1935 Germany. Why horse drawn artillery and supply wagons?

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DonL ,I think those weights you weights you give for the 10.5 cm and 15 cm are just for the projectile, the complete round weight would be about 50% higher.

I think when someone says they shot 210 tons of shells, they're talking about the weight of munitions they went thru, not how much they actually put in the air.
 
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There is no doubt that trucks are better than horses IF

You can actually build the number of trucks needed.

You can supply the trucks with fuel.

You can maintain the trucks.

You can 'crew' the trucks.

The advantages of trucks had been figured out by more than a few armies before WW I. British for one paid a 'subsidy' to commercial operators to use suitable trucks to be 'mobilized" in event of war. Of course if you mobilize too many commercial trucks your domestic transportation system craps out.

Military men had figured out the fodder problem back in Napoleons time (if not before) you can only advance so far before the horses are eating the entire payload of the wagons.

Germany's problem with motorization were many.

#1 was they simply didn't have the factories to produce the needed vehicles.

This page on Wiki is fairly illuminating as far as the US goes.

U.S. Automobile Production Figures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In 1937 Plymouth was the #3 car maker in the United States and built in one year 95% of the total number of military trucks produced by ALL of the Axis nations for the entire war. Granted the Plymouths were NOT military trucks but it gives perspective.

You can wave magic wands about and talk about funding or money spent on the XXX program but it takes several years to build and equip factories and train workers. You can't build trucks very well in shipyards. Each nation only had machine tool industries of certain sizes and it was the machine tool industry that limited the number and types of factories that could be built. You can put up all the empty buildings you want ( subject to structural steel and concrete limits) but you need machinery to put in them.
Yes you can expand the machine tool and factory equipment industry but now we are talking about a 2 or 3 generation factory building scheme. Lathe company "A" only delivers 75% of it's production to truck company "D" while 25% of it's production goes to it's own new expansion plant (Plant "B") which will start delivering machine tools to truck plant "G" in two years time? and so on.

Horse traction was also much more complicated than 6 horses per gun team or wagon. 6 horses was about the minimum pre-war for a team. 8 horses were preferred for even medium artillery and the bigger weapons went for more horses or broke the the gun into two loads even with 8 or 12 horse teams.
You then had at least 3 categories of horses. Calvary horses were almost useless for load towing. The big draft horses were actually not able to stand up to bad weather as well as some smaller breeds.

A lot of European countries between the wars were a strange mix of industry and agriculture to modern eyes. There were very heavily industrialized regions and some regions with little industry. In the heavy industrialized areas the vast majority of workers either walked/biked to work or used street cars/trams/buses. Factory workers and their families rarely had cars. The rural/agricultural areas also rarely had money for cars/trucks. The plow horses often pulled the wagon to market.

There were farm trucks and tractors but they were much less common than they would be even in the 1950s/60s.

The Germans had also learned a lesson in WW I when they mobilized TOO MANY horses form the agricultural sector and helped cause the food shortages of WW I on the home front.
 
regarding my post 37, ive misquoted the article I was referring to. sorry folks.

Im referring to an article co-written by Alo nofi, Jim Dunnigan and Richard berg back in 1982 on supply issues. it states that a german Infantry Division 1943 pattern (12000 men, 4000 horses and 600 trucks) carried a basic 5 day supply load which weighed 1902 tons. this was broken down to fuel 207 tons 10.4%, food 108 tons 5.2%, fodder 248 tons 14.9% and ammunition 1339 tons or 69.5% of the basic load out.

The food and fodder elements never really changed, whatever the overall status of the division. Fuel and POLs could fluctuate greatly. The standard 5 day load out was on the basis the division was not moving. If it started to move it was really only carrying a single load out of fuel, that is, a one day supply. thats on the basis of a 30 kilometre rate of advance per day. The average consumption of fuels for the divisions vehicles when moving or engaged, was about 100 tons per day, or 700 tons per week.

Ammunition expeditures are highly variable, but there are at least some theoretical planning figures given for different states of activity. For defensive operations or small scale probing attacks, the standard 2as 2-300 tons per day of ammunition. For standfard assaults the figures rose to 420 tons per day, whilst in heavy combat the consumption rate for the division was based on 502 tons per day. These are just for the artillery components, not small arms or the like.

nofi states 'artillery was the chief source of firepower for the division, but in order to be effective, consumed enormous amounts of ammunition. For example, a 3 minute barrage by a 105mm bn (12 guns) would consume 9.4 tons. At the higher level, the infantry artillery (36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers would expend 45 tons per hour while covering a deployment, 131 tons per hour for a prepratory fire against an enemy position, 92 tons for a frontal assault, Spoiling fire was planned at the rate of 97 tons per hour. these figures are 'planning' expenditure rates. The point is that by far the chief logistics iss for the division was artillery ammunition".
 
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didnt everyone have horses and cattle, I would have thought the military just took them with some compensation when they were needed?
 
yes, but what is at issue is whether germany has the capacity to motorize the artillery components of its divisions.

There are some issues to consider

How many vehicles needed to motorise (and keep supplied) the artillery. it has been suggested only 100 vehicles w per division are needed. I disagree with that because 100 vehicles does not take into account the elevated supply requirements of a motorised artillery abt. a more realistic estimate to motorise and keep supplied the artillery component of each division is 2-3000 vehicles

What would be required production wise within german industry. it has been suggested that it would simply be a matter of not spending the money on horses and this could then be spent on vehicles. There are enormous problems with this assumption. historically germany never came close to being able to fully motorise its Infantry formations. It took years to rationalise the German motor vehicle industry, and even then it was far from complete. Germany simply lacked the capacity to do what is suggested

It has been suggested that germany was a nation of goat herders incapable of driving trucks. I completely reject that as a valid reason for not motorising its army. Germany was a highly urbanised, highly educated nation that showed in spades during the wqar that it couold motorise and mechanise. What it lacked was the industrial and production capability to achieve that across the board
 
Technically, speaking, the United States had a far larger agricultural area than Germany (and several other nations combined) at the time, so the assumption that since there were open fields and grazing cattle dictating a horse-drawn German military doesn't fly...
 
yes, but what is at issue is whether germany has the capacity to motorize the artillery components of its divisions.

There are some issues to consider

How many vehicles needed to motorise (and keep supplied) the artillery. it has been suggested only 100 vehicles w per division are needed. I disagree with that because 100 vehicles does not take into account the elevated supply requirements of a motorised artillery abt. a more realistic estimate to motorise and keep supplied the artillery component of each division is 2-3000 vehicles

What would be required production wise within german industry. it has been suggested that it would simply be a matter of not spending the money on horses and this could then be spent on vehicles. There are enormous problems with this assumption. historically germany never came close to being able to fully motorise its Infantry formations. It took years to rationalise the German motor vehicle industry, and even then it was far from complete. Germany simply lacked the capacity to do what is suggested

It has been suggested that germany was a nation of goat herders incapable of driving trucks. I completely reject that as a valid reason for not motorising its army. Germany was a highly urbanised, highly educated nation that showed in spades during the wqar that it couold motorise and mechanise. What it lacked was the industrial and production capability to achieve that across the board

I don't disagree, but to my opinion the supply is the duty of the trucks, Maultier and RSO and not of the Sd Kfz 6-11, which were the prime mover of the artillery.
And I think the half trucks Sd Kfz 6-11 and Sd Kfz 250/251 of the german army were successful and advanced and roughly 45750 Sd Kfz 6-11 were produced. So the main problem was not to have enough prime mover for the artillery, but the trucks, Maultier and RSO for the supply.

I think the production capacity of trucks are the shadow of the german automotive industry and the half trucks are the light.
 
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Huh? :)

The US had by far the largest motor vehicle industry of the time and by far the highest per capita number of motor vehicles.

for instance from wiki : "There were no specific plants for the Model B. It rolled side by side with the V-8 off the line. In 1932, Ford Motor Company had 32 plants in the USA, one in Canada, seven in Europe (one for Fordson tractor production only), four in Central and South America, and one in Turkey and Japan."

Of the 7 plants in Europe only one was in Germany.

Not all factories were the same size (production capability) and in some of the European counties it may have been a desire to get around import duties or import restrictions as much as a real need for increased production. Did Ford really need factories in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France and England in addition to Germany?

Total acres plowed/tilled by animal traction is rather irrelevant compared to percentage of acres plowed/tilled or percentage of farmers with motor vehicles. If you draft 100 farm boys from the US in 1939 how many of then will have worked with tractors, trucks or cars vs drafting 100 German farm boys in 1939?
The Germans were trying and as part of the Hitler Youth training programs there were Hitler Youth motorized units which expanded from 3,000 members in 1933 to 102,000 members in 1938. Typical instruction for such members included 80 hours of driving time and 105 hours of mechanical training. After this the NSSK took over training. Between 1933 and 1939 the NSSK trained 187,000 drivers for the Army.

A German Army infantry division in 1939 might have around 940 motor vehicles, 450-530 motorcycles and over 5,000 horses. Many of the horses were pulling carts/light wagons that required only one or two horses. These figures are for divisions that were involved in the Attack on Poland. 2nd class divisions, garrison or fortification divisions would have lower ( in some cases much lower) motor vehicle counts.
 
Technically, speaking, the United States had a far larger agricultural area than Germany (and several other nations combined) at the time, so the assumption that since there were open fields and grazing cattle dictating a horse-drawn German military doesn't fly...

As SR6 already wrote, it didn't matter how large the agricultural area was but how large slice of the population worked on farms and whether they worked they with tractors or with horses. Finland had rather small agricultural area in 39 but was very agrarian society with very low mechanication state in the farms, most of which were very small and our artillery, even medium artillery, depended mostly on drafted work horses during the wars.
 
Hello Parsifal
in your message #45, did you mean 9120 men or what was the exact manpower of the referred WH div?

And did nofi use the term "infantry artillery" when talking on the normal field artillery? German divs had besides the normal field artillery regiment also heavy and light infantry guns (150mm and 75mm) in its infantry regiments' heavy weapons coys. Later at least partly replaced by heavy mortars (120mm)
 
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Here is a reference in german language to the equipment and men power of the not motorized german Infantry divisions.

Lexikon der Wehrmacht - Infanterie-Divisionen

If we look at the first wave which included the active soldiers with only a smal part of reservists, we can see that the german Inf Div.
had.

Lexikon der Wehrmacht

around 17734 men
Horses 4842
Horse drawn vehicles Fahrzeuge 919
PKW/cars 394
Trucks and artillery first mover (Sd. Kfz) 615
Armoured vehicles 3
Motorbikes 527

The rate of horse drawn vehicles and motorized vehicles was equal at the second and four wave Divisions, only the twenty divisions of the third wave divisions, which were Landwehr divisons and planed to operate at the occupied countries France; Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway etc. had a significant drop at the rate of motorized vehicles.

The weak point at all not motorized german Infantry divisions was

Supply sevices with

Staff divisionsn supply operator with
8 truck- platoons each (30 t)
truck-platoon for operating fluids (25 cbm)
repair shop company (mot)
supply company (mot)

The 8 truck platoons of the initial equipment couldn't to no time be reequiped the whole war and were in major replaced by horse drawn vehicles.
 
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Here is a diagram for a 4 gun battery pre war;

German-Horse-org.jpg


It is way more than just 24 horses to pull the guns. It is a total of 153 horses just at the battery level.

Add in the vehicles (wagons) at upper echelon level/s and the number of vehicles, horses, and men needed for an artillery regiment and supply train are staggering. Motor vehicles would have been a great benefit IF they could have been supplied.

The Germans simply didn't have a motor vehicle industry large enough to supply their needs. The wastage of vehicles in military service (even without combat losses) is much, much higher than normal commercial use. Lets also remember than many vehicles of the 1930s and early 40s had much, much, shorter service lives than modern vehicles. The Flat head Ford V-8 engine was commonly overhauled ( rebuilt, including re-boring and new bearings) around 20-30,000 miles in civilian use. Not dessert or Russian steppe conditions.
 
@ shortaround6, I read in your diagram 1.1.1945, so do you realy think this was the reality of the first equipment at the war beginning 1939/1940?
 
Do you have any source about a normal US Infantry Division like my posted german link,

with men strenghts, how many weapons, which weapons, trucks, artillery first mover etc.?

Weapons of a not motorized german Infantry Division:

Weapons:
roundabout 3700 pistols
roundabout 13 000 rifles
312 submachine guns
90 bazookas
435 light machine guns
110 heavy machine guns
12 AA 2 cm
84 light motars (5 cm)
54 heavy motars (8,1 cm)
75 ATG 3,7 cm
20 light infantry guns 7,5 cm
6 heavy Infantry guns 15 cm
36 light howitzer 10,5 cm
12 heavy howitzer 15 cm
9 flame thrower
3 armored scout cars
 
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