Thumpalumpacus
Major
Do you have a source then with accurate figures? And would it negate my point that WWII VVS fighters are going to have a tougher time than MiG-15s?
Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen. (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter Warbringer
- Start date
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Do you have a source then with accurate figures? And would it negate my point that WWII VVS fighters are going to have a tougher time than MiG-15s?
And it was mostly rather shallow with thousands laid mines and if Soviets planned to attack West surely their subs would have had mined the narrow straits leading into it.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
re
Good point.
In addition to don4331's point re starvation in Western Europe, there are the Eastern European countries to consider as well. Most people in the West are not aware that the Soviets made a very serious effort to get food to the non-Soviet countries that ended up in their control - this is one of the positive things often mentioned in the memoirs of the people who were alive in the immediate post-WWII era Warsaw Pact countries - including people from East Germany and Poland.
A bad aspect of this was that the Soviets sometimes sent food to the occupied countries and exported/sold food to foreign nations rather than supply some of their pre-WWII member countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, and to a degree the more remote Russian populations.
What would the West have done in the face of mass starvation in the Eastern European countries as they moved toward the Soviet Union? What could they do?
Good point.
In addition to don4331's point re starvation in Western Europe, there are the Eastern European countries to consider as well. Most people in the West are not aware that the Soviets made a very serious effort to get food to the non-Soviet countries that ended up in their control - this is one of the positive things often mentioned in the memoirs of the people who were alive in the immediate post-WWII era Warsaw Pact countries - including people from East Germany and Poland.
A bad aspect of this was that the Soviets sometimes sent food to the occupied countries and exported/sold food to foreign nations rather than supply some of their pre-WWII member countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, and to a degree the more remote Russian populations.
What would the West have done in the face of mass starvation in the Eastern European countries as they moved toward the Soviet Union? What could they do?
No but the post on Oct 28, 2024 #230 by Reluctant Poster gives an indication on the WWII situation and that of Bf109XL's message #218 shows figures based on Soviet docus. And for the WWII e.g. the real aircraft losses during the Guadalcanal Campaign shows that the losses were fairly even even if both Japanese and Americans thought that they had clearly shot down more than they had lost. Based on Wolf's 13th Fighter Command, 1 Aug 1942 to 9 Feb 1943 American 610 USAAF, USN and USMC vs Japanese 682 IJNAF and IJAAF losses.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I understand overclaiming issues. They don't undermine my point.
Yes, Soviet fighters in 1945 were less effective bomber killers than MiG-15. Even if Soviet guns were more powerful that those same calibre guns used by Japanese the only effective heavy bomber killers of the VVS KA from top of my head were Yak-9Ts 3 000- built and Yak-9UTs 300- built.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Ever hear of Operation Manna, Operation Chowhound or the Berlin Airlift?
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Yes.
But as mentioned in another thread recently (I do not remember which thread) our ability to supply food to the Western European countries was already stretching our logistics almost to the limit. What would we have left over for the Eastern European countries? And how would that affect our performance in Operation Unthinkable?
But as mentioned in another thread recently (I do not remember which thread) our ability to supply food to the Western European countries was already stretching our logistics almost to the limit. What would we have left over for the Eastern European countries? And how would that affect our performance in Operation Unthinkable?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
By 1945, South American nations were joining the Allies, which expanded the source of manpower and supplies, including food stuffs.
British and American logistics, which was still in high-gear by mid-1945, would have come up with a solution based on recent logistical experience.
British and American logistics, which was still in high-gear by mid-1945, would have come up with a solution based on recent logistical experience.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 912
- Sep 30, 2021
The food system abbreviated summary, find and move the food. Wartime,
The Honen Province famine of 1943, the worst disaster to hit China since the start of the war with Japan. The Bengal famine of 1943, the pleas at the time for Iran to have just one ship of wheat at least. The RAF aircraft food bombing what is now Yemen in 1944. The food shortages throughout South East Asia in 1945 including the Indo China famine.
Merchant shipping and the demands of war / by C.B.A. Behrens. Chapter XVI, "The shortage of shipping a stranglehold on essential civilian services" (March 1943). The Turks needed 50,000 tons of wheat but the Egyptians would not sell unless they had guarantees of fertiliser deliveries so they would not experience a shortage. South Africa needed its fertilisers, as did Australia, the shortages produced inflation and encouraged hoarding, there were fewer ships. In February 1943 in Ceylon the rubber workers were leaving the plantations in search of food. For Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius and Seychelles "famine, though not an immediate threat, might, it seems, easily become so."
Logistics, According to the British the allied armies imported some 3,477,951 long tons of supplies (Including vehicles?) into France and Belgium in April 1945. In addition to that there was the civil relief. dividing the figure for the civil relief tonnage for the second quarter of 1945 by 3 gives an estimate of 778,852 long tons of such imports in April 1945, so for an estimate (April times 12) this gives a yearly tonnage of around 51 million long tons of military and civil relief cargoes. No wonder the system was strained when you consider the number of major French ports not working, remembering the heavy bomber forces were in Britain.
As of 31st May 1945 the US controlled refrigerated ships, reefers, with around 15.7 million cubic feet of space, an idea as to their shortage can be seen in the intention to build another 8.5 million cubic feet of space. Despite concepts like 360 cubic feet reefer "boxes" as deck cargo and 100 non self propelled reefer barges the lack of refrigeration space caused problems in shipping perishables and necessitated as much local purchase as possible. As one emergency measure during the northern winter perishables were sent in ordinary freighters with acceptable losses, thick skinned oranges were better survivors than thin skinned ones.
After 1939 Germany never equalled it's pre war grain harvests, hovering between 84 and 92% in the 1940-43 time period, down to 78% in 1944. Potatoes did well for a while, but the figures for 1943 at 75% and 1944 at 80% were not good. Germany was importing an extra 2,400,000 tons of grain by 1942/43 compared with the 1938/39 time period. The Nazis created a food shortage in Germany and "solved" it by taking food from the rest of Europe and causing shortages there, also things like laying minefields and scorched earth. Add the diversion of food stocks into alcohol for fuel and the people the Nazis put on starvation rations who had their rations restored upon liberation. The fact the Nazis preferred explosives to fertiliser. The 30% of German farm labour being impressed or slave labour. The wrecking of European economies, the fact most of them lost at least one growing season. The oil bombings and Nazi decisions meant synthetic nitrogen was available for fertilizer after September, 1944, and the anticipated drop in the 1945 harvest from this cause alone was estimated at 22 percent.
With something like 3.6 million homes destroyed there was an accommodation shortage, concentration camp prisoners found themselves still in the camps, often wearing the camp clothing months after the end of the war.
The food situation around the world was bad in the 1945 to 1947 time period. In Europe the 1945 and 1946 harvests were war effected, and 1947 was a bad year.
The fighting had its effect on food production, according to Allied Administration of Italy 1943-45 by C R S Harris, between July 1943 and September 1945 the allies imported 2,464,100 tons of food for Italy, plus 3,291,200 tons of coal, in partial return the Italians exported around £2,000,000 of food, about half lemons or lemon oil. During this period the allied armies bought about 300,000 tons of food from the Italians. A lack of transport prevented full gathering of the harvest in 1943 and 1944 and distribution of seed in 1945.
The USSR received just under 4,500,000 tons of US food, it was 25% of all the US shipments to the USSR, ignoring the aircraft. The commonwealth apparently received between 4.3 and 5.4 percent of the US food harvest under lend lease in the 1942-44 time period, plus between 4.3 and 5.6 percent of the "other agricultural produce." In dollar terms 12.2% of lend lease to the commonwealth was food, it is number three on the dollar table, behind aircraft and vehicles, it becomes number 2 when you add in other agricultural produce.
On 15th August Anvil/Dragoon landings start the supplies include 300,000 blankets and 350,000 sets of Red Cross relief clothing for the civilian population, due to the known shortages.
In late 1944 the allied civil affairs officials conclude France would need around 500,000 tons of food a month in the April to September 1945 period with Belgium and Holland having higher per capita requirements. These cannot be met thanks to the world wide food shortage, claims of other theatres, shipping shortages and port congestion.
In January 1945 the workers at Antwerp went on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal, there are widespread strikes, in Belgium the result is coal production declines to 60% of the previous month.
During March 1945 US Army men in sedentary jobs will be ordered to take 10% cut in rations because of the food situation. Articles appear in the French press about the food situation including a claim the allies are taking the food. The actual balance is 280,000 tons in aid versus purchase of 70,000 tons. By the end of April 1945 the ration for non working PoWs is cut to 2,000 calories due to the world food crisis and the number of PoWs.
In April 1945 there was only a 10 day supply of food in the major German cities, Dusseldorf and Essen reported starving children, food stocks had been looted. However even In the middle of the year food stocks in small cities and towns were good.
On 3rd May the US War department warned all theatres that food reserves in the US were becoming depleted, fresh and canned meat, canned fruits and vegetables, dehydrated potatoes, rice, dried yeast and spice were the critical items. Meats were to be replaced by egg products, pasta, beans and stews. Amongst the suggestions on how to cope the War Department urged a 50% cut in the Red Cross doughnut and club mobile program.
After the end of hostilities the US Army cuts rations to all men by 10% because of the food situation. Over the course of the campaign the army has issued 115% of the authorised rations, that is 15% more food than the ration strength, the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations noted as of December 1943 it had a loss factor 8% of rations, 2% to theft, 0.5% to enemy action and the rest to spoilage or straight loss. It is estimated 60% of the general purpose vehicles are worth salvaging, 18% could be shipped to the Pacific direct, 21% could be shipped after overhaul and 21% returned to the US for overhaul.
On 13th May SHAEF officials have their first meeting with Doenitz who takes the opportunity to report severe problems including with food, currency and fuel.
Surveys show the 2,000 calorie diet was sufficient for sedentary PoWs, however they also show that the 2,000 calorie diet packs are reduced to 1,750 calories by losses during distribution, breakdown and food preparation. The diet does not help fix the fact most PoWs are suffering dietary deficiencies before capture, the German army diet had been deficient in riboflavin and nicotinic acid, when it was available.
At the end of August the US Army is still feeding around 1,500,000 displaced persons. Also "60% of the Germans lived on a diet that would inevitably lead to diseases caused by malnutrition." Normal consumers were receiving 800 to 1,150 calories a day. It turned out 1945 was a mild enough year to get just enough food, the official ration was 1,550 calories a day. Then at the end of the year large numbers of refugees began moving into western Germany. Like the rest of Europe the country was awash with weapons, and revenge attacks included breaking into prisons to kill the prisoners.
The next figures from Civil affairs and Military Government in North West Europe by F S V Donnison.
"By the end of 1944 France was running out of food, and put down a requirement of 1,000,000 tons of foods and fats over the next 8 months for the civilian population, along with 2,500,000 tons of coal and 800,000 tons of petroleum products.
Belgium was assessed as needing 80,000 tons of food a month in early 1945, the situation was in Q1/44 the ration was 1470 calories (versus 2,000 in Germany), it dropped to 1,200 calories during 1944, in Q4/44, after liberation the ration was 1450 calories if coupons were honoured, and they were often not. By June 1945 the ration was 2,000 calories.
Holland, outside of German occupation followed Belgian rations. Under German occupation the Dutch starved, and the situation became so bad a truce was organised so food could be trucked in and air dropped.
Norway, by raiding German Army stocks only needed around 66,000 tons of food in the first 6 months of liberation since they gained their fishing fleet back, since Germany was taking 100% of the fish catch.
Denmark was a food exporter, once the allies could remove the German army and put a clamp on weapons, provided it could receive enough coal.
The British launched operation Barleycorn, releasing POWs with agricultural experience, and then coal miners, starting on 5 June 1945, the target was some 494,000 releases and it looks like they did release around this many POWs. Even with much of the harvest gathered in rations remained low, only by cutting food reserves in the UK could the British stabilise rations. Britain cut civil rations and while the wartime rationing improved general nutrition the post war ones were below requirements.
In March 1946 German food stocks were at 60 days, rations were cut to 1,180 calories a day and by May and June Army foods were being used. The final crisis would be in the second quarter of 1947.
Allied civil relief northern Europe, tons,
Q2/44 727 (In other words 6 to 30 June 1944)
Q3/44 157,639
Q4/44 588,968
Q1/45 1,359,657
Q2/45 2,336,556
Q3/45 2,211,080
Total 6,654,627 long tons, in addition a further 6,853,313 long tons was sent to the Mediterranean in the same time period. Overall the mix was roughly 50:50 food:coal, with Britain supplying more coal and the US more food, all up the US supplied 6,788,765 tons, Britain 6,098,902 tons and Canada 620,273 tons.
Pre war in South East Asia Burma exported around 3 million tons of rice, Indo China and Thailand around 1.5 million tons each out of a total production of around 14.4 million tons. In 1945/6 Burma could just supply enough rice for its own population and overall production in South East Asia was 2/3 that of pre war. In 1946/7 production was around 75% of pre war, in 1947/8 it was back to around the pre war level. Malaya needed 700,000 tons of rice a year pre war, it received 94,000 tons in 1944 and 12,000 tons in 1945, rice went from $6 to $7,500 between December 1941 and August 1945.
In Java Japanese economic management dropped the area under crops from 8 million hectares in 1940 to 5.8 million in 1945 with yields per hectare down maybe 20 to 30% from pre war. See Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South East Asia.
It should be noted the Japanese military tried to credit finance WWII and one of the government's last acts was to pay the big industrial firms for all outstanding orders, even though none of them would be delivered, increasing the number of notes in circulation from around 5 billion yen in 1941 to around 60 billion yen at the end of 1945. This must be taken into account when you note the increase in food prices, from the end of price controls in 1945 to the end of 1947, rice 500 to 20,944 yen, Barley 33 to 1,260 yen, wheat flour 40 to 1,315 yen, Mackerel 75 to 680 yen. In the period mid 1946 to mid 1947 the US shipped some 800,000 tons of food aid to Japan.
France,
See the histories on the fourth republic, pre war France imported around 10% of its food needs. During the war some 3,000,000 acres had gone out of cultivation. With industry largely not working, most of the new machine tools had been looted, only 20% of the necessary spare parts for agricultural machinery were available, then add fuel shortages. German requisitions had seen the horse population reduced from 2.2 million to 1.5 million. French industry was back to pre war levels of production in 1947.
The result was the French had to concentrate on keeping only the most fertile farms in full operation, leading to resentment amongst those who missed out. Despite the release of some 1.2 million PoWS held by the Germans there was a major labour shortage.
Transport was a problem as well, inland waterways 40% capacity, merchant marine 1/3 capacity, 45% of rail track operational, along with 1 in 6 locos, 1 in 3 wagons and 1 in 2 carriages, 115 out of 300 major stations destroyed, plus 24 main marshalling yards, 7,500 bridges down (1,500 had been hastily repaired), major road repairs needed but these could be delayed since there were few trucks available anyway, and they had fuel problems.
The population of France sank by over 1 million people between 1936 and 1946, to 40.5 million, the average 14 year old in 1945 was 7 to 9 kg lighter and 7 to 11 cm shorter than their 1935 counterparts. Germany had requisitioned a lot of French food production.
Vichy had done the usual axis economic management, printed money, there was 5 times the money in circulation in 1944 than in 1939, 27% inflation in 1944, 63% in 1945.
There was a severe 1944/45 winter and disastrous frosts, reducing the French rail system to a worse state than in wartime. French 1945 grain production was 50% of pre war, down 1/3 on even 1944, the 1946 harvests produced a "precarious balance".
The winter of 1946/7 produced record low temperatures in Europe, and lingered until April and was followed by widespread drought. Shortages of bread and refined sugar lead to riots in Verdun and Le Mans in September 1947. The US population started purchasing food parcels to send to Europe.
From the 1950 Canada Yearbook,
"Wheat - The crop year 1948-49 brought about for the first time in several years a near balance between world wheat supplies and import requirements. Generally excellent crops were harvested in 1948 with world production of both bread grains and coarse grains reaching considerably higher levels than in 1947. Production also exceeded the 1935-39 average by a considerable margin with improved crops being harvested quite generally in both importing and exporting countries. With this easing of previously existing tight supply situation, governments of some wheat importing countries abolished bread rationing while others lowered the compulsory extraction rate in flour milling and considerably reduced the amounts of coarse grains which were formally mixed with bread grains in the manufacture of flour. These two actions provided larger quantities of milling offals and coarse grains for live-stock feed, and so promoted the expansion of live-stock production. The optimism generated by increased available supplies led to the dissolution of the world allocating agency, the international food council of the Food and Agricultural Organisation."
So the usual story, forward feedback for a while, with the reverse applying just post war, when a lack of feed reduced meat, dairy and egg production just when they were needed to cover the loss of other foodstuffs.
To use wheat as a proxy for all foods, the 1952 Australian Yearbook has a table of world wheat production and export/import trade.
World production averaged 5.81 billion bushels 1935 to 1939, and reached 6.1 billion in 1948. The 1946-47 world production was 5.6 billion bushels, as was the 1947-48 crop. Unfortunately the Australian figures switch the basis of a year every so often to account for the way the southern summer is split over two years.
Wheat production by areas, 1930-34 average, 1935-38 average and 1948, million bushels
North America (includes Mexico) 1,096.0, 1,086.0, 1,701.1
Europe, 1,156.0, 1,632.0, 1,348.4
USSR 860.4, 1,050.0, unknown
Africa 135.0, 142.0, 154.3
Asia (India to Japan), 1,456.0, 1,442.0, 1,601.9
South America 295.0, 280.0, 224.1
Oceania 193.8, 161.5, 194.0
Average wheat available for export 1934-38 was around 535.8 million bushels, and net imports came to 516.2 million bushels, in 1946-47 the figures were exports 758.5, imports 748.5, 1947-48 exports 926.8, imports 932.5.
Australia, Argentina and the USSR had bad years in 1946-47 but this was offset by a rise in US wheat exports from an average of 24.4 million bushels in 1934-38 to 405.7 in 1946-47, then in 1948 the US exported 484.9 million bushels. So you can see the expansion of world wheat trade was largely met by a major increase in US crops, able to cope with the fact the rest of the world reduced wheat exports.
The export table gives the top 5 in 1934-38 as Canada 33% of world trade, Argentina 23%, Australia 19%, USSR 5%, USA 4%, with all others accounting for 16%. In 1948 the big 4 (non US) exporters managed around a 4% increase on their pre war average exports, the US had increased exports by around 21.5 times, 2150%. The all other countries exports went from 88.3 million bushels average in 1934-38 to 9.6 million 1946-47 and 1.2 million 1947-48.
So where did all the wheat go?, figures are 1934-38 average, 1946-47 and 1947-48 in million bushels, major increases in imports over pre war, (exporter) means they were nett exporters of wheat during the relevant time period.
Germany 21.5, 83.0, 136.4
Italy 18.1, 46.8, 81.8
Austria 8.9, 11.9, 22.3
France, 5.4, 16.8, 53.2
Ceylon, 0.9, 14.4, 10.8
Mexico, 0.7, 13.9, 10.9
Spain (exporter), 10.7, 16.4
Japan/Korea (exporter), 36.2, 45.6
India/Pakistan (exporter), 37.6, 48.1
Holland 21.6, 25.5, 27.6
On another note by the end of April 1945 the German Army Group B chief surgeon is given the job of controlling hospitals under US control for German PoWs. First army medical section is running 216 German military hospitals, 4 PoW camps, 22 Displaced Persons centres and 3 Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP) hospitals, around 90,000 patients.
As part of going to war in late 1945 someone needs to allocate which parts of the world will have famines.
The Honen Province famine of 1943, the worst disaster to hit China since the start of the war with Japan. The Bengal famine of 1943, the pleas at the time for Iran to have just one ship of wheat at least. The RAF aircraft food bombing what is now Yemen in 1944. The food shortages throughout South East Asia in 1945 including the Indo China famine.
Merchant shipping and the demands of war / by C.B.A. Behrens. Chapter XVI, "The shortage of shipping a stranglehold on essential civilian services" (March 1943). The Turks needed 50,000 tons of wheat but the Egyptians would not sell unless they had guarantees of fertiliser deliveries so they would not experience a shortage. South Africa needed its fertilisers, as did Australia, the shortages produced inflation and encouraged hoarding, there were fewer ships. In February 1943 in Ceylon the rubber workers were leaving the plantations in search of food. For Southern Rhodesia, Mauritius and Seychelles "famine, though not an immediate threat, might, it seems, easily become so."
Logistics, According to the British the allied armies imported some 3,477,951 long tons of supplies (Including vehicles?) into France and Belgium in April 1945. In addition to that there was the civil relief. dividing the figure for the civil relief tonnage for the second quarter of 1945 by 3 gives an estimate of 778,852 long tons of such imports in April 1945, so for an estimate (April times 12) this gives a yearly tonnage of around 51 million long tons of military and civil relief cargoes. No wonder the system was strained when you consider the number of major French ports not working, remembering the heavy bomber forces were in Britain.
As of 31st May 1945 the US controlled refrigerated ships, reefers, with around 15.7 million cubic feet of space, an idea as to their shortage can be seen in the intention to build another 8.5 million cubic feet of space. Despite concepts like 360 cubic feet reefer "boxes" as deck cargo and 100 non self propelled reefer barges the lack of refrigeration space caused problems in shipping perishables and necessitated as much local purchase as possible. As one emergency measure during the northern winter perishables were sent in ordinary freighters with acceptable losses, thick skinned oranges were better survivors than thin skinned ones.
After 1939 Germany never equalled it's pre war grain harvests, hovering between 84 and 92% in the 1940-43 time period, down to 78% in 1944. Potatoes did well for a while, but the figures for 1943 at 75% and 1944 at 80% were not good. Germany was importing an extra 2,400,000 tons of grain by 1942/43 compared with the 1938/39 time period. The Nazis created a food shortage in Germany and "solved" it by taking food from the rest of Europe and causing shortages there, also things like laying minefields and scorched earth. Add the diversion of food stocks into alcohol for fuel and the people the Nazis put on starvation rations who had their rations restored upon liberation. The fact the Nazis preferred explosives to fertiliser. The 30% of German farm labour being impressed or slave labour. The wrecking of European economies, the fact most of them lost at least one growing season. The oil bombings and Nazi decisions meant synthetic nitrogen was available for fertilizer after September, 1944, and the anticipated drop in the 1945 harvest from this cause alone was estimated at 22 percent.
With something like 3.6 million homes destroyed there was an accommodation shortage, concentration camp prisoners found themselves still in the camps, often wearing the camp clothing months after the end of the war.
The food situation around the world was bad in the 1945 to 1947 time period. In Europe the 1945 and 1946 harvests were war effected, and 1947 was a bad year.
The fighting had its effect on food production, according to Allied Administration of Italy 1943-45 by C R S Harris, between July 1943 and September 1945 the allies imported 2,464,100 tons of food for Italy, plus 3,291,200 tons of coal, in partial return the Italians exported around £2,000,000 of food, about half lemons or lemon oil. During this period the allied armies bought about 300,000 tons of food from the Italians. A lack of transport prevented full gathering of the harvest in 1943 and 1944 and distribution of seed in 1945.
The USSR received just under 4,500,000 tons of US food, it was 25% of all the US shipments to the USSR, ignoring the aircraft. The commonwealth apparently received between 4.3 and 5.4 percent of the US food harvest under lend lease in the 1942-44 time period, plus between 4.3 and 5.6 percent of the "other agricultural produce." In dollar terms 12.2% of lend lease to the commonwealth was food, it is number three on the dollar table, behind aircraft and vehicles, it becomes number 2 when you add in other agricultural produce.
On 15th August Anvil/Dragoon landings start the supplies include 300,000 blankets and 350,000 sets of Red Cross relief clothing for the civilian population, due to the known shortages.
In late 1944 the allied civil affairs officials conclude France would need around 500,000 tons of food a month in the April to September 1945 period with Belgium and Holland having higher per capita requirements. These cannot be met thanks to the world wide food shortage, claims of other theatres, shipping shortages and port congestion.
In January 1945 the workers at Antwerp went on strike due to a lack of food, clothing and coal, there are widespread strikes, in Belgium the result is coal production declines to 60% of the previous month.
During March 1945 US Army men in sedentary jobs will be ordered to take 10% cut in rations because of the food situation. Articles appear in the French press about the food situation including a claim the allies are taking the food. The actual balance is 280,000 tons in aid versus purchase of 70,000 tons. By the end of April 1945 the ration for non working PoWs is cut to 2,000 calories due to the world food crisis and the number of PoWs.
In April 1945 there was only a 10 day supply of food in the major German cities, Dusseldorf and Essen reported starving children, food stocks had been looted. However even In the middle of the year food stocks in small cities and towns were good.
On 3rd May the US War department warned all theatres that food reserves in the US were becoming depleted, fresh and canned meat, canned fruits and vegetables, dehydrated potatoes, rice, dried yeast and spice were the critical items. Meats were to be replaced by egg products, pasta, beans and stews. Amongst the suggestions on how to cope the War Department urged a 50% cut in the Red Cross doughnut and club mobile program.
After the end of hostilities the US Army cuts rations to all men by 10% because of the food situation. Over the course of the campaign the army has issued 115% of the authorised rations, that is 15% more food than the ration strength, the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations noted as of December 1943 it had a loss factor 8% of rations, 2% to theft, 0.5% to enemy action and the rest to spoilage or straight loss. It is estimated 60% of the general purpose vehicles are worth salvaging, 18% could be shipped to the Pacific direct, 21% could be shipped after overhaul and 21% returned to the US for overhaul.
On 13th May SHAEF officials have their first meeting with Doenitz who takes the opportunity to report severe problems including with food, currency and fuel.
Surveys show the 2,000 calorie diet was sufficient for sedentary PoWs, however they also show that the 2,000 calorie diet packs are reduced to 1,750 calories by losses during distribution, breakdown and food preparation. The diet does not help fix the fact most PoWs are suffering dietary deficiencies before capture, the German army diet had been deficient in riboflavin and nicotinic acid, when it was available.
At the end of August the US Army is still feeding around 1,500,000 displaced persons. Also "60% of the Germans lived on a diet that would inevitably lead to diseases caused by malnutrition." Normal consumers were receiving 800 to 1,150 calories a day. It turned out 1945 was a mild enough year to get just enough food, the official ration was 1,550 calories a day. Then at the end of the year large numbers of refugees began moving into western Germany. Like the rest of Europe the country was awash with weapons, and revenge attacks included breaking into prisons to kill the prisoners.
The next figures from Civil affairs and Military Government in North West Europe by F S V Donnison.
"By the end of 1944 France was running out of food, and put down a requirement of 1,000,000 tons of foods and fats over the next 8 months for the civilian population, along with 2,500,000 tons of coal and 800,000 tons of petroleum products.
Belgium was assessed as needing 80,000 tons of food a month in early 1945, the situation was in Q1/44 the ration was 1470 calories (versus 2,000 in Germany), it dropped to 1,200 calories during 1944, in Q4/44, after liberation the ration was 1450 calories if coupons were honoured, and they were often not. By June 1945 the ration was 2,000 calories.
Holland, outside of German occupation followed Belgian rations. Under German occupation the Dutch starved, and the situation became so bad a truce was organised so food could be trucked in and air dropped.
Norway, by raiding German Army stocks only needed around 66,000 tons of food in the first 6 months of liberation since they gained their fishing fleet back, since Germany was taking 100% of the fish catch.
Denmark was a food exporter, once the allies could remove the German army and put a clamp on weapons, provided it could receive enough coal.
The British launched operation Barleycorn, releasing POWs with agricultural experience, and then coal miners, starting on 5 June 1945, the target was some 494,000 releases and it looks like they did release around this many POWs. Even with much of the harvest gathered in rations remained low, only by cutting food reserves in the UK could the British stabilise rations. Britain cut civil rations and while the wartime rationing improved general nutrition the post war ones were below requirements.
In March 1946 German food stocks were at 60 days, rations were cut to 1,180 calories a day and by May and June Army foods were being used. The final crisis would be in the second quarter of 1947.
Allied civil relief northern Europe, tons,
Q2/44 727 (In other words 6 to 30 June 1944)
Q3/44 157,639
Q4/44 588,968
Q1/45 1,359,657
Q2/45 2,336,556
Q3/45 2,211,080
Total 6,654,627 long tons, in addition a further 6,853,313 long tons was sent to the Mediterranean in the same time period. Overall the mix was roughly 50:50 food:coal, with Britain supplying more coal and the US more food, all up the US supplied 6,788,765 tons, Britain 6,098,902 tons and Canada 620,273 tons.
Pre war in South East Asia Burma exported around 3 million tons of rice, Indo China and Thailand around 1.5 million tons each out of a total production of around 14.4 million tons. In 1945/6 Burma could just supply enough rice for its own population and overall production in South East Asia was 2/3 that of pre war. In 1946/7 production was around 75% of pre war, in 1947/8 it was back to around the pre war level. Malaya needed 700,000 tons of rice a year pre war, it received 94,000 tons in 1944 and 12,000 tons in 1945, rice went from $6 to $7,500 between December 1941 and August 1945.
In Java Japanese economic management dropped the area under crops from 8 million hectares in 1940 to 5.8 million in 1945 with yields per hectare down maybe 20 to 30% from pre war. See Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South East Asia.
It should be noted the Japanese military tried to credit finance WWII and one of the government's last acts was to pay the big industrial firms for all outstanding orders, even though none of them would be delivered, increasing the number of notes in circulation from around 5 billion yen in 1941 to around 60 billion yen at the end of 1945. This must be taken into account when you note the increase in food prices, from the end of price controls in 1945 to the end of 1947, rice 500 to 20,944 yen, Barley 33 to 1,260 yen, wheat flour 40 to 1,315 yen, Mackerel 75 to 680 yen. In the period mid 1946 to mid 1947 the US shipped some 800,000 tons of food aid to Japan.
France,
See the histories on the fourth republic, pre war France imported around 10% of its food needs. During the war some 3,000,000 acres had gone out of cultivation. With industry largely not working, most of the new machine tools had been looted, only 20% of the necessary spare parts for agricultural machinery were available, then add fuel shortages. German requisitions had seen the horse population reduced from 2.2 million to 1.5 million. French industry was back to pre war levels of production in 1947.
The result was the French had to concentrate on keeping only the most fertile farms in full operation, leading to resentment amongst those who missed out. Despite the release of some 1.2 million PoWS held by the Germans there was a major labour shortage.
Transport was a problem as well, inland waterways 40% capacity, merchant marine 1/3 capacity, 45% of rail track operational, along with 1 in 6 locos, 1 in 3 wagons and 1 in 2 carriages, 115 out of 300 major stations destroyed, plus 24 main marshalling yards, 7,500 bridges down (1,500 had been hastily repaired), major road repairs needed but these could be delayed since there were few trucks available anyway, and they had fuel problems.
The population of France sank by over 1 million people between 1936 and 1946, to 40.5 million, the average 14 year old in 1945 was 7 to 9 kg lighter and 7 to 11 cm shorter than their 1935 counterparts. Germany had requisitioned a lot of French food production.
Vichy had done the usual axis economic management, printed money, there was 5 times the money in circulation in 1944 than in 1939, 27% inflation in 1944, 63% in 1945.
There was a severe 1944/45 winter and disastrous frosts, reducing the French rail system to a worse state than in wartime. French 1945 grain production was 50% of pre war, down 1/3 on even 1944, the 1946 harvests produced a "precarious balance".
The winter of 1946/7 produced record low temperatures in Europe, and lingered until April and was followed by widespread drought. Shortages of bread and refined sugar lead to riots in Verdun and Le Mans in September 1947. The US population started purchasing food parcels to send to Europe.
From the 1950 Canada Yearbook,
"Wheat - The crop year 1948-49 brought about for the first time in several years a near balance between world wheat supplies and import requirements. Generally excellent crops were harvested in 1948 with world production of both bread grains and coarse grains reaching considerably higher levels than in 1947. Production also exceeded the 1935-39 average by a considerable margin with improved crops being harvested quite generally in both importing and exporting countries. With this easing of previously existing tight supply situation, governments of some wheat importing countries abolished bread rationing while others lowered the compulsory extraction rate in flour milling and considerably reduced the amounts of coarse grains which were formally mixed with bread grains in the manufacture of flour. These two actions provided larger quantities of milling offals and coarse grains for live-stock feed, and so promoted the expansion of live-stock production. The optimism generated by increased available supplies led to the dissolution of the world allocating agency, the international food council of the Food and Agricultural Organisation."
So the usual story, forward feedback for a while, with the reverse applying just post war, when a lack of feed reduced meat, dairy and egg production just when they were needed to cover the loss of other foodstuffs.
To use wheat as a proxy for all foods, the 1952 Australian Yearbook has a table of world wheat production and export/import trade.
World production averaged 5.81 billion bushels 1935 to 1939, and reached 6.1 billion in 1948. The 1946-47 world production was 5.6 billion bushels, as was the 1947-48 crop. Unfortunately the Australian figures switch the basis of a year every so often to account for the way the southern summer is split over two years.
Wheat production by areas, 1930-34 average, 1935-38 average and 1948, million bushels
North America (includes Mexico) 1,096.0, 1,086.0, 1,701.1
Europe, 1,156.0, 1,632.0, 1,348.4
USSR 860.4, 1,050.0, unknown
Africa 135.0, 142.0, 154.3
Asia (India to Japan), 1,456.0, 1,442.0, 1,601.9
South America 295.0, 280.0, 224.1
Oceania 193.8, 161.5, 194.0
Average wheat available for export 1934-38 was around 535.8 million bushels, and net imports came to 516.2 million bushels, in 1946-47 the figures were exports 758.5, imports 748.5, 1947-48 exports 926.8, imports 932.5.
Australia, Argentina and the USSR had bad years in 1946-47 but this was offset by a rise in US wheat exports from an average of 24.4 million bushels in 1934-38 to 405.7 in 1946-47, then in 1948 the US exported 484.9 million bushels. So you can see the expansion of world wheat trade was largely met by a major increase in US crops, able to cope with the fact the rest of the world reduced wheat exports.
The export table gives the top 5 in 1934-38 as Canada 33% of world trade, Argentina 23%, Australia 19%, USSR 5%, USA 4%, with all others accounting for 16%. In 1948 the big 4 (non US) exporters managed around a 4% increase on their pre war average exports, the US had increased exports by around 21.5 times, 2150%. The all other countries exports went from 88.3 million bushels average in 1934-38 to 9.6 million 1946-47 and 1.2 million 1947-48.
So where did all the wheat go?, figures are 1934-38 average, 1946-47 and 1947-48 in million bushels, major increases in imports over pre war, (exporter) means they were nett exporters of wheat during the relevant time period.
Germany 21.5, 83.0, 136.4
Italy 18.1, 46.8, 81.8
Austria 8.9, 11.9, 22.3
France, 5.4, 16.8, 53.2
Ceylon, 0.9, 14.4, 10.8
Mexico, 0.7, 13.9, 10.9
Spain (exporter), 10.7, 16.4
Japan/Korea (exporter), 36.2, 45.6
India/Pakistan (exporter), 37.6, 48.1
Holland 21.6, 25.5, 27.6
On another note by the end of April 1945 the German Army Group B chief surgeon is given the job of controlling hospitals under US control for German PoWs. First army medical section is running 216 German military hospitals, 4 PoW camps, 22 Displaced Persons centres and 3 Recovered Allied Military Personnel (RAMP) hospitals, around 90,000 patients.
As part of going to war in late 1945 someone needs to allocate which parts of the world will have famines.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
I agree in theory, however with the war continuing and perhaps at in an even higher gear, I'll bet Lockheed and the AAF sort out the P-80 much quicker, just a guess however.
On the P-82, it should be able to take the B-29/B-32's anywhere they wanted to go, and the AAF will hit whatever is in range, if the factories beyond the Urals are out of range, they'll bide their time until they are, heck, the AAF waited two years to finally get the Empire of Japan in bombing range, they'd wait several months to do the same to Russian facilities.
Also to D don4331 point well taken, however the WA had been supporting the crusade across France and halfway across Germany curtesy of GMC and Dodge, unlike soviet logistics it's doubtful the VVS would be able to do anything meaningful to stop it IMO.
No one named factories beyond the Urals as targets for the B-29.
The most important Soviet factories were in the European part of the USSR, namely in the Volga region and to the west from the Northern Urals (Perm). The B-29s had sufficient range to strike them even in the most unfortunate scenario for the Allies. B-29s have a chance to bomb oil refineries in Baku, after which the war will be over within a month at the latest - it would be exactly the same as defeat of the Kwantung Army for Japan.
Since the summer of 1945, the La-7 was armed with 3xB-20s.
1xNS-37 + 1xUBS, 2748 built
The prototype had 1xN-37+2xB-20, the mass-produced airplanes were armed with 1хNS-23+2хB-20, 282 built
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Informative plus like equals winner.
as I mentioned many pages ago, Having Interceptors means nothing if they can't be directed by GCI.
As far as I have been able to find, the USSR didn't have a real Ground-controlled interception system for anywhere not named Leningrad and Moscow until 1947-1948, and that was spotty until the Korean War was underway.
It's my opinion that the KMT in China during the War had a better GCI system than the immediate postwar USSR, and the Chinese system was primitive, given the overall low infrastructure of that land.
In December 1946, radars were used in the air defense of the following cities/areas:
Moscow - 8
Leningrad - 8
Riga-Vilnius-Kaunas area - 4
Minsk-Gomel area - 6
Murmansk - 2
Baku - 4
Lvov-Mogilev-Podolskyi area - 8
Kharkov-Rostov-Zaporozhye area - 6
Odessa-Nikolaev area - 6
Tbilisi-Batumi area - 6
Another 46(!) radars were deployed in the Far East and Khabarovsk region, what is a bit strange. How many radars were deployed to the summer of 1945, I don't know.
I agree that GCI was rather a weak point for the Soviets. But even just the deployment of optical and sonic detection posts provided timely target designation. Several dozen four-engine bombers I think could be intercepted without CGI. I won't argue, I don't have enough information to make any estimates.
I wonder why you think so?
A bit more about the realities of Soviet postwar air defense.
On October 1, 1946, the commander of the Soviet air defense forces reported to the USSR Minister of Defense that the Soviet air defense was in a critical condition - the available means did not allow to protect objects reliably.
During the exercises of the North-Western Air Defense District in 1946, more than 38% of anti-aircraft artillery guidance systems could not track targets due to poor training of artillery crews, and 34% of them were simply inoperable.
In October 1947, the inspection of the South-West Air Defense District found it unable to repel massive enemy air raids.
It seems that a hundred B-29s could still play the role of Wunderwaffe in 1945.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Chinese were very well practiced in reporting Japanese flights and had a good network in place which operated much like the British Observer Corps.
It was a good piece, but it didn't make a dent during the LW strike on Poltava in June 1944.
PVO (Soviet Air Defence) was not very effective as an organisation even by the USSR standards.
