Yamamoto and Rommel: war geniuses or blunders?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Elmas

Staff Sergeant
1,433
1,418
Jan 17, 2011
Italy
This of course it is not a provocative question, I want just to know the opinion of the highly qualificated people that there are in this Forum…now that we can have the invaluable auxilium of that potent instrument called rectospectroscope…

In almost all books of history these two High Officers are highly regarded as creators of innovative and efficient war plans but, after having read a lot of books and. for N.A. Campaign, having spoken with some Italian officers that fought in N.A., and in the late '60s, when my Father was working in Cyrenaica, having seen all the places were that campaign was fought, there are some reflections I'd like to speak to.

First, at Rommel insistence, Malta was left practically alone, and all resources sent to NA. Terrible blunder, but that was exactly what Hitler and Mussolini wanted to listen. Second, Rommel, during the First Battle of El Alamein, was completely deceived by false information provided by British Intelligence, and sent tanks and troops in search of unexixtant gaps in the mined fields, so having at no avail heavy losses that, one thousand five hundred km from the harbour of Tripoli, he could never replace; third, at El Alamein he had to his shoulders the Sollum Ridge, a place that could have been ideal to resist. Fourth, he completely sacrificed Italian troops: Germans tried to stole even the few trucks Italians possessed so, as one Italian Officer wrote "shootings were in those days on a triangular basis…"

Yamamoto: IJN for years sought after the "decisive battle" between Japanese and American Fleets but, in the Battle of Midway plans, battleships and cruisers and their essential anti-aircraft component, were left one thousand km behind, doing a pleasant cruise in the Pacific. But weren't they looking for a "decisive battle"? With the Fleet split in two?

Could be, and this is a personal point of view, that to toady this two Officers beyond their merit was an intelligent idea of the Allied propaganda: "You can see how strong we are" they could say to their public opinion "they have outstanding Generals but, at last, we defeated them and we won…"

Of course the opposite face of the medal was to deliberately lessen the strenght of Italians and Japanese forces, so to say to their troops "C'mon boys! Certainly you wont't fear some ragged Dagoes and Japs…"

I have a signed First Edition copy of "Fly for your life" from R.R. Stanford Tuck: he recalls that he spent a couple of hours at the phone trying to get in contact with a columnist that described very "lightly" a fight between Hurricanes and CR42s, and to tell him that several Hurricanes had holes from CR42 guns, and that fight had not been a promenade... But, as he recalls in the book, the Secretary always replied that the columnist "had just left…"

Any reply will be appreciated, of course.
 
Last edited:

IMHO Rommel did as well as any Commander could have done in North Africa. Many historians give Von Mainstein credit for being the best, and I agree. With regard to being deceived, the British counter Intelligence achieved many deceptions during the War, looking back its amazing how well some worked, like Operation Fortitude. In Ben Macintyre's book, Operation Mincemeat, he makes a point that its easier to deceive someone when they want to believe what you are telling them. Its not hard to think of Rommel falling into that with the Cairo so close.

For Yamamoto, I don't think history is kind to him. As Combined Fleet Commander he made strategic errors. Committing the strategic assets of two fleet carriers to the Coral Sea, when Midway was a month away was a mistake. Midway was not well planned and also assumed the USN would do what the IJN thought it would do.
 
Last edited:
With the caveat that I think Irwin Rommel and George Patton were the two best field commanders in the ETO-WW11, I will shift to the PTO-- I had a uncle who was in the USN 1943-1945 in the PTO, and that's the only insight I had into the aspects of the USN and their combat experiences in that TO.

But, as I believe that Yamamoto was educated in the USA, and had an understanding of the industrial potential America had pre-1941 (in spite of the Great Depression and its devastating effects on the US economy )--I do agree that it would seem he made many strategic errors, grossly under-estimating the strength and determination of the USA's Armed Forces.

The usage of the term "Japs"- as in the posters reading "Slap The Jap" were perhaps politically correct in the 1941-1945 era, and may have given American forces the miss-guided concept that the "Little Yellow Bastards" , as Adm. Wm. "Bull" Halsey called them, were inferior in fighting ability to the US Forces. Big mistake- when you fight an enemy deeply entrenched and determined to die for their sworn cause- Emperor or Fuhrer-- you had better know that the casualties were be great, regardless of the final outcome.

I am "reaching" here when I say that the Japanese troops with their Bushido code of honor would die for Hirohito willingly in combat, in the post-Stalingrad era in the ETO, perhaps more of the Waffen SS units were of that mindset regarding dying for Hitler, whereas the Wehrmacht troops might have decided surrender (hopefully to Allied forces) was the best option. Just my opinion, and I have an open mind to other opinions from any members of this forum. Hansie
 
Rommel and Yamamoto is a bit much for one thread.........Rommel was commander of a small Panzer Corp in a 2nd string theatre, Yamamoto was the head of the Imperial Japanese Navy.................but trying to answer it.

They were leading their armies at times of victories so they had to be "geniuses", no one wants to be told they were beaten by incompetent fools (Not that Rommel or Yamamoto were incompetent or fools).
 
In my biased opinion (I am a Rommel fan, ditto Patton) if the attempt to kill Hitler at the Wolf's Lair in July 1944 hadn't occurred at all, then perhaps some of the innocent Generals and Field Marshalls Hitler "purged" afterwards would have been involved in the "Autumn Mist" attack starting in Dec 1944-through the Ardennes, etc.

Why Hitler thought Rommel would turn against him is a mystery to me- possibly explained by Hitler's heavy drug usage at that point in time-- but alas, things turned out differently for Rommel- if his supply lines to Africa had been maintained as he wanted, I think he would have defeated the British at El Alemain-hands down.
 
I would agree with most above and Rommel along with Patton are two of my favorites. For such an accomplished military leader it did not begin that way. Rommel's sister described him as a gentle and docile child who, in school, developed an interest in mathematics and engineering. However his grades were not high enough to allow him to attend a university. With few prospects his father, the headmaster of a school, urged him to consider the military. After being rejected by the artillery and engineers, 18-year-old Rommel received acceptance to the infantry in 1910 as an officer cadet. He would remain in the military for the rest of his life unlike his father and other male relatives, who left upon completing their mandatory service.

In the military he was continually taking part in dangerous raids and reconnaissance missions. His men said, "Where Rommel is, there is the front." During one 52-hour period his unit captured some 9,000 Italian prisoners. In September 1914, for, Rommel charged three French soldiers with a bayonet after running out of ammunition, only to be shot in the thigh so badly that a hole opened up as big as his fist. Three years later in Romania, he lost quite a bit of blood from a bullet to the arm, and he also continuously suffered from stomach ailments, fevers and exhaustion. More physical hardships came during World War II, from appendicitis to a face wound caused by a shell splinter. Then, just before the D-Day invasion, Allied aircraft strafed his open-topped car as it rode through Normandy, France, causing it to somersault off the road. When Rommel was found he was unconscious, with multiple skull fractures and glass fragments in his face. This accident was used later to cover-up his forced suicide. Nazi officials told the public he had died as a result of those injuries.

Though he apparently never joined the Nazi Party, his devotion to Hitler was incontrovertible. When Hitler took power, Rommel approved of his remilitarization plans, calling him the "unifier of the nation." Later on, as the two men became better acquainted in the lead-up to the invasion of Poland, Rommel wrote to his wife that "the Führer knows what is right for us." He also attended Nazi indoctrination courses and signed his letters "Heil Hitler!" Hitler even gave him an autographed copy of "Mein Kampf." Only later in the war did Rommel grow disillusioned wirh Hitler's policies, believing that Germany must negotiate with the Allies rather than fight to the bitter end.

During the 1940 blitzkrieg in France, Rommel lead a tank division. Then he was transferred to North Africa in order to help the struggling Italians fight the British. Almost immediately he reversed the tide, pushing the British back hundreds of miles in a series of audacious assaults, for which he received his "Desert Fox" nickname, along with a promotion to field marshal. Finally, in October 1942, the numerically superior British halted his advance near El Alamein, Egypt. Running low on tanks, ammunition and fuel, Rommel prepared to retreat. But Hitler sent a letter telling him not to yield "even a yard of ground." "As to your troops," the Führer added, "you can show them no other road than that to victory or death." Despite those orders Rommel disobeyed fearing that his force would be completely annihilated. He also disregarded an order directing German generals to execute Allied commandos caught behind enemy lines. In the end, Rommel fled all the way to Tunisia, winning a tank battle there against the Americans and losing one against the British. He returned to Europe in March 1943. Two months later, the Allies kicked the Germans out of North Africa altogether, setting the stage for their invasion of Italy.

With an Allied invasion of Western Europe imminent, Rommel was assigned in late 1943 to inspect Germany's defenses along some 1,600 miles of Atlantic coastline. Despite Nazi propaganda to the contrary, he found the area highly vulnerable. Under his supervision, the Nazis built fortifications, flooded coastal lowlands to make them impassable and placed massive amounts of barbed wire, mines and steel girders on beaches and offshore waters. Rommel also wanted tanks at the ready to prevent the Allies from establishing a bridgehead, but his superiors overruled him, preferring to keep most of them inland.

As Germany's military situation deteriorated, a group of senior officials attempted to assassinate Hitler with a briefcase bomb which unfortunately failed. Rommel was friends with some of the conspirators and certainly had discussed a post-Hitler future. That being said the full extent of his involvement in the plot remains unknown. (According to his widow, he opposed assassination but wanted Hitler to be arrested and brought to trial.) Whether innocent or not, his name came up during the subsequent Nazi dragnet, prompting Hitler to arrange for his death.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill praised him before the House of Commons. "We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us," Churchill declared, "and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general." George Patton, Bernard Montgomery and other top Allied generals likewise expressed their respect for him. As a result unlike other prominent World War II-era Germans, Rommel has escaped mass vilification. In fact, his name still graces two military bases and several streets in Germany, and a monument in his hometown praises him as "chivalrous," "brave" and a "victim of tyranny." Not all agree however and a German historian recently called him a "deeply convinced Nazi" and "an anti-Semite" who used North African Jews as slave laborers. At the very least, most historians agree, Rommel likely cared more for his career than he did about Nazi atrocities.
 
 
Since we are on the topic of Rommel being "purged", I have been to the spot where he was forced to commit suicide, as well as his grave several times (including the 50th anniversary of his death.)

I have also met his late son on several occasions when he was the Mayor of Stuttgart.

Here are a few pics I took the last I went there a few years ago.

 
Rommel was a protege of Hitler, as he did not come from a noble family, unlike the whole old class of German officers: but Hitler was an extremely vindictive person, and he did not forgive anyone.
And Rommel made two big mistakes: to promise Hitler and Mussolini to get to Alexandria and then to Suez, and to stop the Allied invasion of the second front on the beaches.
Moreover, on both occasions, when the Allied offensive broke out, he was on leave at home, and that was very serious for Hitler, who never asked for a license during the entire World War I.
His alleged participation in the July coup was, IMHO, just an excuse for Hitler to get rid of him.
 
Last edited:
Yamamoto's greatest tactical achievement is undoubtedly the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. His awareness of America's industrial and military strength allowed him the foresight to understand that Japan could not withstand or endure a long drawn-out battle. His plans were to take control of the entire Western Pacific by destroying as much as possible of America's land, sea and air power in a period of less than 12 months, thereby allowing Japanese forces a remote chance of victory. It was also his knowledge of America's strengths that enabled him to predict Japan's ultimate demise in the war if they could not take control quickly and establish key strongholds throughout the Western Pacific region.

While the attack on Pearl Harbour was considered a success in Japan, Yamamoto was concerned about its impact on US resolve.

The often stated quotation about waking a sleeping giant is questionable, but there is not denying that Yamamoto was firmly opposed to a war with the US, because of that's nations marked industrial and manpower advantages. Yamamoto did not believe that the US could be brought to the peace table by the one climactic "decisive battle". The most he thought was possible was a negotiated peace in which Japan might be able to achieve some of her war aims.

Yamamoto did say on many occasions that Japan needed to secure victory quickly to have any chance at all. This was a remarkably accurate estimation of japanese prospects

Similar to the above quotation was another quotation that, while confirmed as real, was widely misinterpreted in the US press. Yamamoto, when once asked his opinion on the war, pessimistically said that the only way for Japan to win the war was to dictate terms in the White House. Yamamoto's meaning was that military victory, in a protracted war against an opponent with as much of a population and industrial advantage as the United States possessed, was completely impossible—a rebuff to those who thought that winning a major battle against the US Navy would end the war. However, in the US, his words were recast as a bombastic boast that he would literally dictate peace terms at the White House. This deliberate mistranslation became famous when read by narrator Walter Huston over stock footage of Yamamoto and his men on parade, in Frank Capras "Why we fight" propaganda films

After the Pearl Harbour attacks Yamamoto held grave concerns for Japans chances for victory because a number of America's carriers, heavy cruisers and submarines that were absent from Pearl Harbour on the day of the attack. Yamamoto wrote to a friend 'The fact that we have had a small success at Pearl Harbour is nothing. The fact that we have succeeded so easily has pleased people . . . people should think things over and realize how serious the situation is.' Yamamoto struggled to keep the upper hand in the war. For example Admiral Nagumo an IGHQ appointment was a torpedo expert to command the aircraft carriers, and this, combined with superior US Naval Intelligence, worked against him in the Battle of Midway. Midway was not the planning of Yamamoto or his staff, though combined fleet HQ contributed greatly to it That defeat started a chain of events that resulted in the ultimate demise and subsequent defeat of Japan's efforts in the war.

The plan of attack at Midway was needlessly complex. The IJNs forces were too widely dispersed and when the US Navy was able to surprise Japan's aircraft carriers, which had been sailing ahead of the main fleet, Nagumo's lack of experience resulted in the loss of four of their best aircraft carriers and their elite crews. Had Yamamoto been present, the outcome may have been different because his expertise was in the tactical manoeuvring of aircraft and aircraft carriers.

Despite being vehemently opposed to entering into a war with America and challenging Japan's army and government to try and prevent it, Yamamoto was considered with the utmost respect by both his enemies and allies. He had always been a fair man who fought hard, clean battles and the Imperial Navy followed his sense of honour during his command. Even after the defeat at Midway, America still considered Yamamoto to be its most dangerous enemy. When US Intelligence provided an opportunity for an assassination attempt, Admiral Nimitz Commander of the US Pacific Fleet was so concerned about the political implications that he took the unusual step of seeking advice from Washington before carrying out the attack.

After Yamamoto's death, he was posthumously promoted to the highest rank of Fleet Admiral, received the highest state honours at his funeral and was the only foreigner to receive the Knights Cross from Germany, one of its highest medals.

The attack on Pearl Harbour was a crushing blow to America and without it Japan would have been overwhelmed much earlier in the war. Regardless of the success at Pearl Harbour, Japan was always going to be competing against a far better equipped and resilient navy. It is unlikely that Yamamoto was ever going to be in a position to alter the course of history. He understood that it was possible but implausible that Japan could be victorious in a war with America. He was obligated to follow 'Japan's funeral march of aggression' as he put it even though he recognised that the Japanese government and army suffered from 'jingoism – unrealistic and overblown patriotism' Despite the intellectual qualities that he developed from studying and working in a Western culture, he could not influence the higher command. Ultimately, only his patriotism provided the necessary motivation to participate in the battle he fought very hard to avoid and it was that battle that subsequently resulted in his own demise. American pilots shot down the aircraft that he was flying in 18 months after the attack on Pearl Harbour.
 

A new book on Pearl Harbor is
Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, by Alan Zimm
He overturns much of the legend of the attack, suggesting the attack not only was not well planned but also not well executed. He also points out the Japanese did not have a purpose built armor piercing bomb, relying on using a 16 inch shell with fins. He points out contradiction in the Japanese accounts such as Fuchida's about the attack.
 
Havent read the book, but sounds like post war revisionism to me. In December 1941 there were just a handful of people in the world capable of thinking through the issues to deliver an attack like this. There was no "go to" set of instructions, and only one (or possibly two) precedents, Taranto being one, and the sinking of a German cruiser off Bergen in 1940. Part of its brilliance was that nobody expected it to happen, and hitting your enemy that hard that he might not get up again.
Nope, this is a book I wont be in a hurry to go and read.
 
The failure of Pearl Harbour was the US carriers not been in port to be sunk, but that was partly bad luck (or intel)?

Heres a what if..........No Pearl Harbour but invade Malaya, Dutch East Indies for the resources as it happenend (some even say the US might not have interfered if Phillipines was not invaded), If the US Fleet shows up in full strength to interfere with the invasions 1941 they get to face the 6 Japanese fleet carriers, I imagine every USN capital ship would have been sunk just like Repulse and Prince of Wales was, the skill and preparedness level of the Japanese was so far ahead of the US navy in 1941.
 
History is what it is. The attack on Pearl Harbour would have been a bigger success if the USA carriers were in port, but since they were at sea all the Japanese carriers could have been attacked and lost while the attack on Pearl Harbour was in progress.
 
pinehilljoe said:
He also points out the Japanese did not have a purpose built armor piercing bomb, relying on using a 16 inch shell with fins.
Click to expand...

This is often repeated but sometimes a key word is left out.
"Modified" being the word.
According to Campbell (and he may have been in error) the Japanese type 99, No 80 Mk 5 bomb was a 'converted' 41cm AP shell that weighed 1757lbs.
It was rated as penetrating 150mm of armor but drop height (or speed) is not given.

Now consider that the standard 41cm AP shell as fired by the Nagato and Mutsu weighed 2249lbs with no fins
So they somehow got rid of about 500lbs of steel and added tail fins. they may have hollowed out the explosive cavity a bit and used a bit more explosives too, percentages do not add up (about 50lb HE for the bomb and 35lbs for the AP shell.)
I don't know what they took of the nose (a pointy ballistic cap?) but the bomb with fins was only about 22 in longer than the unmodified shell.


Please note the lack of any parallel section on the bomb body. a considerable amount of lathe work needed.

I would also note that the Americans did not introduce purpose built AP bombs until May of 1942 with an assortment of bombs based on converted AP shells being used before then.

I would also note that only the Kate could lift the Japanese AP bomb and for the Americans only the Avenger and Helldiver could lift the 1600lb bombs for most of the war.

Large AP bombs for use against battleships were rather specialized devices (many American carriers even late in the war only carried about 20 such bombs in the magazines) so the fact that the Japanese didn't develop a "specialized" bomb instead of a converted battleship gun shell doesn't really indicate bad planning. One also wonders what the type 99, No 80 MK 1, MK 2 MK 3 and MK 4 bombs were???? service bomb being the MK 5 shows a tleas t some development went on, rather than a hasty lash up as is sometimes implied.
 
Last edited:

We have been over this before, chances of the Japanese leaving the Philippines alone were about zero. Americans had been building air fields and sending B-17s to the Philippines for a number of months before Pearl Harbor. More importantly was the fact that there was a large submarine base in the Philippines with 29 subs there on Dec 7th. The Japanese were NOT going to leave such a submarine force (with support facilities) smack in the middle of the supply routes from the newly conquered areas and homeland. They had no idea how bad the US torpedoes were.
 
The Japanese also failed to destroy the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor- no oil, you have crippled the Fleet-big time! Hansie
 
We might well remember the courts-martial against Gen. Billy Mitchell for trying to prove to our Navy that an aircraft could sink a battleship, withy either a well-placed bomb or torpedo-- but the Japanese were paying attention. All the decoded messages in the month or so prior to PH should have sent off alarms all over CINC-PAC, as well as Washington D.C.-- But our Secretary of State, Welles, was an "old school" highborn gent- who once said: "Gentlemen do NOT read the mail of others"!!
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

Favorite "obscure" theater or World War II to research?
Replies
9
Views
1K
EwenS
E
The Rise and Fall of the Nazi War Machine
Replies
5
Views
973
pbehn
P
Aviation Concepts: Pterodactyl And The Origins Of The Tailless And Flying Wing
Replies
1
Views
440
Gnomey
J
French M15 Adrian Helmet (WW1) original or fake?
Replies
8
Views
784
Wurger
WWII remnants in Tunisia and Algeria
Replies
0
Views
443
Ghosts of War
Menu
Log in
Register