1935 Germany. Why horse drawn artillery and supply wagons?

[parsifal]

Mechanising, as opposed to motorizing isnt the issue. Mechanization was a nice to have luxury whereas motorization in modern warfare was a necessity.

Even today, few armies are fully mechanized. The Bundeswehr had it as an equipment objective, but never really achieved it.

During the war, the US and British armies came closest to getting their armies on wheels, moreover they largely negated the need for tracks by giving their vehicles good levels of off road mobility.

none of this is the issue. The issue is whether the Germans had the capacity or the potential to motorise their artillery parks. they never even came close to that.

You are wrong incidentally on the size of the British Army. Sure, if you count divisions you come up with a figure of just 32 divisions. However what is missed here is the size of the divisional slice. During the Normandy campaign, the divisions committed had an average slice of well over 50000 men per division. Compare that to an average of about 12000, or less for a german division, and the equivalent of those 32 divisions is about 120 german divisions. Moreover, 1/3 of the Indiann army was essentially british, though this was lost as the war progressed, and the indian Army was nearly 35 divisions by the end of 1942. The Australians were 14 divisions, the New Zealanders , 2 divisions, the South Africans a further 3 divs, the Canadians 10 divs. there were perhaps 6 colonial divs, which until the end of 1941 werre all more or less exclusively equipped with British, home produced or canadian equipment. it is simply untrue or misinformation to suggest the british had a smaller or minute p[robelm. It was slightly smaller than the german issue. But they made sure their pro duction bases were far more sound than the germans, and it showed in their outputs of vehicles, about 450000 IIRC.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
firstly I missed the logic of comparing the GB divisional slice in Normandy to the average size of the German div in Normandy at the beginning of June 44. I cannot remember the size of German divisional slice in Normandy, maybe 25. - 30.000 men.
secondly, yes, US and Commonwealth divs in ETO in 44-45 came closest of being fully motorized but even them were not fully motorized. And in armoured divs lorry borne infantry wasn't good enough that's why in US armored divs all infantry battalions were armoured, in other words were equipped with armoured personel carriers as were a couple of German PzDivs. And frankly British army was small when compared to German and Soviet armies with hundreds of divs. even if their "tails" were were smaller than those of Commonwealth divs.

 

[parsifal]

Hello Parsifal
firstly I missed the logic of comparing the GB divisional slice in Normandy to the average size of the German div in Normandy at the beginning of June 44. I cannot remember the size of German divisional slice in Normandy, maybe 25. - 30.000 men.
secondly, yes, US and Commonwealth divs in ETO in 44-45 came closest of being fully motorized but even them were not fully motorized. And in armoured divs lorry borne infantry wasn't good enough that's why in US armored divs all infantry battalions were armoured, in other words were equipped with armoured personel carriers as were a couple of German PzDivs. And frankly British army was small when compared to German and Soviet armies with hundreds of divs. even if their "tails" were were smaller than those of Commonwealth divs.

nope, not correct, because once again you are counting divisions and only considering the British army. thats akin to assesing the Roman army and not considering the auxiliaries who were not roman citizens but did most of the fighting for them. it is essentially a eurocentric way of looking at the british and the relationship they shared with their dominion partners. they need to be considered as a one unit, though this did fray at the edges in WWII from an operational pov. we arent considering operational issues, we are considering simply mnanpower and equipment levels and on that basis it is valid, indeed, esentiual, to consider the British and dominions as a singlke entity. you are counting divisions again and not looking at manpower levels. The British and its dominionsd fielded one of the largest ground armies of the entire war, easily eclipsing the American effort and very nearly matching the german manpower levels put into uniform. and most of these had some level of motorization, certainly much greater than achieved in the heer.

In September 1939, the british army had a total of 892,697 officers and men in both the full-time regular army and part-time Territorial Army. The regular army could muster 224,000 men, who were supported by a reserve of 173,700 men. In April 1939, an additional 34,500 men had been conscripted into the regular army and had only completed their basic training on the eve of war. The regular army was built around 30 cavalry or armoured regiments and 140 infantry battalions.The Territorial Army numbered 438,100, with a reserve of around 20,750 men. This force comprised 29 yeomanry regiments (eight of which were still to be fully mechanized), 12 tank and 232 infantry battalions.
Conscription was introduced in early 1939, with the Military Training Act of 27 April 1939. Initially, the Act required all men aged 20 and 21 to take six months' military training. On the outbreak of war on 3 September 1939, the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939 was rushed through Parliament. This extended the liability to military service to all fit men between 20–23. The age group was increased as the war continued, ultimately applying to all fit men between the ages of 18–41 as manpower shortages became acute.
By the end of 1939, the Army's strength had risen to 1.1 million men, by June 1940 it stood at 1.65 million men, and had further increased to 2.2 million men by the following June. Wehrmacht at this time was about 3.5 million men from memory. The size of the Army peaked in June 1945, at 3.5.
The contribution of the Indian Army is often overlooked, but is critical in understanding the significant role played by the british and commonwealth forces. Almost 3 million Indians and british served in the army.

The contribution of the Australians amounted to nearly 1 million men.

The Canadians contriburted nearly 2 million men.

The remainder of the commonwealth and dominions and empire contributed approximately 1 million men under arms, all of them more or less motorised. If you add up the numbers of troops nominally under British control, not just the British Army (and British industry was responsible initially for equipping all of them, along with home country production), you get a figure of around 10 million men. Concidering the peak strength of the Wehrmacht was about 11 million men, the manpower differences are not that great.

 

[Juha]

Its depends on the PoV, if we want to know what was possible to an European Great Power in early 40s IMHO its better to take an Eurocentric view than an imperial view. It is true that part of British war production went to support Commonwealth armies and Allies but on the other hand it received massive help from USA which IIRC overshadowed that what Germany got from their conquered neighbours, especially if we take into consideration the quality. And IIRC at least Canada relied heavily on its domestic production in its army's motor park, even Indian army could rely partly on domestic car and lorry production, I cannot recall how it was in ANZ armies.
Some 18+ million served actively in the WM 1939-45, of course the Heer was only one part of the WM but just after Stalingrad/Caucasus catastrophe, so just after very heavy losses, especially in the Heer and before the fully mobilization, there were 4,9 million men in the Heer incl. Ersatzheer out of 8 million men in the VM. And one must to remember that the vast majority of the German AA troops (of which there were many) belonged to the LW when in the British system the vast majority of the AA troops belonged to the Army. Clearly the full motorization was out of question because of lack of industrial resources and because there would not have been enough POL for such a vast motor park. Of course germens could have done better by fully mobilizing earlier, better allocating resources, earlier and more thorough standardization and more fully utilizing the production facilities in the conquered countries. But as I wrote earlier, conscript mass armies didn't operate in a vacuum but were products of their societies. That a country which still had a large agricultural sector based on horse power produced a mass army which in great extend relied on horses wasn't very surprising.

 

[tyrodtom]

The Wehrmacht started WW2 with approximately 1/2 million horses, and ended the war with 1.2 million.

Those numbers by themselves should explain why the German army bought horses at the beginning of WW2, they had no means of building enough trucks, nor the fuel to keep them running, and the situation got worse as the war continued.

Quoting what they were paying for generic horses is meaningless without including what kind of horses they were. Work horses, cavalry horses, and the breed stock for each are going to have radically different prices.
And then there the horses the higher ranking officers love to ride in the parades, though I would think those would be private purchases.

With sound breeding stock, and a barn, in effect you have a horse factory.

 

[parsifal]

Its depends on the PoV, if we want to know what was possible to an European Great Power in early 40s IMHO its better to take an Eurocentric view than an imperial view. It is true that part of British war production went to support Commonwealth armies and Allies but on the other hand it received massive help from USA which IIRC overshadowed that what Germany got from their conquered neighbours

Under lend Lease the commonwealth nations received a total of 280000 trucks of US manufacture, but under the reverse lend lease arrangements, almost 100000 vehicles of Commonwealth manufacture, were supplied to US forces. Overwhelmingly these vehiocles were from Canadian sources, which produced over a million vehicles during the war, many of which were ordered by the US army. Net benefit therefore to the Commonwealth was therefore to the tune of 180000 vehicles.

Germany received or captured about 150000 vehicles from a number of non-german. The French supplied nearly 60000 trucks from new and the Dutch Belgians and italians all provided some level of motor vehicles from their production. Vast quantities of captured vehicles were pressed into service for the wehrmacht during the war. This was a major source of supply for the embattled german Army and probably what allowed it to continue its offensive after 1941. 7000 vehicles from italian sources were supplied to Rommel in North Africa. Another source of supply for the wehrmacht were the increasingly draconian comb outs of their civilian stocks of MT. This hurt their economy, but it at least kept the heer moving

The difference between what the british received from Lend Lease and what the germans acquired from their various foreign sources was about 30000 units difference. thats virtually nothing to talk about.

, especially if we take into consideration the quality. And IIRC at least Canada relied heavily on its domestic production in its army's motor park, even Indian army could rely partly on domestic car and lorry production, I cannot recall how it was in ANZ armies.

Unquestionably some of the captured equipment and the foreign manufactured items were too lightly built to withstand the rigours of military service. more imporatnly, the multiplicity of types kept serviceability rates fairly low for the Germans.

Canada was a major exporter of vehicles, producing about 1 million trucks during the war. India and the Eastern Bloc (including Australia) were very minor, about 40000 truck produced, mostly from prefabricated components

Some 18+ million served actively in the WM 1939-45, of course the Heer was only one part of the WM but just after Stalingrad/Caucasus catastrophe, so just after very heavy losses, especially in the Heer and before the fully mobilization, there were 4,9 million men in the Heer incl. Ersatzheer out of 8 million men in the VM. And one must to remember that the vast majority of the German AA troops (of which there were many) belonged to the LW when in the British system the vast majority of the AA troops belonged to the Army.

This is playing with the figures. I suspect that you are relying on a source that "double counts" men wounded, discharged, and then reassigned or enlisted as the war progressed. The most authoritative source for German manpower levels is Victor Madejs The Gerrman Replacement Army 1939-45. in the preface to the book it states "this book details the full order of battle of the german Army in WWII. It relies on the details of two US intelligenmce reports produced at the end of the war, plus the definitive Wehrmacht German Army Order of Battle. i consider thisa book to be the best single volume English language study into German mobilzation. German armed forces mobilzation was nowhere near what you are claimimg as their manning levels. Table I of the book addresses the cumulative manpower inductions for the German armed forces, and also includes a breakdown in manning levels by service branch.

Manning levels, including those lost released, killed or discharged were as follows (in millions)

12/39: 4.2
6/40 6.2
6/41 7.9
6/42 9.4
6/43 11.2
6/44 12.4
4/45 13.7

However these figures are in no way comparable to the figures I posted for the British Army, because these are a cululative total for all services, whereas i only posted peak manning levels for the British Army at elected dates. if we want to compare apples to apples, we have to also look at the peak manning levels for the heer at roughly the same dates. Fortunately Madej has those figures as well, and they show the following

For the heer +SS

12/39: 2.7
6/40 3.8
6/41 3.9
6/42 4.1
6/43 4.3
6/44 4.5
4/45 3.7

In comparsion to the British Army, the German army peaked at manning levels much earlier, but was never greatly larger than the British Army + the dominions. i dont have the full manning levels of all the dominions at every point in the war, but for the Australians for example, they peaked in early 1943 at 890000. the Indian army peaked in 1944, I expect the canadians probably peaked in early 1944. but there really isnt that much difference in the manning levels of the Germans on one hand, and the manning levels of Britain and her dominions on the other.

Clearly the full motorization was out of question because of lack of industrial resources and because there would not have been enough POL for such a vast motor park. Of course germens could have done better by fully mobilizing earlier, better allocating resources, earlier and more thorough standardization and more fully utilizing the production facilities in the conquered countries. But as I wrote earlier, conscript mass armies didn't operate in a vacuum but were products of their societies. That a country which still had a large agricultural sector based on horse power produced a mass army which in great extend relied on horses wasn't very surprising.

I pretty much concur with your conclusions and observations here, but I question that Germany was primarily an agrarian society. It was the most industrialised country except the US, and had the highest standard of education of any nation in Europe. it was not nearly as "agrarian" as the dominion nations, including Canada, and yet these nations out motorised their armies by a country mile. I have serious doubts that being and "agraian nation had much to do with it at all, though i concede thats just opinion. I think it simply came down to an issue of availability, of both POLs and vehicles. The German economy was never a strong vehcile manufacturing nation, and this is something you just cant pull oput of your back pocket with the sanp of fingers and the wave of the wand.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
thanks for the vehicle figures.

...This is playing with the figures. I suspect that you are relying on a source that "double counts" men wounded, discharged, and then reassigned or enlisted as the war progressed. The most authoritative source for German manpower levels is Victor Madejs The Gerrman Replacement Army 1939-45. in the preface to the book it states "this book details the full order of battle of the german Army in WWII. It relies on the details of two US intelligenmce reports produced at the end of the war, plus the definitive Wehrmacht German Army Order of Battle. i consider thisa book to be the best single volume English language study into German mobilzation. German armed forces mobilzation was nowhere near what you are claimimg as their manning levels. Table I of the book addresses the cumulative manpower inductions for the German armed forces, and also includes a breakdown in manning levels by service branch.

Manning levels, including those lost released, killed or discharged were as follows (in millions)

12/39: 4.2
6/40 6.2
6/41 7.9
6/42 9.4
6/43 11.2
6/44 12.4
4/45 13.7

However these figures are in no way comparable to the figures I posted for the British Army, because these are a cululative total for all services, whereas i only posted peak manning levels for the British Army at elected dates. if we want to compare apples to apples, we have to also look at the peak manning levels for the heer at roughly the same dates. Fortunately Madej has those figures as well, and they show the following

For the heer +SS

12/39: 2.7
6/40 3.8
6/41 3.9
6/42 4.1
6/43 4.3
6/44 4.5
4/45 3.7

In comparsion to the British Army, the German army peaked at manning levels much earlier, but was never greatly larger than the British Army + the dominions. i dont have the full manning levels of all the dominions at every point in the war, but for the Australians for example, they peaked in early 1943 at 890000. the Indian army peaked in 1944, I expect the canadians probably peaked in early 1944. but there really isnt that much difference in the manning levels of the Germans on one hand, and the manning levels of Britain and her dominions on the other.

The 18+ million is from German Wiki and is cumulative but the early 43 situation is from the official history Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg vol 8 (2007) and so authoritative.

I pretty much concur with your conclusions and observations here, but I question that Germany was primarily an agrarian society. It was the most industrialised country except the US, and had the highest standard of education of any nation in Europe. it was not nearly as "agrarian" as the dominion nations, including Canada, and yet these nations out motorised their armies by a country mile. I have serious doubts that being and "agraian nation had much to do with it at all, though i concede thats just opinion. I think it simply came down to an issue of availability, of both POLs and vehicles. The German economy was never a strong vehcile manufacturing nation, and this is something you just cant pull oput of your back pocket with the sanp of fingers and the wave of the wand.

I didn't claim that Germany was a primarily agrarian nation in 1939 simply noted the fact that substantially larger part of its population earned living in agriculture than in GB at that time and that its agriculture was largely still not mechanized at that time.

 

[mikewint]

I believe that the answer has already been given by Dave: Germany lacked natural oil resources and was thus forced to rely heavily on synthetic oil and gasoline which were expensive and always in short supply. As a consequence only roughly 20% of the Wehrmacht was made up of mobile Panzer and mechanized divisions.
Second, the roads and mud tracks were not friendly to mechanized forces.
Third, infrastructure (horse/animal) At the beginning of WWII Germany had well over 500,000 military horses thus all of the necessary infrastructure for their care, feeding, handling, usage, etc. were already in place. The average soldier was also well familiar with the horse and its care so no special technical training was required.
Fourth, the horse appeared to be a cheap reliable source of transportation that could "fuel" itself on free grass via grazing. A dead truck was scrap but a dead horse was food.
Fifth, horses lost for whatever reason could be replaced "in the field" as horses were used on farms by both France and Russia. German stud farms in Prussia were not bombing targets and thus continued to supply horses while German industry was severely crippled by bombing. The result is that the Wehrmacht increased its horse population throughout the war averaging over one million.
Now the horse reality was quite different and the Wehrmacht's reliance on horses was a crippling one. As has already been pointed out, the cost of feeding, grooming, and caring for horses is/was staggering. Horses required grain on a daily basis and their ability to work/survive rapidly deteriorated if fed only grass. Fodder made up a major part of supply trains. "Healthy as a horse" is an oxymoron. Even under moderate conditions horses rapidly became unfit after a week or two and replacements needed time to learn to work with the older horses. Horses could haul equipment a maximum of 20 miles (18-19km) per day at best whereas trucks could do 20 times that distance.
At Stalingrad the Wehrmacht, unable to feed their horses and sent them to the rear. Thus when the 6th Army was enveloped they were cut-off from their horses and were unable to move heavy equipment. In the Demyansk Pocket feeding the 20,000 trapped horses required airlifting fodder reducing space for other supplies.

 

[davebender]

Mechanising the artillery arm effectively means you are going 80% of the way to motorising the army

,

1930s German infantry division required 4,000 to 6,000 horses. Providing each division with 100 tractors for towing artillery and transporting ammunition would replace only 600 of those horses.

 

[mikewint]

Dur the 1930s as Germany began its massive build-up certain facts remained: Germany did not have a large number of people familiar with or know how to drive a car or truck (The United States had 1:5 ratio of cars to people, while the ratio in Germany was 1:89, the poorest ratio of Western Europe except for Italy). Extensive programs were put in place to train drivers during this period but the fact remained, Germany did not have a population conducive to the creation of a large motorised or mechanised force. This was further exacerbated by the fact that the German industry was incapable of providing the vehicles and fuel requisite to the creation of a modern, fully motorised force. Given these circumstances, horses had to be used for transportation.
The US Army on the other hand, with large quantities of oil and its massive manufacturing base went the motorized route with not a single horse in Europe. The Pacific was a different story and remote units still used the horse

 

[Juha]

Re Messages # 28 30; Very well put, Mike.
Even 20% was too high percentage for Pz and Mechanized divs later in the war on 1 July 43 there were 23 Pz and 21½ PzGr Divs in German armed forces out of the total of 276 divs and 1 June 44 31 Pz and 16½ PzGr Divs out of the total of 285.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I am pretty sure I remember reading the US 10th Mountain Division used horses and mules in Northern Italy.

 

[parsifal]

,

1930s German infantry division required 4,000 to 6,000 horses. Providing each division with 100 tractors for towing artillery and transporting ammunition would replace only 600 of those horses.

Except then you are left worse off, because your logisitic tail is still horse drawn and completely unable to keep up and completely inadequate for most resupply operations.

The French tried a similar experiement to this shortcut and with their DLCs and these formations proved to be unworkable and innefficient.

The horses are there to haul supplies, and the artillery arm genenerally accounts for about 80% of supply requirements in even periods of light engagement

 

[Juha]

I am pretty sure I remember reading the US 10th Mountain Division used horses and mules in Northern Italy.

Not sure on horses but mules yes.

 

[davebender]

Horse fodder required more BEF tonnage then any other supply category during WWI. I doubt things had changed much with WWII era horse transport.

German Army horses required an average of 9kg of fodder per day whether they do any work or not. Artillery tractors require fuel only when operated. Infantry division artillery is stationary most of the time so fuel requirement for 100 artillery tractors shouldn't amount to much.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Not sure on horses but mules yes.

Not the original source I remember reading, but it does show the data.
Office of Medical History

The horses and mules were acquired locally and the chart below (Average Mean Strength) excludes around 10k that were captured and used [from above link].

One advantage horses and mules have, they are awesome 4x4 vehicles.

 

[parsifal]

Horse fodder required more BEF tonnage then any other supply category during WWI. I doubt things had changed much with WWII era horse transport.

German Army horses required an average of 9kg of fodder per day whether they do any work or not. Artillery tractors require fuel only when operated. Infantry division artillery is stationary most of the time so fuel requirement for 100 artillery tractors shouldn't amount to much.

I dont disagree that horse drawn transport had inherent inefficiencies, but you are wrong about the peak supply demands for a division. it was ammunition always that was the limiting factor and the dominant supply demand. Ive got the average supply requirements of the german Infantry Division 1941 and I think your fodder demands are about right, but placing it as the main supply demand is fundamentally wrong.

providing transport just for the artillery component of the division does not solve this problem and in fact makes things worse. Being able to move around the teeth component of the division, in this case its artillery component, was the least important aspect of motorization. If you can move your weapons around efficiently, but not your supply, you are at minimum not deriving maximum benefit from the MT, and probably are worse off than if you dont motorize the artillery park. The tendency for commanders, once the heat of battle starts, is to move these assets around quickly, which will strain the supply train and tend to increase ammunition demands for longer. There will be longer periods when the division is at a disadvantage because of its logistics difficulties.

Historically the germans motorised some of its artillery for the Infantry, but overwhelmingly the 800 or so trucks attached to an early wave division were allocated to the supply train. if any elements of the division were motorised, it was firstly the command elements, followed by the ATG components followed by the AAA components of the division. If the division was moving, it might use its MT assets to speed up the movement of other elements, but usually as the division was advancing the MT was busy stockpiling supplies in forward areas for easier access once the division became engaged. During normal or heavy periods of engagements, the job of MT elements was universally to keep the guns supplied. 100 additional ammunition tracors will make no difference to that basic situation, for a divisinal sized formation. During periods of heavy engagement, typically for the artillary battalions attached, the maximum ammunition consumption was between 500 and 1000 tons per hour, but typically about 150 tons per hour. The fodder demands of the division, about 140 tons per day (or week, im operating from memory) are of no significant relevance to the problem. You need rapid ammunition lift capacity for your guns, not mobility, and you dont need to worry about the fodder issue. You need to invest a minimum of an additional 2-3000 additional MT per Div to make any significant difference to the overall hitting power and flexibility of the Divisional guns , and that mostly means overhauling its logistics systems from horse dependance to truck borne supply.

 

[DonL]

I have here some problems with the calculation and your number of tons per hour posted.

A normal german Infantry Artillerie-Regiment had 3 light Abteilungen with 12 guns each (10,5cm) and one heavy Abteilung with 12 guns (15cm).
In summary 48 guns per Artillerie-Regiment, 3/4 10,5cm and 1/4 15cm.

The average shell for the 10,5cm was 15kg and for the 15cm 43,5kg.

During periods of heavy engagement, typically for the artillary battalions attached, the maximum ammunition consumption was between 500 and 1000 tons per hour, but typically about 150 tons per hour.

At 1000 tons per hour every gun would have to shoot around 1000 shells per hour. (1000 x 15kg = 15 tons x 36 = 540 tons plus 1000 x 43,5kg = 43,5 tons x 12 = 522 tons.) In summary 48000 shells in one hour?
At 500 tons it would be around 500 shells for each gun per hour. Still 24000 shells in one hour.I haven't read of any such engagements.

The 150 tons per hour is to me a realistic calculation for engagements which means 166 shells for each 10,5cm gun and 115 shells for each 15cm gun per hour.

 

[GrauGeist]

Artillery tractors require fuel only when operated.

They needed fuel to operate, they also required oil for the differentials/gearboxes. They needed constant lubrication for bearings (especially the track idlers) and joints, etc.
They required mechanical maintenance per so many hours of operation, transmissions, clutches, engines. They needed new radiators when they got punctured, they needed hoses, fuel lines, wiring repair and so on...

And more often than not, they needed a team of horses to help them get unstuck

 

[mikewint]

And at times horses to unstuck the horses