1940: RAF 'ideal' Bombers in France

Just to clarify, the the British were totally "motorized" in the sense that there were NO HORSES in the British army units in France. The Infantry still walked/marched where it had to go. Sometimes trucks could be assigned for long moves but the battalions/divisions did NOT have enough organic transport for anywhere near all the troops.

Shortround6 said:

Just to clarify, the the British were totally "motorized" in the sense that there were NO HORSES in the British army units in France. The Infantry still walked/marched where it had to go. Sometimes trucks could be assigned for long moves but the battalions/divisions did NOT have enough organic transport for anywhere near all the troops.

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This assumes that somehow the level of motorization in the british Army was less than those of its allies and opponents. Whilst there were undeniable shortages of MTin the BEF, they pale into insignificance compared to the germans (in particular).

A British Infantry Division with a strength of 13800 men in 1940 had 2852 MT assigned to the Divisional TO&E and around 3000 other vehicles that were non-divisional trucks in support.

For the French a DLM with a strength of 10400 men and around 3300 MT directly attached. I dont know the numbers of non-divisional trucks, but Ive estimated previously about 1000 truck for their mobile formations in support echelons

The french DIM (motorized infantry) had 17900 men attached and about 1600 vehciles directly attached. The French used a system of strategic groupements whereby motorization groupes would be attached to the division as needed. Each groupe typically had about 200 lorries and an unknown number of other vehicles attached (this was remarkably similar to the American Truck pool system used in 1944 in the post Overlor advances. It typically required the attachment of 3 Groupes to a division to allow all its elements to be moved at once. That means on my estimate that to move the entire division it took about 2200-2400 MT Its a lot less than the British unit (despite greater manpower levels), because of the vastly bigger artillery park in the British Div.

A German Infantry Div (1st line) had 942 MT attached to a div with 15500 personnel. Second echelon trucks were fairly limited, perhaps just under 1000 vehicles per div (though Im not sure)

A German Panzer Div had about 2500 MT attached to a TO&E of around 13000 men.

British motorization had its shortages and problems, but it was vastly better than any of its allies or its oponents

parsifal said:

There were stirrings on the allied side to update the methods of warfare. men like DeGaulle and the much maligned Gort viewed with a lot of misgiving the prepration being made for war.

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One of the refrains you hear time and time again in the writings of BEF and AASF/Air Component leaders was that some of the valuable lessons learned in the pre-war (1936-1939) exercises were either completely ignored or thrown out when they were deployed into combat.

Ideas about proper aircraft dispersion, airfield positioning and ground organisation for the air arms seems to have reverted to the models of the late 1920s, early 1930s. Similarly, notions of effective use of aircraft for ground support, reconnissance, as well as air-ground communications and cooperation between the Army and the Air Force reverted to doctrine from a similar period.

If these men had been listened to, tactics changed, dispositions altered things would have gone differently. The idea the French didnt fight ofr the germans were unstoppable is a total post war allied apology for what amounted to a total stuff up.

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I agree entirely. The western allies weren't pre-destined to fail in France, although they didn't do themselves that many favours in the lead up to the war. The French and the British were disorganised and thoroughly unprepared for the type of warfare they encountered.

If the higher echelons of command in France and Britain had been more willing to listen to men like Fuller and Hart on the ground and been less willing to listen to the 'Trenchard' school of aerial warfare theorists, things might have gone much differently.

Some material on the british Army which i think is quite useful


http://www.testofbattle.com/upload/bob/CD Guide ro British Forces in Europe 39-41.pdf

A forum discussion on motorization that people might find useful


http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/motor-transport-german-army-30006-3.html

The RAF or Air ministry didn't exactly help the cause in France: from what I have read there was always a shortage of spare parts and other support on the airfields used by the RAF, while there were also big problems regarding a lack of rear echelon servicing areas, including hangars, accommodation for aircrew and ground crews etc. 2 TAF solved the problems by having a huge support and supply network which enabled them to build and supply airfields where-ever and when-ever needed.

Some interesting points:

- I just don't see the RAF ordering bombers from the US in time for France 1940. Earlier they were impressed by the B-10 and used it's capabilities to get the British Aircraft industry to modernise. Yet, there was (AFAIK) no interest in the A-17 or A-18 i.e. 'attack' aircraft with forward firing weapons. When the BPC went to the US they were impressed with the speed efficiency of Lockheed and ordered what became - the Hudson, though when it was announced there was a lot of opposition.

- You might think there was more benefit in co-operation with production with France, but we are looking with 'modern eyes' to with the view of the time - how can you sell Blenheims to Finland and Yugoslavia when you're buying it's competitor the Potez 630 series.
The French bombers of the period tend to be much maligned, but that was the IMO the older ones i.e. Farman, Bloch 210, whereas the Bloch 174, Amiot 350 series, Leo 451, and stubby Bregeot 690 series - in numbers, in the right (trained) hands, and fully sortied could have done well.

As mention RAF attitude and tactics didn't help! But then, they didn't want to send an Air Component to France if they could help it. Perhaps too a side effect of the dividing the air force into Bomber Fighter Commands etc., meant that Bomber Command had no Fighters, and Fighter Command had no Bombers!

It has been suggested about the 'Stuka' - the nearest the RAF came to having one was the Henley (surprised no one's mentioned it) - yes granted it would have needed a different attitude to DB, but it could have been there in stead of some of the Battles. A mixed formation of Henleys Hurricanes would be confusing to the Germans!!
Also, re: flak - to me it seems physically easier to track a low-flying or shallow diving aircraft i.e. from right-to-left, than it would be to track from up - to - down a diving aircraft!

It's pushing plausibility to get the Mosquito or Beaufighter early enough - but maybe the Supermarine 313 - able to carry bombs internally, or the Gloster twin to the earlier Turret spec - "could it carry bombs".

And, maybe Blenheim with better engines, or (as said earlier) Bristol P.13/36 - Bicester or Buckfast ?

Any other 'projects that could help!