The Bf 109 F suffered a similar problem as you say, but the RLM never contemplated cancelling it. It all depends on the options available and the capability to introduce new types.
I should be noted that the Typhoon failures at the transport joint, unlike the failures of the 'Friedrich' were not due to an inherent structural weakness but to a rather complicated series of factors leading to fatigue failures. The cure involved strengthening the elevator mass balance mounting bracket, introducing different bearings to the elevator circuit, fitting an 8lb elevator mass balance and a 16lb control column inertia weight, changing the geared rudder balance tab to an ordinary adjustable trim tab and removing the damping cords on the rudder trailing edge. It was NOT a case of riveting on a few strengthening strips as for the Messerschmitt.
No aircraft suffered a tail breakage after the reinforcement of the elevator balance mounting bracket, even before the other modifications were introduced.
All the changes were incorporated in all Typhoons starting with the MN series, delivered to the RAF from late 1943, and of course retro fitted to earlier aircraft.
It was Beamont, while at Hawkers, who dived the modified aircraft at 500mph, making 'harsh' recoveries 'to see if the tail came off.' It didn't and 61/2 g turns were made at 5,000ft with no tendency to tighten up, showing another issue was also cured.
Once again the tendency to underestimate the complexity and difficulties associated with the development of these high performance aircraft rears its head! It took more than a year to fully understand and fix the fatigue problem with the Typhoon's empennage, precisely because there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the structure. A quick, interim fix, in the form of the strengthened bracket did work, but a regular inspection schedule had to be introduced with it.
The Typhoon was, and proved later in its fighter bomber role, one of the strongest and most rugged of any of the fighters deployed by the RAF.
It was just one of many development problems that beset the Typhoon, quite aside from the issues with the engine, and this was not entirely due to Hawkers. It was rushed to delivery in September 1941 with a preliminary Service Clearance and no standardisation. The programme was not initially well managed by any of the bodies involved, largely due to the Focke-Wulf panic (and look at the shambles around the introduction of that aircraft) but the Air Ministry/RAF did get it under control, and quickly, in early 1942, just in time for the new problem with structural failure to arise.
At the conference to discuss the future of the Typhoon held in January 1943 Beamont's voice was just about the only one speaking up for the type. The Typhoon was seen by the RAF as a low level defensive interceptor and this was reflected in the rebuff Beamont had received when he attempted to have his Typhoons of No. 609 Squadron included on offensive sweeps. It was on Beamont's initiative, and an authorisation from AVM Saunders at 11 Group, that the Typhoons undertook independent offensive operations from Manston. It was the data from this independent operational trial that enabled Beamont to argue for the low level offensive role for the Typhoon, which prevented the aircraft being cancelled or becoming something like the Whirlwind, in early 1943. The Typhoon had proved itself as a capable low level offensive aircraft, and unintended and secondary role at which it was as good if not better than any other Allied aircraft operating in NW Europe.
Cheers
Steve
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