Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Yes, the RAF would have loved to have a P-51 or equivalent in 1942, to extend the air superiority they had already gained (at such hig price) over Britain, the Channel and the channel coast in 1941-2. The Luftwaffe either refused battle except under the most favourable circumstances, or withdrew out of the range of FC. If FC had had a long range fighter like the P-51 in 1942, they could have finished the LW off in the west.
In 1943 when the P-51 began to be supplied as LL, the RAF could not get enough of them. There were no serious complaints about the type from any in the CW that used them.
What we are seeing here is the classic formula these guys always use....mix a little truth with a load of codswallop to jazz up the brew, and thereby increase its potency. that way more people will believe the basic lie
How did the late war DB605D perform at high altitude?
I think thats why they like me so muchParsifal - have you thought about the effect you have on tender ears when you 'tippy toe' around the point?
Made necessary by the repeated unansweerd attacks on the heavy ships based in the channel. If the allies did not posses air superiority the channel dash (a retreat made out by the german propaganda machine to look like a victory) would never have been neededLike channel dash?
Like Dieppe? Luftwafffe ordered the british where to land ? And then then run away ? Who shot down 120 british plsnes? Even if i used a little truth you used none.
Parsifal
The quality of historical accarancy and truth of your post is analog to your quality. Call me leier by the safety of your chair.Keep exchange likes with drgondog
Anyway, opposite opinion means leis for the anglosaxons. Time to retire.
The fact that the british could undertake a cross channel raid in 1942 is evidence of itself that they had won air superiority. without air superiority the operation could not be undertaken.
The losses at Dieppe are not as one sided as you suggest, but I will leave that to others to explain to you. Suffice it to say that it was evidence of the german ability to deny airspece. the allied evidence of air superiority was in their ability to undertake the operation in the first place, confident that the LW could not stop them
21 May 1944.
Erich Hartmann flying Me-109G near Bucharest.
Hartmann shot down two P-51s without difficulty then evaded the other 8 P-51s until his Me-109G ran out of fuel, forcing him to bail out.
And Chuck Yeager, among some other allied pilots, made "ace in a day" with the Mustang. Proves nothing. There were Wildcat pilots who shot down multiple zero's in one mission. There were Hurricane and P40 pilots that shot down more than 1 109 or 190's on a single mission.
If we are discussing airframes alone, the fact the Mustangs could fly from England and fight until the GERMANS ran out of fuel speak for itself.
With all respect, Dieppe was nothing more then a suicide commando what ended in a total disaster. I can't understand, with any military thinking, that Dieppe proved anything except it was a wrong plan at a wrong time.
Any suicide commando can be undertaken at any time!
At 1942 the FW 190A was introduced in numbers at the english channel and was called the butcher bird by the english counterparts and the FC had a very difficult time near the whole year 1942 to get something equal in the air. To all my books nobody had ever claimed a FC air superiority at 1942 of the english channel.
Sorry here I disagree fundamental from military viewpoint!
?The allied losses were 4359 men (1179 killed and 2190 prisoners, rest injured). The FC lost 119 fighters.
The Wehrmacht lost 311 men and 280 injured. The LW lost 29 fighters and total 74 aircrafts (40 bombers). From this 74 aircrafts were 48 total losses.
If this isn't one sided, what is in your opinion one sided
It was not seen as a commando attack and whilst it proved suicidal, its purpose was partly to act as a sop to Stalin and demonstrate to him that a cross channel attack impractical. Sacrificing 5000 Allied lives (mostly Canadian) saved tens of thousands of others. It proved that a direct attack onto a defended port or coast was indeed suicide, and led to a whole range of changes to amphibious assaults that followed. most notably a massive increase in gunfire support, the allocation of specific direct fire support ships (usually DDs) that acted as a rapid response unit for individual formations on shore (usually of battalion size). This experience, and that gained during the TORCH landings greatly reduced the casualty rates in the larger operations that followed, such as GHusky, Neptune/Overlord and Dragoon. The techniques learnt at Dieppe were even of benefit to the fighting in the Pacific.
Dieppe was never intended or executed as a permanent landing. it was always a probing attack, to test defences and learn fom the experience. in this regard it was an outstanding success. it achieved the strategic aims it was designed to do, but at great cost.
Im not claiming the LW was driven from the sky, or that they were not capable of inflicting heavy losses. But look up what the meaning of air superiority is. The Germans didnt have it, not in 1940, not in 1941, certainly not in 1942. The British didnt have it in 1940, many claim that they had achieved it by 1941, but more say by 1942.
Air superiority has little to do with losses. It has mostly to do with control....what can be done and what cannot. Amphibious asault is generally seen as impossible if the enemy holds air superiority. It can be undertaken if the air control state is neutral, but its best to have control of the air to maximise success of the operation. Thats one of the main reasons why the japanese did not undertake any further amphibs after August 1942, and why the germans did not undertake any amphibs except in the baltic, after 1940 (and in the baltic they were unsuccessful in 1944, though they did succeed in '41)
I was mostly referring to the air losses, but in the context of what the operation set out to do, and what it did achieve, it was successful. it was never going to be cheap, but what it achieved saved more lives than it cost.
Doomed perhaps. Certainly doomed. But suicidal no. Hitler was suicidal, but the Germans in the kettle were NOT suicidal and, DonL, you speak too glibly about the lives of your dead countrymen, IMHO . "Suicidal", indeed !!!!
In any event, and an attempt to get this back on topic, the claim that led to this fraccus was that the P-51 was not a very good airframe, or at least not better than any of its contemporaries. Debateable. then the claim was what would happen if the RAF had possessed an aircraft like the P-51 in 1942. To which my reply was...they would finish the job they started in 1941 a whole lot earlier.
This has raised clouds of dust from here to Berlin it seems. But I remain of the opinion that an aircraft like the P-51 in the hands of the RAF in 1941 would have had the same effect as it did in American hands in 1944. Nowhere safe for the LW to run and hide, so safe skies for them to train, an aircraft equal or superior to the very best they (the Germans could field at any time in the war. a war winner of strategic importance.