Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Nevertheless, an engine with acceptable performance (AM-39FN2 aka AM-40) did not appear until the end of 1945, and its serial production began only in late 1946. It is difficult to say whether it was possible to accelerate its finalization, but most likely yes, a mass series could be expected in early 1946. In reality, from the middle of 1945 Mikoyan and Gurevich already focused on the development of the I-250 (another absolutely futile idea).
Thus, in early 1946, the Soviets could have fighters capable of intercepting the B-29 - I estimate the effectiveness as rather low, but B-29 losses could be much higher than in the raids on Japan if bombers were detected in time taking into account the potential numbers of Soviet fighters.

Serial production in "early 1946" when what we're talking about is summer 1945. Say, by winter 1945 you get B-29s shifted to Europe, you still have literally a couple of thousand B-17s and B-24s doing what they've been doing for three years already. How many thousands of Soviet fighters are there capable of combatting even those older models?

Because you're going to need thousands of them.

The Soviets used radars, but the most industrial centers deep in the European part of the USSR had either completely inadequate radar detection or even not at all.
No new technology was required to manufacture these fighters, so they could be produced in fairly large quantities if necessary.
The most intriguing question is where the Soviets will get the high-octane gasoline for the manufactured high-altitude fighters.

They're not getting high-test fuels because it's no longer being sent via LL. Neither are the tires, boots, steel ingots, aluminum billets, chemicals for explosives, etc.

 

[SaparotRob]

Nor Spam.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I would like to see the frequency distribution of the various reasons for technical failures.

Great, go look it up. In James Scott's Black Snow, the overheating issue is listed first and foremost as a problem. Lowering bombing altitude was originally done to improve accuracy, but it was seen that a concomitant benefit was that fewer overheat aborts and engine fires occurred.

No doubt there were other technical failures. Say, how many He-277s did the Soviets shoot down?

Or reduces the chance of overconsumption of fuel. And airplanes with engines with fewer defects could also be delivered. Or just new engines for replacement.

There were plenty of B-17s and B-24s capable of bombing at 25,000 foot, albeit slower and shorter in range. But I'm unsure the VVS had enough capable fighters to counter them. Substandard radar defense net, fighters that while fast are optimized for lower altitudes and short in range, I'm thinking they hope the -29s don't show up. They're going to have their hands full all the same.

And these are bombers that have been tested and largely had defects addressed.

The B-29 was a fundamentally new machine, there was not yet much experience with such aircraft. All the "big bombers" became not big enough.

We had 18 months' experience with B-29s by June 1945. And many of their crews were crews which had flown in 8th AF ETO ops.

As for "became not big enough", that's really an appeal to hindsight. A B-29 was a hell of a lot bigger than anything a Soviet fighter pilot had ever seen. A lot harder to kill. A lot more counterfire. A lot harder to even catch.

Soviet fighters in 1945 weren't huffing for breath at 25k, they started huffing somewhere around 28k, if not higher. That's why I asked at what altitudes flights over the USSR are supposed to be carried out. In any case, this is in no way comparable to the raids on Japan from the Marianas where only a relatively small part of the route assumed a high-altitude (over 20k) flight.

Without good fighter direction, and especially considering the short range of Soviet fighters, acquiring an efficient intercept is going to be mighty hard. Now factor in small numbers of these fighters, and their relatively weak armament, and the large numbers of bombers they'll be attacking. It's not good math.

The problem is that by the time of B-29 deployment in Europe, it is too late to blanket the airfields - the bombers from the 8th and 15th AF will be doing that. B-29s are needed for strategic destruction of industrial potential of the USSR, their use for tactical tasks is little justified, in my humble opinion.

You're right that the 8th and 15th AFs will be doing yeoman's work, but blanketing the airfields will be on the B-26s and A-26s, Mosquitoes, and other tacair. The downside to Soviet fighter air is that their ranges are so short that their airfields must needs be within tactical counterair -- and that frees up the 8th and 15th heavies to strike at railyards, depots, and other, deeper targets.

I wouldn't try to destroy USSR's industry -- it's too far away for even B-29s. But I'd cripple their ability to bring anything to the front.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Nor Spam.

... and they knelt and gave thanks that they need not eat horsecock.

 

[bf109xxl]

Serial production in "early 1946" when what we're talking about is summer 1945.

In summer 1945 they will be less important. Yak-3PD can reach serial production earlier - already in September/October 1945.

Say, by winter 1945 you get B-29s shifted to Europe, you still have literally a couple of thousand B-17s and B-24s doing what they've been doing for three years already. How many thousands of Soviet fighters are there capable of combatting even those older models?

I think 5,000-6,000 out of a total of about 10,000. That's what was available on May 10, 1945 (AF + AD + Navy). Plus, the monthly production.

Because you're going to need thousands of them.

So they are available.

They're not getting high-test fuels because it's no longer being sent via LL. Neither are the tires, boots, steel ingots, aluminum billets, chemicals for explosives, etc.

The reasons are obvious, they have been mentioned many times here. The question is how fast the accumulated reserves will be consumed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think 5,000-6,000 out of a total of about 10,000. That's what was available on May 10, 1945 (AF + AD + Navy). Plus, the monthly production.

Wait, so you think the Soviets will have 5-6000 fighters capable of getting to 25,000 with one 23-mm and two 12.7mm guns and putting a stop to B-17s and B-24s? Through P-51 escorts?

So they are available.

The reasons are obvious, they have been mentioned many times here. The question is how fast the accumulated reserves will be consumed.

Right. And meanwhile, there's Liberty ships, no longer worried about U-boats, traversing the Atlantic at will.

All that fuel no longer going to USSR, where do you think it's going? All that food? Backstock of steel or chemicals for explosives, that'll keep in a warehouse, but food and fuel, those are consumables and you will not move without them. No more hi-test fuel? How fast and high will your fighters fly? No more C-rats? Now you have to move more labor to agriculture to make up the deficit. When you look at it big-picture, sure, the fighting on the ground will be tough for a bit, but the cards ain't in the East.

Facing the Western Allies, alone, and with no more LL, the Soviets might make temporary inroads into Central Europe, but I'm skeptical those inroads will last.

 

[bf109xxl]

Great, go look it up. In James Scott's Black Snow, the overheating issue is listed first and foremost as a problem.

I need statistics, numbers, not just a list.

Lowering bombing altitude was originally done to improve accuracy, but it was seen that a concomitant benefit was that fewer overheat aborts and engine fires occurred.

Or less often, the fuel ran out over the ocean. I prefer to operate with numbers.

No doubt there were other technical failures. Say, how many He-277s did the Soviets shoot down?

At least two, may be more. The first one was shot down by a woman, or rather a woman/man pair from the same regiment, claim was confirmed. But in general, the He 177 was so unreliable and used in extremely difficult conditions not for intended purpose (Stalingrad, winter-spring 1943) that its losses were very high.

There were plenty of B-17s and B-24s capable of bombing at 25,000 foot, albeit slower and shorter in range. But I'm unsure the VVS had enough capable fighters to counter them.

Ok, the real value of soviet fighters is difficult to estimate. May be, I overestimate it. Who can make an unbiased reliable estimation?

Substandard radar defense net, fighters that while fast are optimized for lower altitudes and short in range, I'm thinking they hope the -29s don't show up. They're going to have their hands full all the same.

Of course, the Soviets will have a very hard time. But they already have a high percentage of experienced pilots. Anyway, I don't see the point in guessing.

And these are bombers that have been tested and largely had defects addressed.

Soviet fighters perform better as well.

We had 18 months' experience with B-29s by June 1945. And many of their crews were crews which had flown in 8th AF ETO ops.

It's not "years of experience" at all. Rather, it is a rather modest experience.

As for "became not big enough", that's really an appeal to hindsight. A B-29 was a hell of a lot bigger than anything a Soviet fighter pilot had ever seen. A lot harder to kill. A lot more counterfire. A lot harder to even catch.

I.e., a whole new machine, much more complicated and less reliable.

Without good fighter direction, and especially considering the short range of Soviet fighters, acquiring an efficient intercept is going to be mighty hard. Now factor in small numbers of these fighters, and their relatively weak armament, and the large numbers of bombers they'll be attacking. It's not good math.

3x20 or 3x23 or 1x23+2x20 or 1x37+2x12.7 - weak armament?!

You're right that the 8th and 15th AFs will be doing yeoman's work, but blanketing the airfields will be on the B-26s and A-26s, Mosquitoes, and other tacair. The downside to Soviet fighter air is that their ranges are so short that their airfields must needs be within tactical counterair -- and that frees up the 8th and 15th heavies to strike at railyards, depots, and other, deeper targets.

The range of Soviet fighters was quite sufficient to counter Allied tactical aircraft. It would not be a decisive factor. Much more important is the training of the pilots. And here I find it difficult to say whether the Soviets had sufficient training in 1945. Probably not. But the occasional air combats with the Americans demonstrated rather equality.

I wouldn't try to destroy USSR's industry -- it's too far away for even B-29s.

Ok, you prefer to fight longer with heavier losses.

But I'd cripple their ability to bring anything to the front.

I know of one good example where a large number (several hundred) of B-17s during the day tried to bomb a large railroad junction with several bridges over a river. As a result, only one bridge suffered non-critical damage and was quickly repaired. The railroad structure suffered little damage and transportation continued after a day or two.

 

[GrauGeist]

I know of one good example

Out of how many hundreds of missions?

 

[bf109xxl]

Wait, so you think the Soviets will have 5-6000 fighters capable of getting to 25,000 with one 23-mm and two 12.7mm guns and putting a stop to B-17s and B-24s? Through P-51 escorts?

Or 3x20. Or 3x23. Or 1x37+2x12,7. They were definitely able to shoot down bomber or escort fighter. I wonder if they would have had the courage to attack a bomber formation like the Germans. I don't know.

Right. And meanwhile, there's Liberty ships, no longer worried about U-boats, traversing the Atlantic at will.

What do Liberty ships have to do with this discussion?

All that fuel no longer going to USSR, where do you think it's going?

Doesn't matter.

All that food? Backstock of steel or chemicals for explosives, that'll keep in a warehouse, but food and fuel, those are consumables and you will not move without them. No more hi-test fuel? How fast and high will your fighters fly? No more C-rats? Now you have to move more labor to agriculture to make up the deficit. When you look at it big-picture, sure, the fighting on the ground will be tough for a bit, but the cards ain't in the East.

Facing the Western Allies, alone, and with no more LL, the Soviets might make temporary inroads into Central Europe, but I'm skeptical those inroads will last.

I will not respond to what I consider irrelevant to the discussion.

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's also take into consideration the B-32 coming into service.
There were also other US bombers under development late war that were ready for production near WWII's end like the XB-42.

I can aporeciate the staunch defense of the Soviet Union, but let's face it, if.the might of the U.S military industrial complex were unleashed on the Soviet Union in 1945, it would utterly steamroll Uncle Joe's minions, regardless of long, exhausting dissertations based on opinionated suppositions.

 

[bf109xxl]

Out of how many hundreds of missions?

How many hundreds of missions involving hundreds of B-17s in a single raid on a railroad junction are known?

 

[GrauGeist]

How many hundreds of missions involving hundreds of B-17s in a single raid on a railroad junction are known?

Do more research and get back to me.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I need statistics, numbers, not just a list.

Great. If you're that interested, look 'em up. I'm not your secretary and don't work at your beck-and-call.

Or less often, the fuel ran out over the ocean. I prefer to operate with numbers.

Running out of fuel happened but usually only in conditions of battle-damage. USAAF wasn't in the habit of pushing margins too close. Most non-combat losses arose from engine trouble, not bingo fuel.

At least two, may be more. The first one was shot down by a woman, or rather a woman/man pair from the same regiment, claim was confirmed. But in general, the He 177 was so unreliable and used in extremely difficult conditions not for intended purpose (Stalingrad, winter-spring 1943) that its losses were very high.

So: the Soviets had little to no experience in combatting even mediocre heavy bombers in small numbers, and even at that only bagged one or two.

But they're going to put a stop to a couple thousand very experienced bomber crews flying airframes honed to good tolerances, and then deal as well with a few hundred bombers that were head-and-shoulders above those older designs in performance.

Ok, the real value of soviet fighters is difficult to estimate. May be, I overestimate it. Who can make an unbiased reliable estimation?

I think it's fair to say that their armament was much too light, if they could even perform well at those altitudes. The Germans saw fit to equip their bomber-destroyers with up to four 20mm cannon and then found that those propeller fighters couldn't hang with the escorts.

They put four 30s on the -262, but USSR doesn't have that capable airframe, so it's not relevant.

Of course, the Soviets will have a very hard time. But they already have a high percentage of experienced pilots. Anyway, I don't see the point in guessing.

Well, we're discussing how Unthinkable might unfold on a WWII aircraft forum. Opinions will be offered.

Soviet fighters perform better as well.

Do they perform well enough in delivering lethal armament to the fighting zone?

It's not "years of experience" at all. Rather, it is a rather modest experience.

The Brits had been flying against Germany since 1939, the Americans since 1942, so yes, it is actually years of experience delivering heavy loads against a damned good opponent.

And to be clear. the VVS had literally zero-point-zero experience defending against raids of 300-1000 bombers flying day and night. That's a mighty steep learning curve against a force well-honed for -- yes -- years in the task.

I.e., a whole new machine, much more complicated and less reliable.

Sure, it had teething troubles. Some were mechanical, some were environmental, some were operational. The Soviets themselves recognized it as great, which is why instead of designing something better than this crap they reverse-engineered it.

3x20 or 3x23 or 1x23+2x20 or 1x37+2x12.7 - weak armament?!

What planes, what armaments, and what capabilities? Be specific.

The range of Soviet fighters was quite sufficient to counter Allied tactical aircraft. It would not be a decisive factor. Much more important is the training of the pilots. And here I find it difficult to say whether the Soviets had sufficient training in 1945. Probably not. But the occasional air combats with the Americans demonstrated rather equality.

I don't think you understand me. I'm not talking about Allied tactical bombers. I'm talking about the heavies.

Without an efficient radar net, dialing in an intercept on high-flying heavies will be tough. The Brits found that out in 1940 even with medium bombers, for all Chain Home was great at the time. But if your radar is not great, your airspace is large (like, Russia large), and your fighters don't have a lot of fuel, getting them to 27,000 ft or so, at speed, and on the right vector, and they only have one cannon and a couple of MGs, their short range means that they may not get there at all, and if they do, B-17s have already shown they can stand up to 4x20mm from better fighters.

Now, if you want to use those Soviet fighters to defend against Allied tactical bombers, what's attacking the heavies?

Ok, you prefer to fight longer with heavier losses.

Not a preference, just an understanding of realities. B-29s can't reach the Urals efficiently.

Me, I'm happy this scenario never came to pass, so my preference was actually met.

I know of one good example where a large number (several hundred) of B-17s during the day tried to bomb a large railroad junction with several bridges over a river. As a result, only one bridge suffered non-critical damage and was quickly repaired. The railroad structure suffered little damage and transportation continued after a day or two.

Right, and I know of a German army that got chased out of France because they couldn't be supplied or moved by rail because heavy bombers destroyed communications. What of it?

I will not respond to what I consider irrelevant to the discussion.

What you consider "irrelevant" speaks to your limitations in thinking about this topic. It's about the Western Allies conducting war against the USSR in 1945. If you think logistics are irrelevant in that discussion, I'm not sure you bring much to the table.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

What do Liberty ships have to do with this discussion?

Do you even logistics, bro?

 

[Peter Gunn]

Been away a couple of days, lots of interesting points here.

I saw a reference that B-29's wouldn't have escorts. Really? I'm going to move on from that one because I can't wrap my head around the USAAF not using the Mustang, Thunderbolt, Lightning resources that are already combat proven. Not to mention the soon to be available P-82 and P-80. I can only assume that was in reference to trying to get to the factories beyond the Urals. However, those factories can be negated in other ways, such as:

A). Thumpalumpacus made a good point regarding all the fuel, food, chemicals etc. that the USSR is NOT getting any longer, anyone that doesn't think that will have an effect on ANY soviet offensive/defensive capability needs to dust up on logistics.

B). Thumpalumpacus also uses the example of the Wehrmacht getting its collective ass kicked out of France because of Allied TacAir nixing the use of rail and road transport, I don't see the VVS capable of stopping that either.

Again, I'm not impressed with any VVS fighter or its odds of taking on a combined bomber offensive (let alone the escorts) that has been honed to a FINE edge in training, experience, equipment and logistics. Nothing from MiG, Lavochkin or Yak is going to put much fear in a Mustang, Thunderbolt, P-82 or (unfortunately for the soviets) a P-80 pilot.

Besides, the USAAF is going to just send B-29's on impossibly long range missions just for the hell of it, they'd start hitting what they needed to within range and work their way east.

 

[special ed]

Just a chirp from the sidelines, I do not think the P-80 in 1945-46 will be a factor with it's short range and unreliable engine. These were mostly solved by 1950 just in time for Korea.

 

[SaparotRob]

Besides, the USAAF is going to just send B-29's on impossibly long range missions just for the hell of it,....

That has the ring of truth.

 

[don4331]

Just a chirp from the sidelines, I do not think the P-80 in 1945-46 will be a factor with it's short range and unreliable engine. These were mostly solved by 1950 just in time for Korea.

Another chirp from the sidelines:

Can Allies do sufficient logistics to support Western Europe through the winter of 45-46 while fighting Soviets at the same time?

Weren't things really tight for the Germans/French without fighting Russians while we put the infrastructure back together??​

​

Will French/Germans/Norwegians/etc be happy to have Americans/British fighting Soviets while they freeze/starve?​

 

[Juha3]

And how well Allied supply would have fared without the French railways. The railway workers' union was in the hands of the communists and probably most of the railway workers were communists, so if the West vs USSR war broke out, they would probably have paralyzed the French railways at least for a while. And they had in fresh memory of effective means of disrupting railway traffic.

 

[Juha3]

...Then your Soviet fighters get to the B-29's analog-computer FC system which managed a positive kill-ratio against jets.

Did they, those confirmed claims vs own true losses comparisions are rather useless in giving info about the real life facts. The writers of the report did not even know what aircraft North Koreans had, even at the beginning of the war they had Yak-9Ps, a post-war version and a bit different animal than Yak-7 or plain Yak-9 or even Yak-9D.