Yamamoto and Rommel: war geniuses or blunders?

[Shortround6]

The Renown had been rebuilt with one of the more effective heavy AA Batteries of the time.
10 twin 4.5 in mounts which puts her ahead of just about everyone else in 1939.
One can argue rates of fire and training speeds and so on, but this battery may well have been better than the eight twin 5.25in battery of the KGVs or the eight twin 10.5cm guns on the Bismark.

The old American ships had eight single 5in/25s which doesn't make for good fleet defence. The 5in/25 may be under rated but there are too few barrels per ship to make them useful as an addition to carrier group. The old battleships don't bring enough AA to the game, they are too slow to keep up and they suck fuel like football fans suck beer on game day. Some of them got eight twin 5in/38s which brought them near to the modern battleships but that was not until much later in the war.

the 40mm Bofors is marginal for "fleet" defense and the 2pdr and smaller are pretty much for individual ship defence. They don't have enough range to cover a nearby ship unless you are so close that you are starting to restrict freedom of movement.

I would agree that the Japanese really dropped the ball on submarine (offensive or defensive trade warfare) warfare. Considering the size/range of some of their own subs, not figuring that an enemy could build long range subs to operate in Japanese waters seems really strange.

 

[swampyankee]

The Renown had been rebuilt with one of the more effective heavy AA Batteries of the time.
10 twin 4.5 in mounts which puts her ahead of just about everyone else in 1939.
One can argue rates of fire and training speeds and so on, but this battery may well have been better than the eight twin 5.25in battery of the KGVs or the eight twin 10.5cm guns on the Bismark.

The old American ships had eight single 5in/25s which doesn't make for good fleet defence. The 5in/25 may be under rated but there are too few barrels per ship to make them useful as an addition to carrier group. The old battleships don't bring enough AA to the game, they are too slow to keep up and they suck fuel like football fans suck beer on game day. Some of them got eight twin 5in/38s which brought them near to the modern battleships but that was not until much later in the war.

the 40mm Bofors is marginal for "fleet" defense and the 2pdr and smaller are pretty much for individual ship defence. They don't have enough range to cover a nearby ship unless you are so close that you are starting to restrict freedom of movement.

I would agree that the Japanese really dropped the ball on submarine (offensive or defensive trade warfare) warfare. Considering the size/range of some of their own subs, not figuring that an enemy could build long range subs to operate in Japanese waters seems really strange.

Not noticing the amount of effort the RN needed to put forth to deal with submarines 20 years earlier, the damage caused by surface raiders on the US 4 score years earlier, or, essentially 500 years of RN history dealing with trade war strikes one as appallingly uninterested in anything beyond tactics.

 

[parsifal]

Neither the IJN or the USN were particularly interested at the outbreak of hostilities in ASW warfare. Both navies viewed convoy as a concept as essentially defensive and unsuited to the type of battle they wanted to wage

Further, for the Japanese it was always assumed that the war would be very short duration. This rapidly was a hope that was dashed, but then to add insult to injury, the Japanese pored hopelessly inadequate resources into their ASW effort and adopted some rather pathetic technological and doctrinal solutions.

Still the abilities of the allies to sink Japanese shipping were rather poor at the beginning. To December 1942, the Japanese lost just over 800000 tons of unrecoverable shipping losses whilst capturing or otherwise enlisting the services of just over a million tons

1943 was a worse year for the Japanese, but still not a killer blow, the real killer to the Japanese merchant marine occurred in 1944.

By comparison, Japanese submarines were not always used for merchant shipping attacks, although there is zer evidence to support the calim they refused to attack merchant shipping as a target of opportunity. Moreover, in the first year of the war, an awful lot of allied and neutral shipping was seized and put into Japanese service. More than 650000 tons was captured intact, and re-used by the Japanese. About 1 million tons of allied shipping was sunk, comfortably exceeding comparable allied effort. In several areas, such as the indian Ocean, dedicated anti shipping campaigns were mounted by the Japanese, with some impressive results achieved for TOs with only limited target densities.

However several factors have coloured western views of the IJN submarines. To this end I would highly recommend Akira Akihito's (????) book on Japanese submarines, co-written by an American whose name escapes me. It debunks many of the myths and half truths that have been written about IJN submarine operations. Undoubtedly the complete failure of the IJN efforts around Pearl Harbour and the West Coast colour the mostly American view on this subject. Counter this to their deadly efforts off the eastern seabord of Australia and operations in the Indian Ocean.

Japan wanted their submarines to be able to operate as part of or as an extension of the decisive battle they expected to occur in the Central Pacific. Japanese subs were built with high surfaced speeds and the ability to provide scouting capabilities. The idea was that as the Pacific Fleet sallied out with its best flet speed of 19 knots, the Iboats would attack and then reposition themselves at a point ahead the main force, using their design sustained sea speeds of 24 knots to do so. Not a bad concept, and probably would have worked, except with the loss of the BBs from the force structure, fleet speeds increased to nearly 28 knots, more than enough to get away from an iboat on patrol. Couple that with the MAGIC intercepts, and I-boat losses skyrocketed and allied shipping bottomed out after guadacanal.

Just the same the IJN did achieve some good results against Allied naval groups. Loss of the Yorktown., damage to the Saratoga (twice), loss of the Wasp, loss of CA Indianapolis and DD Obrien, and a couple of others come to mind. But by 1944, even in this area of direct tactical support the USN subs had caught up, and probably overtaken the IJN as they tore into the IJN, sinking such valuable ships as the Taiho and the Yamato class CVS conversion (Ive had a pensioner moment and forgotten the name….starts with an "s")…….

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

This is rather far afield from the Yamamoto question, but there is still a lot of fanboyism around battleships. I think, in hindsight, had the USN canceled every one of the Iowas the net effect on the war would probably have been to shorten it by like ten minutes. Of course, they didn't know that when they needed to decide.

Yamamoto had a tendency to draw up very complex plans requiring accurate timing between widely separated forces. I suspect his greatness as an admiral grew as he died before the IJN started on an obvious course to Davey Jones' locker. What he and the IJN failed to do included any kind of offensive or defensive trade warfare. Considering the IJA and IJN treatment of civilians in occupied areas, arguments that this was beneath their warrior ethic seem rather inane.

Yamamoto was apparently NOT a believer of simplicity in drafting battle plans and orders. The more complex you make your plans for your subordinates to put into action, the greater the odds of big-time SNAFU arise. The initial attack on Midway may verify this- The JN assumed that Halsey had taken the "bait" and was steaming toward the Aleutians-- how their intel missed the fact that Halsey was in sick bay with some form of skin disorder, and had picked Raymond Spruance as his "stand-in"-- the rest is history, the USN came out ahead on this historic battle due to sheer luck--IMO

 

[cherry blossom]

Yamamoto Isoruku was an energetic, determined and charismatic leader. However, the problem with calling him a genius is that his judgement, particularly of American attitudes, tended to be very poor.

The Pearl Harbor attack was certainly Yamamoto's idea and he possibly started planning even before the British attack on Taranto. Yamamoto realised that the IJN could carry out such an attack "successfully" despite the doubts of other IJN officers (and also the general American belief, except for Adm. Richardson, that it was not logistically possible).

There are serious criticisms of the military planning of the Pearl Harbor attack made for example by Alan D. Zimm in "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions", which points out that there was little attempt to protect the bombers either from anti-aircraft fire or possible fighter attack and that there was little overall plan of target selection.

However, the worse problem with the Pearl Harbor plan was that it made it almost impossible for Japan to make a subsequent compromise peace with America. Yamamoto was warned about that by Onishi Takijiro in August 1941, who argued "...we should avoid anything like the Hawaiian operation that would put America's back up too badly" ("The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy" by Agawa Hiroyuki, page 229) but ignored Onishi. Interestingly, Yamamoto actually planned the attack with an eye on American opinion according to Minoru Genda, who is quoted as saying "Yamamoto wanted to target only battleships. He appreciated the importance of destroying aircraft carriers but believed that the psychological effect on the American people of destroying all the American battleships would be greater than that of the destruction of carriers." (I found this in " Winning" the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda by Angelo N. Caravaggio https://usnwc2.usnwc.edu/getattachm...the-Pacific-War--The-Masterful-Strategy-.aspx where it is referenced to Minoru Genda, interview by Gordon Prange, 9 March 1948, interview no. Minoru 2A, transcript, Prange Papers).

The other obvious point about the Pearl Harbor attack was that Japan could not try to attack only the British and Dutch possessions. I am slightly hesitant to discuss this because I have never convinced myself that I understand who wanted to attack the Philippines in 1941. However, Yamamoto clearly saw no advantage in trying to avoid American territory. There is a brief mention of a war game on 26th-28th November 1940 presided over by Yamamoto with "leading members of the Naval General Staff" in "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" by Sadao Asada (page 279). The conclusion was that an attack on the Dutch East Indies would involve war with America. I am not sure how that conclusion was reached but I suspect that Rear-Adm. Maeda Minoru was involved. Marder's "Old Friends, New Enemies" mentions an interview with Maeda from 1962 in which he claimed responsability and that he had used the argument that the Dutch and the Americans were the same race! Yamamoto was probably correct about America entering any war by late 1941 but I am not so sure about 1940 or that he had the right reasons or that he was thinking beyond the start of the war towards possible negotiations.

As well as posible political errors, Yamamoto has also been criticized for his planning as Combined Fleet Commander. I have not read Mark Stille's short biography "Yamamoto Isoroku" (except the extract at Yamamoto Isoroku) but I suspect the comment "As with any famous military commander, there is always reality and myth. For Yamamoto these stand in stark contrast." is inspired by doubts about his military rather than political judgement. Certainly, Yamamoto did not feel bound to keep the six carriers of the First Air Fleet (Kido Butai) together, which almost everyone with the benefit of hindsight supports. Interestingly, according to Mark Peattie's "Sunburst" it was not Yamamoto but Ozawa who had been the early advocate of concentrating Japan's carrier force (Sunburst).

However, whilst it is obvious that the plans which divided the carriers for Coral Sea and Midway (and earlier without a carrier battle around Wake Island) were very bad, I can see a crazy logic for the Midway plan at least. I believe that Yamamoto assumed that the Americans would not fight unless they were offered a very tempting target. Thus, he was happy to send two carriers to the Aleutians and spread his battleships across the Pacific in order to offer such a target. As Nimitz had sent two carriers to fight against up to five Japanese carriers at Coral Sea (Kaga was believed to be attached to the 4th Fleet on the basis of early decrypted signals), Yamamoto again failed to understand his enemies or learn from recent history.

An earlier example may show the same failure to understand America, although I am not at all sure if Yamamoto was deeply involved. However, Yamamoto was certainly keenly interested in the development of long range bombers, especially the G3M. Indeed, that is the only major technical innovation in which he played a major role. What is less clear is whether he, at the time Vice-Minister of the Navy, supported the IJN's use of the G3M from the start of the 1937 conflict in attacks on Chinese cities. Photographs of those attacks, which naturally were chosen to show civilian casualties, did little to improve Japan's image, especially America with its missionary linked China lobby.

 

[Elmas]

Did the Naval High Staffs understand after the sinking of the BIsmark that BBs whitout proper air cover were sitting ducks?
Probably, thinking of PoW and Repulse, no.

 

[parsifal]

some were aware, some were not. It took a while for the lesson to become universally understood. For the Japanese there was the added constraint of there often not being any air support available, but a crucial naval mission to undertake nevertheless, to deal with.

 

[swampyankee]

Neither the IJN or the USN were particularly interested at the outbreak of hostilities in ASW warfare. Both navies viewed convoy as a concept as essentially defensive and unsuited to the type of battle they wanted to wage

Further, for the Japanese it was always assumed that the war would be very short duration. This rapidly was a hope that was dashed, but then to add insult to injury, the Japanese pored hopelessly inadequate resources into their ASW effort and adopted some rather pathetic technological and doctrinal solutions.

Still the abilities of the allies to sink Japanese shipping were rather poor at the beginning. To December 1942, the Japanese lost just over 800000 tons of unrecoverable shipping losses whilst capturing or otherwise enlisting the services of just over a million tons

1943 was a worse year for the Japanese, but still not a killer blow, the real killer to the Japanese merchant marine occurred in 1944.

By comparison, Japanese submarines were not always used for merchant shipping attacks, although there is zer evidence to support the calim they refused to attack merchant shipping as a target of opportunity. Moreover, in the first year of the war, an awful lot of allied and neutral shipping was seized and put into Japanese service. More than 650000 tons was captured intact, and re-used by the Japanese. About 1 million tons of allied shipping was sunk, comfortably exceeding comparable allied effort. In several areas, such as the indian Ocean, dedicated anti shipping campaigns were mounted by the Japanese, with some impressive results achieved for TOs with only limited target densities.

However several factors have coloured western views of the IJN submarines. To this end I would highly recommend Akira Akihito's (????) book on Japanese submarines, co-written by an American whose name escapes me. It debunks many of the myths and half truths that have been written about IJN submarine operations. Undoubtedly the complete failure of the IJN efforts around Pearl Harbour and the West Coast colour the mostly American view on this subject. Counter this to their deadly efforts off the eastern seabord of Australia and operations in the Indian Ocean.

Japan wanted their submarines to be able to operate as part of or as an extension of the decisive battle they expected to occur in the Central Pacific. Japanese subs were built with high surfaced speeds and the ability to provide scouting capabilities. The idea was that as the Pacific Fleet sallied out with its best flet speed of 19 knots, the Iboats would attack and then reposition themselves at a point ahead the main force, using their design sustained sea speeds of 24 knots to do so. Not a bad concept, and probably would have worked, except with the loss of the BBs from the force structure, fleet speeds increased to nearly 28 knots, more than enough to get away from an iboat on patrol. Couple that with the MAGIC intercepts, and I-boat losses skyrocketed and allied shipping bottomed out after guadacanal.

Just the same the IJN did achieve some good results against Allied naval groups. Loss of the
Yorktown., damage to the Saratoga (twice), loss of the Wasp, loss of CA Indianapolis and DD Obrien, and a couple of others come to mind. But by 1944, even in this area of direct tactical support the USN subs had caught up, and probably overtaken the IJN as they tore into the IJN, sinking such valuable ships as the Taiho and the Yamato class CVS conversion (Ive had a pensioner moment and forgotten the name….starts with an "s")…….

Shinano.

The USN did have to protect trade, but the US was a net exporter of food, metals, and fuel at that time; Japan, despite a of effort to promote rice cultivation was a net importer of food, fuel, and raw materials. Without merchant shipping, Americans don't get Guiness, good wine, and bananas; Japanese starve.

 

[Shortround6]

Without merchant shipping, Americans don't get Guiness, good wine, and bananas; Japanese starve.

And they starve while walking most places and freezing in winter. While Japan as a whole was self sufficient in coal 90% of it was either on the North Island or the South Island. You need ships to get it to the other other two Islands.

 

[Freebird]

With the caveat that I think Irwin Rommel and George Patton were the two best field commanders in the ETO-WW11,

Back to Rommel...

Rommel and Patton were hard driving officers, although probably best suited for tank Corps commander, not higher rank.

Despite the hype, it should be remembered that in the battles against the British (& Commonwealth Allies) in North Africa, Rommel only won ONE of his major battles, and even if we only count the battles where his forces equalled or exceeded the Allies, he still only won just 1 battle out of 4.

 

[redcoat]

Did the Naval High Staffs understand after the sinking of the BIsmark that BBs whitout proper air cover were sitting ducks?
Probably, thinking of PoW and Repulse, no.

The Bismarck was damaged by aircraft, but not sunk, that was achieved by surface warships. Until the POW and Repulse not a single capital ship had been sunk while at sea by aircraft.

 

[GrauGeist]

U.S. Aircraft Carriers on Dec 7, 1941
CV - 2 Lexington Transporting aircraft to Midway Island, 460 Miles East of Midway. Pacific
CV - 3 Saratoga At San Diego California. Pacific
CV - 4 Ranger At sea returning to Norfolk Va. Caribbean. Atlantic
CV - 5 Yorktown At Norfolk Va. Atlantic
CV - 6 Enterprise Returning to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island. 200 Miles West Of Pearl. Pacific
CV - 7 Wasp Grassy Bay Bermuda. Atlantic
CV - 8 Hornet Fitting out Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
AVG – 1 Long Island Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic

Great list, Mike, but don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).
She was at anchor off Cavite in the Philippines when war broke out.

 

[Freebird]

Great list, Mike, but don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).
She was at anchor off Cavite in the Philippines when war broke out.

She wasn't an aircraft carrier at that point though, Langley had been converted to a seaplane carrier, and even had half of her deck cut off.

 

[mikewint]

don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).

As Freebird stated above on 26 Feb 1937 our very first (converted from a collier) aircraft carrier had been converted again, this time into a seaplane tender so she was, from that time forward, no longer a carrier and was assigned hull number AV-3.

 

[GrauGeist]

Yes, I'm aware that the Langley was converted from the collier Jupiter and then relegated to a Seaplane Tender just prior to the war, but she was still considered a carrier in the rolls of lost Carriers of the war, just like the carriers of the IJA were also included. She was also considered in many circles as the first Allied carrier casualty of the PTO.
And the Langley had been shuttling P-40s back and forth, trying to get them to safe Allied locations, just ahead of the Japanese advances, and when she was attacked and damaged, she had several dozen P-40s aboard.

 

[mikewint]

Dave, I would suspect that whomsoever made up that list was stretching a bit due to the historical significance of the Langley. As above half her deck had been cut away and ordinary aircraft could not take off or land on her which is the essence of a carrier. In addition she had a different hull number AV-3 no longer CV-1. I really don't see, except perhaps in an honorable sense, that the Langly could be considered a carrier.
As an aside almost her pilots were lost when Edsall was sunk on the same day and the Pecos was also sunk taking more of her crew with it

 

[swampyankee]

Back to Rommel...

Rommel and Patton were hard driving officers, although probably best suited for tank Corps commander, not higher rank.

Despite the hype, it should be remembered that in the battles against the British (& Commonwealth Allies) in North Africa, Rommel only won ONE of his major battles, and even if we only count the battles where his forces equalled or exceeded the Allies, he still only won just 1 battle out of 4.

Back to Patton...

A historian, I think John Eisenhower, called Patton "a master of pursuit," by which I believe he meant that Patton was best when the battle was fluid and he was on the attack.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Back to Patton...

A historian, I think John Eisenhower, called Patton "a master of pursuit," by which I believe he meant that Patton was best when the battle was fluid and he was on the attack.[/Q

Patton's entire Army career was based on his cavalry experiences, especially in the Mexican campaign against Pancho Villa and his Banditos-and that means mounted pursuit after a retreating enemy-- not the "stand and hold" position Custer found himself and his troops at the Little Big Horn. Patton later added aircraft, tank and artillery support to the mix after his experiences under Pershing's command in WW1. Wish Pershing had been in command in the ETO in WW2 instead of Eisenhower- As he told the French Generals in 1917- when they requested his troops be under their command, he refused, commenting: "You don't put new wine in old bottles"! As Pershing saw the blood baths from British Command (The Somme comes to mind) in WW1`- he was determined to mount assaults to break the stalemate of the war of attrition he and Patton encountered "over there" in 1917-- Much of Patton's career was based on the favored position he held with John Pershing- a part of which might be Pershing's interest in Patton's sister, which developed after the tragic deaths of Pershing's wife and two daughters in a house fire at Fort Bliss TX in 1912.

One of the many great advantages a "dogface" had if he served in Patton's Army-- whether in Africa, or Sicily-then Italy-then France and Germany- he didn't have to spend time and energy digging in-=the only digging done was for latrines-- Patton was indeed, a "Master of pursuit"-- and the German OKW considered him to be the best field commander the Allies had in the entire ETO-- It would have been interesting to see how the War in Europe had evolved if Patton hadn't lost his temper in the field hospitals in Sicily, and if Ike had put Patton in command instead of Montgomery--

 

[Freebird]

Back to Patton...
.

The thread was actually about Rommel & Yamamoto...

For some reason we have a Patton thread which is fixated on Monty, and a Rommel thread discussing Patton.

Anyways, I'll take my Patton reply to the Patton thread.

 

[swampyankee]

The thread was actually about Rommel & Yamamoto...

For some reason we have a Patton thread which is fixated on Monty, and a Rommel thread discussing Patton.

Anyways, I'll take my Patton reply to the Patton thread.

Every time any WWII general is mentioned, Montgomery or Patton must be mentioned.

Yamamoto probably best understood the US of the Japanese military leaders; he seems to have been the only one to have understood that a long naval war is as much a test of industry as of warriors. What he -- and the remainder of the Japanese military establishment failed to understand -- is how Americans, with nothing evident as a "warrior culture" were much tougher than the Japanese expectations.