Naziabomb
I'm not even going to address some of the issues on this fantasy site, but your $64,000 dollar question is answered quite incorrectly and any look at the historical record will confirm this. The issue of the use, or even potential use, of such weapons is and was contentious. It should not be treated so flippantly.
It is true that in 1944 the decision was taken to order 500,000 anthrax 'bombs' from the Americans, but the defensive rationale for this is ignored.
Churchill March 8th (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. M.246/4, Churchill to Brown, 8 March 1944, in PREM 3/65.):
".. I have had most secret consultations with my Military Advisers. They consider, and I entirely agree, that if our enemies should indulge in this form of warfare, the only deterrent would be our power to retaliate."
Again on May 21st (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. D. 162/4, Churchill to Ismay, 21 May 1944, in CAB 120/782.)
"As you know, great progress has been made in bacteriological warfare and we have ordered a half million bombs from America for use should this mode of warfare be employed against us ..."
I have included references which you can check. Now, clearly not only do you have the timing wrong, but the interest in bacteriological agents was as a response to a perceived threat from similar weapons if deployed by the enemy. It had absolutely ZERO connection to a non existent nuclear threat in March 1944.
It is possible you are conflating two different things. In July 1944 Churchill did seriously consider the use of poison gas in the now infamous and often misquoted minute (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. D.217/4, 6 July 1944, in PREM 3/89 (also in CAB 120/775)).
I include just a couple of paragraphs, the full minute is in the public domain for anyone who wants to read it.
"1. I want you to think very seriously over this question of poison gas. I would not use it unless it could be shown either that (a) it was life or death for us, or (b) that it would shorten the war by a year.
6. If the bombardment of London really became a serious nuisance and great rockets with far-reaching and devastating effect fell on many centres of Government and labour, I should be prepared to do anything that would hit the enemy in a murderous place. I may certainly have to ask you to support me in using poison gas. We could drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical attention. We could stop all work at the flying bomb starting points. I do not see why we should always have all the disadvantages of being the gentleman while they have all the advantages of being the cad. There are times when this may be so but not now."
This is clearly a consideration of the use of chemical NOT biological weapons in response to the continued bombardment of London by V-1s and predates the first V-2 attack. Again, explicitly, nothing to do with a non existent nuclear weapon slightly later in 1944.
The nature of the response and others within the UK's government and forces is confirmed by comments like this, on 8th July by the Chief of the Naval Staff (Cunningham) in his diary. (Cunningham Papers, Vol. XXI, Diary, 1944 (British Library, Add. MS. 52577)
"C.O.S. meeting at 1100. Discussion on P.M.'s rather immoderate minutes (a) on the use of gas (b) on General Alexander's plans in Italy. In the first he talks of 'uniformed psalm-singers' presumably referring to the Directors of Plans ... He obviously had a bad day after his statement [of 6 July, on flying bombs] in H[ouse] of C[ommons]."
The Chief of the Air Staff (Portal) didn't believe the use of gas would be effective. It was during these discussions that it was suggested that the investigation into chemical options should be undertaken under the supervision of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff, and that both the Chemical AND Biological Warfare sub-committees should be consulted. In other words, the Chiefs of Staff took it upon themselves to widen the terms of reference for the proposed report to bring in germ warfare as well as gas. This broadening of the task was specified in the formal instruction to the Vice-Chiefs (COS(44)227th Mtg (0)(14), 8 July 1944, in CAB 79/77)
"carry out a comprehensive examination of the points raised in the Prime Minister's minute, and to include in their examination consideration of the possibilities of biological warfare and of the form which enemy reprisals might take."
As Churchill had not asked for the biological option to be explored the reply from a COS secretary (Hollis) to Churchill's original minute didn't even mention it.
"Prime Minister, Reference your minute at Flag 'A' (D.217/4) about the use of gas, the Chiefs of Staff this morning directed the Vice-Chiefs of Staff to go into this matter with the greatest care and thoroughness, bringing into consultation all interested authorities.
2. A report will be submitted to you as soon as possible." (COS Sec. Min. 1140/4, Hollis to Churchill, 8 July 1944, in CAB 120/775)
The resulting report had very little on biological warfare. Only three paragraphs were devoted to it.
"19. If the claims of N [anthrax] are substantiated, its use could probably make a material change in the war situation, but there is no likelihood of a sustained attack being possible before the middle of 1945.
20. There is no known prophylactic against N. If it can be used in practice, the effect on morale will be profound.
21. It is improbable that the Germans will initiate biological warfare. There is no evidence to show whether they are in a position to retaliate in kind, were we to initiate it."
(COS(44)661 (0), 26 July 1944, in CAB 80/85.)
The British did not have enough biological weapons to mount a meaningful campaign. The 500,000 bombs ordered from the Americans were supposed to suffice for retaliatory attacks on six German cities, but in October 1944 the Biological Warfare sub-committee told the Chiefs of Staff that.
"it may be necessary to arrange provision of 8 times this number of bombs in order to achieve results on the scale originally intended"
(Closed (50 years) Document: BW(44)21, 10 October 1944 – also circulated as COS(44)892(0), 10 October 1944, in CAB 80/88.)
This was never done, indeed the Chiefs of Staff, on 13 October 1944 decided to let stand what was termed
"the present token order for 500,000 bombs."
(COS(44)338th Mtg (0) (7), 13 October 1944, in CAB 79/81.)
In summary though the British did seriously look at chemical and to a lesser extent biological warfare options in response to the V-1 bombardment there was never a serious plan to implement either. As far as biological warfare goes there was no plan, nor sufficient material. There were never anything other than experimental 'Anthrax laced cattle cakes', produced at Porton Down in 1942 (I'm aware of the 5 million claimed by some, making the cake (Olympia Oil and Cake Company in Blackburn) and impregnating it are two different things), and there was never a public threat to use them. The discussions were so secret that some of the papers referenced above were sealed for 50 years (until 1994). There was resistance to the use of either form of warfare by just about everyone in the British establishment. Even in wartime Britain was still a democracy and Churchill did not have the powers of his adversary in Germany. Just because Churchill was interested in something didn't mean that it would happen. This was summed up nicely in Cunningham's diary on 21st July 1944 when he wrote:
"C.O.S. meeting at 1100. Nothing much of importance, P.M.'s minute on the study of retaliation by gas was to the effect that he could do nothing if the warriors as well as the parsons were against him."
Now, you posed your own $64000 question and gave an answer that the Germans did not use their super weapon for fear of retaliation by biological warfare. I can show that the answer is absolute nonsense. Maybe you should try again? Why didn't the Germans use this supposed weapon? Not because of the threat of biological retaliation by Britain. A far more likely and logical explanation would be that no such weapon existed.
The problem with sites like yours, trying to show an alternate history or discredit the received version is that they don't bother to do the work to establish the facts. By cherry picking a few 'facts', conflating them, quoting them out of context, they attempt to construct a version or series of events that rarely if ever stand up to a proper and rigorous historical examination.
Cheers
Steve
I'm not even going to address some of the issues on this fantasy site, but your $64,000 dollar question is answered quite incorrectly and any look at the historical record will confirm this. The issue of the use, or even potential use, of such weapons is and was contentious. It should not be treated so flippantly.
It is true that in 1944 the decision was taken to order 500,000 anthrax 'bombs' from the Americans, but the defensive rationale for this is ignored.
Churchill March 8th (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. M.246/4, Churchill to Brown, 8 March 1944, in PREM 3/65.):
".. I have had most secret consultations with my Military Advisers. They consider, and I entirely agree, that if our enemies should indulge in this form of warfare, the only deterrent would be our power to retaliate."
Again on May 21st (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. D. 162/4, Churchill to Ismay, 21 May 1944, in CAB 120/782.)
"As you know, great progress has been made in bacteriological warfare and we have ordered a half million bombs from America for use should this mode of warfare be employed against us ..."
I have included references which you can check. Now, clearly not only do you have the timing wrong, but the interest in bacteriological agents was as a response to a perceived threat from similar weapons if deployed by the enemy. It had absolutely ZERO connection to a non existent nuclear threat in March 1944.
It is possible you are conflating two different things. In July 1944 Churchill did seriously consider the use of poison gas in the now infamous and often misquoted minute (P.M.'s Personal Min. No. D.217/4, 6 July 1944, in PREM 3/89 (also in CAB 120/775)).
I include just a couple of paragraphs, the full minute is in the public domain for anyone who wants to read it.
"1. I want you to think very seriously over this question of poison gas. I would not use it unless it could be shown either that (a) it was life or death for us, or (b) that it would shorten the war by a year.
6. If the bombardment of London really became a serious nuisance and great rockets with far-reaching and devastating effect fell on many centres of Government and labour, I should be prepared to do anything that would hit the enemy in a murderous place. I may certainly have to ask you to support me in using poison gas. We could drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical attention. We could stop all work at the flying bomb starting points. I do not see why we should always have all the disadvantages of being the gentleman while they have all the advantages of being the cad. There are times when this may be so but not now."
This is clearly a consideration of the use of chemical NOT biological weapons in response to the continued bombardment of London by V-1s and predates the first V-2 attack. Again, explicitly, nothing to do with a non existent nuclear weapon slightly later in 1944.
The nature of the response and others within the UK's government and forces is confirmed by comments like this, on 8th July by the Chief of the Naval Staff (Cunningham) in his diary. (Cunningham Papers, Vol. XXI, Diary, 1944 (British Library, Add. MS. 52577)
"C.O.S. meeting at 1100. Discussion on P.M.'s rather immoderate minutes (a) on the use of gas (b) on General Alexander's plans in Italy. In the first he talks of 'uniformed psalm-singers' presumably referring to the Directors of Plans ... He obviously had a bad day after his statement [of 6 July, on flying bombs] in H[ouse] of C[ommons]."
The Chief of the Air Staff (Portal) didn't believe the use of gas would be effective. It was during these discussions that it was suggested that the investigation into chemical options should be undertaken under the supervision of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff, and that both the Chemical AND Biological Warfare sub-committees should be consulted. In other words, the Chiefs of Staff took it upon themselves to widen the terms of reference for the proposed report to bring in germ warfare as well as gas. This broadening of the task was specified in the formal instruction to the Vice-Chiefs (COS(44)227th Mtg (0)(14), 8 July 1944, in CAB 79/77)
"carry out a comprehensive examination of the points raised in the Prime Minister's minute, and to include in their examination consideration of the possibilities of biological warfare and of the form which enemy reprisals might take."
As Churchill had not asked for the biological option to be explored the reply from a COS secretary (Hollis) to Churchill's original minute didn't even mention it.
"Prime Minister, Reference your minute at Flag 'A' (D.217/4) about the use of gas, the Chiefs of Staff this morning directed the Vice-Chiefs of Staff to go into this matter with the greatest care and thoroughness, bringing into consultation all interested authorities.
2. A report will be submitted to you as soon as possible." (COS Sec. Min. 1140/4, Hollis to Churchill, 8 July 1944, in CAB 120/775)
The resulting report had very little on biological warfare. Only three paragraphs were devoted to it.
"19. If the claims of N [anthrax] are substantiated, its use could probably make a material change in the war situation, but there is no likelihood of a sustained attack being possible before the middle of 1945.
20. There is no known prophylactic against N. If it can be used in practice, the effect on morale will be profound.
21. It is improbable that the Germans will initiate biological warfare. There is no evidence to show whether they are in a position to retaliate in kind, were we to initiate it."
(COS(44)661 (0), 26 July 1944, in CAB 80/85.)
The British did not have enough biological weapons to mount a meaningful campaign. The 500,000 bombs ordered from the Americans were supposed to suffice for retaliatory attacks on six German cities, but in October 1944 the Biological Warfare sub-committee told the Chiefs of Staff that.
"it may be necessary to arrange provision of 8 times this number of bombs in order to achieve results on the scale originally intended"
(Closed (50 years) Document: BW(44)21, 10 October 1944 – also circulated as COS(44)892(0), 10 October 1944, in CAB 80/88.)
This was never done, indeed the Chiefs of Staff, on 13 October 1944 decided to let stand what was termed
"the present token order for 500,000 bombs."
(COS(44)338th Mtg (0) (7), 13 October 1944, in CAB 79/81.)
In summary though the British did seriously look at chemical and to a lesser extent biological warfare options in response to the V-1 bombardment there was never a serious plan to implement either. As far as biological warfare goes there was no plan, nor sufficient material. There were never anything other than experimental 'Anthrax laced cattle cakes', produced at Porton Down in 1942 (I'm aware of the 5 million claimed by some, making the cake (Olympia Oil and Cake Company in Blackburn) and impregnating it are two different things), and there was never a public threat to use them. The discussions were so secret that some of the papers referenced above were sealed for 50 years (until 1994). There was resistance to the use of either form of warfare by just about everyone in the British establishment. Even in wartime Britain was still a democracy and Churchill did not have the powers of his adversary in Germany. Just because Churchill was interested in something didn't mean that it would happen. This was summed up nicely in Cunningham's diary on 21st July 1944 when he wrote:
"C.O.S. meeting at 1100. Nothing much of importance, P.M.'s minute on the study of retaliation by gas was to the effect that he could do nothing if the warriors as well as the parsons were against him."
Now, you posed your own $64000 question and gave an answer that the Germans did not use their super weapon for fear of retaliation by biological warfare. I can show that the answer is absolute nonsense. Maybe you should try again? Why didn't the Germans use this supposed weapon? Not because of the threat of biological retaliation by Britain. A far more likely and logical explanation would be that no such weapon existed.
The problem with sites like yours, trying to show an alternate history or discredit the received version is that they don't bother to do the work to establish the facts. By cherry picking a few 'facts', conflating them, quoting them out of context, they attempt to construct a version or series of events that rarely if ever stand up to a proper and rigorous historical examination.
Cheers
Steve
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