materials that produce no toxic fumes. I cant be sure but I seem to remember the floor level exit lighting regulations came out of this accident as well. Given I am old this may not be correct.