If you make a list of all the things that should have been destroyed it becomes a job for 1000 four engine bombers.
Yamamoto and Rommel: war geniuses or blunders?
- Thread starter Elmas
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Shortround6
Major General
Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th 
Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.
Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.
mikewint
Captain
Beyond a doubt the third wave should have been launched to hit the fuel, repair facilities, dry docks, and sub facilities. Battleships were no longer the most important naval vessels the carriers were. Even so only the Arizona and Utah were not salvaged in the shallow water of the harbor. The third wave would have been costly for the Japanese as the base was on full alert but destroying the above would have severely crippled the fleet much more so than the damaged battleships
parsifal
Colonel
Up until Pearl Harbour, Battleships were still the most important weapon in the USN arsenal. they were obsolete, but somebody needed to tell the USN that. Yamamoto was the man that did that.
Before the attack, the long standing plan was for the US forces based at Pearl and also (later) for the forces on the mainland to join them, to sally forth out and head west toward the Far East, meeting the Japanese fleet somewhere in the middle of the Pacific for one massive decisive battle. The battleships were the key to that plan, the so called War Plan Orange. It was something the USN truly believed in until their BBs were sunk or disabled. they WERE the reason for the attack. The Japanese feared the Plan Orange, because the Americans outnumbered them in Battleships, especially if the british fleet is included in the mix. All of Japans defensive plans (and yes Pearl was a defensive measure) were designed to try and even things up for the IJN. The IJN were just as wedded as the Americans to the idea of the single decisive battle to win the war. Sinking carriers to the IJN was secondary to that (Yamamoto did NOT believe that....he knew the carriers were as important to the USN plan as the BBs, but his bosses were not).
In the context of what they were facing, the Japanese attack was a massive success. too successful. it forced the US to rethink its whole response, to cancel the march across the Pacific temporarily which in turn caused the loss of the strategically vital Far east. It forced the US to adopt a long war strategy with massive numbers of troops and aircraft, a vast logistic train and the centre piece of the fleet moved from the battleship. The ultimate plan that did emerge from the ruins of Pearl harbour was still a Plan Orange, but heavily modified. And by the time it could be implemented, with the added issue of having to retake the lost ground and bases on which the whole plan was also reliant.
Before the attack, the long standing plan was for the US forces based at Pearl and also (later) for the forces on the mainland to join them, to sally forth out and head west toward the Far East, meeting the Japanese fleet somewhere in the middle of the Pacific for one massive decisive battle. The battleships were the key to that plan, the so called War Plan Orange. It was something the USN truly believed in until their BBs were sunk or disabled. they WERE the reason for the attack. The Japanese feared the Plan Orange, because the Americans outnumbered them in Battleships, especially if the british fleet is included in the mix. All of Japans defensive plans (and yes Pearl was a defensive measure) were designed to try and even things up for the IJN. The IJN were just as wedded as the Americans to the idea of the single decisive battle to win the war. Sinking carriers to the IJN was secondary to that (Yamamoto did NOT believe that....he knew the carriers were as important to the USN plan as the BBs, but his bosses were not).
In the context of what they were facing, the Japanese attack was a massive success. too successful. it forced the US to rethink its whole response, to cancel the march across the Pacific temporarily which in turn caused the loss of the strategically vital Far east. It forced the US to adopt a long war strategy with massive numbers of troops and aircraft, a vast logistic train and the centre piece of the fleet moved from the battleship. The ultimate plan that did emerge from the ruins of Pearl harbour was still a Plan Orange, but heavily modified. And by the time it could be implemented, with the added issue of having to retake the lost ground and bases on which the whole plan was also reliant.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th
Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.
On the other hand, destroying the tanks will make a terrible mess and probably leave much of the fuel unrecoverable.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Given the greater viscosity of bunker fuels, once ignited, would they not tend to burn like napalm, rather than flash like high octane aviation fuels?Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th
Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.
mikewint
Captain
Michael, true but not launching that third strike doomed the anti-battleship scenario as well. The first repaired battleship was launched in Feb of 1942 and US fuel supplies remained intact.
True, both sides were wedded to the surface-ship slug fest. The Japanese counter to the US plan was to allow the US fleet to sail across the Pacific while sniping at it with subs and carrier aircraft THEN force that decisive battle against a weakened US fleet.
The US modified its plan only a bit as surface action was mostly carrier driven. The methodical, cautious, island hopping (never outside of land-based aircraft) remained intact.
The real deciders were Japan's inability to appreciate the effects of submarine warfare and they never developed an effective anti-sub defense. US subs effectively choked Japan's industrial production and paralysed her Navy. Japan also never developed an anti-commerce ability. Commerce-raiders could have played havoc with US supply lines and made the Pacific war much more difficult and costly
True, both sides were wedded to the surface-ship slug fest. The Japanese counter to the US plan was to allow the US fleet to sail across the Pacific while sniping at it with subs and carrier aircraft THEN force that decisive battle against a weakened US fleet.
The US modified its plan only a bit as surface action was mostly carrier driven. The methodical, cautious, island hopping (never outside of land-based aircraft) remained intact.
The real deciders were Japan's inability to appreciate the effects of submarine warfare and they never developed an effective anti-sub defense. US subs effectively choked Japan's industrial production and paralysed her Navy. Japan also never developed an anti-commerce ability. Commerce-raiders could have played havoc with US supply lines and made the Pacific war much more difficult and costly
Shortround6
Major General
To be fair the Oklahoma was effectively destroyed, damaged beyond economic repair.
On the other hand the Utah was no longer a battleship and would have taken a considerable amount of time to turn it back into a battleship. It mounted no main guns (or, indeed, even some of her turrets/gun houses) and had been stripped of large amounts of armor.
Utah being painted at Puget Sound 1941.
The trouble for the Japanese was that the US was a two ocean navy and they had only knocked out/severely damaged a small portion (less than 1/3) of the US total number of battleships. The US had 15 old battleships in Service in Dec 1941 not including the 2 targets/training ships and 2 new battleships, with 3 more new ones commissioning in one each in March, April and May of 1942. Granted the new ones had some troubles and needed working up/training.
However of the eight battleships at Pearl 3 were back in service (the Pennsylvania was never official out of service despite being in drydock at the time of the attack ) by Feb/March of 1942.
The Japanese had eight old battleships and While the Yamato was commissioned in Dec 1941 she conducted training exercises until the end of May 1942. The Musashi would not be done working up/training until the end of 1942/Jan 1943.
The Japanese had bought themselves some time, but not enough.
On the other hand the Utah was no longer a battleship and would have taken a considerable amount of time to turn it back into a battleship. It mounted no main guns (or, indeed, even some of her turrets/gun houses) and had been stripped of large amounts of armor.
Utah being painted at Puget Sound 1941.
The trouble for the Japanese was that the US was a two ocean navy and they had only knocked out/severely damaged a small portion (less than 1/3) of the US total number of battleships. The US had 15 old battleships in Service in Dec 1941 not including the 2 targets/training ships and 2 new battleships, with 3 more new ones commissioning in one each in March, April and May of 1942. Granted the new ones had some troubles and needed working up/training.
However of the eight battleships at Pearl 3 were back in service (the Pennsylvania was never official out of service despite being in drydock at the time of the attack ) by Feb/March of 1942.
The Japanese had eight old battleships and While the Yamato was commissioned in Dec 1941 she conducted training exercises until the end of May 1942. The Musashi would not be done working up/training until the end of 1942/Jan 1943.
The Japanese had bought themselves some time, but not enough.
Shortround6
Major General
No, Bunker fuel is so viscous that it needs steam pipes in the tanks just to be able to be pumped from the tanks to the boilers. It also needs to be heated to around 200 degrees ( I forget exact amount) to flow through the burners and atomize for proper combustion in the boilers.
This doesn't mean you can't get it to burn at all outside of a boiler but it does take quite a bit of effort and favorable conditions.
Please see the photo of the tank farm posted by Pbehn, each tank was surrounded by a retaining wall. Blowing open one or two tanks and setting them on fire does NOT result in a lake of burning fuel lapping up against the other tanks. A lot depends on the damage control/firefighting capabilities on site or nearby.
Bunker fuel is the some stuff left after you take out a large amount of the compounds that make up gasoline and kerosene/diesel fuel.
It is not crude oil like at the well or being transported to the refinery which has a mixture of a lot of compounds and in a fire situation the more volatile compounds can burn out of the crude.
From wiki so......" Number 6 fuel oil is a high-viscosity residual oil requiring preheating to 104–127 °C (219–261 °F). Residual means the material remaining after the more valuable cuts of crude oil have boiled off. The residue may contain various undesirable impurities, including 2% water and 0.5% mineral soil. This fuel may be known as residual fuel oil (RFO), by the Navy specification of Bunker C, or by the Pacific Specification of PS-400.[2]
Great post SR Hard to tell from the photo but from my experience on tank farms the retaining walls are on top of berms so the tanks are actually sunk by several meters in the ground, it seems the same in the photo. Also I was in Saudi Arabia when a fuel tank was blown up.
List of terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia - Wikipedia
1988 30 September - four Shi'ite men are beheaded for blowing up fuel storage tanks[3] at the Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF) facility in Jubail. They had entered the plant by cutting a hole in the perimeter fence. One tank happened to be empty, but another was full and burned for several days. Eventually the fire was extinguished when a firefighting team literally plugged the hole in the tank.
I was working doing thermography on the Petromin Shell plant next door. We were not allowed to work for two days. The people there explained that the fire was allowed to burn down, with a lot of hoses on the tank, then the fire was blown out with an explosion "Red Adair" style and then it was plugged. The point is the terrorist blew a hole in the tank and started a fire but it didn't produce a Hollywood style conflagration and mushroom cloud.
parsifal
Colonel
It is very common that most US sources misrepresent the losses and extent of damage sustained. To understand the seriousness of the damage inflicted, one really has to refer to primary sources.
For the war In Europe thread, myself and Chris ("Njaco") carried out some pretty detailed research on this very issue and came up with the following:
BB OKLAHOMA (USN 27500 grt) was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. On the day of her loss she was moored in berth Fox 5 in Battleship Row. Outboard alongside BB MARYLAND, OKLAHOMA took three torpedo hits almost immediately after the first Japanese bombs fell. As she began to capsize to port, two more torpedoes struck home, and her men were strafed as they abandoned ship. In less than 12 minutes, she rolled over until halted by her masts touching bottom, her starboard side above water, and a part of her keel exposed
BB ARIZONA (USN 29158 grt) was sunk was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. Shortly after 08:00, 10 Nakajima Kates, five each from the carriers KAGA and HIRYU attacked ARIZONA. All of the aircraft were carrying 410-millimeter (16.1") AP shells modified into 797-kilogram (1,757 lb) bombs. Flying at an estimated altitude of 3,000 meters (9,800 ft). KAGA's aircraft bombed ARIZONA from amidships to stern. Soon after, HIRYU's bombers hit the bow area.
The aircraft scored four hits and three near misses on and around Arizona. The near miss off the port bow is believed to have caused observers to believe that the ship had been torpedoed, although no torpedo damage has been found. The stern most bomb ricocheted off the face of Turret IV and penetrated the deck to detonate in the captain's pantry, causing a small fire. The next forward most hit was near the port edge of the ship, abreast the mainmast, probably detonating in the area of the anti-torpedo bulkhead. The next bomb struck near the port rear 5-inch AA gun.
The last bomb hit at 0806 in the vicinity of Turret II, likely penetrating the armored deck near the ammunition magazines located in the forward section of the ship. It is not possible to judge the exact location of this hit, its effects are indisputable: about seven seconds after the hit, the forward magazines detonated in a cataclysmic explosion, mostly venting through the sides of the ship and destroying much of the interior structure of the forward part of the ship. This caused the forward turrets and conning tower to collapse downward some 25–30 feet and the foremast and funnel to collapse forward, effectively tearing the ship in half. The explosion touched off fierce fires that burned for two days; debris showered down on Ford Island in the vicinity. The blast from this explosion also put out fires on the repair ship VESTAL, which was moored alongside and ablaze. The bombs and subsequent explosion killed 1,177 of the 1,512 crewmen on board at the time
BB CALIFORNIA (USN 33190 grt) was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. CALIFORNIAwas moored at the southernmost berth of Battleship Row and was with other dreadnoughts of the Battle Force. She was struck on the port side with two torpedoes. One detonated below the armor belt at frame 52 (between number 2 turret and the bridge), creating a hole 10 feet high and 24 feet long, destructively deforming the first antitorpedo bulkhead and transverse stiffeners between frames 47 and 60, and holing the second bulkhead with fragments. Watertight integrity had been impaired by preparations for a material inspection; and the ship suffered extensive flooding damage when hit.
The second torpedo detonated below the armor belt and turret 3 at frame 101, causing nearly identical damage. The third and fourth bulkheads were deformed but remained intact at both locations. The innermost fifth armored bulkhead was deflected approximately 1 inch forward and punctured by a fuel line fitting aft. This damage caused by the shifting fuel line aft allowed flooding of the centre motor room through the port thrust block room.
At 08:45, a 551-pound (250 kg) bomb entered the starboard upper deck level at Frame 60, passed through the main deck, and exploded on the armoured second deck, setting off an AA ammunition magazine and killing about 50 men.
A second near miss bomb off the port bow ruptured hull plates between frames 10 and 15 causing immediate flooding of all first platform compartments forward of frame 21, and three compartments on the second platform putting CALIFORNIA down about one meter by the bow. Smoke from fires started by the bomb hit caused evacuation of the forward engine-room at 1000 and ended pumping efforts to keep CALIFORNIA afloat. After three days of progressive flooding, CALIFORNIA settled into the mud with only her superstructure remaining above the surface. When the action ended, 100 of her crew were lost and 62 wounded.
CALIFORNIA had been extensively wrecked and her repair was marginally effective yet as much for prestige reasons as operational requirements, she was raised and repaired.
On 25 March 1942, CALIFORNIA was refloated and dry-docked at Pearl Harbor for repairs. On 7 June, she departed under her own power for Puget Sound where a major repair and reconstruction job was undertaken, including improved protection, watertight compartmenting, stability, AA battery, and fire control system. Her original twin funnels were combined into a single funnel faired into the superstructure tower as with the newer STH DAKOTA class. It would take until 31 January 1944 before she was to emerge ready for action again.
BB WEST VIRGINIA (USN 32100 grt) was sunk in the attack.
Seven Type 91 aerial torpedoes struck the port side of WEST VIRGINIA. One hit the steering gear, dislodging the rudder. At least three struck below the armor belt, with one or more striking the belt itself (requiring the complex replacement of seven armor plates). One or two torpedoes exploded on the armored second deck after entering the listing ship through holes made by previous torpedoes. One torpedo failed to detonate, and was recovered and disarmed by shipyard explosive technicians. The torpedo attack made two large holes, extending from frames 43 to 52 and 62 to 97.
WEST VIRGINIA was also damaged by two Type 99 No. 80 Mk 5 bombs made from 16 in AP naval shells fitted with aerial fins. The first was found, unexploded, in debris on the second deck after passing through the searchlight platform, signal bridge and main deck deck near frame 70. The second bomb penetrated the 4-inch (100 mm) roof of turret three and broke apart destroying one of the turret's two guns, but did not detonate. It destroyed the Vought OS2U Kingfisher floatplane on the turret catapult. The impact knocked a second floatplane upside down to the main deck below, spilling gasoline (which ignited) from its fuel tanks. Burning aircraft fuel injured turret personnel and damaged the remaining gun. WEST VIRGINIA was eventually engulfed by an oil-fed conflagration, begun by the burning ARIZONA and sustained for 30 hours by fuel leaking from both ships.
Port-side torpedo damage caused rapid compartment flooding; prompt counter-flooding by four damage-control parties under the command of Lcdr John S. Harper and early closure of all water-tight doors and hatches ordered by Harper's assistant, Archie P. Kelley, prevented the ship from capsizing. Water damage ruined much of the ship's communications gear and electrics, including its battle-phone batteries.
With a patch over the damaged area of her hull the BB was pumped out, refloated on 17 May 1942 and docked in Drydock Number One on 9 June. This enabled a more detailed damage assessment, indicating six (not five) torpedo hits.
Shipyard workers were confronted with a monumental task because of the damage to her port side, WEST VIRGINIA sailed from Pearl Harbor on 7 May 1943 to Bremerton and a complete rebuild at Puget Navy yard. During this reconstruction, the cage masts supporting the three-tier fire-control tops, the two funnels, the open-mount 5-inch (127 mm)/25 caliber guns and the casemates with the single-purpose 5-inch/51 caliber guns were replaced by a single funnel and 5/38 dual-purpose guns. On the decks, 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm oerlikon batteries were added. Although the two-ocean naval policy dictated a beam limit of 108 feet for U.S. BBs to traverse the Panama Canal when WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA were rebuilt their beams were widened to 114 feet feet, effectively limiting their service to the Pacific theater. WEST VIRGINIA was finally ready to return to active duty by early July 1944.
Demilitarised BB UTAH (USN 21825 grt) was sunk. Shortly before 0800, some crewmen aboard UTAHobserved the first IJN planes approaching, but they assumed they were US aircraft. The Japanese began their attack shortly thereafter, concentrating on the BBs moored around Ford Island of which the UTAH was considered by them to be one. At 0801, the first of two torpedoes struck UTAH, which caused serious flooding. The ship began to list to port and settle by the stern.
UTAH was attacked mercilessly because like the Japanese HIEI, which had been similarly "demilitarised" in the 30's it was quite possible this ship might have been re-equipped and returned to service as a BB. As such the IJN considered her a potential threat deserving of attack.
US BB NEVADA was damaged with 57 fatalities and 112 wounded. NEVADA was the only BB to get underway during the attack, making the ship "the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal and depressing morning" for the United States. Still, it was hit by one torpedo and at least six bombs while getting underway forcing the crew to beach
the stricken ship on a coral ledge. The ship continued to flood and eventually slid off the ledge and sunk to the harbor floor. NEVADA was subsequently salvaged and modernized but took some time to return to active service..
NEVADA was struck by at least 5x250kg bombs as she proceeded down the channel as the IJN attempted to sink her in the channel to impede use of the harbor.
The gasoline fires that flared up around Turret 1 would have caused more critical damage if the main magazines had not been empty. For several days prior to the attack, all of the 14-inch-gun (356 mm) battleships had been replacing their standard-weight main battery projectiles with a new heavier projectile that offered greater penetration and a larger explosive charge in exchange for a slight decrease in range. All of the older projectiles and powder charges had been removed from the magazines of NEVADA, and the crew had taken a break after loading the new projectiles in anticipation of loading the new powder charges on Sunday.[
As bomb damage became evident, NEVADA was ordered to proceed to the west side of Ford Island to prevent her from sinking in deeper water. Instead, she was grounded off Hospital Point at 10:30, though she claimed to have forced down three planes before she struck the shore. Gasoline fires prevented damage control parties from containing flooding forward of the main torpedo defense system. Flooding the main magazine and counterflooding to keep the ship stable lowered the bow allowing water to enter the ship at the second deck level. Lack of watertight subdivision between the second and main decks from frame 30 to frame 115 allowed water entering through bomb holes in the forecastle to flow aft through the ship's ventilation system to flood the dynamo and boiler rooms.
In addition to the immediate casualties mentioned above, NEVADA suffered two more men died aboard during salvage operations on 7 February 1942 when they were overcome by H2S gas gas from decomposing paper and meat. The ship suffered a minimum of six bomb hits and one torpedo hit, but "it is possible that as many as ten bomb hits may have been received, from not more than 18 attackers. Certain damaged areas were of sufficient size to indicate that they were struck by more than one bomb according to the DNS report.
NEVADA urgently required both repairs and modernization. DNS reported the repairs complete November 1942, but the modernization, which was necessarily modest (as it was intended that NEVADA would henceforth be used only as a convoy escort) were completed April 1943.
US BB PENNSYLVANIA was damaged 29 men killed and a further 29 wounded. It is often reported that she returned to service by 30 March 1942m, but in fact this is very misleading. She was indeed recommissioned on that date, only to find that she suffered repeated machinery failures due to the secondary effects of the repairs. It was not until 4 June 1942 that she was finally deemed fit for service. Even then she would need several months of work up exercises to be considered combat ready.
US BB TENNESSEE was damaged with 5 killed and 24 wounded. It is often misreported that she returned to service almost immediately, but this is untrue.
TENNESSEE was struck by two armor-piercing bombs that detonated incompletely. The first one hit the center gun of turret two, and it made all three guns inoperable.[7] Debris from the bomb hit on TENNESSEE's turret two hit the command deck of WEST VIRGINIA which mortally wounded her commanding officer. The second bomb went through the roof of turret three; and low-order ignition, rather than detonation, burned out only the left gun compartment of that turret. It was extremely lucky this bomb hit was a dud. TENNESSEE was showered with debris when the magazine of ARIZONA exploded and her stern was engulfed in flames from Arizona's burning fuel oil.
Wedged between the sunken WEST VIRGINIAa and her mooring quays, TENNESSEE was trapped at her berth for ten days before being freed, and four days later she set sail for the West Coast to be repaired.
After preliminary repairs at Pearl Harbor, TENNESSEE headed for Puget for permanent repairs. In addition to repairing her, crews upgraded her AA capbiliities which after the pearl Harbour attack were considered essential. Search and Fcradars were fitted. . Other modifications improved the BB's habitability. On 26 February 1942, TENNESSEE departed from Puget Sound with the work ostensibly complete. She was not declared fully combat ready, however, until after June 1942
US BB MARYLAND with four killed and 21 wounded. She was the first damaged ship at Pearl to actually be considered combat ready…..in June 1942.
MARYLAND was struck by two armor-piercing bombs which detonated low on her hull. The first struck the forecastle awning and made a hole about 12 ft (3.7 m) by 20 ft (6.1 m). The second exploded after entering the hull at the 22 ft (6.7 m) water level at Frame 10. The latter hit caused flooding and increased the draft forward by 5 ft (1.5 m). MARYLAND continued to fire and, after the attack, sent firefighting parties to assist her compatriots, especially attempting to rescue survivors from the capsized OKLAHOMA. The men continued to muster the AA defenses in case the Japanese returned to attack. In all, two officers and two men were killed in the attack. The damage to the ship was more extensive than the casualties would suggest.
The Japanese erroneously announced that MARYLAND had been sunk, but on 30 December, the damaged ship entered Puget for repairs just behind TENNESSEE. Two of the original twelve 5/51 guns were removed and the 5 in/25 cal guns were replaced by an equal number of 5/38s. These were deemed essential at the time, due to the generally poor performace of the USN AA during the 7 December attack Over the course of the next two months, she was repaired and overhauled, receiving new fighting equipment. Repairs were complete on 26 February 1942, but she was not combat ready until the following June. She underwent a series of shakedown cruises to iron out persitent faults and work up the crews,. She was finally declared a combat ready unit of the USN sent back in June 1942, just prior to Midway
For the war In Europe thread, myself and Chris ("Njaco") carried out some pretty detailed research on this very issue and came up with the following:
BB OKLAHOMA (USN 27500 grt) was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. On the day of her loss she was moored in berth Fox 5 in Battleship Row. Outboard alongside BB MARYLAND, OKLAHOMA took three torpedo hits almost immediately after the first Japanese bombs fell. As she began to capsize to port, two more torpedoes struck home, and her men were strafed as they abandoned ship. In less than 12 minutes, she rolled over until halted by her masts touching bottom, her starboard side above water, and a part of her keel exposed
BB ARIZONA (USN 29158 grt) was sunk was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. Shortly after 08:00, 10 Nakajima Kates, five each from the carriers KAGA and HIRYU attacked ARIZONA. All of the aircraft were carrying 410-millimeter (16.1") AP shells modified into 797-kilogram (1,757 lb) bombs. Flying at an estimated altitude of 3,000 meters (9,800 ft). KAGA's aircraft bombed ARIZONA from amidships to stern. Soon after, HIRYU's bombers hit the bow area.
The aircraft scored four hits and three near misses on and around Arizona. The near miss off the port bow is believed to have caused observers to believe that the ship had been torpedoed, although no torpedo damage has been found. The stern most bomb ricocheted off the face of Turret IV and penetrated the deck to detonate in the captain's pantry, causing a small fire. The next forward most hit was near the port edge of the ship, abreast the mainmast, probably detonating in the area of the anti-torpedo bulkhead. The next bomb struck near the port rear 5-inch AA gun.
The last bomb hit at 0806 in the vicinity of Turret II, likely penetrating the armored deck near the ammunition magazines located in the forward section of the ship. It is not possible to judge the exact location of this hit, its effects are indisputable: about seven seconds after the hit, the forward magazines detonated in a cataclysmic explosion, mostly venting through the sides of the ship and destroying much of the interior structure of the forward part of the ship. This caused the forward turrets and conning tower to collapse downward some 25–30 feet and the foremast and funnel to collapse forward, effectively tearing the ship in half. The explosion touched off fierce fires that burned for two days; debris showered down on Ford Island in the vicinity. The blast from this explosion also put out fires on the repair ship VESTAL, which was moored alongside and ablaze. The bombs and subsequent explosion killed 1,177 of the 1,512 crewmen on board at the time
BB CALIFORNIA (USN 33190 grt) was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. CALIFORNIAwas moored at the southernmost berth of Battleship Row and was with other dreadnoughts of the Battle Force. She was struck on the port side with two torpedoes. One detonated below the armor belt at frame 52 (between number 2 turret and the bridge), creating a hole 10 feet high and 24 feet long, destructively deforming the first antitorpedo bulkhead and transverse stiffeners between frames 47 and 60, and holing the second bulkhead with fragments. Watertight integrity had been impaired by preparations for a material inspection; and the ship suffered extensive flooding damage when hit.
The second torpedo detonated below the armor belt and turret 3 at frame 101, causing nearly identical damage. The third and fourth bulkheads were deformed but remained intact at both locations. The innermost fifth armored bulkhead was deflected approximately 1 inch forward and punctured by a fuel line fitting aft. This damage caused by the shifting fuel line aft allowed flooding of the centre motor room through the port thrust block room.
At 08:45, a 551-pound (250 kg) bomb entered the starboard upper deck level at Frame 60, passed through the main deck, and exploded on the armoured second deck, setting off an AA ammunition magazine and killing about 50 men.
A second near miss bomb off the port bow ruptured hull plates between frames 10 and 15 causing immediate flooding of all first platform compartments forward of frame 21, and three compartments on the second platform putting CALIFORNIA down about one meter by the bow. Smoke from fires started by the bomb hit caused evacuation of the forward engine-room at 1000 and ended pumping efforts to keep CALIFORNIA afloat. After three days of progressive flooding, CALIFORNIA settled into the mud with only her superstructure remaining above the surface. When the action ended, 100 of her crew were lost and 62 wounded.
CALIFORNIA had been extensively wrecked and her repair was marginally effective yet as much for prestige reasons as operational requirements, she was raised and repaired.
On 25 March 1942, CALIFORNIA was refloated and dry-docked at Pearl Harbor for repairs. On 7 June, she departed under her own power for Puget Sound where a major repair and reconstruction job was undertaken, including improved protection, watertight compartmenting, stability, AA battery, and fire control system. Her original twin funnels were combined into a single funnel faired into the superstructure tower as with the newer STH DAKOTA class. It would take until 31 January 1944 before she was to emerge ready for action again.
BB WEST VIRGINIA (USN 32100 grt) was sunk in the attack.
Seven Type 91 aerial torpedoes struck the port side of WEST VIRGINIA. One hit the steering gear, dislodging the rudder. At least three struck below the armor belt, with one or more striking the belt itself (requiring the complex replacement of seven armor plates). One or two torpedoes exploded on the armored second deck after entering the listing ship through holes made by previous torpedoes. One torpedo failed to detonate, and was recovered and disarmed by shipyard explosive technicians. The torpedo attack made two large holes, extending from frames 43 to 52 and 62 to 97.
WEST VIRGINIA was also damaged by two Type 99 No. 80 Mk 5 bombs made from 16 in AP naval shells fitted with aerial fins. The first was found, unexploded, in debris on the second deck after passing through the searchlight platform, signal bridge and main deck deck near frame 70. The second bomb penetrated the 4-inch (100 mm) roof of turret three and broke apart destroying one of the turret's two guns, but did not detonate. It destroyed the Vought OS2U Kingfisher floatplane on the turret catapult. The impact knocked a second floatplane upside down to the main deck below, spilling gasoline (which ignited) from its fuel tanks. Burning aircraft fuel injured turret personnel and damaged the remaining gun. WEST VIRGINIA was eventually engulfed by an oil-fed conflagration, begun by the burning ARIZONA and sustained for 30 hours by fuel leaking from both ships.
Port-side torpedo damage caused rapid compartment flooding; prompt counter-flooding by four damage-control parties under the command of Lcdr John S. Harper and early closure of all water-tight doors and hatches ordered by Harper's assistant, Archie P. Kelley, prevented the ship from capsizing. Water damage ruined much of the ship's communications gear and electrics, including its battle-phone batteries.
With a patch over the damaged area of her hull the BB was pumped out, refloated on 17 May 1942 and docked in Drydock Number One on 9 June. This enabled a more detailed damage assessment, indicating six (not five) torpedo hits.
Shipyard workers were confronted with a monumental task because of the damage to her port side, WEST VIRGINIA sailed from Pearl Harbor on 7 May 1943 to Bremerton and a complete rebuild at Puget Navy yard. During this reconstruction, the cage masts supporting the three-tier fire-control tops, the two funnels, the open-mount 5-inch (127 mm)/25 caliber guns and the casemates with the single-purpose 5-inch/51 caliber guns were replaced by a single funnel and 5/38 dual-purpose guns. On the decks, 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm oerlikon batteries were added. Although the two-ocean naval policy dictated a beam limit of 108 feet for U.S. BBs to traverse the Panama Canal when WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA were rebuilt their beams were widened to 114 feet feet, effectively limiting their service to the Pacific theater. WEST VIRGINIA was finally ready to return to active duty by early July 1944.
Demilitarised BB UTAH (USN 21825 grt) was sunk. Shortly before 0800, some crewmen aboard UTAHobserved the first IJN planes approaching, but they assumed they were US aircraft. The Japanese began their attack shortly thereafter, concentrating on the BBs moored around Ford Island of which the UTAH was considered by them to be one. At 0801, the first of two torpedoes struck UTAH, which caused serious flooding. The ship began to list to port and settle by the stern.
UTAH was attacked mercilessly because like the Japanese HIEI, which had been similarly "demilitarised" in the 30's it was quite possible this ship might have been re-equipped and returned to service as a BB. As such the IJN considered her a potential threat deserving of attack.
US BB NEVADA was damaged with 57 fatalities and 112 wounded. NEVADA was the only BB to get underway during the attack, making the ship "the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal and depressing morning" for the United States. Still, it was hit by one torpedo and at least six bombs while getting underway forcing the crew to beach
the stricken ship on a coral ledge. The ship continued to flood and eventually slid off the ledge and sunk to the harbor floor. NEVADA was subsequently salvaged and modernized but took some time to return to active service..
NEVADA was struck by at least 5x250kg bombs as she proceeded down the channel as the IJN attempted to sink her in the channel to impede use of the harbor.
The gasoline fires that flared up around Turret 1 would have caused more critical damage if the main magazines had not been empty. For several days prior to the attack, all of the 14-inch-gun (356 mm) battleships had been replacing their standard-weight main battery projectiles with a new heavier projectile that offered greater penetration and a larger explosive charge in exchange for a slight decrease in range. All of the older projectiles and powder charges had been removed from the magazines of NEVADA, and the crew had taken a break after loading the new projectiles in anticipation of loading the new powder charges on Sunday.[
As bomb damage became evident, NEVADA was ordered to proceed to the west side of Ford Island to prevent her from sinking in deeper water. Instead, she was grounded off Hospital Point at 10:30, though she claimed to have forced down three planes before she struck the shore. Gasoline fires prevented damage control parties from containing flooding forward of the main torpedo defense system. Flooding the main magazine and counterflooding to keep the ship stable lowered the bow allowing water to enter the ship at the second deck level. Lack of watertight subdivision between the second and main decks from frame 30 to frame 115 allowed water entering through bomb holes in the forecastle to flow aft through the ship's ventilation system to flood the dynamo and boiler rooms.
In addition to the immediate casualties mentioned above, NEVADA suffered two more men died aboard during salvage operations on 7 February 1942 when they were overcome by H2S gas gas from decomposing paper and meat. The ship suffered a minimum of six bomb hits and one torpedo hit, but "it is possible that as many as ten bomb hits may have been received, from not more than 18 attackers. Certain damaged areas were of sufficient size to indicate that they were struck by more than one bomb according to the DNS report.
NEVADA urgently required both repairs and modernization. DNS reported the repairs complete November 1942, but the modernization, which was necessarily modest (as it was intended that NEVADA would henceforth be used only as a convoy escort) were completed April 1943.
US BB PENNSYLVANIA was damaged 29 men killed and a further 29 wounded. It is often reported that she returned to service by 30 March 1942m, but in fact this is very misleading. She was indeed recommissioned on that date, only to find that she suffered repeated machinery failures due to the secondary effects of the repairs. It was not until 4 June 1942 that she was finally deemed fit for service. Even then she would need several months of work up exercises to be considered combat ready.
US BB TENNESSEE was damaged with 5 killed and 24 wounded. It is often misreported that she returned to service almost immediately, but this is untrue.
TENNESSEE was struck by two armor-piercing bombs that detonated incompletely. The first one hit the center gun of turret two, and it made all three guns inoperable.[7] Debris from the bomb hit on TENNESSEE's turret two hit the command deck of WEST VIRGINIA which mortally wounded her commanding officer. The second bomb went through the roof of turret three; and low-order ignition, rather than detonation, burned out only the left gun compartment of that turret. It was extremely lucky this bomb hit was a dud. TENNESSEE was showered with debris when the magazine of ARIZONA exploded and her stern was engulfed in flames from Arizona's burning fuel oil.
Wedged between the sunken WEST VIRGINIAa and her mooring quays, TENNESSEE was trapped at her berth for ten days before being freed, and four days later she set sail for the West Coast to be repaired.
After preliminary repairs at Pearl Harbor, TENNESSEE headed for Puget for permanent repairs. In addition to repairing her, crews upgraded her AA capbiliities which after the pearl Harbour attack were considered essential. Search and Fcradars were fitted. . Other modifications improved the BB's habitability. On 26 February 1942, TENNESSEE departed from Puget Sound with the work ostensibly complete. She was not declared fully combat ready, however, until after June 1942
US BB MARYLAND with four killed and 21 wounded. She was the first damaged ship at Pearl to actually be considered combat ready…..in June 1942.
MARYLAND was struck by two armor-piercing bombs which detonated low on her hull. The first struck the forecastle awning and made a hole about 12 ft (3.7 m) by 20 ft (6.1 m). The second exploded after entering the hull at the 22 ft (6.7 m) water level at Frame 10. The latter hit caused flooding and increased the draft forward by 5 ft (1.5 m). MARYLAND continued to fire and, after the attack, sent firefighting parties to assist her compatriots, especially attempting to rescue survivors from the capsized OKLAHOMA. The men continued to muster the AA defenses in case the Japanese returned to attack. In all, two officers and two men were killed in the attack. The damage to the ship was more extensive than the casualties would suggest.
The Japanese erroneously announced that MARYLAND had been sunk, but on 30 December, the damaged ship entered Puget for repairs just behind TENNESSEE. Two of the original twelve 5/51 guns were removed and the 5 in/25 cal guns were replaced by an equal number of 5/38s. These were deemed essential at the time, due to the generally poor performace of the USN AA during the 7 December attack Over the course of the next two months, she was repaired and overhauled, receiving new fighting equipment. Repairs were complete on 26 February 1942, but she was not combat ready until the following June. She underwent a series of shakedown cruises to iron out persitent faults and work up the crews,. She was finally declared a combat ready unit of the USN sent back in June 1942, just prior to Midway
mikewint
Captain
Twas not even counting poor old Utah. On Dec. 7th 1941 the U.S. had 17 Battleships in both Atlantic and Pacific fleets
2 of the 17 were on shakedown cruises
8 of the 17 were at Pearl Harbor during the attack
Of the 8 battleships at Pearl only 1 was declared a total loss (Arizona). Oklahoma was raised but never repaired
As far as carriers, the US had 7 plus one Escort Carrier
U.S. Battleships on Dec. 7, 1941
BB - 33 Arkansas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic
BB - 34 New York Argentia Newfoundland. Atlantic
BB - 35 Texas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic
BB - 36 Nevada Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 37 Oklahoma Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 38 Pennsylvania Dry Dock, Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 39 Arizona Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 40 New Mexico Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
BB - 41 Mississippi Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic
BB - 42 Idaho Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic
BB - 43 Tennessee Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 44 California Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 45 Colorado Overhaul, Bremerton Washington. Pacific
BB - 46 Maryland Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 48 West Virginia Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 55 North Carolina Post shakedown overhaul, Portland Maine. Atlantic
BB - 56 Washington Shakedown cruise, Gulf of Mexico. Atlantic
Battleships at Pearl Harbor Dec 7, 1941
Arizona (BB-39) (Sunk Total Loss)
California (BB-44) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)
Maryland (BB-46) (Light Damage)
Nevada (BB-36) (Beached Heavy Damage, Repaired)
Oklahoma (BB-37) (Capsized -Raised Not Repaired)
Pennsylvania (BB-38) (In Dry Dock No. 1. - Light Damage, Repaired)
Tennessee (BB-43) (Light Damage, Repaired)
West Virginia (BB-48) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)
U.S. Aircraft Carriers on Dec 7, 1941
CV - 2 Lexington Transporting aircraft to Midway Island, 460 Miles East of Midway. Pacific
CV - 3 Saratoga At San Diego California. Pacific
CV - 4 Ranger At sea returning to Norfolk Va. Caribbean. Atlantic
CV - 5 Yorktown At Norfolk Va. Atlantic
CV - 6 Enterprise Returning to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island. 200 Miles West Of Pearl. Pacific
CV - 7 Wasp Grassy Bay Bermuda. Atlantic
CV - 8 Hornet Fitting out Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
AVG – 1 Long Island Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
2 of the 17 were on shakedown cruises
8 of the 17 were at Pearl Harbor during the attack
Of the 8 battleships at Pearl only 1 was declared a total loss (Arizona). Oklahoma was raised but never repaired
As far as carriers, the US had 7 plus one Escort Carrier
U.S. Battleships on Dec. 7, 1941
BB - 33 Arkansas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic
BB - 34 New York Argentia Newfoundland. Atlantic
BB - 35 Texas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic
BB - 36 Nevada Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 37 Oklahoma Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 38 Pennsylvania Dry Dock, Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 39 Arizona Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 40 New Mexico Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
BB - 41 Mississippi Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic
BB - 42 Idaho Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic
BB - 43 Tennessee Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 44 California Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 45 Colorado Overhaul, Bremerton Washington. Pacific
BB - 46 Maryland Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 48 West Virginia Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific
BB - 55 North Carolina Post shakedown overhaul, Portland Maine. Atlantic
BB - 56 Washington Shakedown cruise, Gulf of Mexico. Atlantic
Battleships at Pearl Harbor Dec 7, 1941
Arizona (BB-39) (Sunk Total Loss)
California (BB-44) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)
Maryland (BB-46) (Light Damage)
Nevada (BB-36) (Beached Heavy Damage, Repaired)
Oklahoma (BB-37) (Capsized -Raised Not Repaired)
Pennsylvania (BB-38) (In Dry Dock No. 1. - Light Damage, Repaired)
Tennessee (BB-43) (Light Damage, Repaired)
West Virginia (BB-48) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)
U.S. Aircraft Carriers on Dec 7, 1941
CV - 2 Lexington Transporting aircraft to Midway Island, 460 Miles East of Midway. Pacific
CV - 3 Saratoga At San Diego California. Pacific
CV - 4 Ranger At sea returning to Norfolk Va. Caribbean. Atlantic
CV - 5 Yorktown At Norfolk Va. Atlantic
CV - 6 Enterprise Returning to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island. 200 Miles West Of Pearl. Pacific
CV - 7 Wasp Grassy Bay Bermuda. Atlantic
CV - 8 Hornet Fitting out Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
AVG – 1 Long Island Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic
Shortround6
Major General
Thank you both for the more detailed accounts of damage and dispositions of the US major ships.
The Japanese had, for all practical purposes, sunk 5 of the American Battleships. A tremendous achievement, but not enough in light of the American reserve of battleships and their production program. (four of the Iowas were already laid down by the time of Pearl Harbor)
In fact they may have simplified things for the Americans as the Americans didn't have enough fleet oilers to supply both the carrier task force and a large number of Battleships for most of 1942. This was also simplified by the fact the old American battleships could not tactically combine with carriers (only the modern battleships could exceed 21 kts).
The Japanese had spent large sums of money to modify all their old battleships and combined longer hulls (mostly additions to the stern) and more powerful engines to bring the battleship speeds up to around 25 kts and the Kongo class battlecruisers were almost totally rebuilt into fast battleships (over 3500 tons of armor being added) with new boilers/turbines of almost double the power and another 14 ft added to the length to increase speed form 27-27.5 kts to 30.5 kts despite the much greater weight. The Japanese had the same problem of combining units only not to the same extent. Only the 4 battlecruisers could really operate with carriers in terms of speed but with only eight 5 in guns (four twin mounts) they weren't exactly large floating flak batteries like the later American Battleships or the old American ships with major rebuilds.
The Japanese had, for all practical purposes, sunk 5 of the American Battleships. A tremendous achievement, but not enough in light of the American reserve of battleships and their production program. (four of the Iowas were already laid down by the time of Pearl Harbor)
In fact they may have simplified things for the Americans as the Americans didn't have enough fleet oilers to supply both the carrier task force and a large number of Battleships for most of 1942. This was also simplified by the fact the old American battleships could not tactically combine with carriers (only the modern battleships could exceed 21 kts).
The Japanese had spent large sums of money to modify all their old battleships and combined longer hulls (mostly additions to the stern) and more powerful engines to bring the battleship speeds up to around 25 kts and the Kongo class battlecruisers were almost totally rebuilt into fast battleships (over 3500 tons of armor being added) with new boilers/turbines of almost double the power and another 14 ft added to the length to increase speed form 27-27.5 kts to 30.5 kts despite the much greater weight. The Japanese had the same problem of combining units only not to the same extent. Only the 4 battlecruisers could really operate with carriers in terms of speed but with only eight 5 in guns (four twin mounts) they weren't exactly large floating flak batteries like the later American Battleships or the old American ships with major rebuilds.
parsifal
Colonel
The USN fought most of 1942 in the PTO without relying on its battleships because it had to, not because it wanted to. There were persistent, almost unsolvable problems that prevented the wholesale use of the battleship force in the massed role that had been intended. In no way could any of the US battleships, old or new, be considered combat ready until the latter part of 1942. By the time the battleship force was deemed ready, the war in the Pacific was largely decided and there were safer and more efficient ways of defeating the IJN.
The central role of the US carriers in the operations that followed the Pearl Harbour debacle ought not be diminished by some erroneous belief that the USN could always fall back on its battleshiips if the need arose (at least not until after august 1942) . Despite its numbers, the US battlefleet was found to be badly in need of modernisation and in no way ready to take on the IJN in those early months of the war. I have no doubts that if the climactic Mahanist battle had been fought as planned, the IJN would have torn the heart out of the USN. The difference in quality was just too great for that to be risked.
And there was no joy to be had from the new battleships then entering service either. Even though the North Carolinas were either commissioning, or nearing commissioning at the time of pearl harbour, it would take a lot of time to get any of these ships combat ready. They suffered many serious delays in getting to combat ready status. WASHINGTON for instance suffered severe engine vibrations for many months that virtually prevented her proceeding to sea, affected her gunnery until the problem was "solved, and could not enter work up status because of those persistent nagging issues. In the case of WASHINGTON she continued to have big problems with the vibration and cavitation issues (that affected her stability as a gun platform and reduced her speed to dangerous levels) until well into 1943, and in fact these vibration issues to a lesser extent persisted even after they had ostensibly been solved. In WASHINGTON's case it was a very wise move to fit radar to her so early as the WASHINGTON was the first of 20 USN ships selected for a full radar fitout, making it possible for the crews to be fully trained by the time it was needed
That the new fast battleships continued to suffer dangerous teething issues can be found in the conduct of the November battles. Despite being heavily outgunned, caught by surprise and facing a well trained radar equipped enemy, the Japanese forces very nearly caused an upset in this battle.
Despite the resounding victory for the USN that was snatched from defeat at the November showdown with the IJN Battlecruiser, it ought not be overlooked that both USN Battleships suffered numerous failures. Sth Dakota was very lucky to escape more serious damage than she did. It was not as one side a battle as it first appears
Researcher@Large - BB-57 USS South Dakota Gunfire Damage - Battle of Guadalcanal - Nov 14-15, 1942
What I consider to be the very best damage analysis on the IJN KIRISHIMA provides an interesting foil to the above article
http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf
The central role of the US carriers in the operations that followed the Pearl Harbour debacle ought not be diminished by some erroneous belief that the USN could always fall back on its battleshiips if the need arose (at least not until after august 1942) . Despite its numbers, the US battlefleet was found to be badly in need of modernisation and in no way ready to take on the IJN in those early months of the war. I have no doubts that if the climactic Mahanist battle had been fought as planned, the IJN would have torn the heart out of the USN. The difference in quality was just too great for that to be risked.
And there was no joy to be had from the new battleships then entering service either. Even though the North Carolinas were either commissioning, or nearing commissioning at the time of pearl harbour, it would take a lot of time to get any of these ships combat ready. They suffered many serious delays in getting to combat ready status. WASHINGTON for instance suffered severe engine vibrations for many months that virtually prevented her proceeding to sea, affected her gunnery until the problem was "solved, and could not enter work up status because of those persistent nagging issues. In the case of WASHINGTON she continued to have big problems with the vibration and cavitation issues (that affected her stability as a gun platform and reduced her speed to dangerous levels) until well into 1943, and in fact these vibration issues to a lesser extent persisted even after they had ostensibly been solved. In WASHINGTON's case it was a very wise move to fit radar to her so early as the WASHINGTON was the first of 20 USN ships selected for a full radar fitout, making it possible for the crews to be fully trained by the time it was needed
That the new fast battleships continued to suffer dangerous teething issues can be found in the conduct of the November battles. Despite being heavily outgunned, caught by surprise and facing a well trained radar equipped enemy, the Japanese forces very nearly caused an upset in this battle.
Despite the resounding victory for the USN that was snatched from defeat at the November showdown with the IJN Battlecruiser, it ought not be overlooked that both USN Battleships suffered numerous failures. Sth Dakota was very lucky to escape more serious damage than she did. It was not as one side a battle as it first appears
Researcher@Large - BB-57 USS South Dakota Gunfire Damage - Battle of Guadalcanal - Nov 14-15, 1942
What I consider to be the very best damage analysis on the IJN KIRISHIMA provides an interesting foil to the above article
http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf
Last edited:
mikewint
Captain
Plain and simple the day of the slug-fest battlewagon vs. battlewagon was over. It always seems like the military is fighting the LAST war and has to be dragged into the present. Weapons will always (eventually) outpace armor.
The German approach to Tanks is a perfect example and just as self-defeating in the end
The German approach to Tanks is a perfect example and just as self-defeating in the end
parsifal
Colonel
Substantially I agree. Battleships as the last arbiter in naval power had ended. However that was not fully apparent in 1942, not even in 1944. What did become apparent was that maintining a battleship force was an expense few nations could afford and for which the returns were limited.
In 1942, both side fought each other to a standstill with respect to their carrier capabilities. As a result of that most of the battles fought in the latter part of 1942 through to most of 1943 were surface naval battles. As a generalisation, the IJN proved to be superior to the USN but was unable to replace losses as effectively. They were nearly always, invariably, outnumbered and the increasing advantages of radar tipped the balance increasingly in favour of the USN. Other improvements in areas like Damage Control and tactical control of surface forces gradually helped the USN to achieve the upper hand in surface battles. There were several in late 1943 that were clear US victories, in which the USN, even when outnumbered could get the better of the IJN. By the time of Samar, the Japanese surface fleet was thoroughly inferior, both numbers and capability in surface combat.
The problem for heavy ships was not that they were obsolete in these battles, but that they were too valuable and were often exposed to threats like destroyers, PT boats and submarines, as well of course as aircraft. But given that the surface naval engagement was still the prevalent 9but not the dominant) form of naval warfare, it is not true to claim that battleships were obsolete.. They were just no longer the sole arbiters of sea power, and there were cheaper, more efficient ways of force projection available
Shortround6
Major General
There was also quite a difference between the old battleships and the new ones in terms of basic AA ability, this tends to cover all nations. Many older battleships having 6-8 guns of 4-5in caliber for AA work, not much better (if any better) than heavy cruisers. British and few others flirted with heavier AA guns, like 6in but rates of fire counted against them even if the mount had high angle elevation.
The new generation of battleships (and some of the most reworked older ones) often had 16-20 4in -5.25in guns and, in theory, could offer increased AA protection to the formation.
Dockyard time, weapons availability, and even deck space/stability often prevented as much AA firepower from being mounted as desired.
Battleships, briefly ( few years) , could operate at times or conditions that prevented effective airstrikes (Northern Convoys). The battleships being much reduced in capability by heavy seas and poor visibility but carriers were restricted even more.
Much is made of the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse but the Repulse, despite the heroic efforts of her captain and crew, was handicapped by a distinctly second rate (if not 3rd rate) AA suite.
The new generation of battleships (and some of the most reworked older ones) often had 16-20 4in -5.25in guns and, in theory, could offer increased AA protection to the formation.
Dockyard time, weapons availability, and even deck space/stability often prevented as much AA firepower from being mounted as desired.
Battleships, briefly ( few years) , could operate at times or conditions that prevented effective airstrikes (Northern Convoys). The battleships being much reduced in capability by heavy seas and poor visibility but carriers were restricted even more.
Much is made of the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse but the Repulse, despite the heroic efforts of her captain and crew, was handicapped by a distinctly second rate (if not 3rd rate) AA suite.
parsifal
Colonel
It was more a difference between AA carried early in the war and AA carried later. A good illustration of this is HMS warspite, designed to carry just two medium caliber AA guns in 1915, by March 1941 she was provided with the following fitout
Warspite March 1941
8 x BL 15-inch /42 main guns (with increased elevation) in four twin-gun turrets (two forward, two aft).
8 x 6-inch Mk XII (152mm) guns
8 x 4-inch Mk XVI anti-aircraft cannons in four twin-gun turrets
32 x 2-pdr (40mm) "pom-pom" anti-aircraft cannons
15 x 20mm anti-aircraft cannons
16 x 0.50 caliber Vickers anti-aircraft machine guns in quad mountings.
By comparison, USS North Carolina (BB55) in March 1941 was carrying:
4x4 quadruple 1.1 in and 12x.50 caliber HMG
It was a similar story for most BBs. For the british, the problem was that many of their more useful ships were so busy they didn't get the chance to upgrade the AA fitout. Repulse was definately in that category.
Fast BBs were so valuable (and so expensive) there was a rapid and comprehensive increase in their AA fitouts though the older US BBs also received quite a few upgrades as the was progressed.
BBs actually were not the most efficient Aa platforms in either navy. the most efficient ships were actually the purpose built Aa cruisers, because they had smaller TDs they could get in close and provide better levels of support where needed. BBs couldn't really do that.
Warspite March 1941
8 x BL 15-inch /42 main guns (with increased elevation) in four twin-gun turrets (two forward, two aft).
8 x 6-inch Mk XII (152mm) guns
8 x 4-inch Mk XVI anti-aircraft cannons in four twin-gun turrets
32 x 2-pdr (40mm) "pom-pom" anti-aircraft cannons
15 x 20mm anti-aircraft cannons
16 x 0.50 caliber Vickers anti-aircraft machine guns in quad mountings.
By comparison, USS North Carolina (BB55) in March 1941 was carrying:
4x4 quadruple 1.1 in and 12x.50 caliber HMG
It was a similar story for most BBs. For the british, the problem was that many of their more useful ships were so busy they didn't get the chance to upgrade the AA fitout. Repulse was definately in that category.
Fast BBs were so valuable (and so expensive) there was a rapid and comprehensive increase in their AA fitouts though the older US BBs also received quite a few upgrades as the was progressed.
BBs actually were not the most efficient Aa platforms in either navy. the most efficient ships were actually the purpose built Aa cruisers, because they had smaller TDs they could get in close and provide better levels of support where needed. BBs couldn't really do that.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
This is rather far afield from the Yamamoto question, but there is still a lot of fanboyism around battleships. I think, in hindsight, had the USN canceled every one of the Iowas the net effect on the war would probably have been to shorten it by like ten minutes. Of course, they didn't know that when they needed to decide.
Yamamoto had a tendency to draw up very complex plans requiring accurate timing between widely separated forces. I suspect his greatness as an admiral grew as he died before the IJN started on an obvious course to Davey Jones' locker. What he and the IJN failed to do included any kind of offensive or defensive trade warfare. Considering the IJA and IJN treatment of civilians in occupied areas, arguments that this was beneath their warrior ethic seem rather inane.
Yamamoto had a tendency to draw up very complex plans requiring accurate timing between widely separated forces. I suspect his greatness as an admiral grew as he died before the IJN started on an obvious course to Davey Jones' locker. What he and the IJN failed to do included any kind of offensive or defensive trade warfare. Considering the IJA and IJN treatment of civilians in occupied areas, arguments that this was beneath their warrior ethic seem rather inane.
