1940: RAF 'ideal' Bombers in France

[stona]

I agree. However it's what Britain needed for CAS.

Unfortunately that was not a role the RAF saw for itself in the 1930s. It was dragged kicking and screaming to CAS, first by men like Coningham in North Africa, and then all over again in 1944. It is almost impossible to over emphasise the objections amongst senior air men to this type of role, throughout the 1930s and throughout the war.

From D-Day to the end of the war in Europe Bomber Command flew 182,549 operational sorties of which less than 10,000 were in close support.

Even in 1945 none of the aircraft flying CAS to British troops had been designed for that role.

In May 1941 Air Vice Marshall Slessor reacted to Army suggestions that the RAF should be doing more to destroy German tanks and guns on the battlefield by angrily condemning this as a tendency for the Army to ask the RAF to do what it should be doing itself, adding that "it was the job of the Army's anti tank weaponry to destroy enemy tanks on the battlefield."

It doesn't change the fact that aircraft like the Ju 87,capable of this kind of operation, were exactly what the RAF needed in France in 1940. Of course it would have needed the command and control system to operate such an aircraft in this role too. That doesn't mean, as happened, army officers telephoning London for support from aircraft based in France!

Hindsight is a wonderful thing!

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Ju88 is one thing, but i absolutely reject that Ju87 was what was needed by the RAF in France. If it had Ju87s in place of say its battles, the Ju87s would still have been slaughtered, just like the Battles because of the types vulnerability.

When operating in such a hostile environment as NW France in 1940, what was needed was greater survivability, not greater mission capability.

Divebombing was a thoroughly discredited technique by late 43 anyway, because of the vulnerabilities of the aircraft whilst undetaking such manouvres. they tended to be vulnerable to fighters, because of the low performance of the types, but even worse, were just absolute death traps when confronted with even half decent flak defences. A dive bomber in its dive is an avsolutely predictable, vulnerable target.

Ju88 was an altogether different proposition. if the RAF had something similar to the Ju88, they would have had a potent bomber in the inventory.

 

[davebender]

Where did you get a crazy idea like that? Here's a picture of a P-47 attempting (unsuccessfully) to dive bomb Fort Driant during the fall of 1944.

By late 1943 everyone was trying to dive bomb to improve weapon accuracy. Naturally purpose built dive bombers such as Ju-87D had a big advantage in bomb size, accuracy and protection against ground fire.

 

[pattle]

Where did you get a crazy idea like that? Here's a picture of a P-47 attempting (unsuccessfully) to dive bomb Fort Driant during the fall of 1944.
View attachment 235089

By late 1943 everyone was trying to dive bomb to improve weapon accuracy. Naturally purpose built dive bombers such as Ju-87D had a big advantage in bomb size, accuracy and protection against ground fire.

It was one thing for a P47 to try this sort of thing but another for a slow plodding Vultee Vengeance though.

 

[parsifal]

Where did you get a crazy idea like that? Here's a picture of a P-47 attempting (unsuccessfully) to dive bomb Fort Driant during the fall of 1944.

As has been pointed out many times, fighter bomber attacks are not divebombing attacks, though they are similar in a general sort of way. Divebombers use divebrakes and a much steeper angle of dive, that makes them both accurate but slow and vulnerable at the same time. Fighter Bombers improved the survability of the aircraft by maintaining high perforamance, and attacking at shallower angles. They were far less accurate, but far more suvivable as well

Divebombers were first declared obsolete during the military negotiation part of Casablanca. A comunique issued jointly by the RAF and the USAAC was reported in the Times as follows:

"ALGIERS, Thursday.-The dive bomber is described as obsoleto in a statement issued by tho R.A.F and U.S.A.A.F. in Tunisia. "Stukas wero the first bombing weapons tho Germans used against our troops in Africa over two years ago," it says. "Ono year later tho Stuka had been proved obsolete.

"A careful analysis of hundreds of dive-bombing attacks shows that tho average amount of damage they did was minute compared with the losses suffered. Their slow diving speed made thom ideal targets for anti-aircraft gun ners and a prey to fighters. Thorn have been occasions in this wor when considerable formations of .Stukas havo been shot out of the sky in one en gagement. Their losses became so heavy last autumn that they no longer dared to dive.""

Stukas suffered horeendous losses everywhere except the eastern front after 1942

By late 1943 everyone was trying to dive bomb to improve weapon accuracy. Naturally purpose built dive bombers such as Ju-87D had a big advantage in bomb size, accuracy and protection against ground fire.

They are more accurate, but your claims are in direct conflict with the conclusions reached by both the RAF and the USAAC from early in 1943 onward. And they were withdrawing their purpose built divebombers because of thta vulnerability such as the Vengeance squadrons in New Guinea.

Fighter Bombers are a different issue, but are not strictly divebombers either. im not raising issue with fighter bombers, neither am i raising issues with glide bombers like the Ju88.

 

[tomo pauk]

Pe-2 and A-36 were operating against the dreded German light Flak, nowhere where they, or their tactics (=dive bombers) discarded as obsolete; lumping Ju-87 together with decent performers is misleading.
It took guided missiles to offer accuracy offered by dive bomber attack, both on land and sea.

 

[Greyman]

Indeed, any worthwhile examination into the exploits of Hawker Typhoons reveals a lot of dive bombing.

 

[parsifal]

But they, or any other fighter undertaking a ground strike, are not, by definition, a divebomber. And neither are they nearly as accurate.

Ju87s could undertake attacks at near vertical descents, or at least , up to a maximum of about 70-80 degrees. They could control the rate of descent using their dive brakes. All of which made them very efficient in terms of accuracy. But they were vulnerable. very much so. to both flak and fighters. the very things that made them dangerous in attack, made them vulnerable in defence. And the thing the RAF needed in 1940 more than anything was survivability.

Typhoons, Pe2s, Ju88s, were accurate, more accurate than a level bomber, but not as accurate as a divebomber. their angle of attack might be 40 or 50% maximum, and the steeper the dive the faster the descent. This made them inherently less accurate than a dedicated divebomber. But the edvantage for them was that this inherent weakness in their mission capability also made them survivable in a hostile environment.

 

[stona]

Incidentally the P-47 could dive bomb from a 90 degree dive and did so in trials. Accuracy was significantly better than the more usual 60 degree attack and it was found that there was no danger of the bomb striking the propeller. I posted this from the original report, which I can't find at the moment, in another thread somewhere.

Both the British and Americans were dive bombing in some way or another in 1944/45 in CAS. The reasons why none of these aircraft (British or US) were designed for this purpose lies in my posts above.

The original question was about 1940 and is entirely hypothetical. Had the RAF had an aircraft like the Ju 87 and used it properly it might well have been successful in the Battle of France. It would have had to have used tactics not developed until later in the war, attacking from several points of the compass simultaneously to "dilute" anti aircraft fire for example. It would also have had to operate under an umbrella of local and temporary air superiority. There are a lot of ifs and buts but it could have been done theoretically.
Would it have been possible practically in 1940? Not a chance, but that wasn't the question.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

But they, or any other fighter undertaking a ground strike, are not, by definition, a divebomber. And neither are they nearly as accurate.

Ju87s could undertake attacks at near vertical descents, or at least , up to a maximum of about 70-80 degrees. They could control the rate of descent using their dive brakes. All of which made them very efficient in terms of accuracy. But they were vulnerable. very much so. to both flak and fighters. the very things that made them dangerous in attack, made them vulnerable in defence. And the thing the RAF needed in 1940 more than anything was survivability.

Typhoons, Pe2s, Ju88s, were accurate, more accurate than a level bomber, but not as accurate as a divebomber. their angle of attack might be 40 or 50% maximum, and the steeper the dive the faster the descent. This made them inherently less accurate than a dedicated divebomber. But the edvantage for them was that this inherent weakness in their mission capability also made them survivable in a hostile environment.

Again - it was Ju-87 that was vulnerable to the fighters, due to it's low performance, not due the fact it was a dive bomber. Same can be said for Dauntless, Val, Skua etc - accurate dive bombers, but cold meat on table for decent fighter opposition.
Ju-88 and Pe-2 were proper dive bombers (of course, those two were built in other versions), dive brakes et el. Ditto A-36. The decent performance made them far less vulnerable to the fighters.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Better bombers would have been nice in France, but to really make a difference, you'd need a different bombing doctrine, different training, better communication between the bomber and fighter arms and better target selection. Above all that though, the RAF needed three or four times the number of fighters stationed in France in May 1940 - denying the Luftwaffe air superiority would have taken away their tactical and strategic initiative in the campaign and enabled the RAF and the Armee de la Air to operate much more effectively.

RAF bomber doctrine favoured long-range strategic attacks, rather than the fluid, tactical situation that the RAF found itself faced with in May-1940. Even the Battle was designed to carry a bomb on a 1000 mile round trip. The Advanced Air Striking Force was expecting and planning to hit industrial targets in Germany, not battlefield targets in the fields of France.

What the RAF in France needed was a doctrine based around medium range interdiction and short range support. To some extent, it tried the first part, aiming to hit German motor concentrations, supply dumps and the like, but its was generally unsuccessful. Such strikes were usually unescorted and based on incorrect or scanty intelligence.

Combined operations doctrine between bomber and land forces was almost non-existent. To quote Gooderson:
The British Army and Royal Air Force did not possess an agreed joint doctrine for integrating air power with the operations of an army in the field. There was no tactical air force for working closely with an army, and there was no joint system of command and communications.

Against heavily defended bridges, RAF tactics were also found wanting. The RAF had not correctly judged to firepower of modern, automatic or semi-automatic anti-aircraft artillery, particularly the 20-37 mm weapons the Germans used in great numbers.

Effective bomber-fighter communications and cooperation were also virtually non-existent. Fighters and bombers continually missed rendezvous, leaving the fighters to swan about maintaining local air superiority (a task they actually performed admirably given their limited numbers) or fly about searching for the bombers. Meanwhile, the bombers either ended up getting hacked apart by German fighters, as they had no escorts, or engaging in tactical missions that they simply weren't designed to carry out.

Fighter numbers were insufficient. There were only 4 RAF fighter squadrons in France when the German attack came, but they were supposed to provide protection for the 10 bomber squadrons AND the nine other specialist squadrons. Fighter support was increased though the campaign, but in dribs and drabs, rather than the decisive mass than was needed from the onset.

RAF operations over Dunkirk, southern England and in the Western Desert in early 1941 showed that even the obsolescent Hurricane could make life impossible for the enemy, provided that it met the opposition in equal numbers.

 

[Shortround6]

Jabberwocky has it pretty much on the mark. As an indication of what the RAF thought the army needed for support aircraft see the Lysander. The spiritual successor if you will to the army co-operation Harts of earlier times. The Lysander had double the number of forward firing guns as a Battle or Blenheim. It could carry a 250lb bomb on EACH bomb rack. It was fitted with a message hook for picking up messages from ground units ( can't trust those pesky radios
The Lysander just didn't undertake any high profile missions in France. But is record is every bit as dismal as the others despite the bravery and dedication of it's crews.

" Of 174 Lysanders sent to France, 88 were lost in aerial combat and 30 were destroyed on the ground. 120 crewmen were lost. Only 50 aircraft survived to return to Britain."

That was the RAF "tasked" with supporting the army.

The British need not different planes but a different doctrine, different training, different communications networks and it needed constant practice. A few hours training several months before a combat mission and few "table-top" exercises wouldn't have done the reick even if they had attempted such a minimal approach.

 

[pattle]

The Allies were doomed in the Battle of France because they were behind with the times, the British Army was under the command of the French who's HQ didn't even have telephone communications for heavens sake and the French General running the whole thing was as old as the Ark! If the French had their more modern thinking Generals in charge before and during the war then they would of had things much better organised and maybe the Germans would not have dared going to war with France. If the RAF had had mosquitos during the Battle of France I don't think even they could have done much more than slow the Germans down.

 

[parsifal]

They were doomed, but I think it was an avoidable defeat, if only......so many things were wrong....maybe it was unavoidable after all

 

[tomo pauk]

The Allies were doomed in the Battle of France because they were behind with the times, the British Army was under the command of the French who's HQ didn't even have telephone communications for heavens sake and the French General running the whole thing was as old as the Ark! If the French had their more modern thinking Generals in charge before and during the war then they would of had things much better organised and maybe the Germans would not have dared going to war with France. If the RAF had had mosquitos during the Battle of France I don't think even they could have done much more than slow the Germans down.

Neither French, nor British show during May/June of 1940 was stellar, of course due to not being prepared for a motorized war. Blaming just the French is misleading.

 

[Shortround6]

The British showing was far from stellar but given the size of the British army at the time (10 divisions?) the British were NOT going to be able to save France. Delay things by a week or two at absolute best. Many British units put up a creditable showing performing a difficult role. Retreating in the face of constant pressure from an attacking enemy is a very difficult job. Many times the retreats were caused by Belgian or French units falling back and exposing the the British flanks.
Standing and dying sounds glorious but actually accomplishes little unless it actually blocks the enemy for a defining moment at a critical time. Standing and dying when the enemy only only has to march 2-10 miles one way or the other to go around is foolish. The British units retreated in good order, leap frogging backwards retaining most of their equipment and were able to fight right up until the last few days.

Had the Belgians and French performed as well the Germans might still have won but it would have been a much longer fight.

 

[tomo pauk]

Part of the British armed forces was also the RAF, that was to give the opportunity for the UK not to fight the next big war like the Great war was fought. Unfortunately, one can readily agree with Jaberwocky (post #31 here) - RAF was ill able to offensively hurt the Germans during 1939/40, either on strategic* or tactical level, hence it could not helped the British (and allied) ground forces back then.

Had the Belgians and French performed as well the Germans might still have won but it would have been a much longer fight.

Well put.

*my conclusion, re. recent thread about feasibility of Anglo-French bombing campaign in 1939/40

 

[Shortround6]

Unfortunately, one can readily agree with Jaberwocky (post #31 here) - RAF was ill able to offensively hurt the Germans during 1939/40, either on strategic* or tactical level, hence it could not helped the British (and allied) ground forces back then.
*my conclusion, re. recent thread about feasibility of Anglo-French bombing campaign in 1939/40

The British were also restricted on the political level. The French insisted that the British "Advanced Air Striking Force" not actually bomb German territory for fear of reprisal German bombing of France. This edict lead to the numerous and infamous leaflet raids of the phony war. Given their later performance they might not have accomplished much except to recognize earlier how bad their navigation/bombing accuracy was. Photo-recon doesn't show leaflet impacts

 

[pattle]

Neither French, nor British show during May/June of 1940 was stellar, of course due to not being prepared for a motorized war. Blaming just the French is misleading.

You misunderstand, I don't blame just the French which is why I wrote that the Allies were doomed. Although not nearly modern enough I think the British were more modern in their ways than the French but having said that it was hardly possible not to be. The French had a lot on their side including better tanks and more of them than the Germans, the French also had a lot of very committed troops it was just their top brass that let them down. If the French (and I talk of the French because they had by far the biggest army) had of had good communications with their front lines, had of had concentrated tank formations, had of had committed the best of it's air force and had of had been clever enough to realise that they were being drawn into a trap by moving into Belgium should of done well against the Germans, the fact that they didn't wasn't the fault of the ordinary French soldiers who were killed in massive numbers but their leaders. There is a tendency to expect the next war to be fought like the last and this is where the mistake was made in London and Paris before the war.

 

[parsifal]

The BEF in 1940 was actually more significant proportionally than it had been in 1914 when the "old contemptibles" (a reference to the reported description made by the Kaiser that the British army was a "contemptible little army" to be destroyed) took part at Mons and later in the defences at the Meuse. In August 1914 there were just 6 divs under General French, by December it was possible to form 2 Armies, with about 12 functional divisions.

The great stregth of the british Army was its motorization. There were 10 fully motorized divisions, with more vehicles than the 10 Pz Divs in the Wehrmacht. If you throw in the French motorized formations, consiting of 10 motorized Infantry Divs, 4 armoured Divs and 3 DLM (mechanized divs) plus the incomplete British 1st Armoured Div, the Allies enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage. But the available forces were badly misused. At the heart of the problem was the unshakeable belief in the "continuous front" theories. This threw all the idea of mobile reserves, "strongpoint defence (quadrillage) and immediate counterattacks out the door for the sake of stringing out forces, lining them up like nine pins for destruction in detail and relying on firepower over mobility.

There were stirrings on the allied side to update the methods of warfare. men like DeGaulle and the much maligned Gort viewed with a lot of misgiving the prepration being made for war.

If these men had been listened to, tactics changed, dispositions altered things would have gone differently. The idea the French didnt fight ofr the germans were unstoppable is a total post war allied apology for what amounted to a total stuff up.