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P-47 victory credits overstated by nearly 2X.As to the P-51 vs P-47 debate, one set of data I memorised from another French article was that the P-47 scored 140 of 220 Big Week kills, the P-38 and P-51 sharing 80 in an unknown ratio.
USAF Study 85 and Olynyk/USAF HRC current values for February 20-February 25, 1944During Big Week, with 1/5 the sorties, the -51B destroyed 64.5, the P-47 destroyed 78. The P-38 destroyed 10. (This totals 152.5, a long way from 220)
The John Foreman figures are as noted Fighter Command/ADGB/2nd TAF ONLY, as a result most of the reported conclusions are invalidIt's interesting here that 1943 fighter losses were much lower than 1944, despite an apparent completed switch (in 1943) to mostly Spitfire activity judging from the distribution of losses.
To me this indicates a lack of awareness of sortie rates. Day operations, in 1942 Fighter Command reported 91,772 defensive and 43,003 offensive sorties, in the first 4 months of 1945 Fighter Command and 2nd TAF reported 11,375 defensive and 75,565 offensive sorties, multiply the 1945 figures by 3 to give an idea on tempo and it would give around 230,000 offensive sorties for 12 months, or about 5 times the 1942 rate, not surprising losses were greater per month but lower per sortie. Then factor in 1942 there were few fighter bomber sorties as a percentage of total sorties compared to 1945, so the 1945 operations had much more flak exposure.To me this indicates the later models of the Spitfire did not improve survivability despite a declining Luftwaffe. Or that the later models took a lot of ground attack losses.
Given these claimed adjustments (add "lot" more, subtract "some") do Luftwaffe fighter claims head toward 1 claim to 1 shoot down? While allied claims subtract "huge amount" go below 2 claims to 1 shot down or more? Please present the numbers you must have to make the above statements. The above hand waving adjustments explains how the turn fighter idea was created.The way they are probaby wrong is that a lot of axis air to air kills are counted as flak kills or unknown, or accidents. Also, a huge amount of Allied air to air kills are likely vaporware. The same applies to some dubious Axis claims,
Mighty Eighth War Diary, it does not break down claims by type for 20 February 1944, for 21, 22, 24 and 25 February the totals are P-38 279 sorties despatched, 3 claims, P-47 2,373 sorties despatched, 102 claims, 352 sorties despatched, 51 claims, P-38 1 claim per 93 sorties, P-47 1 claim per 23.3 sorties, P-51 1 claim per 6.9 sorties. On 20 February, 94 P-38, 668 P-47 and 73 P-51 sorties made 61 claims between them, giving 217 claims for the 5 days, 373 P-38, 3,061 P-47 and 425 P-51 sorties despatched, total 3,859.As to the P-51 vs P-47 debate, one set of data I memorised from another French article was that the P-47 scored 140 of 220 Big Week kills, the P-38 and P-51 sharing 80 in an unknown ratio. ... During Big Week, with 1/5 the sorties, the -51B destroyed 64.5, the P-47 destroyed 78. The P-38 destroyed 10. (This totals 152.5, a long way from 220)
The John Foreman figures are as noted Fighter Command/ADGB/2nd TAF ONLY, as a result most of the reported conclusions are invalid
To me this indicates a lack of awareness of sortie rates. Day operations, in 1942 Fighter Command reported 91,772 defensive and 43,003 offensive sorties, in the first 4 months of 1945 Fighter Command and 2nd TAF reported 11,375 defensive and 75,565 offensive sorties, multiply the 1945 figures by 3 to give an idea on tempo and it would give around 230,000 offensive sorties for 12 months, or about 5 times the 1942 rate, not surprising losses were greater per month but lower per sortie. Then factor in 1942 there were few fighter bomber sorties as a percentage of total sorties compared to 1945, so the 1945 operations had much more flak exposure.
Given these claimed adjustments (add "lot" more, subtract "some") do Luftwaffe fighter claims head toward 1 claim to 1 shoot down? While allied claims subtract "huge amount" go below 2 claims to 1 shot down or more? Please present the numbers you must have to make the above statements. The above hand waving adjustments explains how the turn fighter idea was created.
That brings up an interesting point. The 56th FG was far more successful than any other P47 group by a substantial margin. I believe that was more due to the leadership of Zemke than the intrinsic capabilities of the P-47. Ironically Zemke actually thought the P-51 was a better fighter. I compiled the following table from various sources. Please point out any errors.P-47 78 with both 9 combined 8th and 9th AF FG flying Penetration and Withdrawal escort. 56th FG claims/credits were 52 - all other 26 combined
The only thing I can imagine that would accomplish is increasing fuel consumption. Those thick wings and other drag inducing features would negate much of the benefit.Good points.
While I understand why the UK concentrated on the Spitfire development over that of the Hurricane, I have always wondered what the effects of concentrating on development of the Hurricane rather than the Tornado/Typhoon and the Vulture and Sabre engines.
The Griffon/Hurricane seemed particularly doable - assuming production/availability of the Griffon in enough numbers.
If work had started sooner and the griffon prioritised it would have been something like this, the Tempest Mk I.The Griffon/Hurricane seemed particularly doable - assuming production/availability of the Griffon in enough numbers.
Your numbers are close, to same, as 8th AF VCB 9-45, which is basis of Kent Miller's compilations.That brings up an interesting point. The 56th FG was far more successful than any other P47 group by a substantial margin. I believe that was more due to the leadership of Zemke than the intrinsic capabilities of the P-47. Ironically Zemke actually thought the P-51 was a better fighter. I complied the following table from various sources. Please point out any errors.
View attachment 806707
Note that the 56th more than doubled the score of the next group. I included the two Spitfire groups because during the time they flew the Spitfire they outscored all of the P-47 groups with the exception of the 56th. The only reason the 348th, 78th and 353th exceeded the 31st was they they were in action longer. One could claim the USSAF Spitfires "broke the back" of the Luftwaffe not the P-47.
"ops on Aug 43" should be 42?Your numbers are close, to same, as 8th AF VCB 9-45, which is basis of Kent Miller's compilations.
USAF 85 is slightly different and Olynyk's values are different (again) - for example 666.5 for 56th FG
The 31st was operational in 8AF/ETO - ops on Aug 43, before it went to 12AF and operational again in Feb 43 with Spits, then 15th AF and operational with P-51B in April 44.
So with 582 total, it not only preceeded 56, 78 and 353 but actually earlier than 4th FG (Oct 42) with ETO. Also remember the 31st scored ~ 390 Mustang scores. All in, only the 357, 56 and 354 outscored the 31st in total air to air VCs in Europe and Pacific. Far ahead of the 348th FG (349 total)
the 348th was 'operational' in July 43- but didn't get first VC until Aug 43
No, the 348th was originally tasked for ETO to arrive in same timeframe as the 353rd, 352nd and 355th FG. Pilots moved to Australia, then New Guinea in May-June 1943, trained in June-July. I am unclear on first actual combat mission, but Kearby's first VC was Sept 4 1943."ops on Aug 43" should be 42?
The comment was referring to the 31st not the 348th.No, the 348th was originally tasked for ETO to arrive in same timeframe as the 353rd, 352nd and 355th FG. Pilots moved to Australia, then New Guinea in May-June 1943, trained in June-July. I am unclear on first actual combat mission, but Kearby's first VC was Sept 4 1943.
Actually you are a long way from understanding the difference between overall operations and air combat results. Where does the 20:1 ratio come from and what do the numbers count?But still we are talking about a roughly consistent 2:1 fighter to fighter kill/loss ratio regardless of "declining" Luftwaffe training. We are a long way from 20:1 or 19:1 US claims.
No time period given, is this 1.5 to 2 German losses per Luftwaffe victory claimed or is it multiply German claims by 1.5 or 2 to become accurate? Meantime to repeat myself, Given these claimed adjustments (add "lot" more, subtract "some") do Luftwaffe fighter claims head toward 1 claim to 1 shoot down? While allied claims subtract "huge amount" go below 2 claims to 1 shot down or more? Please present the numbers you must have to make the above statements.Actually, in an article I recently read, Luftwaffe units deployed in France lost around 250 pilots killed and made around 500 claims (in an Eduard Store Info Eduard article of the past year, can't look up the exact one right now). This does not include pilots shot down that survived, so while 1 to 1 may not be correct, 1.5 or 2 losses per German victory is not massively out of line...
Apart from the widely reported better performance of the Mustang and Thunderbolt versus the Spitfire IX? Including the range to stay to force fights? How about we declare the Fw190A and Bf109F in 1941/42 "I don't see why the ratio should not be similar", even though the Fw190A of the time was reported to have better performance.I don't see why the USAF ratio should not be similar to British pilots flying Spitfires in 1944,
Given your idea of dates perhaps a reference to exactly when it happened might be in order, USAAF says it lost 201 fighters to enemy aircraft in April 1944, 176 in May and 147 in June, its top 3 loss months, heavy bombers for the three months are 314, 211 and 112. Also explain why the near 100% casualties the Luftwaffe fighter force took in the first 5 months of 1944 are not considered.Another major aspect completely skewing the period view of the P-51's relative effectiveness is the Luftwaffe's "bombers only" directive, which created a huge number of P-51 "ace in a day" when introduced in the month of May 1944.
8th Air Force.May (or April?) 1944 is also the period where the US escorts were first allowed to free hunt, which massively upped their opportunities and created surprise in the German tactics: They were now being caught on the climb....
Right, now try the real dates and the real results from early 1944, the ones already given for Big Week, next is the idea the later P-47 could not turn as well or something? Which fight test states "significant inferiority".What also skews this picture even further is that the Bubbletop P-47, arriving in April 1944, was in my opinion significantly inferior in air to air combat handling than the Razorback version.
You are the only person making them, and everyone agrees the claim is not accurate.It seems to me the claims of 20:1 air to air cannot be accurate
So present the factual material to back up the apparent systematic faking of reports, also explain how the people making the claims managed to get around the universal fitting of gun cameras in 1944.but the number of actual air to air kills is also questionable. I know for a fact US leaders were frequently using their seniority to get confirmation blurbs out of lower ranked wingmen...
I think everyone agrees it confirms their suspicions but not about USAAF fighter claims.I'll just use as an example of my suspicions a famous and narrowly specific example: The Palms Sunday massacre,
As the transports turned back the fight started over the sea and continued inland, the claim for the Spitfire was inland."On Sunday, 18 April 1943, 65 Ju 52s were returning to Sicily from Tunisia, which were escorted by 15 Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and 7./JG 53 and 4 Bf 110s and Me 210s destroyers of ZG 1 and ZG 26. This formation was intercepted by 46 P-40s and 11 Spitfires. This date became to be known among the Allies as Palm Sunday Massacre. According to Eric Hammel's Air War Europa, 61 Ju 52s and 15 Bf 109s were shot down by the Allied fighters which included claims by three American fighter pilots who were credited with five apiece. The loss was six P-40s and one Spitfire.
The latest information I have from the German side comes from Jochen Prien's Die Jagdfliegerverbände Vol.11/I which states that 24 Ju 52s crashed into the sea and another 35 were forced to land in Tunisia. There is no indication of how many, if any, were written-off or to what degree, if any, they were damaged. One twin-engine destroyer was lost in addition to one Bf 109 of JG 27, plus one damaged 20% and one forced to land due to engine defect. The Germans claimed one Spitfire and three P-40s.
It appears that the Allies heavily over-claimed, especially the 15 Bf 109s(!) and the Germans underclaimed Allied fighters."
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Looking at this specific example, we see here that the US overclaiming in fighters was 15:1 for the Me-109s... The Ju-52 overclaiming was nearly 3:1.
You should stop doing it then.There is no doubt this is one of the worst defeats the Luftwaffe ever experienced, yet apparently that was still not enough, and the embellishment was considerable...
21 November 1944, big Luftwaffe attempt to intercept 8th Air Force raid, Werner Gerbig reports 40 Luftwaffe pilots killed, 20 wounded, Donald Caldwell reports 84 Luftwaffe fighters lost, Luftwaffe quartermaster reports Reich lost 65 fighters lost to enemy action, 2 to other causes, 16 on operations not enemy action, 4 not on operations,, Luftflotte 3 says 2 fighters lost on operations, plus a Bf109 reconnaissance machine, 1 fighter on operations not enemy action, 1 not on operations, John Foreman says the RAF claimed 2 kills, Roger Freeman notes 1 claim lodged by a heavy bomber, USAAF fighters made 76.5 claims.This is why I think several narrow events, with the return to base data on both sides, is more likely to be accurate and informative as to what things looked like.
Yep typo - aug 42The comment was referring to the 31st not the 348th.
MAW writes that total claims were 128 destroyed EA by the 57th FG + 324th FS, 77 were allowed after review. There were clashes between (British) Spitfires and 109's about an hour earlier than the Palm Sunday Massacre took place and further inland, both sides claimed and suffered losses. Two 1./ JG53 and one 4./ Jg51 109's were lost inland. There is only one 4./ Jg53 109 definitely lost in the Cap Bon area as well as 1 Me210 of 7./ Zg1. A Spitfire was claimed by a Jg27 pilot, none were lost. Italian pilots claimed a number of Spitfires and a P-40, probably in this fight though the locations given Sousse- Enfidaville are a bit further south, but the times given seem to match.Meantime the series The Mediterranean Air War by Shores et. al. finds after review the USAAF allowed claims were 59 Ju52, 14 Bf109/MC202, 2 Bf110. Old references report 24 Ju52, 9 Bf109, 1 Bf110 lost 35 Ju52 force landed, but that includes 8 Bf109 from II/JG27 with all pilots saved. Their new results are 37 transports shot down, 9 crash landed with implications these 9 did not fly again. When it comes to Bf109 JG53 lost 3 that day, they were part of the transport escort, but no JG27 losses listed, throw in 1 from JG27 which Prien reports and the US fighters are over claiming transports about 3 to 2 and single engine fighters maybe 3.5 to 1, twin engine 2 to 1 or possibly 1 to 1, since 2 Me210 were lost.
The allies lost 4 P-40 and 1 Spitfire, the Germans claimed 4 P-40, 1 P-38 and 4 Spitfires. Given the transports had defensive fire and were at zero feet the probability is 1 or more P-40 were shot down by the transports and/or misjudged and hit the sea/land, the 9 to 5 raw score can easily become 3 to 1.