1937-41: build your VVS

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

They really need both.
Click to expand...

They will get both, and then some. The equivalent of He-111 is a dead meat on the table, in case Soviets don't field escort fighters, and they are unlikely to get those. So the AM-35A/38 engined bomber will enter the production instead. The role of a 'compact twin' will be assumed by Pe-2, as historically. We will build far less Il-2s, instead the Pe-2 with M-88 will be produced. The DB-4 will not be continued as Il-4. Production of SB will be somewhat reduced.
 
Production of the SB pretty much ended in 1940 or early 1941 which was a bit late.

The DB-3/IL-4 made a good night bomber and it could carry 2000-2700 kg of bombs over short (but longer than PE-2 distances) distances.

The PE-2 bomb load was rather restricted. It could carry 4 100kg bombs in the bomb bay plus a single 100kg bomb in a bomb bay in the rear of each engine nacelle. It could carry four 250kg bombs or two 500 kg bombs externally and the total bomb load on the early planes was 1000 kg. (external racks full means no internal bombs.) The were schemes for using 'cassettes' of small bombs in the internal bays but these had problems with dispersion and sometimes hit the aircraft upon release and were either not often used or took a while to sort out.

There were a number of schemes to improve the bomb load of the PE-2 but nothing came into service until 1944 or 1945. There was not enough space between the wing spars and the fuselage bottom for bigger than 100kg bombs. At least one prototype moved the wing in relation to the fuselage to create more room but I don't believe the Russians ever tried bulging the bomb bay doors? The plane with the moved wing could hold a pair of 250kg bombs or a single 500kg bomb inside.

If you want to drop tons of bombs on a single target you need a LOT of PE-2s.

You are proposing a AM-35A/38 powered TU-2 basically except using AM-35A engines you have a lot less take-off power. Switching to the AM-38 gets more of the take-off power back but kills any HIGH altitude (being over 10,000ft?) performance. This may affect range, trying to fly fast at low altitude can really suck fuel.
 
Shortround6 said:
...
The DB-3/IL-4 made a good night bomber and it could carry 2000-2700 kg of bombs over short (but longer than PE-2 distances) distances.
Click to expand...

Damning with a feint praise? Most of the good bombers were also good night bombers, but it took time, resources and effort for the night bombers to actually hit something other than meadow or a hill. Relegation of the DB-3 into night bomber role points us at at least two things: Soviets were unable to provide a meaningful escort for daylight duties, and DB-3 was unable to survive during daylight on it's own. Similar thing as for RAF's Wellingtons and Hampdens, or for LW's He-111s.


The Pe-2, when looking at carrying capabilities, could not be compared with 'proper' bombers. Where it was better than most of those is speed. Meaning that out of 20 dispatched A/C maybe 15 will return in case they encounter LW, against maybe 10 of DB-4 in same situation. They will also more likely hit the target, since were dive bombers.


The Pe-2 started out as fighter, with low set wing. Since this is 'our VVS', we can start out the Pe-2 as a high wing aircraft, looking like V-12 engined A-20

If you want to drop tons of bombs on a single target you need a LOT of PE-2s.
Click to expand...

A good reason to reduce the number of Il-2 built? BTW, the Pe-2 will likely have more bombs hit home than a non-dive bomber, making up a lot for lower bomb load.


The pursuing fighters would also suck fuel faster at low level The take off power will be down, from 1450 to 1350 (AM-37 vs. 35A), but we will not increase armament nor crew vs. the 'aircraft 100', so the payload can remain the same (as it was the case for the heavier 100U).
The AM-38s on board mean greater payload, and we will try to keep them under 3 km.
 
Problem with all Blitzkrieg-type campaigns is that they are dependent upon a huge logistical support, over an increasingly longer supply train. Tanks trucks need fuel to keep themselves moving, just about everybody needs ammo, food, medical supplies. The particular problem for Germans is that they did not have any sort of surplus resources to boot with, so every truck laden with supply will hurt them more than eg. Soviets or Anglo-Americans in 1943-45. A tank or artillery unit without fuel and ammo is worth nothing when one is attacking. Infantry that need to leave their trucks, because of fuel shortage, is worth what? Someone need to haul better clothing to the units from October 1941 on. If the Soviets have enough dive bombers (like Pe-2 or Tu-2, or even the Ar-2), they can reliably kill a bridge, or wreck a supply column back in the area where the Germans might have sense of false security. For such undertakings, one need fast bombers (so they can survive above enemy held terrain) with good range bomb load, and that the Il-2 was not. Il-2 was also hard pressed to kill tanks with cannon fire - 20 mm won't cut it, the 23mm were marginally effective vs. up-armored Pz-III and IV, the 37mm was trowing off pilots aim. The bigger the cannons, the less of bombs were carried. Until improved engines started being installed (late 1942/early 1943), the rear gunner was out of the question.

You might note that I have not suggested cancellation of the Il-2. Instead of 35-40000 pcs, it will be more likely circa 15000. SOme of it's task will assume the Pe-2 with radial engines. Should make a far better platform for AT cannons, while having a greater payload, speed and rear gunner from day one.
 
The Soviets at the outbreak of the war employed essentially western methods, tactics and organizations and were comprehensively defeated in the air whilst attempting to use methods that were completely unsuited to the capabilities of their equipment and personnel. Our ways of thinking, therefore frequaently do not understand what the Soviets needed to get out of their air forces and exactly how thay defeated a foe that at the beginning outnumbered them (at the front), and throughout the the war employed superior aircraft, better pilots, and possessed a tactical doctrine that on the face of it was superior to that used by the Soviets. like many things about the Russians however, Russian methodology, whilst to us crude and clumsy, is in fact very subtle and clever in how it gets the very best out of what it is.

Traditional theories for the application of air power, is that your fighters gain area wide air superiority so that your bombers can operate with tolerable, or minimal losses. Training wise, you aim to maximise the proficiency of your aircrew and spend a lot of time and resources training your forces to maximise proficiency. Each aircrew in that scenario was an invaluable asset, but equally, each loss was a major blow to your force capability and generally difficult to replace, unless you have unlimited resources like the RAF or USAAC. The VVS initially was very short of resources....it fought the Battle of Moscow with about 400 aircraft, against more than 1500 German aircraft. It is often quoted as having 20000 a/c on strength at the outbreak of the war. In fact it was closer to 10000, and of these barely 2000 were airworthy. The remainder were mostly obsolete, and not flyable. Within a few weeks of the initial attack, more than half the flying VVS had been destroyed.

Airframe wise, western air forces and the LW emphasise technical excellence....they will expend extraordinary amounts of gold and time to seek the tiniest and most irrelevant advantages in air technologies. The Germans were particularly bad at falling for this type chicanery, they would constantly disrupt the flow of production, to introduce some change to a design, or introduce a new design, that in the end, made not a jot of difference, or at best, very little difference, and certainly did not justify the loss of months and months of lesser types' production. As a generalization, after the initial types had been developed , from the middle of the war on, the Soviets generally accepted lesser types and fewer changes, to maintain numbers.

The most important person in the Soviet Air Force of the wartime era, was Air Marshal Novikov. Alexander Novikov was named Commander of the Soviet Army Air Force on 11 April 1942 and concurrently promoted to Lieutenant-General. With the new commander came a new senior staff. The structure and tactics of the air force were also changed by what were known as the "Novikov Reforms". There were so many vital changes made, it is hard to prioritise them, and they can safely be said to be essential to winning the entire war. He is a man virtually ignored in the west, and yet he did more to win the war, than any other individual in the western alliance. He realized that the Soviets in their essentially western application of air power were losing the air war, and from that the war as a whole. He realized that the limits on training and equipment, and the very limited industrial base enjoyed by the Soviets meant they had to abandon the traditional theories on air power. No longer was it a priority to win the fighters war, no longer was the air battle seen as anything other than adjunct to the ground battle. Whilst good aircrew were a prized and valubale asset, Novikov realized (and indeeed,, in 1942 was forced to do it anyway) that crew training was a luxury the VVS could not afford. Crew training was cut to the absolute minimum, for a long time, simly to get the numbers up. Basic aircrew training went down to less than 50 hours, and combat training down to about 20 hours, untill well after Kursk. as a result, losses in aircrew were never a problem after Novikov made the change. Technoloogy wise , once a design found a point of profitable return, the Soviets closed the design and churned them out again like hoit cakes, until they were no longer useful

Every ounce of Soviet capability was directed against winning the immediate land battle, whatever that might be. Even the activities of their long range aviation units were subordinated to this cause. The VVS accounted for something over 50% of the total aircraft engaged against the germans, yet they only manged to destroyed something less than 25% of the total German losses sustained by the LW. Killing the LW was not a priority for the VVS after 1942, destroying her armies were.

Novikov copied certain ideas from the Germans while others were of Soviet origin. A new long-range aviation organization (ADD) was created. The Air Army replaced frontal aviation (which had the effecet of concentrating and centralising critical air assets) . Except for some liaison and reconnaissance aircraft, army level commanders lost their aviation assets. Reserve formations were organized into Air Corps of two or more Air Divisions, with a strength of 120-270 aircraft. Several Air Corps would be given to an Air Army for critical operations, then moved to another sector on an as needed basis. Further reform measures covered rear services, lower level organizational structures, training, and other areas.

The new Air Armies and reserve Air Corps gave the Soviet Air Force (VVS) a strategic mobility, which it had lacked. This new ability was demonstrated in the Stalingrad campaign. During the Axis advance to Stalingrad and stubborn defense the VVS didn't seriously challenge the Luftwaffe. This allowed the Soviets to conserve strength, adapt to the new organizational structure, and gain experience with the large numbers of new aircraft coming into inventory. Once the Soviets decided to go over to the offensive this quickly changed, but the focus always remained basically the same....forget the LW, go for the ground forces. this is where the flying artillery that was the Sturmovik came into its own. Flying at zero geight, heavily protected, and enmasse, it disrupted the Germans defences and avoided one sided loss rates simply by swamping and overwhelming a given sector of the front. Such losses as did occur were irrelevant, because the machines and the men that flew them were so cheap and replaceable as to not matter if large numbers were lost.

General Novikov continued to be a key player in the Soviet command team, and he was sent as a Stavka (Headquarters, Supreme High Command) representative to various parts of the front. General Novikov arrived at Stalingrad in November 1942, once again at the request of Zhukov, who said, "We work well together." Novikov concentrated 1,414 aircraft in three Air Armies to support operation 'Uranus' (still outnumbered by the LW, but an imporessive contration nevertheless) . The expansible nature of the new Air Armies is demonstrated by the inclusion of four Air Corps from Stavka Reserve. When the attack began poor weather limited the Luftwaffe to 150 sorties over four days. In contrast the VVS flew 1,000 sorties, mostly ground support.
 

You also need pilots/aircrew that are trained in dive bombing. While you may be able to fix the Pe-2s initial dive brake problems the Pe-2 was just coming into use in summer of 1940 and many units had mixtures of SB and Pe-2s aircraft and were in the process of converting. P2-2s were NOT easy to fly and there were a number of accidents. Please note that the early Pe-2s were the fast ones and later versions were around 10% slower. Changing to the 105PF didn't help much for a technical reason ( 105PF was a poor match for the existing propeller due to gear ratio change and because the high speed of the early Pe-2 was at 5000meters) In part because of the higher drag of the 12.7mm mounting some of the the slowest of the Pe-2 series did 408kph at sea level. Trying to build a Pe-2 like aircraft earlier runs into the engine problem, either lower powered engines or unreliable engines. For close support work (IL-2 replacement) the Pe-2 lacks the armored tub/forward fuselage that makes the IL-2 rather difficult to shoot down. You could certainly add more armor but that is at the cost of performance. For a final check on a radial engined Pe-2 there was a small series (100 planned but only 30 built?) in 1944 using ASh-82 engines. Speed at sea level was 470kph and speed at 3000 meters was 528kph. I rather doubt a M-88 powered version would be as fast.


The training issue affects a number of Russian aircraft. The Mig1/3 was the most numerous of the modern fighters in June of 1041 but with around 1000 built and issued there were under 500 pilots who had completed transition training. Perhaps because the MIg-3 was not that easy to fly? While it was said that a good I-16 pilot had little trouble ( in part because the I-16 had some of the same bad characteristics of the Mig) this rather leaves thousands of I-15 and I-15bis pilots writing sad letters to relatives as they wait for their turn in the cockpit



I would note that the JU-87G didn't carry any bombs, neither did the He 129 when carrying a 30mm gun or larger and neither did the 40mm armed Hurricanes.

You might build fewer IL-2 but building a twin with AM series engines and expecting it to survive like an IL-2 calls for more than a rear gunner, it calls for armor on the scale of the IL-2 on BOTH engines and the cockpit. IL-2 had the higher drag but exposed wheels and fairings for a wheels up landing.

I would note that the nominal bomb load for an IL-2 was the same 600kg as the internal bomb load of a Pe-2. It might have required a different load of bomb types to reach that 600kg.
I would appreciate details/corrections.

One might also wonder if this twin could operate in the same field conditions as the IL-2?
 

Soviets pilots need to be trained for new, high performance aircraft. It is easier said than done, sure enough, and the pre-war training process will have to endure some changes.


The armored tub protected pilot, engine and cooling system. Unfortunately, the oil cooler was just under the tub, in the slipstream, and was both a vulnerable point and source of drag. The TsAGI was tweaking one of run-on-the-mill Il-2s, since those were far slower than prototypes (~370 km/h at SL, vs. 420!), and one of the tweaks they recommended was relocating of the oil cooler into the tunnel, ie. to be close to the protected engine's radiator.
Using the radial engine means that there is no cooling system to protect, and there is no such an urgent need to envelop the engines in armor. We can 'cancel' the gunner at low part of fuselage, it's gun ammo, use that weight saving to up the armor plating.
The speed of the Pe-2 at SL, with M-105, was 445-455 km/h. (link; the * denotes serial build types, the ** denotes mass built types) Ie. mass produced examples were faster than Il-2 prototypes. We should expect the M-88 powered example to top ~420 km/h at SL?



MiG-3 should be a slightly less of a beast with a tad bigger wing and longer fuselage? Even if we lost 10 km/h. No much point in making it as small as Yak-1, but with engine 30% bigger heavier.

I would note that the JU-87G didn't carry any bombs, neither did the He 129 when carrying a 30mm gun or larger and neither did the 40mm armed Hurricanes.
Click to expand...

There is only so much stuff one can attach at aircraft with 1300-1600 HP, before it starts under-performing or breaking up in mid air. Twin engined aircraft allow for more elbow room, so one can have, all in the same time, a rear gunner, 1-2 bigger or 2-3 smaller cannons, meaningful protection, and a handful of bombs or rockets.


I'm not using the bomber with two Mikulins to loiter around enemy ground forces near the front line, but more of dash in, bomb target miles away from front line, get away. Like Mosquito.

I would note that the nominal bomb load for an IL-2 was the same 600kg as the internal bomb load of a Pe-2. It might have required a different load of bomb types to reach that 600kg.
I would appreciate details/corrections.
Click to expand...

No, 400 kg was nominal bomb load, 600 kg was maximum. In case the cannons were VYa-23, max bomb load was same as nominal (400 kg). With 37mm cannons, nominal bomb load was 200 kg. table

One might also wonder if this twin could operate in the same field conditions as the IL-2?
Click to expand...

Really don't know. Soviets did built 11400 Pe-2s, seems they were suitable for airstrips that are not really paved? The greater range should lower the need for them to be located really close to the front line, negating a bit the need for unprepared strips?
 
OK the thread title is "1937-41: build your VVS"

A bit like the German thread a lot depends on what (engines/guns/etc) becomes available when.

From Wiki but it seems to track well in the book on Russian piston engines. DB-3 flies with the M-85 engine in 1936, production models start with that engine but switch to the 950hp M-86 in 1938, 1938 sees a 2nd factory begin production of DB-3 aircraft.
1938-39 sees the introduction of the M87A engine and variable pitch propellers. 1939-40 sees the introduction of the M-87B engine (both engines had same take-off power as earlier engine but more power at altitude) with the end of 1940 seeing the introduction of the M-88 in production aircraft. Of course by this time you are only 6-8 Months away from the German invasion.

Is the goal of the 37-41 time line to create a more effective VVS in 1942/43 or in 1941 to better resist the German invasion to begin with?

While the VI-100 fighter prototype did fly in Dec of 1939 the first Pe-2 bomber did not fly until Dec of 1940 and was ordered into production before the first flight of the bomber version.

AS for the M-105 predecessors : The M-103" Developed in 1936 it was ready for testing in October 1936. The first two models failed testing due to cracked cylinder blocks and the engine was resubmitted for testing in 1937. After passing its trials it was cleared for production in 1938 and 11,681 were produced until 1942 at its factory in Rybinsk.

Rybinsk also produced something under 300 M-104 engines during this time period but this engines was not the success they hoped for and was quickly replaced by the M-105, which as noted before, took until late 1940 to get to a reliable stage.

The M-106 was in wings, work starting in 1938 but it was never made into a satisfactory engine for the duration of the war.

More later.
 
The goal is to have aircraft as good as capable, using the historical state of the art engines, aerodynamics and armament. Circa 4 years should be enough to have good aircraft in more than token numbers, along with historically produced designs like I-16, SB-2, DB-3 etc.
Petlyakov's team can be ordered to produce a good bomber, instead of a hi-alt escort fighter. That would mean not just that such a bomber would be introduced few moths earlier, but that it features high set wing, that allows for a decent bomb bay. Using the radial engines of 900-1000 HP introduces redundancy, that might come in handy if the Klimov's V-12 encounter issues. The Petlyakov's bomber can start 1st with M-103, switching to M-105 once it is available. The bomber will be outfitted with later versions of the M-105, like VK-105PF, when available, thus making itself useful in the upcoming years.
 
The Russians got hung up for a bit and just about all the new planes were being introduced from around Dec of 1940 to the summer of 1941. Unfortunately that meant that the new planes were only available in small quantities and with partially trained aircrews.
To have planes available in quantity means starting production 6-12 months earlier which means starting design work 6-12 moths earlier at best.

Just like other countries, planes designed in 1936 were often were obsolete in 1940 so you really need to have things down pat. Just the right amount of advanced features without going too far and not waiting too long for the latest advance features or the plane won't make it into production. You also need planes for the Spanish civil war, for fighting the Japanese in Manchuria and for fighting the Finns in 1940.

Petlyakov's first fighter prototype actually used turbo-charged engines but the turbos were not ready for service use. However it does help explain some of the performance figures. You also have to consider that the PE-2 was roughly the size of a Bf 110C-4 but weighed about 800-1000kg more empty and loaded( and had a bit fatter fuselage.) and trying to fly them with M-103 engines with 1000hp for take-off and only 850 hp at altitude is not likely to give the combat results you want. The plane needs the M-105 engines. Trying to use earlier than the M-88 radial doesn't work that well either. The M-86/87 has 950hp for take-off and 800hp at altitude with the actual height depending on which version of the engine.

I wouldn't put a lot of faith in the G-R type engine being able to the take the battle damage that a P&W R-2800 could either. Since it's main flaw in making good power was a weak crankshaft design it's ability to keep running with damaged or missing cylinders may be a little suspect, out of balance crank assembly means what?

I believe it was the French Hispano radials that had a tendency to loose their propellers (gear box failure) even without combat damage rather than the G-R engines but not all radials tolerated battle damage the same.

Going to the AM series of engines follows the same pattern. While the AM-35 goes into production in August 1939 it is actually a small batch of a bit over 50 engines and takes until sometime into 1940 to complete. The AM-35 offers the "same" power (1350 for take-off) but the 1200hp altitude is raised from 4500 meters to 6000 meters. Unfortunately itwhile it was first run in Oct of 1939 it spent much of 1940 under going testing and didn't enter production until the end of 1940 and in early 1941 it was given an strengthened supercharger impeller, and slightly later the drive for the variable incidence blades at the supercharger inlet was changed from electro-mechanical to mechanical. 4500 AM-35As were built from 1940 to the end of 1943 (very small batches continued to be made after 1941) but 4034 of them were built in 1941 which leaves very few indeed built in 1940. The earlier M-34 was often not built in large quantities depending on sub type. Last version built in numbers was the AM-34FRNV which did offer 1200hp for take-off and 1050hp at altitude for 763kg. This engine became available in the summer of 1938.

While the SB bomber certainly needed replacement it was designed in 1934, The Plane that became the Pe-2 was started in 1938/39. If you want large numbers of a better bomber than the SB in late 1940 you need to start in 1937/38 and your engine choices are a bit limited and even production aircraft in the spring/summer of 1940 don't have the choices that became available in the winter of 1940/41. Given the lower powered engines available in 1938/39 the "early" Pe-2 may have a bigger wing than the Pe-2. The PE-2s wing was about 71.5% the size if the SB wing (174 sq ft smaller) so there was certainly room to squeeze in-between but a bigger wing means a bit less speed.

In a lot of these threads people seem to want to "design" an 1942/43 (service use) airframe in 1938 (or before) and 'just' power it with earlier/lowered engines until the engines that will really make it perform become available. They tend to forget that airfoils/flaps and propellers were all making progress at quite a rapid pace in the late 30s while some aircraft could be upgraded easily others could not. Some of the ones that could not be upgraded easily were designed they way they were for valid reasons at the time even if some of the reasons have become a bit lost or shrouded with time.
 
Thanks for desription of Soviet engines' development time line.
Some comments:

You also need planes for the Spanish civil war, for fighting the Japanese in Manchuria and for fighting the Finns in 1940.
Click to expand...

The planes that would be developed from 1937 on are too late for anything before 1941. So the I-16, SB-2 and other will have to suffice.

In a lot of these threads people seem to want to "design" an 1942/43 (service use) airframe in 1938 (or before) and 'just' power it with earlier/lowered engines until the engines that will really make it perform become available.
Click to expand...

We might note that Tu-2 and Tu-2S were, basically, the 1940 vintage airframe, outfitted with 1941/42 and 1943/44 engines, respectively. The Pe-2 was pretty 'consistent', the engines of slightly more power were added to an 1940 airframe.
 
I think about 85% of the VVS's problems were not the aircraft or even engine designs, per se, but poor quality control, which was, indirectly, due to Stalin and his (possibly clinical, but possibly realistic) feelings of being threatened.
 
swampyankee said:
I think about 85% of the VVS's problems were not the aircraft or even engine designs, per se, but poor quality control, which was, indirectly, due to Stalin and his (possibly clinical, but possibly realistic) feelings of being threatened.
Click to expand...

Short answer to this is no. VVS C&C was actually probably the best of any of the major nations in Europe. It did take a while to get to that point, as until April 1942 the VVS were trying to make a western model of command structure work, and it just wouldnt, given the inexperience of the aircrew and wide exapanses of the frontage as well as the limitations of the equipment they were using, Soviet fighters were just not of the same standard as their german counterparts. . They had to centralise, accept heavy losses, and make compromises with regard to training, tactics and objectives. once they did all that, the VVS took off and could not be stopped. They were very effective at the mission given to them. the germans had no answer to the VVS once it got going, but it did not get going until after Stalingrad really
 
Soviets did have problems with fit finish in their aircraft industry. The differences in performance were maybe 20-30 km/h in same types that were built pre war and from 1943 on, when compared with aircraft built between start of the war and late 1942. Not just that performance numbers were lower, the rate if acceptance plummeted to just some 60% in case of the worst offender (Il-2). The factory control, made by VVS officers, was present only after the complete plane was built, so most of the hidden defects were overlooked, emerging once the planes were in operational units. In other words, the bad workmanship killed pilots. Very comparable with what LW had to contend with during the last 12 months of the ww2. Many of the fighters were leaking gasses in the cockpit, forcing pilots to fly with canopys part open - kills speed, making it easier for the LW fighters to kill the VVS fghters. Sometimes the U/C legs were not to be retracted completely, not a good thing on a fighter that is already a bit slower than the German opposition. Gordon's Khazanov's book about Soviet fighters lists such and many more defects. To be fair, plenty of the planes were built by semi skilled workforce, under open sky, so it's a small wonder that SU actually outproduced Germany, even in those toughest times.
People might want to read more about the Il-2 development and woes here (translation by Bing translator):
rkka.es/aviones/ilyushin/001_IL-2_descripcion/002/002_IL-2.htm - Translator
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.
17 18 19
Replies
367
Views
13K
EwenS
E
French Army alternatives, 1935-40 (41?)
2 3 4
Replies
64
Views
3K
Admiral Beez
A
Douglas C-47 "Johnny Reb" serial 41-18571
Replies
1
Views
406
Snautzer01
1937-45: Doubling down on the 2-engined 'day fighters'
7 8 9
Replies
175
Views
9K
Admiral Beez
A
Aero industry on the war footing, 1937-42
Replies
2
Views
683
elbmc1969
E
Menu
Log in
Register