1935 Germany. Why horse drawn artillery and supply wagons?
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parsifal
Colonel
It was yet another massive typo on my part. Have the flu at the moment.
For the record it was meant to read as follows
(12000 men, 4000 horses and 600 trucks)
I dont think he was referring or taking into account the supporting Infantry Guns or mortars supporting each regiment. Just looking purely at the artillery components of the div....that is the separate the artillery regiment. He does not include the ATG components either
A German division, in combat was an awesomely powerful unit, but it needed firepower and mobility to generate that. Firepower is generated by supply, and supply is provided by vehicles, lots of em. Being cross country and being good all terrain vehicles is an advantage, but simply being on wheels was by far the most important element to the equation.
parsifal
Colonel
Hi SR,
For the US TOE, I believe one of the best references is Shelby Stanton Order Of Battle US Army WWII.
As at 1.1.44, the division was surprisingly light on in terms of motorization. Just roughly, the TOE of the late '43 division, I count 830 trucks attached. However Stanton is at pains to point out that the US system differed from the British in that they tended to centailose and control their MT assets at corps and higher levels far more so than in the British system .
There are 12 different ToEs listed for Infantry Bn TOEs, they are somewhat similar to each other, but its difficult to give a typical manning level. ive also got a book by David Myers, titled Unit organizations of WWII which gives a brief rundown of what was happening, but concentrates on the schematic layouts. It also includes a representation of the US infantry Div in 1944.
It says in the blurb about US Infantry"the US army centralised its heavy artillery to higher echelons and pooled the majority of its transport also at those higher level. Transport needs vould be attached on an as required basis". it also lists 830 vehicles directly attached, with nearly 50% (some 351 vehicles), being attached directly to the 2479 strong, 54 gun artillery regiment of the division. 56 MT were allocated to the Engineer Bn, The 767 strong TD unit had 115 vehicles attached, suggesting to me they wanted the unit to be able to operate at a moments notice as an independent formation.
Shortround6
Major General
That sounds about right.
I would note that even battalion or regimental weapons required considerable back up in unit ammunition trains.
For instance pre-war (1940) US infantry battalion ammunition loads for the 81 mm mortar as given as 100 rounds on the prime mover, 50 rounds on the unit (battalion) ammunition train and 150 rounds on the train of a higher echelon unit for a total of 300 rounds per 81 mm mortar. Other ammo totals were 220 rounds per 60mm mortar, 300 rounds per 37mm AT gun, 2800 rounds per "antitank machine gun" (.50 cal Browning). 6000 rounds per M1919 .30 cal Browning LMG and 8250 rounds per M1917 .30 cal HMG.
In 1940 the "deuce and half" and the 3/4 ton trucks had yet to be standardized and the standard military trucks were 1 1/2 ton and 1/2 ton models. The capacity of these trucks, with no other load and without overloading were respectively, 37,500 rounds and 12,500 rounds of belted .30 cal ammo ( ammo packaged for rifles and automatic rifles reduced capacity a bit), 9,000 and 3,000 of .50 cal ammo in belts, 810 and 270 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. 300 and 100 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition and 600 and 200 rounds of 37mm AT gun ammo.
People can talk about man packed/carried 81mm mortars (and they were in difficult terrain) but obviously some sort of transport was needed for even the Battalion "infantry" weapons ammo supply if they were to keep firing for more than a few minutes.
Please note that each 81mm mortar might require two 1/2 ton trucks ( or a single 1 1/2 ton) to carry the weapon/crew/first 100 rounds.
The shift to 3/4 ton weapons carriers made things easier. but you still need two extra trucks per 6 tube platoon to carry extra ammo at the mortar platoon level (if they kept to the 50 per tube on separate vehicles) and three 1 1/2 ton or two 2 1/2 ton trucks at regiment or divisional level to carry the rest of the 300 rounds per tube, and even at 3 rounds per minute 300 rounds won't last two hours. Granted the 81mm is the worst case among the Battalion weapons but a single water cooled Browning can use up the contents of a 1/2 ton truck in 62.5 minutes firing at 200 rpm (water permitting). While hours long machine gun barrages may have a been a thing of the past how many miles form the supply dump/point/rail head do you want to be without trucks or wagons?
I would note that even battalion or regimental weapons required considerable back up in unit ammunition trains.
For instance pre-war (1940) US infantry battalion ammunition loads for the 81 mm mortar as given as 100 rounds on the prime mover, 50 rounds on the unit (battalion) ammunition train and 150 rounds on the train of a higher echelon unit for a total of 300 rounds per 81 mm mortar. Other ammo totals were 220 rounds per 60mm mortar, 300 rounds per 37mm AT gun, 2800 rounds per "antitank machine gun" (.50 cal Browning). 6000 rounds per M1919 .30 cal Browning LMG and 8250 rounds per M1917 .30 cal HMG.
In 1940 the "deuce and half" and the 3/4 ton trucks had yet to be standardized and the standard military trucks were 1 1/2 ton and 1/2 ton models. The capacity of these trucks, with no other load and without overloading were respectively, 37,500 rounds and 12,500 rounds of belted .30 cal ammo ( ammo packaged for rifles and automatic rifles reduced capacity a bit), 9,000 and 3,000 of .50 cal ammo in belts, 810 and 270 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. 300 and 100 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition and 600 and 200 rounds of 37mm AT gun ammo.
People can talk about man packed/carried 81mm mortars (and they were in difficult terrain) but obviously some sort of transport was needed for even the Battalion "infantry" weapons ammo supply if they were to keep firing for more than a few minutes.
Please note that each 81mm mortar might require two 1/2 ton trucks ( or a single 1 1/2 ton) to carry the weapon/crew/first 100 rounds.
The shift to 3/4 ton weapons carriers made things easier. but you still need two extra trucks per 6 tube platoon to carry extra ammo at the mortar platoon level (if they kept to the 50 per tube on separate vehicles) and three 1 1/2 ton or two 2 1/2 ton trucks at regiment or divisional level to carry the rest of the 300 rounds per tube, and even at 3 rounds per minute 300 rounds won't last two hours. Granted the 81mm is the worst case among the Battalion weapons but a single water cooled Browning can use up the contents of a 1/2 ton truck in 62.5 minutes firing at 200 rpm (water permitting). While hours long machine gun barrages may have a been a thing of the past how many miles form the supply dump/point/rail head do you want to be without trucks or wagons?
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Pre war German vehicle designs tended to be over specified which cant have helped. US and British trucks were usually just lightly modified civilian vehicles rather than specially designed for military service. 4x4, long travel suspension and multi range gearboxes are very nice but do you really need them when you need sturdy reliable vehicles to move supplies from the rail head to near the front line. The German army needed more Opel Blitz type vehicles and fewer of the bewildering variety of cargo carriers it was stuck with.
Hello Parsifal
thanks for the correction. IMHO 1943 div info is important because after the massive losses in the East during winter 41/42 the Welle ToEs were rather meaningless because they were unattainable to most of divs participating fighting, 1943 ToE was an attempt to standardize a ToE which was hoped to be attainable even if in reality active divs were usually rather badly understrenght.
thanks for the correction. IMHO 1943 div info is important because after the massive losses in the East during winter 41/42 the Welle ToEs were rather meaningless because they were unattainable to most of divs participating fighting, 1943 ToE was an attempt to standardize a ToE which was hoped to be attainable even if in reality active divs were usually rather badly understrenght.
Hello Fastmongrel
IMHO what Heer really needed on the Eastern Front were just robush 4x4 or 6x6 lorries with powerful enough engines. In the west 4 x2 or 6x4 lorries were usually fine also the French lorries but not good enough in Russia bacause of its the poor roads and sparse roadnet.
IMHO what Heer really needed on the Eastern Front were just robush 4x4 or 6x6 lorries with powerful enough engines. In the west 4 x2 or 6x4 lorries were usually fine also the French lorries but not good enough in Russia bacause of its the poor roads and sparse roadnet.
In 1932 two teams of horses (four animals) plus harness and 'covers' (I don't know what that is) cost $227 according to the accounts of one Nebraska farmer. I'd call that about $50 per working horse.
Since RM 1 was roughly equivalent to $4 US I can't see how six horses could have cost around RM 8,000. Even if horses were much more expensive in Europe than the US a few years later (and there is no reason why they should be orders of magnitude higher) the figures just don't make sense.
Where do they come from?
Cheers
Steve
Since RM 1 was roughly equivalent to $4 US I can't see how six horses could have cost around RM 8,000. Even if horses were much more expensive in Europe than the US a few years later (and there is no reason why they should be orders of magnitude higher) the figures just don't make sense.
Where do they come from?
Cheers
Steve
Those horse prices are more in line with what I was familiar with in the USA in the late 50s, and early 60s, accounting for inflation over 20-30 years.
But you've got the exchange rate backward, I think it's 4 RM to 1 US dollar.
- Thread starter
- #70
davebender
1st Lieutenant
So were Ford and Opel 3 ton trucks which formed the backbone of Heer motorized transport.
Yes I did...ooops. Also by the mid 1930s it was closer to 2.5 RM to the dollar.
I still can't believe that a horse cost around RM 1300 or over $500 ! I think someone is out by a factor of ten
It's important because part of the argument is that horses were more expensive than motorised vehicles and I don't think that was the case.
Cheers
Steve
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Yes but there were too many types of vehicle I mean did the Heer need all those different sizes of 1/2 track did they really need so many types of truck.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Opel Maultier was a great innovation, merging the standard truck with a light tank chassis, giving it much better mobility.
As far as variety goes, the U.S. military employed a wide variety of vehicles. Unfortunately, the Jeep and the 2 1/2 ton "duece and a half" captured most of the attention.
Along with those, the American M3 halftrack was about as well known as the SdKfz series vehicles.
As far as variety goes, the U.S. military employed a wide variety of vehicles. Unfortunately, the Jeep and the 2 1/2 ton "duece and a half" captured most of the attention.
Along with those, the American M3 halftrack was about as well known as the SdKfz series vehicles.
Shortround6
Major General
The US actually used both types to a considerable extent. There were a considerable number of lightly modified civilian vehicles used by the US military but they were often used on or between US bases (in the US) or as air field vehicles or specialty vehicles ( fire fighting, fuel trucks, repair shop trucks, etc.) The "tactical" trucks were designed as such even if the design was a bit cruder than some peoples military trucks. Multi range gear boxes were fairly common at the time and for many years after in order to get small engines to move large vehicles. The US had on average a lower rail density than western Europe and depended more on truck transport and long distance truck transport at that. The US also had NO TAX on engine size or cylinder bore and supported larger engines in general that the European nations.
Also do not confuse a commercial style cab on a military chassis with a commercial truck. Quite a few US trucks built in 1940-42 used commercial style or type cabs (lots of hardtops) before switching to the canvas roof military style cabs. Fenders often started as compound curve commercial fenders before changing to military style fenders ( they already had the stamping dies for the commercial style body work. Why not keep using it. these were NOT hand beaten body panels, A large hydraulic press turned flat sheet stock into compound curved fenders in seconds.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Germany couldn't supply enough horses; they had to steal<-<-<-<-<- requisition them from occupied countries, especially France.
How effective or useful might motorised transport be on a continent where, once outside the major conurbations, anywhere from 60% to 90+% of roads were unpaved? The Wermacht was heading east where the upper figure would be more appropriate. Horses might actually be a better option in some cases.
Cheers
Steve
Cheers
Steve
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Europe was probably more heavily paved than the US and was certainly more heavily paved than Africa, and the two most motorized armies operated in those two areas.
Europe was not more heavily paved than the US, particularly once you leave the industrial regions of the three western powers. The industrial infrastructure of Europe operated by rail and to a lesser extent, but still significant in the 1930s, canals and rivers. Almost all Europe's major cities are on a navigable river. Even today watching the barges butt up the Rhine from a decent vantage point like Lorelei is quite a sight
As the Wermacht advanced into Eastern Europe the complaints turned from dust to mud. The former did bad things to internal combustion engines and the latter stopped most untracked motorised vehicles from operating at all. Neither are a problem on paved roads.
The motorised armies in Africa only operated in a thin strip of coastal land on which was suitable for the operation of their vehicles. They certainly didn't operate 'in Africa' generally.
Cheers
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
It also took a while for some countries to figure out how to drive in North Africa.
like sand tires
worked in mud too
a 9:00 x 13 wheel tire vs the "commercial" 6:00 x 16. Some Humbers were also 4 wheel drive.
"converting" large numbers of trucks/cars to 4/6 wheel drive is not as easy as it sounds. The extra axle and steerable driven wheels are a problem as you need extra gear cutting equipment. Many times car or truck factories in peace time had purchased axles differentials from outside suppliers so expansion of production, while done, was often not done smoothly.
While 2-3 ton trucks are a considerable help bigger trucks can lower the burden considerably. The US also used tens of thousands of tractor trailer rigs and tens of thousands of larger than 2-3 ton trucks.
The Red Ball Express for example used hundreds of 4-5 tractors pulling 25ft 10 ton trailers among the fleet of trucks used.
The 'ton' rating of US Military trucks was the off road load rating. On road was roughly doubled. Granted some supplies are denser than others and you sometimes can't fit 5 tons of item XXX in the truck bed
like sand tires
worked in mud too
a 9:00 x 13 wheel tire vs the "commercial" 6:00 x 16. Some Humbers were also 4 wheel drive.
"converting" large numbers of trucks/cars to 4/6 wheel drive is not as easy as it sounds. The extra axle and steerable driven wheels are a problem as you need extra gear cutting equipment. Many times car or truck factories in peace time had purchased axles differentials from outside suppliers so expansion of production, while done, was often not done smoothly.
While 2-3 ton trucks are a considerable help bigger trucks can lower the burden considerably. The US also used tens of thousands of tractor trailer rigs and tens of thousands of larger than 2-3 ton trucks.
The Red Ball Express for example used hundreds of 4-5 tractors pulling 25ft 10 ton trailers among the fleet of trucks used.
The 'ton' rating of US Military trucks was the off road load rating. On road was roughly doubled. Granted some supplies are denser than others and you sometimes can't fit 5 tons of item XXX in the truck bed
parsifal
Colonel
Having better off-road capability is always a bonus, but not if it interferes with the overall numbers of vehicles being produced. This really didnt matter too much for the allies, who had spare production. they could afford to dabble with special modification and four wheel drives and the like, and still have more vehicles than they needed,
Not so for the Germans. i think that having tracked trucks, four wheel drive trucks, half tracks, or any other kind of fancy tgruck like vehicles is really just adding to the problem, because it reduces the overall supply of vehicles. They are just pointless fripperies from the german perspective. What they needed was numbers, and a lesser number of different types to keep serviceability rates up. These types needed to be simplified and made relaiable rather than fancy. This was perhaps the biggest single killer for the germans. They messed about with their rationalization plan until it was too late, then in the mad scramble, accepted just about any vehicle that could move, from a range of sources. The result was fairly predicable. At the first big challenge, most of it broke down and spares and maintenance became a nightmare for them.
What the germans really needed, was to implement their snell Plan earlier than they did, reduce the number of types to a manageable number, simplify and strengthen design and do what they could to expand production....perhaps exempt the auto industry from the mass drafts that wrecked a lot of their industries.
Roads were bad in Russia, but in Summer they were good enough for two wheeled drive transport to do the job. but with the vehicle park they possessed they suffered high attrition rates for a whole range of reasons. i am reasonably sure that when the russians started their counteroffensives, using mostly the 400000 odd US pattern trucks supplied to them, they did not suffer the same level of breakdown rates that plagued the German offensives.
Not so for the Germans. i think that having tracked trucks, four wheel drive trucks, half tracks, or any other kind of fancy tgruck like vehicles is really just adding to the problem, because it reduces the overall supply of vehicles. They are just pointless fripperies from the german perspective. What they needed was numbers, and a lesser number of different types to keep serviceability rates up. These types needed to be simplified and made relaiable rather than fancy. This was perhaps the biggest single killer for the germans. They messed about with their rationalization plan until it was too late, then in the mad scramble, accepted just about any vehicle that could move, from a range of sources. The result was fairly predicable. At the first big challenge, most of it broke down and spares and maintenance became a nightmare for them.
What the germans really needed, was to implement their snell Plan earlier than they did, reduce the number of types to a manageable number, simplify and strengthen design and do what they could to expand production....perhaps exempt the auto industry from the mass drafts that wrecked a lot of their industries.
Roads were bad in Russia, but in Summer they were good enough for two wheeled drive transport to do the job. but with the vehicle park they possessed they suffered high attrition rates for a whole range of reasons. i am reasonably sure that when the russians started their counteroffensives, using mostly the 400000 odd US pattern trucks supplied to them, they did not suffer the same level of breakdown rates that plagued the German offensives.
