1941: the best airframe for a single engined fighter

[tomo pauk]

Betty and Nell were not designated as 'maritime attack aircraft' in IJA, but as the 'heavy bombers', able equally to carry bombs or torpedo, to attack both ground maritime targets. The Zero was to be able equally to escort those and Bettys and Vals. The Japanese seem to not believe in the maxims that bombers could protect themselves, nor that they will always get through, at least not in early ww2 years.

 

[jim]

Yes, the RAF would have loved to have a P-51 or equivalent in 1942, to extend the air superiority they had already gained (at such hig price) over Britain, the Channel and the channel coast in 1941-2. The Luftwaffe either refused battle except under the most favourable circumstances, or withdrew out of the range of FC. If FC had had a long range fighter like the P-51 in 1942, they could have finished the LW off in the west.

In 1943 when the P-51 began to be supplied as LL, the RAF could not get enough of them. There were no serious complaints about the type from any in the CW that used them.

What we are seeing here is the classic formula these guys always use....mix a little truth with a load of codswallop to jazz up the brew, and thereby increase its potency. that way more people will believe the basic lie

Like channel dash?
Like Dieppe? Luftwafffe ordered the british where to land ? And then then run away ? Who shot down 120 british plsnes? Even if i used a little truth you used none.
Parsifal
The quality of historical accarancy and truth of your post is analog to your quality. Call me leier by the safety of your chair.Keep exchange likes with drgondog
Drgondog , nice irony your last post
Mr Dave parir
a) MW50 was nothing special, 150 octane fuel was special
b) Ki84 why was not fast? 2000hp in a relatively small airframe
C) P51A accelarated very slowly to its top speed. It is reported in this forum
d)F4 is 41/42 machine
e) G56 was 685-700 km/h machine
Anyway, opposite opinion means leis for the anglosaxons. Time to retire.

 

[Siegfried]

How did the late war DB605D perform at high altitude?

The DCM and DBM (M if MW50) the D engines had a higher compression ratio than the DB605ASM so for the same manifold pressure had higher power and efficieny.. In addition the engine could take 1.8 even 1.98 ata boost.

Some tables here, of limited use due to the lack of full curves.
The Luftwaffe page , Daimler-Benz DB 605

The rated aktitutenpower at rated altutue for DB and DC would apply for the DC and DB rate altitude.
There was the DB605L engine with a two stage supercharger, however the single stage DB605DCM series did quite well.

IE the power levels for D2, DB, DC would apply to all 3

 

[davebender]

They also had 3 valves per cylinder rather then 4 like DB605A series engines. Not sure why they made that change.

 

[pinsog]

I repeat P51 was excellent, top escort fighter (along late p38s) but during all its carrer i could see better dogfight/air superiority airframes,
Many german pilots had this opinion too[/QUOTE]

I'm sorry, but I get an image of some poor hapless German pilot running like mad with a Mustang hot on his tail, 50 caliber tracer rounds pelting his airframe and then 1 minute later, he is floating down in his parachute thinking about what a pile of junk it was that just shot him down.

How could German pilots have anything but the GREATEST respect for an airplane that flies all the way from Britain, shoots your top performing fighters down in flames on a regular basis and then flies home.

PS: I don;t even like the Mustang. I like the P47 and the F4U

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal - have you thought about the effect you have on tender ears when you 'tippy toe' around the point?

I think thats why they like me so much

 

[parsifal]

Like channel dash?

Made necessary by the repeated unansweerd attacks on the heavy ships based in the channel. If the allies did not posses air superiority the channel dash (a retreat made out by the german propaganda machine to look like a victory) would never have been needed

Like Dieppe? Luftwafffe ordered the british where to land ? And then then run away ? Who shot down 120 british plsnes? Even if i used a little truth you used none.

The fact that the british could undertake a cross channel raid in 1942 is evidence of itself that they had won air superiority. without air superiority the operation could not be undertaken. This was precisely the reason the Germans could not undertake such raids at any time, from1940 on. They never gained air superiority, ergo they could not undertake military action with complete freedom of manouvre.

air superiority is not about losses. In my posts I acknowledge that the British won their prize at great cost. Air superiority is not about having the flashiest fighters, its about getting control of the sky and being able to do the things you want to do. In 1942 the allies had greater fredom of action compared to the LW. Germans still had air denial capability, hence the losses, but this was a wasting asset, a pointless, directionless resistance that was leading them nowhere. The allies were working toward a goal and achieving it.

The losses at Dieppe are not as one sided as you suggest, but I will leave that to others to explain to you. Suffice it to say that it was evidence of the german ability to deny airspece. the allied evidence of air superiority was in their ability to undertake the operation in the first place, confident that the LW could not stop them

Parsifal
The quality of historical accarancy and truth of your post is analog to your quality. Call me leier by the safety of your chair.Keep exchange likes with drgondog

I didnt call you a liar, I said this is the brew used by some to increase the potency of the brew. if you think you have told lies in your post, good on you for admitting as much.

I like DGs posts because he provides crystal clear clarity and brings a lot of knowledge into this place. That deserves respect ("like) in my opnion

Anyway, opposite opinion means leis for the anglosaxons. Time to retire.

Im not an anglo saxon, and yes, it might be time to retire. bye bye until next time

 

[davebender]

21 May 1944.
Erich Hartmann flying Me-109G near Bucharest.
Hartmann shot down two P-51s without difficulty then evaded the other 8 P-51s until his Me-109G ran out of fuel, forcing him to bail out.

IMO this engagement nicely sums up the strengths and weaknesses of Me-109s vs P-51s. The Me-109 sacrificed internal fuel capacity to achieve an excellent power to weight ratio resulting in superior aerial performance. Just hope the battle doesn't last long or take place far from your airfield.

 

[DonL]

The fact that the british could undertake a cross channel raid in 1942 is evidence of itself that they had won air superiority. without air superiority the operation could not be undertaken.

With all respect, Dieppe was nothing more then a suicide commando what ended in a total disaster. I can't understand, with any military thinking, that Dieppe proved anything except it was a wrong plan at a wrong time.

Any suicide commando can be undertaken at any time!

At 1942 the FW 190A was introduced in numbers at the english channel and was called the butcher bird by the english counterparts and the FC had a very difficult time near the whole year 1942 to get something equal in the air. To all my books nobody had ever claimed a FC air superiority at 1942 of the english channel.

Sorry here I disagree fundamental from military viewpoint!

Edit:

The losses at Dieppe are not as one sided as you suggest, but I will leave that to others to explain to you. Suffice it to say that it was evidence of the german ability to deny airspece. the allied evidence of air superiority was in their ability to undertake the operation in the first place, confident that the LW could not stop them

The allied losses were 4359 men (1179 killed and 2190 prisoners, rest injured). The FC lost 119 fighters.
The Wehrmacht lost 311 men and 280 injured. The LW lost 29 fighters and total 74 aircrafts (40 bombers). From this 74 aircrafts were 48 total losses.

If this isn't one sided, what is in your opinion one sided?

 

[pinsog]

21 May 1944.
Erich Hartmann flying Me-109G near Bucharest.
Hartmann shot down two P-51s without difficulty then evaded the other 8 P-51s until his Me-109G ran out of fuel, forcing him to bail out.

And Chuck Yeager, among some other allied pilots, made "ace in a day" with the Mustang. Proves nothing. There were Wildcat pilots who shot down multiple zero's in one mission. There were Hurricane and P40 pilots that shot down more than 1 109 or 190's on a single mission.

If we are discussing airframes alone, the fact the Mustangs could fly from England and fight until the GERMANS ran out of fuel speak for itself.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... With all respect, Dieppe was nothing more then a suicide commando what ended in a total disaster. I can't understand ...."

Careful, my friend. We don't describe Dieppe quite that way in Canada. We acknowledge that Dieppe was ill-fated, and we admit there were 'political' considerations - of our own making - here in Canada - but Dieppe was not suicidal. Canadian Forces don't roll that way, and if you know your history - both wars - you should know that, DonL.

MM

 

[DonL]

For me, from a strictly military viewpont, this whole raid was suicidal!

There was know single hope or chance that this raid would be in any kind successful and this was communicated to Lord Mountbatten more then one time!

Edit:

I have no problem to describe german military actions as suicidal, if they had the same chance of success as Dieppe!
For exampel, Stalingrad was at a certain date nothing more then suicidal!

 

[davebender]

Operation Jubilee order of battle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
4th Canadian Infantry Bde (3 regiments)
1 infantry company plus a mortar platoon from 5th Canadian Infantry Bde.
6th Canadian Infantry Bde (-). 1 regiment did not go ashore.
14th Tank Regiment.

Did the Canadian division size task force withdraw any equipment from the beach?

 

[parsifal]

With all respect, Dieppe was nothing more then a suicide commando what ended in a total disaster. I can't understand, with any military thinking, that Dieppe proved anything except it was a wrong plan at a wrong time.

Any suicide commando can be undertaken at any time!

It was not seen as a commando attack and whilst it proved suicidal, its purpose was partly to act as a sop to Stalin and demonstrate to him that a cross channel attack impractical. Sacrificing 5000 Allied lives (mostly Canadian) saved tens of thousands of others. It proved that a direct attack onto a defended port or coast was indeed suicide, and led to a whole range of changes to amphibious assaults that followed. most notably a massive increase in gunfire support, the allocation of specific direct fire support ships (usually DDs) that acted as a rapid response unit for individual formations on shore (usually of battalion size). This experience, and that gained during the TORCH landings greatly reduced the casualty rates in the larger operations that followed, such as GHusky, Neptune/Overlord and Dragoon. The techniques learnt at Dieppe were even of benefit to the fighting in the Pacific.

Dieppe was never intended or executed as a permanent landing. it was always a probing attack, to test defences and learn fom the experience. in this regard it was an outstanding success. it achieved the strategic aims it was designed to do, but at great cost.

At 1942 the FW 190A was introduced in numbers at the english channel and was called the butcher bird by the english counterparts and the FC had a very difficult time near the whole year 1942 to get something equal in the air. To all my books nobody had ever claimed a FC air superiority at 1942 of the english channel.

Im not claiming the LW was driven from the sky, or that they were not capable of inflicting heavy losses. But look up what the meaning of air superiority is. The Germans didnt have it, not in 1940, not in 1941, certainly not in 1942. The British didnt have it in 1940, many claim that they had achieved it by 1941, but more say by 1942.

Air superiority has little to do with losses. It has mostly to do with control....what can be done and what cannot. Amphibious asault is generally seen as impossible if the enemy holds air superiority. It can be undertaken if the air control state is neutral, but its best to have control of the air to maximise success of the operation. Thats one of the main reasons why the japanese did not undertake any further amphibs after August 1942, and why the germans did not undertake any amphibs except in the baltic, after 1940 (and in the baltic they were unsuccessful in 1944, though they did succeed in '41)

Sorry here I disagree fundamental from military viewpoint!

Thats fine, we have disagreed on this point before, but military theory is military theory, and the definition of what constitutes air superiority is also very clear. I am simply applying the theory to the situation on the western front (the british isles, the Channel and the European Channel Coast). The allies had achieved air superiority ion either 1941, or 1942, within those parameters. Thats not my opinion, or some far out position, its the simple application of what is air superiority to that region.

The allied losses were 4359 men (1179 killed and 2190 prisoners, rest injured). The FC lost 119 fighters.
The Wehrmacht lost 311 men and 280 injured. The LW lost 29 fighters and total 74 aircrafts (40 bombers). From this 74 aircrafts were 48 total losses.

If this isn't one sided, what is in your opinion one sided

?

I was mostly referring to the air losses, but in the context of what the operation set out to do, and what it did achieve, it was successful. it was never going to be cheap, but what it achieved saved more lives than it cost.

Military success is not always the butchers bill. in fact it seldom is. The casualty figures are a by-product of the operation. Look at Lees defences in the seven days battles during the ACW and you will see what im referring to. Now, the casualties for Dieppe are undenaible, but what did it achieve ? For the germans, virtually nothing, for the allies, a welath of information, and a soothing of a disgruntled ally. Good value at the price paid IMO

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Did the Canadian division size task force withdraw any equipment from the beach?"

I don't believe so, db. The main stuff was the Churchills and they didn't get off the pebble-cobblestone beach - sadly.


"... I have no problem to describe german military actions as suicidal, if they had the same chance of success as Dieppe!
For example, " Stalingrad" was at a certain date nothing more then suicidal!

Doomed perhaps. Certainly doomed. But suicidal no. Hitler was suicidal, but the Germans in the kettle were NOT suicidal and, DonL, you speak too glibly about the lives of your dead countrymen, IMHO . "Suicidal", indeed !!!!

 

[DonL]

It was not seen as a commando attack and whilst it proved suicidal, its purpose was partly to act as a sop to Stalin and demonstrate to him that a cross channel attack impractical. Sacrificing 5000 Allied lives (mostly Canadian) saved tens of thousands of others. It proved that a direct attack onto a defended port or coast was indeed suicide, and led to a whole range of changes to amphibious assaults that followed. most notably a massive increase in gunfire support, the allocation of specific direct fire support ships (usually DDs) that acted as a rapid response unit for individual formations on shore (usually of battalion size). This experience, and that gained during the TORCH landings greatly reduced the casualty rates in the larger operations that followed, such as GHusky, Neptune/Overlord and Dragoon. The techniques learnt at Dieppe were even of benefit to the fighting in the Pacific.

Dieppe was never intended or executed as a permanent landing. it was always a probing attack, to test defences and learn fom the experience. in this regard it was an outstanding success. it achieved the strategic aims it was designed to do, but at great cost.

I have great doubts that from 4.50 AM to 10.50 AM at one day so much can be learned! I have no doubt that there were some interesting informations but I have a major problem that you sell the operation as great success from the learning viewpoint!
There were more then one chances to achieve such a learning experience under much better conditions and as I said I have my doubts that that much can be learned in six hours of fighting and reaction. Do you have primary sources for this claim?

Also I think that all other landings had a much more learning experience then Dieppe, because nothing of the original plan was achieved, and Dieppe proved that the allied had not the military freedom to initiate such a military action, because they hadn't the air superiority and the whole plan ended in a disaster!

Im not claiming the LW was driven from the sky, or that they were not capable of inflicting heavy losses. But look up what the meaning of air superiority is. The Germans didnt have it, not in 1940, not in 1941, certainly not in 1942. The British didnt have it in 1940, many claim that they had achieved it by 1941, but more say by 1942.

To all my books all said at 1941 and 1942 it was equal, so who claimed the FC air superiority at the english channel at 1942?

Air superiority has little to do with losses. It has mostly to do with control....what can be done and what cannot. Amphibious asault is generally seen as impossible if the enemy holds air superiority. It can be undertaken if the air control state is neutral, but its best to have control of the air to maximise success of the operation. Thats one of the main reasons why the japanese did not undertake any further amphibs after August 1942, and why the germans did not undertake any amphibs except in the baltic, after 1940 (and in the baltic they were unsuccessful in 1944, though they did succeed in '41)

To come back to this, for me Crete was also a partly a amphib landing and at this time, to me, the german LW had air superiority and the landing of Crete was a success with very heavy losses but the FC was miles away from this air superriority at 1942 at the english channel, so Dieppe was a full disaster.

I was mostly referring to the air losses, but in the context of what the operation set out to do, and what it did achieve, it was successful. it was never going to be cheap, but what it achieved saved more lives than it cost.

As I said I have my doubts because I think the other operations did a lot more from the learning viewpoint to the allied then Dieppe!

Doomed perhaps. Certainly doomed. But suicidal no. Hitler was suicidal, but the Germans in the kettle were NOT suicidal and, DonL, you speak too glibly about the lives of your dead countrymen, IMHO . "Suicidal", indeed !!!!

Perhaps we have here a misunderstanding! I have not and would not ever say that the soldiers or the local commanders were suicidal, because most or all of them didn't knew the whole or parts of the plan and the action and most important not the capacity of the enemy.

But the persons who have fielded the plan of Dieppe knew the risks and the capacity of the enemy and at any serious military there are sand pit games and success estimations of an action.
So either the estimations were totaly/absolutely wrong or the soldiers lifes were totaly equal to the "important" people!
To me, if a military action is estimated as heavy failure from the beginning, but is initiated nevertheless, it is suicidal!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Gents, good conversation and information but let's try to get this back on topic.

 

[parsifal]

The best on-line definition on what constitutes air superiority 9as opposed to air parity, air denial or air supremacy) can be found at the following link.

Go to chapter 1, it gives a pretty good rundown on what air superiority is, and why the allies could claim it from 1941-2. The germans cannot. They can claim an air denial state, but they lacked the freedom that comes with air superiority to undertake a whole range of operations on the western front. That culminated with the Channel Dash, but the germans could never have undertaken a Dieppe. They lacked the air superiority to do that.

Anyway, here is the link. might be of help

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat

 

[parsifal]

In any event, and an attempt to get this back on topic, the claim that led to this fraccus was that the P-51 was not a very good airframe, or at least not better than any of its contemporaries. Debateable. then the claim was what would happen if the RAF had possessed an aircraft like the P-51 in 1942. To which my reply was...they would finish the job they started in 1941 a whole lot earlier.

This has raised clouds of dust from here to Berlin it seems. But I remain of the opinion that an aircraft like the P-51 in the hands of the RAF in 1941 would have had the same effect as it did in American hands in 1944. Nowhere safe for the LW to run and hide, so safe skies for them to train, an aircraft equal or superior to the very best they (the Germans could field at any time in the war. a war winner of strategic importance.

nothing in the foregoing discussions, with all its smokescreens and cabal sways me to an alternative view

For those wanting to learn a little more about the dieppe raid, i recommend the following link

http://www.combinedops.com/Dieppe.htm

 

[DonL]

In any event, and an attempt to get this back on topic, the claim that led to this fraccus was that the P-51 was not a very good airframe, or at least not better than any of its contemporaries. Debateable. then the claim was what would happen if the RAF had possessed an aircraft like the P-51 in 1942. To which my reply was...they would finish the job they started in 1941 a whole lot earlier.

This has raised clouds of dust from here to Berlin it seems. But I remain of the opinion that an aircraft like the P-51 in the hands of the RAF in 1941 would have had the same effect as it did in American hands in 1944. Nowhere safe for the LW to run and hide, so safe skies for them to train, an aircraft equal or superior to the very best they (the Germans could field at any time in the war. a war winner of strategic importance.

Under which definitions?

With an Allison single stage engine or a Rolls-Royce Merlin 45 ( Spitfire MK V engine) I have my doubts to this claim!
I see no advantage of such a P51 compare to the FW 190A, Bf 109F or Spitfire. Range isn't all if the counter aircrafts are better.
The Spitfire MK V had it's difficult troubles against the FW 190A and the Bf 109F and the P51 would be a lot more heavier then the Spitfire.

There would perhaps interactions at other frontlines (UDSSR, North Africa etc...), but the LW would react to such an aircraft, perhaps with one more JG at France from an other frontline. You can't do such a claim without the engine of the airframe and the estimated performance!

Edit:

You can't divide the airframe from the engines of the timeline!
For example a Tank 152 H or C, or a Fw 190D-9 would do nothing to the LW with a DB 601E, any Bf 109F or FW 190A would perform better.

I don't deny the claim of the airframe of the P51, but a certain airframe needs a proper engine to play all it's good parts, if the engine had not enough performance for the airframe, the aircraft will be outperformed from other aircrafts, where the airframe and engine match better.